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The Times
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE WAR
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VOL. IV.

THE HISTORY
DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE WAR
VOLUME IX

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The  Times

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY
OF THE WAR

VOLUME IV.

NAVAL—PART 2



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INTRODUCTION

"THE TIMES" DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE WAR is a collection of documents concerning the War in all its aspects, so arranged as to record the events of the great struggle in which the Nations are now involved, and the circumstances which led up to them.

It consists of documents issued officially or recognised by the various belligerents, such as diplomatic correspondence, proclamations, ultimatums, military orders, reports, despatches, messages from monarchs to their people, etc., together with public statements by responsible Ministers and Correspondence in the Press of an authoritative character; the whole collated, classified, indexed, and where necessary cross-referenced and annotated.

The documents are left to speak for themselves, except where brief unbiased notes are needed to elucidate them. These are placed within square brackets, to distinguish them from the notes in the originals.

The Times, with its network of Correspondents in all parts of the world, is in a particularly favourable position to obtain information, and, having at its service an experienced staff, is able to reach sources not generally accessible to others.

As the large mass of documents involved in the collection has been systematically classified and arranged from the commencement of the War, it has been found possible to issue to the public simultaneously a representative series of volumes.

INTRODUCTION

A survey of the constantly accumulating material would appear to indicate that *The Times* DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE WAR will be grouped into at least five main divisions :—

I. DIPLOMATIC.

II. NAVAL.

III. MILITARY.

IV. OVERSEAS, comprising documents dealing with events in the Dominions and Possessions Overseas and in enemy territories not included in the first three divisions.

V. INTERNATIONAL LAW, including documents relating to the Laws of War, the Proceedings of Prize Courts, etc.

Each division will appear in its own distinct set of volumes.

PREFACE

This is the second volume of the Naval division of *The Times* DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE WAR, and the fourth of the whole work. The general scheme of the work and its distribution into a series of separate divisions is outlined in the foregoing Introduction. It has not, however, always been found possible to maintain a clear-cut distinction between the several divisions—Diplomatic, Naval, Military, and so forth, there indicated. A certain degree of cross-division is inherent in the nature of the work, since the naval events to be recorded and the questions of policy and acts of State of which they are the outcome and the manifestation are sometimes diplomatic, sometimes military, and so forth, as well as naval in character. Some illustrations of these characteristics are to be found in the present volume, and will probably not be infrequent in succeeding volumes of the several divisions; but they need not here be specified in detail, since the inclusion in the naval volume of documents not exclusively naval in character will generally be found to explain itself, as in the case of the official papers relating to “Operations in the Persian Gulf and in Mesopotamia” (see pages 172–192, and pages 360–402 of the present volume). One case in particular must, however, be mentioned since it is in some respects an exceptional one. The official “Correspondence respecting events leading to the rupture of relations with Turkey” (pages 34–172 of the present volume) is manifestly a series of documents illustrative of the Diplomatic History of the War, and must, therefore, as such, of course be given *in extenso* in the Diplomatic division of this History. But, apart from its diplomatic character, the Correspondence was found on examination to contain a copious and unique record of naval events and naval issues of great moment organically embedded in its text, and for this reason it has been deemed advisable to give the text *in extenso* in this

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volume also. On the other hand the Diplomatic division contains also *in extenso* the text of a second Orange Book issued by the Russian Government in illustration of the same topics. The text of the Russian Correspondence has not, however, been given in the present volume. It adds little or nothing of importance from a naval point of view to the information to be obtained from the British Correspondence here given, and it has therefore seemed sufficient to refer the student to the text of the Russian Correspondence as given in the Diplomatic division.

For convenience of reference an explanatory list of the abbreviations used in the margin of this volume to indicate sources of information is here appended:—

- (1) *C.O.* = COMMUNIQUÉS OFFICIELS. These are extracted and translated by permission from a French publication entitled “*Nos Marins et la Guerre*,” belonging to the well-known series of “*Pages d'Histoire*” (Paris and Nancy, Librairie Militaire Berger-Levrault), and containing, amongst other matter of a less official character, the official communications of the French Ministry of Marine.
- (2) *D.N.S.B.* = DUTCH NORTH SEA BOOK, an official publication of the Netherlands Government entitled “*Diplomatieke Bescheiden betreffende de Vaart in de Noordzee en het Kanaal in Verband met den Oorlogstoestand*” (s' Gravenhage—Algemeene Landsdrukkerij—1915). The correspondence extracted from this publication and cited in the present volume is given, in the original, in English as regards the English despatches, and in French as regards the Dutch. The latter have been translated.
- (3) *D.R.* = “*DAILY REVIEW*” of the Foreign Press, issued by the General Staff, War Office. By the

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
courtesy of the War Office, copies of this publication have been supplied to the Editors of this History.

- (4) *K.D.* = KRIEGS-DEPESCHEN, a German serial publication entitled "Kriegs-Depeschen, nach den amtlichen Berichten des W.T.B. (*i.e.*, the Wolff Telegraphic Bureau) zusammengestellt" (Boll u. Pickardt, Verlagsbuchhandlung, Berlin). This serial is largely, but not entirely, identical with that next to be described, and most of the extracts common to both have been taken from the latter. In all cases they have been translated.
 - (5) *K.V.* = KRIEGSVERLAUF, another German serial, entitled "Der Kriegsverlauf, Sammlung der amtlichen Nachrichten von den Kriegsschauplätzen, Depeschen des Deutschen Grossen Hauptquartiers, des Österreichischen Generalstabes, des Türkischen Hauptquartiers, Meldungen von W.T.B., Urkunden und Berichte" (Carl Heymanns Verlag in Berlin W.8. Mauerstrasse, 43, 44). It is more copious than "*K.D.*" and has, therefore, commonly been used in preference.
 - (6) *L.G.* = THE "LONDON GAZETTE."
 - (7) *P.B.* = THE PRESS BUREAU, which it is unnecessary to describe.
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NOVEMBER.

THE ACTION OFF CORONEL.

THE Secretary of the Admiralty issued the following *Times*, statement early this morning : Nov. 5,

Rumours and reports have been received at the Admiralty ^{1914.} from various sources of a naval action having taken place off the Chilian coast.

The Admiralty have no official confirmation of this, and such accounts as they have received rest admittedly on German evidence.

It is reported that the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig*, *Dresden*, and *Nürnberg* concentrated near Valparaiso, and that an engagement was fought with a portion of Admiral Cradock's squadron on Sunday, November 1st.

The German report asserts that the *Monmouth* was sunk and the *Good Hope* very severely damaged. The *Glasgow* and the armed auxiliary cruiser *Otranto* broke off the action and escaped.

The Admiralty cannot accept these facts as accurate at the present time, for the battleship *Canopus*, which had been specially sent to strengthen Admiral Cradock's squadron, and would have given him a decided superiority, is not mentioned in them, and, further, although five German ships concentrated in Chilian waters, only three have come into Valparaiso harbour. It is possible, therefore, that, when full accounts of the action are received, they may considerably modify the German version.

Effective measures have been taken to deal with the situation in any event.

Valparaiso, November 4. ibid.

The following account of the naval battle in the Pacific is given by Admiral von Spee, commanding the German

squadron, to the Chilian authorities. Four German cruisers, including the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*, fought on Sunday shortly before night the English cruisers *Good Hope*, *Monmouth*, *Glasgow*, and *Otranto*.

The fight lasted about an hour and ceased at dark.

The *Good Hope* was damaged to such an extent that she was obliged to fly, protected by the darkness. An explosion was seen between the funnels. The *Monmouth* attempted to fly, followed by a small German cruiser.

The *Monmouth* sank after various shots. It was unfortunately impossible to lower any boats, owing to the storm. It is supposed that the *Glasgow* and the *Otranto* suffered small damage and escaped in the darkness owing to their high speed. The German ships did not suffer any serious damage. The *Gneisenau* had two men slightly wounded.

The fight took place near Santa Maria Island off Coronel. The above report is the only news available. Up to date there is no news of the *Glasgow*, *Good Hope*, or *Otranto*. It is anticipated that all the crew of the *Monmouth* are lost. The German officers bear testimony to the great gallantry of the crew of the *Monmouth*, which while in a sinking condition attempted to ram one of the German vessels. The *Gneisenau*, *Scharnhorst*, and *Nürnberg*, which are still at Valparaiso and show small signs of damage, sail to-day. It is reported that outside are the *Leipzig* and *Dresden*, and four armed transports.

The universal opinion is that the German squadron was always well provided with wireless information, whilst the contrary was the case with the English squadron.

The mail steamer *Oronsa* arrived this morning accompanied by a Chilian torpedo-boat, safe, thanks to her observance of the three-mile limit. The mail steamer *Orcoma* was retained at Coronel.

The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement :

November 6.

The Admiralty have now received trustworthy information about the action on the Chilian coast.

During Sunday, November 1st, the *Good Hope*, *Mon-*

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mouth, and *Glasgow* came up with the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig*, and *Dresden*. Both squadrons were steaming south in a strong wind and considerable sea. The German squadron declined action until sunset, when the light gave it an important advantage.

The action lasted an hour. Early in the action both the *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* took fire, but fought on until nearly dark, when a serious explosion occurred on the *Good Hope*, and she foundered.

The *Monmouth* hauled off at dark making water badly, and appeared unable to steam away. She was accompanied by the *Glasgow*, who had meanwhile during the whole action fought the *Leipzig* and *Dresden*. On the enemy again approaching the wounded *Monmouth*, the *Glasgow*, who was also under fire from one of the armoured cruisers, drew off. The enemy then attacked the *Monmouth* again, with what result is not definitely known.

Glasgow is not extensively damaged, and has very few casualties. Neither *Otranto* nor *Canopus* was engaged.

Reports received by the Foreign Office from Valparaiso state that a belligerent warship is ashore on the Chilian coast, and it is possible that this may prove to be the *Monmouth*. Energetic measures are being taken on this assumption to rescue any survivors.

The action appears to the Admiralty to have been most gallantly contested, but in the absence of the *Canopus* the enemy's preponderance of force was considerable.

Berlin, November 6.

According to an announcement by the English Official K.V. Press Bureau the English armoured cruiser *Monmouth* was destroyed and the armoured cruiser *Good Hope* severely damaged by our Cruiser Squadron near the Chilean coast. The small cruiser *Glasgow* escaped in a damaged condition. S.M. large cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and S.M. small cruisers *Nürnberg*, *Leipzig* and *Dresden* were present, and do not appear to have suffered.

BEHNCKE.
Acting Chief of Admiral Staff.

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Times,
Nov 9,
1914.

The German official war news contains the following reference to the naval engagement off Valparaiso :

Admiral Cradock's fleet has been annihilated in the Pacific. On the German side the losses amounted only to a few wounded and the material damage to the ships was insignificant. This engagement is a striking contrast to the British vessels' coast-hunting exploits in search of German cruisers.

K.V.,
Nov. 14,
1914.

Berlin, November 14.

The following wireless despatch is to hand (*via* North America) from the Cruiser Squadron Commander concerning the naval battle off Coronel :

On November 1st S.M.S. *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig* and *Dresden* met the English cruisers *Good Hope*, *Monmouth*, *Glasgow* and *Otranto* off Coronel. S.M.S. *Nürnberg* was detached during the fight. In a heavy seaway, firing was opened at long range, and the fire of the hostile ships was silenced in fifty-two minutes ; firing ceased after dark had set in. The *Good Hope*, which was heavily damaged by gun-fire and an explosion, was lost to sight in the darkness. The *Monmouth* was met by the *Nürnberg* as she was escaping. She was already severely damaged, and capsized on being fired at again. It was not possible to save the crew, on account of the heavy sea and lack of boats. The *Glasgow* escaped apparently slightly damaged. The auxiliary cruiser fled out of the action after the first shot struck her. On our side we had no losses, and no damage to speak of.

BEHNCKE.

Acting Chief of Admiral Staff.

November 23.

The Secretary of the Admiralty communicates following report from H.M.S. *Glasgow* (Captain John Luce, R.N.) concerning action off the Chilian coast :

Glasgow left Coronel at 9 a.m. on November 1st to rejoin *Good Hope* (flagship), *Monmouth*, and *Otranto* at rendezvous. At 2 p.m. flagship signalled that apparently from wireless calls there was an enemy ship to northward. Orders were given

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for squadron to spread N.E. by E. in the following order : *Good Hope*, *Monmouth*, *Otranto*, and *Glasgow*, speed to be worked up to 15 knots. 4.20 p.m., saw smoke ; proved to be enemy's ships, one small cruiser and two armoured cruisers. *Glasgow* reported to Admiral, ships in sight were warned, and all concentrated on *Good Hope*. At 5.0 p.m. *Good Hope* was sighted.

5.47 p.m., squadron formed in line ahead in following order : *Good Hope*, *Monmouth*, *Glasgow*, *Otranto*. Enemy, who had turned south, were now in single line ahead, twelve miles off. *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* leading. 6.18 p.m., speed ordered to 17 knots, and flagship signalled *Canopus* : " I am going to attack enemy now." Enemy were now 15,000 yards away and maintained this range, at the same time jamming wireless signals.

By this time sun was setting immediately behind us from enemy position, and while it remained above horizon we had advantage in light, but range too great. 6.55 p.m., sun set, and visibility conditions altered, our ships being silhouetted against afterglow, and failing light made enemy difficult to see.

7.3 p.m., enemy opened fire 12,000 yards, followed in quick succession by *Good Hope*, *Monmouth*, *Glasgow*. Two squadrons were now converging, and each ship engaged opposite number in the line. Growing darkness and heavy spray of head sea made firing difficult, particularly for main deck guns of *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*. Enemy firing salvos got range quickly, and their third salvo caused fire to break out on fore part of both ships, which were constantly on fire till 7.45 p.m. 7.50 p.m., immense explosion occurred on *Good Hope* amidships, flames reaching 200 feet high. Total destruction must have followed. It was now quite dark.

Both sides continued firing at flashes of opposing guns. *Monmouth* was badly down by the bow and turned away to get stern to sea, signalling to *Glasgow* to that effect. 8.30 p.m., *Glasgow* signalled to *Monmouth* : " Enemy following us," but received no reply. Under rising moon enemy's ships were now seen approaching, and as *Glasgow* could render *Monmouth* no assistance, she proceeded at full speed to avoid destruction. 8.50 p.m., lost sight of enemy. 9.20 p.m., observed seventy-five flashes of fire, which was no doubt final attack on *Monmouth*.

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Nothing could have been more admirable than conduct of officers and men throughout. Though it was most trying to receive great volume of fire without chance of returning it adequately, all kept perfectly cool, there was no wild firing, and discipline was the same as at battle practice. When target ceased to be visible, gunlayers spontaneously ceased fire. The serious reverse sustained has entirely failed to impair the spirit of officers and ship's company, and it is our unanimous wish to meet the enemy again as soon as possible.

Times,
July 8,
1915.

Amsterdam, July 7.

The German newspapers publish Admiral Spee's report upon the battle of Coronel on November 1st, which has only just reached its destination. It says :

The squadron under my command, composed of the large cruisers *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, and the small cruisers *Nürnberg*, *Leipzig*, and *Dresden*, reached on November 1st a point about 20 sea miles from the Chilian coast in order to attack a British cruiser which, according to trustworthy information, had reached the locality on the previous evening. On the way to the spot the small cruisers were several times thrown out on the flanks to observe steamers and sailing ships.

At 4.15 p.m., the *Nürnberg*, which was detached on one of these missions, was lost sight of to the north-east, while the *Dresden* remained about 12 sea miles behind. With the bulk of the fleet I was about 40 miles north of Arauco Bay. At 4.17 p.m. there were sighted to the south-west at first two ships, and then, at 4.25 p.m., a third ship about 15 miles away. Two of them were identified as warships, and were presumed to be the *Monmouth* and *Glasgow*, while the third was evidently the auxiliary cruiser *Otranto*. They, too, seemed to be on a southerly course. The squadron steamed at full speed in pursuit, keeping the enemy four points to starboard. The wind was south, force 6, with a correspondingly high sea, so that I had to be careful not to be manœuvred into a lee position. Moreover, the course chosen helped to cut off the enemy from the neutral coast.

About 4.35 p.m. it was seen that the enemy ships were steering to the west, and I gradually changed my course to

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south-west, the *Scharnhorst* working up 22 knots, while the *Gneisenau* and the *Leipzig* slowed down. The enemy's numerous wireless messages were jammed as far as possible.

At 5.20 the arrival of another warship was reported, which took the head of the line and was identified as the *Good Hope*, the flagship of Rear-Admiral Cradock. The enemy ships now got into battle formation, hoisted their mast-head flags, and tried slowly to approach a southerly course. From 5.35 p.m. onwards I held to a south-westerly course and later to a southerly course, and reduced speed to enable my own ships to come up. At 6.7 both lines (*Dresden* about one mile astern), except the *Nürnberg*, which was at considerable distance, were on an almost parallel southerly course, the distance separating them being 135 hectomètres.

At 6.20, when at a distance of 124 hectomètres, I altered my course one point towards the enemy, and at 6.34 opened fire at a range of 104 hectomètres. There was a head wind and sea, and the ships rolled and pitched heavily, particularly the small cruisers on both sides. Observation and range-finding work was most difficult, the seas sweeping over the forecastles and conning towers, and preventing the use of some guns on the middle decks, the crews of which were never able to see the sterns of their opponents, and only occasionally their bows. On the other hand, the guns of the two armoured cruisers worked splendidly and were well served. At 6.39 the first hit was recorded in the *Good Hope*. Shortly afterwards the British opened fire. I am of opinion that they suffered more from the heavy seas than we did. Both their armoured cruisers with the shortening range and the failing light were practically covered by our fire, while they themselves, so far as can be ascertained at present, only hit the *Scharnhorst* twice and the *Gneisenau* four times. At 6.53, when at a distance of 60 hectomètres, I sheered off a point.

The enemy's artillery at this time was firing more slowly, while we were able to observe numerous hits. Among other things it was seen that the roof of the fore double turret was carried away and that a fierce fire was started in the turret. The *Scharnhorst* reckons thirty-five hits on the *Good*

Hope. As the distance, in spite of our change of course, had now decreased to 49 hectomètres, it was to be presumed that the enemy doubted the success of his artillery and was manœuvring for torpedo firing. The position of the moon, which had risen about six o'clock, favoured this manœuvre. At about 7.45, therefore, I gradually sheered off. In the meantime darkness had set in and the rangefinders in the *Scharnhorst* for the moment used the reflections of the fires which had broken out in the *Good Hope* to estimate the distances; gradually, however, rangefinding and observation became so difficult that we ceased fire at 7.26.

At 7.23 a great explosion was observed between the funnels of the *Good Hope*. So far as I could see, the ship did not fire after that. The *Monmouth* seems to have stopped firing at 7.20.

The small cruisers, including the *Nürnberg*, which came up in the meantime, were ordered by wireless at 7.30 to pursue the enemy and make a torpedo attack. At this time rain squalls limited the range of vision. The small cruisers were not able to find the *Good Hope*, but the *Nürnberg* came upon the *Monmouth*, which, badly damaged, crossed her bows and then tried to come alongside. At 8.58 the *Nürnberg* sank her by a bombardment at point-blank range. The *Monmouth* did not reply, but she went down with her flag flying. There was no chance of saving anybody owing to the heavy sea, especially as the *Nürnberg* sighted smoke, and believed that another enemy ship was approaching, which she prepared to attack. At the beginning of the fight the *Otranto* made off. The *Glasgow* was able to keep up her harmless fire longer than her consorts maintained theirs, and she then escaped in the darkness.

The *Leipzig* and the *Dresden* believe that they hit her several times. The small cruisers sustained neither loss of life nor damage. The *Gneisenau* had two slightly wounded. The crews went into the fight with enthusiasm. Every man did his duty and contributed to the victory.—*Reuter*.

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(From letters of Admiral Count von Spee, dated November 2nd and 3rd, 1914.)

Yesterday was All Saints' Day, and a lucky day for us. D.R., I was cruising with the squadron southwards along the coast Jan. 2, when I received intelligence that an English cruiser had put ¹⁹¹⁷ in to Coronel, a small coaling harbour near Concepcion. As a warship cannot stay longer than twenty-four hours in a neutral port, I determined to intercept her. I placed my ships so that *Nürnberg* should run past the entrance to the harbour to see if the enemy ship was still in there, while my other ships waited much farther out. At 4.25 my squadron was somewhat spread out when it was reported that two ships had been sighted to the west-south-west.

Ordering the other ships to join me, I held in that direction, for it was evident that they must be enemy ships—in fact, the *Monmouth* and *Glasgow*. Soon afterwards the auxiliary cruiser *Otranto* appeared, and then a little later the armoured cruiser *Good Hope*. The enemy attempted some manœuvres with the object, I believe, of getting nearer to the coast and thence to windward, which would have been very harmful to me.

I immediately ordered *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* to get all their boilers to work, and in fifteen minutes I was running at twenty knots against a heavy sea, and got parallel to the enemy, but had to await the other ships. The enemy was so obliging as not to disturb me in this undertaking; the distance between us was then about nine miles.

When my ships—except the *Nürnberg*, which was nowhere in sight—had come up at ten minutes past six, I began to diminish the distance. And when we were about five miles off I ordered the firing to commence. The battle had begun, and, with a few changes, of course, I led the line quite calmly.

I had manœuvred so that the sun in the west could not disturb me. The moon in the east was not yet full, but promised a bright night. There were scuds of rain in various directions.

My ships fired rapidly and with success against the big ships. *Scharnhorst* engaged *Good Hope* (Admiral Cradock's

flagship), *Gneisenau* fired on the *Monmouth*, *Leipzig* against *Glasgow*, and the *Dresden* against *Otranto*. The last-named ship left the line after a time ; and, I believe, escaped.

Fires broke out on *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*. There was a tremendous explosion on the former, which looked like a splendid firework display against the dark sky. The glowing white flames, mingled with bright green stars, shot up to a great height. I made sure that the ship would sink, but no, she was still afloat, and the fight went on uninterruptedly.

Meanwhile it had become dark ; I had diminished the distance between us to 4,500 metres ; then I turned outward so that it gradually increased. The enemy's ships could only be made out by the fires, but the cannonade was kept up against them, and only ceased when the gunners could no longer take aim. The enemy fire had ceased, and I ordered the small cruisers to take up the pursuit. But as it seemed that he had succeeded in extinguishing the fires on board, no trace of him could be found, and steaming round the enemy's line in order to get it into a favourable light brought no further result. The artillery battle had lasted fifty-two minutes.

At 8.40 p.m. I was on a north-west course, and heard artillery fire in front at a very great distance (estimated at nine to ten miles). I made towards it to help if necessary. It came from the *Nürnberg*, which had failed to get into touch with us, and had accidentally fallen in with the *Monmouth* in flight. The latter listed heavily to starboard. *Nürnberg* went close up (*ging dicht heran*) and finished her off with gun-fire. *Monmouth* turned over and went down.

Unfortunately the heavy sea rendered rescue work impossible, added to which *Nürnberg* thought she had seen *Good Hope* in the vicinity—an assumption which was doubtless incorrect. Probably in the moonlight, at a great distance, she mistook one of our cruisers for the *Good Hope*. I do not know what became of the latter. Lieutenant G., who had opportunity for observation, believed that she, too, had a heavy list ; and, when I recall the incidents, I am inclined to think he was right, although during the battle I believed it to have been an appearance caused by the movements of

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the ship in a heavy sea. It is quite possible that she sank ; in any case she was completely disabled. The *Glasgow* could hardly be seen ; it is supposed that she got hit, too, but in my opinion she made good her escape.

Thus we were victorious along the whole line, and I thank God for the victory. We have been protected in an absolutely marvellous manner ; we have no losses to mourn. There were a few cases of slightly wounded on *Gneisenau* ; the small cruisers did not get a single hit, while the hits scored on *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* have inflicted hardly any damage at all. I found one 15-centimetre shell in a store-room on the *Scharnhorst* ; it had come through an unarmoured spot, broken a lot of things, but fortunately had not exploded and lay there as a kind of greeting. One funnel was hit, but not so badly as to prevent it performing its functions. Similar trivialities occurred on *Gneisenau*.

I do not know what unfortunate circumstances could have prevailed with our opponent which deprived him of any and every success. The enthusiasm among our men is enormous. I was especially pleased that the *Nürnberg*, which through no fault of her own took no part in the battle itself, was still able at the end to contribute to our success.

If *Good Hope* has escaped, then in my opinion she will be compelled by her injuries to put into a Chilian harbour. In order to find out I am going to-morrow with *Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg* into Valparaiso. Should the *Good Hope* have sought refuge there I shall endeavour to have her disarmed and interned by the Chilian authorities, and shall be then rid of two strong opponents.

Good Hope is bigger than *Scharnhorst*, but her artillery is not so powerful. It is true she has heavy guns, but only two of them. *Monmouth*, on the other hand, is inferior to the *Scharnhorst*, as she had only 6-inch guns. The English have another ship out here like the *Monmouth*, and, as it would seem further, a ship of the line (*Queen* class) with 30·5-centimetre guns. Against the latter we could hardly do anything at all. If the English had kept their forces together then we should certainly have got the worst of it.

You can hardly imagine the joy which prevails amongst

us. At least we have been able to add to the glory of our arms, even if it may have little significance for the whole, and in view of the enormous number of English ships.

November 3, 1914.

We arrived at Valparaiso this morning. Legation Secretary von Erckert and Consul Gumprecht came on board. The news of our naval victory had not preceded us, but it very soon spread. On landing to visit the chief of the station there was a huge crowd round the landing stage, while groups here and there shouted "Hurrah!" Of course, the Germans wanted to have a big celebration, a proposal which I absolutely refused; but under pressure I paid a visit to the German club and spent an hour and a half there.

[The foregoing extract is taken from the official publication entitled "*Daily Review* of the Foreign Press, issued by the General Staff, War Office." The original source of the extracts is indicated by the *Daily Review* of January 2nd, 1917, as follows:—"Vice-Admiral Kirchhoff has collected a volume of narratives of naval actions by German sailors and published them in a volume entitled 'Der Seekrieg, 1914-1915.' The extracts are taken from a translation by Dr. Thomas F. A. Smith in the *Journal of the Royal United Service Institution*, November, 1916."]

House of Commons.

Hansard,
Feb. 8,
1915.

MR. FALLE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he is aware that five men of His Majesty's Ship *Good Hope* were landed on a rock or islet in the Pacific previous to the naval engagement in which that ship was sunk; and if he will give the names of these men?

MR. CHURCHILL: One acting warrant officer and four men had been landed from the *Good Hope* before she was lost. Their relatives were informed of their safety shortly after the loss of the ship was made public, but it is not proposed to publish their names.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL RUSSIA ON TURKISH HOSTILITIES

(Official.)

Petrograd, November 1.

THE Berlin and Vienna agencies have issued communiqués *Times*, asserting that the Russian Fleet began hostilities against a Turkish squadron (*see* Part I., pp. 364-366). This statement is a gross invention, evidently intended to mislead public opinion in Constantinople, which is carefully kept in ignorance of the treacherous attack on our coast by Turkish vessels commanded by German officers. The same method was adopted when Germany declared war on us, she justifying it by stating that German territory had been invaded by Russian soldiers, whereas not a single Russian soldier had crossed the frontier before war was declared. Nov. 2,
1914.

Now, as then, our Fleet committed no hostile act before Turkey opened hostilities against our Fleet, and it is evident that if the initiative had come from the Russian Fleet the bombardment of our ports and the sudden attack by the Turkish Fleet could not have taken place.—*Reuter*.

ARREST OF ENEMY RESERVISTS.

Foreign Office, November 1, 1914.

IN view of the action taken by the German forces in *L G.* Belgium and France of removing, as prisoners of war, all persons who are liable to military service, His Majesty's Government have given instructions that all enemy reservists on board neutral vessels should be made prisoners of war.

THE ALLIED FLEETS AT CHESNE.

THE Imperial and Royal Telegraphic Correspondence *K.V.* Bureau at Vienna reports as follows under date November 2nd. According to trustworthy reports an Anglo-French fleet yesterday entered the Gulf of Chesne in Asia Minor with a view to attacking the small Turkish gunboat *Burak Reiss* and the steamer *Kinali Aga*. The Commander of the *Burak Reiss* sank the *Kinali Aga* in order to prevent her destruction by the enemy and then blew up his own vessel.

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NORTH SEA A "MILITARY AREA."

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THE Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement :

November 2.

During the last week the Germans have scattered mines indiscriminately in the open sea on the main trade route from America to Liverpool *via* the North of Ireland. Peaceful merchant ships have already been blown up with loss of life by this agency. The White Star liner *Olympic* escaped disaster by pure good luck. But for the warnings given by British cruisers, other British and neutral merchant and passenger vessels would have been destroyed. These mines cannot have been laid by any German ship of war. They have been laid by some merchant vessel flying a neutral flag which has come along the trade route as if for the purposes of peaceful commerce and, while profiting to the full by the immunity enjoyed by neutral merchant ships, has wantonly and recklessly endangered the lives of all who travel on the sea, regardless of whether they are friend or foe, civilian or military in character.

Mine-laying under a neutral flag and reconnaissance conducted by trawlers, hospital ships, and neutral vessels are the ordinary features of German naval warfare. In these circumstances, having regard to the great interests entrusted to the British Navy, to the safety of peaceful commerce on the high seas, and to the maintenance within the limits of International Law of trade between neutral countries, the Admiralty feel it necessary to adopt exceptional measures appropriate to the novel conditions under which this war is being waged.

They therefore give notice that the whole of the North Sea must be considered a military area. Within this area merchant shipping of all kinds, traders of all countries, fishing craft, and all other vessels will be exposed to the gravest dangers from mines which it has been necessary to lay, and from warships searching vigilantly by night and day for suspicious craft. All merchant and fishing vessels of every description are hereby warned of the dangers they encounter by entering this area except in strict accordance with Admiralty directions. Every effort will be made to convey this warning to

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neutral countries and to vessels on the sea, but from November 5th onwards the Admiralty announce that all ships passing a line drawn from the northern point of the Hebrides through the Faroe Islands to Iceland do so at their own peril.

Ships of all countries wishing to trade to and from Norway, the Baltic, Denmark, and Holland are advised to come, if inward bound, by the English Channel and the Straits of Dover. There they will be given sailing directions which will pass them safely, so far as Great Britain is concerned, up the East Coast of England to Farn Island, whence a safe route will, if possible, be given to Lindesnaes Lighthouse. From this point they should turn north or south according to their destination, keeping as near the coast as possible. The converse applies to vessels outward bound. By strict adherence to these routes the commerce of all countries will be able to reach its destination in safety, so far as Great Britain is concerned, but any straying, even for a few miles, from the course thus indicated, may be followed by fatal consequences.

TURKEY AND THE WAR.

(French Official Statement.)

Bordeaux, November 2.

AN official statement was issued to the Press to-day *Times*, dealing with the departures from neutrality by the Ottoman Government and announcing the rupture of diplomatic relations. After citing the facts mentioned in the statement of the British Foreign Office with reference to the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, and the increasing number of German officers in Turkey, and referring to the acts of war committed in the Black Sea, the communiqué proceeds :

The Russian and French Governments, in concert with the British Government, being willing to hope that these acts were imputable to the initiative of German officers, who attempted to usurp the authority due to the Ottoman command, proposed to the Sublime Porte that it should dissociate its policy from that of the Berlin Cabinet, dismissing imme-

diately all the German officers employed in the Ottoman service.

Following a meeting of the Grand Council of the Turkish Government and the Committee of Union and Progress, held on the evening of the 30th, the Turkish Government confined itself to proposing to the Ambassadors of the Triple Entente the recall of the Turkish warships in the Dardanelles, and expressed a desire to remain at peace with the Cabinets of Russia, France, and Great Britain; but in default of the dismissal of the German officers in the Ottoman service the Governments of the Triple Entente could not hope that Turkey would be able to maintain the passive attitude which she offered. It was evident that Germany, after having provoked a rupture, would take full advantage of it. Moreover, the proposals of the Ottoman Government had for the Governments of the Triple Entente the same disadvantages as an open war, since they obliged them to divert a part of their forces to guard themselves against an aggression which it was no longer permissible to consider as an imaginary peril.

The Ottoman Government not having thought it its duty to give, by dismissing the German officers, the mark of the sincerity of its intentions which was requested of it, the three Ambassadors of Russia, France, and Great Britain, in conformity with the instructions of their Governments, demanded their passports from the Grand Vizier. This step was taken on the morning of October 31st. Following on this diplomatic rupture, the Ambassadors left Turkey.

News received from Algeria, Tunisia, and Morocco following the Turkish aggression proves that the Mussulman world in Northern Africa has very well understood the error and mistakes committed by the Sublime Porte in abdicating its sovereignty and the independence of a Mussulman Empire into the hands of Germany. It would appear that the Mussulman world intends in no degree to throw in its lot with the Turks and to compromise in so reckless a manner the Mussulman cause.

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Russian Official Statement.

On October 20th (November 2nd) the Russian Government published the following official communication :

"The report of the Berlin and Vienna telegraphic agencies, to the effect that our fleet opened hostile operations against the Turkish squadron, is a vulgar fiction having the palpable object of misleading public opinion at Constantinople. The latter is deliberately kept in ignorance respecting the treacherous attack effected on our coast by Turkish ships, under the guidance of German officers.

"The same method was practised by Germany on the declaration of war against us, which was justified by the alleged incursion of Russian troops into her territory, whereas not a single Russian soldier had crossed the neighbouring frontier before the declaration of war.

"In exactly the same way now, before the commencement of hostile movements by Turkey, the Russian fleet on its part did not undertake such movements.

"It is evident that if the initiative of attack had proceeded from the Russian fleet, the bombardment of the ports and the sudden raid of the Turkish fleet could not have ensued." [See p. 13.]

On October 26th (November 8th) the Naval General Staff reported the following particulars concerning the commencement of war operations in the Black Sea, which clearly show the mendacity of German and Turkish assertions to the effect that the initiative of attack belonged to the Russians.

"On October 15th (October 28th) the Black Sea fleet, after a sojourn at sea, returned to the roadstead of Sevastopol, having failed to meet any Turkish vessels at sea.

"At 5 a.m. on October 16th (October 29th) the commander of the Black Sea fleet received from Odessa a report in which it was stated that at 3 a.m. two Turkish torpedo-boats, having distinguishing lights and Russian flags, entered the harbour; the words of command on the torpedo-boats were loudly pronounced in Russian. Nevertheless, the gunboat *Kubanetz*, which was on guard duty in the harbour, not receiving a recognisable signal from the incoming torpedo-boats, immediately opened fire. Another gunboat, the *Donetz*, which was also lying in the harbour, had no time to fire a single shell, inasmuch as she was sunk by the first

torpedo discharged by the Turks. The enemy torpedo-boats, shelled by the *Kubanetz*, retreated and put to sea at full speed, the smokestack on one having been dismantled. In retiring they fired on and caused inconsiderable damage to the *Kubanetz* and the merchant vessels lying near, and also damaged one of the shore petroleum cisterns.

"On receipt of the message from Odessa, the commander of the fleet reported to the shore batteries of Sevastopol the discovery of Turkish ships in the Black Sea and made arrangements to send out a trawling squadron for the customary examination of the outlets to the open sea prior to the departure of the fleet from the roadstead, as an indispensable precaution against possible enemy floating mines.

"About 6.30 a.m. in a fog the cruiser *Goeben* approached Sevastopol from the north of Eupatoria and opened fire. The shore batteries and ships near the outlet answered with an energetic fire the *Goeben*, whose cannonade of the roadstead proved unsuccessful; several shells fell in the town without causing any considerable damage, or human casualties. One shell fell in the coal stores, another struck the railway track, and the fragments of one, which burst near the naval hospital building, killed two patients and wounded five privates.

"At the same time a patrol division of torpedo-boats, under command of Captain Prince Trubetskoi, openly attacked the *Goeben*. The enemy's strong fire which met this attack did not permit it to continue; a large hole was made in the torpedo-boat *Leitenant Puschin* and fire broke out on board.

"The cannonade of the *Goeben* continued about twenty minutes, after which the enemy cruiser went out to sea.

"On the way from Sevastopol the *Goeben* sighted the transport *Prut* returning, and veering towards her, signalled her to surrender. In reply to this the *Prut*, which had no artillery armament, ran up war flags, directed her course towards the shore, and the commander, opening the Kingstons and blowing up the bottom with an explosive cartridge, sank the transport. In preparing the explosion of a second cartridge, Lieutenant Rogusky heroically perished together with the transport. A portion of the crew were saved in

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boats, hammocks and lifebelts, while a portion were picked up by the Turkish torpedo-boats escorting the *Goeben*.

"A trawling squadron, which suspended its labours during the bombardment, at the close of the firing finished the examination of the outlet from the roadstead, and thereafter the Black Sea fleet put out to sea in pursuit of the enemy, but the latter, avoiding an engagement, escaped to its base in the Bosphorus Straits.

"Our losses : on the transport *Prut*, perished two officers, a chaplain and twenty-six men ; on the torpedo-boat *Leitenant Puschin*, seven men were killed and seven wounded ; on the gunboat *Kubanetz* were wounded seven men, and on the gunboat *Donetz* a ship's doctor perished.

"As is now known, the Turkish plan contemplated simultaneously with the attack on Sevastopol and Odessa, the bombardment of other points of our coast ; the cruiser *Breslau* shelled Theodosia and the cruiser *Hamidieh* Novorossiisk."

TURKISH ACCOUNT OF SEA FIGHT IN THE BLACK SEA.

Vienna, November 3.

K.D.

ACCORDING to reports received here from the Turkish Ministry the sea fight in the Black Sea (*see* Part I., pp. 364-366) was much more serious than the first news led us to suppose. In the action the battleship *Torgud Reisz* distinguished herself especially. The success of the Turkish fleet can be estimated as follows : five Russian warships sent to the bottom and 19 transports sunk. The bombardment of the ports resulted in the destruction of 55 warehouses containing petroleum and corn, *i.e.*, 50 in Sebastopol and Novorossiisk and 5 in Odessa.

OPERATIONS IN GERMAN EAST AFRICA. THE TANGA DISASTER.

THE Secretary of State for India communicates the following regarding the military operations in East Africa.

Times,
Nov. 24,
1914.

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As regards East Africa, it appears from the latest information to hand that as an important German railway terminus was reported to be weakly held, a force was sent from British East Africa to seize it. On the evening of November 2nd one and a half battalions were landed within two miles of the place and at once advanced. This small force became heavily engaged just outside the town, but as the enemy were in much superior strength it was compelled to fall back and await reinforcements. At 11 a.m. on the 4th the attack was renewed. When within 800 yards of the position the troops engaged came under very heavy fire. On the left flank, in spite of heavy casualties, the 101st Grenadiers actually entered the town and crossed bayonets with the enemy. The North Lancashire Regiment and Kashmir Rifles, on the right, pushed on in support under very heavy fire, and also reached the town, but found themselves opposed by tiers of fire from the houses, and were eventually compelled to fall back to cover 500 yards from enemy's position.

The losses were so heavy and the position so strong that it was considered useless to renew the attack, and the force re-embarked and returned to its base to prepare for future operations. From recent reports just received the total casualties in this unsuccessful operation were 795, including 141 British officers and men. The wounded are mostly doing well, and many are convalescent. The above casualties were included in the statement recently made by Lord Crewe in the House of Lords.

ibid.

Speaking in the House of Lords on Wednesday (November 18th), the Marquess of Crewe said :

"No less than seven different actions had taken place in East Africa. Those operations had not taken place without considerable loss to ourselves. In one particular case an attack was made on a very strong position, which was powerfully met by the enemy with a number of guns and a machine gun. Very heavy casualties were suffered by our troops without achieving their purpose. The total casualties in all the operations in East Africa during two months amounted to something like 900."

Reports have now been received, of which the following

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is a summary, giving an account of the unsuccessful attack upon Tanga in German East Africa.

*The
Pioneer
Mail,
Dec. 18,
1914.*

The British Force, which included both British and Indian regular troops, as well as Imperial Service troops, sailed from Bombay in October last. It left Mombassa, its port of rendezvous, on a date previously arranged and arrived off Tanga, the place selected for a landing, at daylight on November 2nd. Tanga is an unfortified port and town in the north of German East Africa, some miles south of our border. As it was an open town and reported to be undefended by the enemy, it was apparently deemed right to give notice of the intention to occupy the place and to summon it to surrender before commencing a bombardment.

This honourable, perhaps somewhat too punctilious, action was largely responsible, as after events proved, for the failure of the attack, as Tanga is at the end of a line of railway which leads from one of the most settled districts of the interior, whence it was very easy to obtain help. The summons to surrender, made by H.M.S. *Fox*, the escorting warship, was refused by the German Governor of the town who, it appears, had already received news of the intended attack and energetically employed the respite thus afforded him in preparing the place for defence and in getting up reinforcements from the interior by rail.

Access to the locality selected for landing proved difficult, the navigation being somewhat intricate, and it was not until 4.30 p.m. on November 2nd that the first troops anchored within reach of the shore. To save time a battalion-and-a-half were landed by moonlight. The only landing place was a difficult one and it was after midnight when these troops got ashore. Patrols were at once sent out and at dawn the troops advanced on Tanga. They were met by a heavy rifle fire, but held their ground until the enemy, strongly reinforced, delivered a counter attack before which they were compelled to give ground until H.M.S. *Fox* opened fire on the enemy, who then hastily withdrew. Meanwhile further troops had been landed and the combined force securely entrenched a position to cover the landing of the remainder of the force.

Despite the great distance from the shore at which the transport had to anchor, the dangerous channels leading in and the lack of pilots, by 9 a.m. on November 4th all the

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infantry of the force were ashore. The enemy had made no attempt to molest the landing troops, having apparently suffered severely on November 2nd.

An immediate advance on Tanga was not ordered. Some indication of the extreme difficulty of this operation is afforded by the fact that, although the distance to Tanga was only one-and-three-quarter miles, it was two-and-a-half hours before our troops came under fire. The country was a mass of dense plantation in which it was seldom possible to see a hundred yards, and often not nearly so far. The handling of troops in such country naturally demanded continuous exposure of selves by the British officers, a fact to which the casualty list bears eloquent testimony.

Artillery support being almost impracticable owing to the density of the bush, it was decided to attack without waiting for the guns to be landed. The guns were accordingly left on board and fired from the deck of a transport in the outer harbour at such targets as could be made out. The advance was begun at noon and at 2.30 p.m. the troops came under a heavy fire from rifles and machine guns.

The 101st Grenadiers, making a fine effort to fill a gap in the firing line due to the difficulty of advancing in line through the dense bush, came under exceedingly heavy cross fire of rifles and machine guns, were unable to advance, but tenaciously held their own. The Loyal North Lancashire Regiment and the Kashmir Rifles on the right had meanwhile slowly gained ground and entered Tanga, to the outskirts of which they held on despite a heavy fire from the houses which had been loopholed and strongly prepared for defence. Unfortunately the somewhat extended disposal of the troops, due to the thick bush, rendered it impossible to support these regiments at the moment when efficient support might have enabled them to carry the town.

Darkness coming brought the action to a conclusion, after which our troops withdrew unmolested to an entrenched position a quarter-of-a-mile in the rear. In view of the extreme difficulty of the country in the vicinity of Tanga it was judged inadvisable to attempt a second attack without adequate reinforcements. Orders for embarkation were accordingly issued and this was carried out without any interference on the part of the enemy.

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It has transpired that the Germans had some 2,000 to 3,000 European troops in Tanga. Our troops had to move to the attack immediately they landed, after having been at sea a fortnight. This was necessary in order to give the enemy no time in which to reconnoitre and ascertain the strength of the attacking force. The attack had to be delivered over a most difficult country covered with dense bush. Every house in the town, which itself lies concealed in the bush, was prepared for defence, many with several tiers of loopholes, and the enemy possessed a large number of machine guns. It is no small credit to the troops who reached the town that they succeeded in doing so despite all these difficulties.

Among those that did particularly well may be mentioned the Loyal North Lancashire Regiment, the 101st Grenadiers and the Kashmir Rifles, the last named being of course Imperial Service troops.

Official reports from the Governor of German East *K.D.*, Africa are now to hand concerning the battle of Tanga, the Jan. 16, most important military event that has hitherto taken ¹⁹¹⁵ place on the soil of our colony. According to these reports the success was far more important than the English accounts had admitted. The actions took place on November 3rd, 4th and 5th. On November 2nd the English appeared before Tanga with two warships and twelve transports and demanded unconditional surrender, which was, however, refused by the Governor, Dr. Schnee. The ships then steamed away but appeared again on the third day before Tanga and landed one European and four Indian regiments, including some cavalry, with about eight machine and nine field guns, at Ras Kasone. Marines were also landed. The big naval guns from the cruiser *Fox* supported the enemy's attack from the sea. After three days of embittered fighting the enemy landing corps was beaten back with heavy losses to the enemy. On November 4th the fighting lasted for 15½ hours without interruption. The decisive fight against the whole of the enemy forces took place in the evening, notwithstanding a violent bombardment of the town by the enemy's naval guns. The fire from our guns set fire to one of the English transports. The cruiser *Fox* also received

serious hits. On the 6th the English ships withdrew towards the north. The landing forces amounted to about 8,000 men, while ours only amounted to 2,000 men. The losses of the English amounted to over 3,000 men killed, wounded and prisoners; our losses were unimportant; exact figures are to follow; a cursory computation shows the following booty: eight machine guns, 300,000 cartridges, 30 field telephones, over 1,000 woollen blankets, in addition to many rifles and articles of equipment and large quantities of provisions. The spirits of our victorious troops (Protectorate and police troops and volunteers from the Protectorate) were excellent; the Ascaris also displayed self-sacrificing devotion and heroism. The full extent of the far-reaching importance of the English defeat cannot yet be gauged even approximately from here.

K.D.,
Feb. 14,
1915.

In addition to the earlier news concerning the battle of Tanga the following is now reported: two warships and 14 transports arrived off Tanga on November 2nd. The summons to surrender the town unconditionally being refused, the ships sailed away again but landed troops during the night near Tanga. In a battle lasting three days from November 3rd to 5th the enemy troops composed of 8 companies of the North Lancashire Regiment and 8 Indian regiments were beaten with disastrous losses by our troops under Chief Lieutenant v. Lettow. The enemy left behind 150 English, and 600 Indians killed; many English and Indians were taken prisoner, 8 machine guns taken, many arms, munitions and provisions were captured; the ships sailed away with many wounded including 60 severely wounded and two lieutenants and a number of other officers who had pledged their word of honour not to fight against Germany again. Our losses are slight, 15 killed among whom Von Prince. During the bombardment of Tanga a number of houses were damaged.

The English troops which had penetrated into the German district near Kifumbiro to the West of the Victoria Lake, were thrown out of German territory by our troops under Major v. Stümer in November; English Kisiba was occupied. At present German East Africa is entirely clear of the enemy. Parties of German troops are on enemy territory in British East

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Africa and Uganda. Off the East African coast are the English cruisers *Chatham*, *Weymouth*, *Fox* and a few auxiliary cruisers.

Amsterdam, January 18, 1915.

An official telegram from Berlin states that the Emperor William has sent the following telegram from Main Headquarters to Dr. Solf, Secretary of State for the Colonies :

Your report of the brilliant victory near Tanga, in East Africa, has pleased me greatly. I heartily congratulate you upon this glorious deed of our colonial troops. Communicate my appreciation to all the brave men who, far from the Fatherland, decisively defeated an enemy four times their strength to the glory of the German name. The Fatherland is proud of its sons.

WILHELM I.R.

A Berlin telegram, reproducing an official report from the Governor of German South-West Africa, states that on November 24th "the open and undefended town of Swakopmund was bombarded by the English, after Captain —, the commander of the auxiliary cruiser —, had repeatedly threatened a bombardment."—*Reuter*.

DARDANELLES FORTS AND AKABA SHELLED.

THE following statements are issued by the Secretary of the Admiralty : *Times*,
Nov. 4,
1914.

A combined British and French squadron bombarded the Dardanelles forts at long range at daybreak on November 3rd.

The forts replied, but no ships were hit and the Allies suffered no loss, only one projectile falling alongside.

The material damage to the forts cannot be estimated, but a large explosion, accompanied by dense volumes of black smoke, occurred at Helles Fort.

On arrival at Akaba, H.M.S. *Minerva* (Captain Percival H. Warleigh) found the place in the occupation of soldiers, one of whom had the appearance of a German officer, and armed natives. The *Minerva* then shelled the fort and the troops. The town was evacuated, and a landing party proceeded to destroy the fort, the barracks, the post office, and the stores.

There was some loss to the enemy, but no British casualties.

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Constantinople.

Times,
Nov. 5,
1914.

According to later intelligence, the English warships *Inflexible*, *Indefatigable*, *Gloucester* and *Defence* and one of the two French ironclads *République* and *Bouvet*, together with two French cruisers and eight torpedo-craft, took part in the bombardment of the entrance to the Dardanelles. They fired 240 rounds. Nevertheless they inflicted no considerable damage. Our forts fired only ten rounds one of which hit an English armoured vessel causing an explosion therein.

Cairo, November 17.

Times,
Nov. 18,
1914.

The following official account of the attack on Akaba has just been published :

In consequence of a report received that mines had been sent to Akaba for laying in the Gulf of Akaba and possibly in the Red Sea, the cruiser *Minerva* was ordered to proceed to Akaba to investigate and stop any such action. On arriving at Akaba the captain found it occupied by a small detachment of troops. Negotiations for a surrender were attempted, but were frustrated by German officers present. The *Minerva* was compelled to open fire, confining her attack to the fort, the post office, and Government buildings.

Later a landing party reconnoitred in the direction of Wadi-el-Ithm, and only encountered a few armed men, who rapidly disappeared. The patrol returned to the town and re-embarked, after posting a proclamation inviting the inhabitants to return and assuring their safety. The town and wells were not damaged and there were no British casualties.

Constantinople.

K.V.,
Nov. 4,
1914.

The following official announcement is made from Headquarters : On November 1st, the English Fleet bombarded Akaba on the Egyptian frontier and made an attempt to land. But after four Englishmen had fallen the remainder threw themselves back into their boats. Although the English guns fired a thousand rounds only a single gendarme was killed on our side.

Constantinople.

K.V.,
Nov. 6,
1914.

Headquarters report officially that the English landed troops a second time at Akaba but were attacked by gen-

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darmes and native tribes. After an English officer had been killed the English threw away their ammunition and took to flight.

LOSS OF THE "D 5."

Admiralty, November 3, 1914.

EARLY this morning an enemy's squadron fired on the *Times*, *Halcyon*, a coastguard gunboat engaged in patrolling, with Nov. 4. the result that one man was wounded.

The *Halcyon* having reported the presence of these vessels, various naval movements were made, as a result of which they retreated rapidly, and although shadowed by the light cruisers they could not be brought to action before dusk.

The rearmost German cruiser, in retirement, threw out a number of mines, and submarine D 5 was sunk by exploding one of these. Two officers and two men who were on the bridge of the submarine, which was running on the surface, were saved.

Nothing else has happened during the day in home waters, except that the gunboat flotilla has been available in support of the Belgian left flank.

The Secretary of the Admiralty announces that the *Times*, following officer, petty officers, and men have, it is feared, Nov. 5, lost their lives owing to the sinking of H.M. Submarine D 5, 1914. by a mine on the 3rd inst. :

OFFICER.

Lieutenant Donald F. O'C. Brodie, R.N.

MEN.

Blunsdon, F. D., P.O., 1st Class, Portsmouth, 203087.

Boardman, W., Leading Seaman, Devonport, 237913.

Bradley, F., Acting Leading Stoker, Devonport, 302220.

Copland, W. J., E.R.A., 2nd Class, Devonport, 271454.

Crimp, G., Leading Seaman, Devonport, 217450.

Dowsett, W. R. C., Sig., Portsmouth, J. 8219.

Dunne, J., A.B., Devonport, J. 14090.

Houlcroft, E., E.R.A., 3rd Class, Chatham, M. 2924.

Ingham, T., Stoker, 1st Class, Devonport, K. 7494.

King, G. C., Telegraphist, Devonport, J. 5994.

Leake, J. R., Acting Leading Stoker, Portsmouth, 304084.

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Norris, A., Leading Seaman, Devonport, 187835.
Penhaligon, R. C., Stoker, 1st Class, Devonport, 223326.
Simmons, S. C. S., Stoker, 1st Class, Devonport, K. 1975.
Smith, A. C., Acting Chief, E.R.A., 2nd Class, Portsmouth,
270627.

Smith, T., Stoker P.O., Portsmouth, 344519.
Tilley, J. T. P., E.R.A., 3rd Class, Devonport, 272256.
Whiting, H., Stoker, 1st Class, Devonport, K. 7502.
Wilcox, E., A.B., Devonport, 222115.
Worth, E., Stoker, 1st Class, Devonport, K. 2292.
The following casualty has also been reported :

H.M.S. "HALCYON."

Died of Wounds : Scotney, H., A.B., S.S. 3063, Chatham.

Main Headquarters, Berlin, November 6.

K.V.

On November 3rd our large and small cruisers made an attack on the English coast at Yarmouth.

They bombarded the coast defences there and also some small vessels which lay at anchor and did not seem to expect an attack.

Strong English forces were not present to defend this important harbour. The English submarine D 5, which seems to have followed our cruisers, ran on a mine and sank ; this was announced by the English Admiralty.

VON POHL,

Chief of the Admiral Staff.

PASSAGE CLOSED BY ADMIRALTY.

November 4.

P.B.

THE Secretary of the Admiralty announces, in reply to numerous inquiries in regard to the freedom of the passage into the North Sea from the Great Minch and the Little Minch, that this passage into the North Sea will be closed in connection with the declaration of a proclaimed area under the Defence of the Realm Act.

ILLCIT WIRELESS.

THE Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement :

Many letters have been received from wireless amateurs

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throughout the country suggesting they should be permitted to use their apparatus for the detection of secret wireless stations. In considering this question, it must first of all be remembered that there are several thousands of holders of wireless licences, and since it is impossible to make distinctions, the rule must be all or none.

The successful detection of illicit wireless telegraphy stations depends on the careful collation of relevant observations, and it is obvious that a small and select body of observers can give much better results than a very large number who have not the necessary knowledge of the circumstances.

Illicit wireless telegraphy stations, to be dangerous must be capable of sending a considerable distance, and although it is true that reception can be carried out to some extent without a formal and visible aerial, yet transmission to any serious extent would be impossible.

Under the present rule, where all private stations are closed, any aerial seen to be hoisted must be either Government or illicit, a very great help to the police, who are saved all trouble of discrimination.

It is, therefore, to the common good that all known private stations should be closed and rendered reasonably incapable of being used.

JAPANESE SUCCESSES AT KIAO CHAU.

Tokyo.

IT is officially announced that the bombardment of Tsingtau *K.V.*, continues. Most of the German forts have been silenced. ^{Nov. 4,} Only two of them reply without intermission to the attacks ^{1914.} of the Allies by sea and land. The bombardment caused an outbreak of fire near the harbour and the explosion of an oil tank. The fort Siochausan is in flames. A German gunboat which lost its funnel is no longer to be seen.

Tokyo, November 4.

A Dispatch from Tsinanfu, Shantung, says that the *Times*, Japanese forces have captured 800 prisoners and destroyed ^{Nov. 5,} 26 guns. ^{1914.}

An official statement says it is believed that the Austrian

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cruiser *Kaiserin Elisabeth*, which was at Tsingtau when the siege began, has been deliberately blown up, and that the floating dock in Tsingtau Harbour has also been sunk. The bombardment continues.

The Japanese Foreign Office has issued an unequivocal denial of the reports said to emanate from the United States that a defensive alliance has been concluded between Japan and Russia. The communiqué said:

Surely it is unnecessary to state that the report is absolutely without foundation. It is only another glaring instance of German intrigue in America, seeking to stir up animosity and suspicion against Japan. A moment of serious consideration will convince the people of the United States that the story is too far-fetched to command attention, while the Japanese people will ignore this latest baseless *canard*.

Tokyo, November 5.

Times,
Nov. 6,
1914.

The following official announcement has been issued here :
The bombardment of Tsingtau is being vigorously continued.

On the night of November 3rd the Germans made a counter-attack in order to hinder our operations.

The power house has been destroyed. The attacking forces are gradually closing in, and our shells are now falling in the streets.

GERMAN HOSPITAL SHIP DETAINED.

Times,
Nov. 5,
1914.

THE Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement :

The German vessel *Ophelia*, flying the Red Cross flag, was detained because her name had not been notified to His Majesty's Government as a hospital ship in accordance with the requirements of the Convention, and at the time she was encountered she was behaving in a manner inconsistent with the duties of a hospital ship.

The vessel will be brought before the Prize Court in due course.

[The *Ophelia* was detained by H.M.S. *Meteor* on October 18th, 1914.]

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LOSS OF THE "YORCK."

Amsterdam, November 5.

THE German cruiser *Yorck* yesterday forenoon struck *Times*,
the chain of mines blocking the entrance to Jahde Bay and Nov. 6,
sank. 1914.

The latest reports say that up to the present 382 men—
more than half of the crew—have been saved. The work
of rescue has been rendered more difficult by a thick fog.

BEHNCKE.

Acting Chief of the Admiral Staff.—*Reuter.*

NOTIFICATION OF WAR WITH TURKEY.

NOTICE.

Foreign Office, November 5, 1914.

Owing to hostile acts committed by Turkish forces *L.G.*,
under German officers, a state of war exists between Great Nov. 5.
Britain and Turkey as from to-day. 1914.

BY THE KING.

A PROCLAMATION

EXTENDING TO THE WAR WITH TURKEY THE PROCLAMATIONS
AND ORDERS IN COUNCIL NOW IN FORCE RELATING
TO THE WAR.

WHEREAS, owing to hostile acts committed by Turkish *ibid.*
forces under German officers, a state of war now exists between
Us and the Sultan of Turkey ;

AND WHEREAS on the 4th day of August, 1914, a state
of war came into existence between Us and the German
Emperor ;

AND WHEREAS We did on the same date and on certain
other dates subsequent thereto issue certain Proclamations
and Orders in Council connected with such state of war ;

AND WHEREAS on the 12th day of August, 1914, a state
of war came into existence between Us and the Emperor of
Austria, King of Hungary ;

AND WHEREAS certain of the aforesaid Proclamations
and Orders in Council have since been extended so as to cover

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the state of war between Us and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary ;

AND WHEREAS it is desirable now to provide for the state of war between Us and the Sultan of Turkey ;

AND WHEREAS the Convention relating to the status of enemy merchant vessels at the outbreak of hostilities, signed at The Hague on the 18th October, 1907, has not been ratified by the Sultan of Turkey, and therefore We do not think fit to extend to Turkish ships the Order in Council issued on the 4th day of August, 1914, with reference to the departure from Our ports of enemy vessels, which at the outbreak of hostilities were in any such port or which subsequently entered the same :

NOW, THEREFORE, We have thought fit, by and with the advice of Our Privy Council, to issue this Our Royal Proclamation declaring, and it is hereby declared, as follows :

1. The Proclamations and Orders in Council issued with reference to the state of war between Us and the German Emperor, or with reference to the state of war between Us and the German Emperor and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary, other than the Order in Council issued on the 4th day of August, 1914, with reference to the departure from Our ports of enemy vessels, which at the outbreak of hostilities were in any such port, or which subsequently entered the same, shall, if still in force, apply to the state of war between Us and the Sultan of Turkey as from this 5th day of November, 1914.

2. The Proclamation issued on the 5th day of August, 1914, warning all Our subjects, and all persons resident or being in Our Dominions, from contributing to or participating in, or assisting in the floating of, any loan raised on behalf of the German Government, or from advancing money to or entering into any contract or dealings whatsoever with the said Government, or otherwise aiding, abetting, or assisting the said Government, shall be deemed as from this 5th day of November, 1914, to apply to all loans raised on behalf of, or contracts or dealings entered into with, or to aiding, abetting, or assisting the Ottoman Government.

3. The words " enemy country " in any of the Proclamations or Orders in Council referred to in Article 1 of this Proclamation shall include the Dominions of His Imperial

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Majesty the Sultan of Turkey other than Egypt, Cyprus, and any territory in the occupation of Us or Our Allies.

Constantinople.

The Porte publishes the text of an Imperial Iradé which *K.V.*, contains the Declaration of War. The Iradé says: "On ^{Nov. 12,} October 29th, at a time when the Ottoman Fleet was under-^{1914.}taking manœuvres in the Black Sea, a portion of the Russian Fleet, which as we learnt later had been set in motion in order to lay mines at the entrance of the Bosphorus, interrupted our manœuvres and advanced towards the Strait in prosecution of an act of hostility. The Imperial Russian Fleet began the action. Nevertheless the Ottoman Government, in view of this untoward event, approached the Russian Government and proposed to open an inquiry to elucidate the causes of the event, and in this wise to maintain its neutrality. In spite of this the Russian Government, without answering this invitation, withdrew its Ambassador and began hostilities, ordering its armed forces to cross the frontier at several points in the neighbourhood of Erzeroum. Meanwhile the English and French Governments recalled their Ambassadors and began effective hostilities including an attack of the English and French Fleets on the Dardanelles and the bombardment of Akaba by an English cruiser. Since these Powers have thus shown that they consider themselves in a state of war with the Ottoman Government, I, trusting in the support of the Almighty, now declare war on the aforesaid States." The Iradé is signed by the Sultan and all his Ministers.

Constantinople.

A proclamation of the Sultan to the Army announces a *ibid.* Holy War for all Mussulmans.

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CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING EVENTS LEAD-
ING TO THE RUPTURE OF RELATIONS
WITH TURKEY.

MISCELLANEOUS. No. 13 (1914). [CD. 7628.]

No. 1.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 3, 1914.*

TURKISH ships building in Great Britain.

Arrangements are being made with the firm of Armstrong, Whitworth, and Co. for His Majesty's Government to take over the Turkish battleship *Osman I.* now building with that firm.

Please inform Turkish Government that His Majesty's Government are anxious to take over the contract.

No. 2.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 3, 1914.*

GRAND VIZIER and Minister of the Interior spoke to me with some vexation of the detention of Turkish ship, which they seemed to consider an unfriendly act as Turkey is not at war. Minister of the Interior referred to the very heavy financial sacrifices by which this ship had been paid for with money borrowed at a rate amounting to interest at 20 per cent.

No. 3.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 4.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 4, 1914.*

GRAND VIZIER to-day renewed assurances that Turkey intends to observe strict neutrality. Mobilisation had been decided upon only because it would take months to complete, and because the Government wished not to be taken by surprise in case of aggression by Bulgaria, though they had also been alarmed by rumours of action by Russia—attributable, I think, to German Ambassador. Retention of German military mission meant nothing and had no political significance. He regarded them as Turkish employés

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who were doing good work, and, as they had offered to remain, it would have been ungracious to refuse.

No. 4.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 4, 1914.

YOUR telegram of August 3rd.¹

I am sure Turkish Government will understand necessity for His Majesty's Government to keep all warships available in England for their own needs in this crisis.

Financial and other loss to Turkey will receive all due consideration, and is subject of sincere regret to His Majesty's Government. You should inform Grand Vizier.

No. 5.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 7, 1914.

IF Turkey remains neutral and Egypt remains quiet, and should no unforeseen circumstances arise, His Majesty's Government do not propose to alter the status of Egypt.

A report has reached me that it is being alleged that the annexation of Egypt is under consideration by His Majesty's Government.

You should emphatically contradict this to the Turkish Government, and say that we have no intention of injuring Turkey, and you should add an assurance in the sense of the first paragraph.

No. 6.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 10.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 9, 1914.

AN official communiqué was recently published here which showed a distinctly hostile tone towards Great Britain. This communiqué dealt with the requisition of the Turkish warships by His Majesty's Government. The Grand Vizier has told me that Turkish Government had to pretend to the

¹ See No. 2.

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Turkish public, as the latter had subscribed towards the purchase money for the vessels, that they were taking a stronger line than really was the case. He said, however, that we should not attach too much importance to publications of this kind.

Public opinion is daily growing more excited, and I think that if His Majesty's Government were able to give an assurance that Turkey would have the ships, if possible, on the conclusion of hostilities, such an assurance would have a soothing effect.

I have received a most emphatic assurance from the Grand Vizier that nothing will induce Turkey to join Austria and Germany as long as he remains in power. His position is strong enough to give a certain value to this assurance.

No. 7.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 11, 1914.*

A REPORT has reached me from vice-consul at the Dardanelles, dated evening of the 10th August, that two large warships, thought to be the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*, have entered the Straits, and that the German consul went to meet them. Arrival of these vessels at Nagara late on same evening was reported in a second telegram.

No. 8.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 11, 1914.*

I LEARN that at 8.30 p.m. last night *Goeben* and *Breslau* reached the Dardanelles. These ships should not be allowed to pass through the Straits, and they should either leave within twenty-four hours, or be disarmed and laid up. You should point out to the Turkish Government that these are the duties entailed upon them by their neutrality, and that His Majesty's Government expect that they will act up to their obligations.

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No. 9.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 11, 1914.*

My telegram of August 11th.¹

The Ottoman Government have bought *Goeben* and *Breslau*. Officers and men will be allowed to return to Germany. Grand Vizier told me that purchase was due to our detention of *Sultan Osman*. They must have ship to bargain with regard to question of the islands on equal terms with Greece, and it was in no way directed against Russia, the idea of which he scouted.

He formally asked that the British naval mission might be allowed to remain.

No. 10.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 12.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 11, 1914.*

FOLLOWING from consul, Dardanelles, to-day :

"The large German ship has just left for Constantinople.

"Boats from small German ship have perquisitioned our ships here, and destroyed Marconi apparatus on French ships under threat of sinking them.

"We have protested, demanding disarmament or expulsion of German ships before night.

"It seems that they desire to force Turkey into war."

Military authorities seem to have completely lost their heads. British ships are capriciously detained at Dardanelles, and port officials here are refusing to issue papers to outgoing vessels.

No. 11.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 12, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of August 11th.²

If the crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* are returned to Germany at once and if the transfer of those vessels to Turkey is *bona fide*, so that they can only reappear as Turkish ships with Turkish crews, there seems no reason that the British naval mission should be withdrawn.

¹ See No. 7.

² See No. 9.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

No. 12.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 12, 1914.*

I SAW the Grand Vizier this morning and made strong representations to him against restrictions of free passage of the Straits, which the military authorities are now imposing under various pretexts. I said they had been holding up passenger and grain ships in the Dardanelles, refusing to deliver papers to ships wishing to leave Constantinople, and ordering grain ships to return to Constantinople at their caprice.

The Grand Vizier admitted that the War Office had been most high-handed in their action, in violation of international obligations.

It seems that the Minister of War has now got entirely out of hand, and I gather that he alone is responsible for the present situation. Matters are undoubtedly becoming serious, but a Cabinet Council is being held this afternoon, and I hope I may be able afterwards to report some improvement.

I should add that all foreign shipping is affected by the restrictions to which I have alluded above.

No. 13.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 12, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of August 11th.¹

You should at once point out to Grand Vizier that Turkish Government must not permit German ships to commit acts of war in the Straits, and ask why British merchant ships are detained.

No. 14.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 13.)

(TRANSLATION.)

Turkish Embassy, London, August 13, 1914.

THE Turkish Ambassador presents his compliments to Sir E. Grey and has the honour to communicate herewith the text of a telegram just received from his Government, which runs as follows :

¹ See No. 10.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

"In order that there may be no doubt as to the pacific attitude which the Turkish Government have decided to observe in the existing struggle, I inform you forthwith that they are determined to maintain strict neutrality."

No. 15.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 14, 1914.*

ADMIRAL LIMPUS has received promise from Minister of Marine that his Excellency will make crews for the *Goeben* and *Breslau*. This will take time, but nevertheless it will be done; and his Excellency has undertaken to hand over the two ships bodily to the British admiral.

Admiral Limpus informs me that a month will probably elapse before *Sultan Selim* (late *Goeben*) can be even moved by the Turkish crew; but the formalities of transfer may be complete technically in a day or two. Further delay in taking delivery from the Germans is unavoidable.

Minister of Marine declared there was no intention of sending the ships outside Sea of Marmora until the end of the war.

No. 16.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 15, 1914.*

ADMIRAL LIMPUS and all officers of British Naval Mission have suddenly been replaced in their executive command by Turkish officers, and have been ordered to continue work at Ministry of Marine if they remain. Although I have been given to understand by a member of the Government that they are still anxious to get officers and crew of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* out of Turkey, this will probably mean retention of mechanics and technical experts at least, which will create most dangerous situation here.

No. 17.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Beaumont.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 16, 1914.*

AS soon as French and Russian Ambassadors are similarly

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instructed, you are authorised to declare to Turkish Government that if Turkey will observe scrupulous neutrality during the war England, France, and Russia will uphold her independence and integrity against any enemies that may wish to utilise the general European complication in order to attack her.

No. 18.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—Received August 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 16, 1914.*

THIS morning Grand Vizier assured me again most solemnly that Turkish neutrality would be maintained. That Germany was doing her utmost to compromise the Turkish Government he did not deny, and he went so far as to admit that there was a danger of provoking Russia if Turkey leant herself to German designs which it served Turkey's interests to acquiesce in. This ambiguous expression no doubt refers to the fact that a certain number of German experts will be left on the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, owing to the inability of the Turks to handle those ships themselves. It would have been an impossible situation for Admiral Limpus, if he had had under his direct orders a mixed crew of Turks and Germans, and perhaps reason of his withdrawal from executive command may lie in this consideration.

The *Goeben* and *Breslau* are at present lying off Constantinople. The Grand Vizier has assured me that there is no intention of moving them from Marmora. They are now flying the Ottoman flag under nominal command of Turkish officer, and have been transferred. This at least is a good sign.

No. 19.

Mr. Beaumont to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 16, 1914.*

I HAVE received the following telegram, dated the 15th August, from His Majesty's vice-consul at Dardanelles :

"A new field of mines has been laid in the zone formerly sown with mines of observation type. It may be assumed that these latter had previously been removed.

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"The new contact mines, to the number of forty-one, were laid by the *Mtibah* from Kephez to Suandere in a double line. Seven were kept on the ship, and the twenty-four from the *Selanik*, which is proceeding to Constantinople, were also taken on board.

"The *Lily Rickmers*, a German ship which has arrived here, carries a wireless installation."

No. 20.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 18.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 18, 1914.*

I HAVE been accorded most cordial reception upon my return to my post by the Grand Vizier, of whom I enquired whether the German crews would be removed soon, and what guarantee he would give that the *Goeben* and *Breslau* would be used neither against Great Britain nor against Russia. I also expressed my surprise that the Turkish Government should be apparently entirely under German influence, and that they should have committed such a serious breach of neutrality as was involved by their action in the matter of the German ships.

His Highness said that he deeply deplored this breach of neutrality, which he could not deny. He begged me to give him time to get rid of German crews, which he promised he would do gradually, but, until arrival of Turkish transport with crews from London, Turkish Government had no crew to replace Germans.

His Highness added that he had protested against the action of the *Breslau* in boarding British and French ships at the Dardanelles; and he expressed the hope that I would not take too serious a view of that incident.

Situation is delicate, but I have great hopes that if His Majesty's Government will exercise patience, it may yet be saved; for Grand Vizier solemnly assured me that neither the *Goeben* nor the *Breslau* would go into the Black Sea or the Mediterranean.

His Highness said that seizure of Turkish ships building in England by His Majesty's Government had caused the whole crisis, and, as almost every Turkish subject had subscribed towards their purchase, a terrible impression had

been made throughout Turkey, where British attitude had been attributed to intention to assist Greece in aggressive designs against Turkey. Turkish population would have understood if Great Britain had paid for the ships, or if she had promised to return them when the war was over; but as it was it looked like robbery. Germans had not been slow to exploit the situation, of which they had taken every advantage.

His Highness was much impressed and relieved when I informed him of the declaration authorised in your telegram of the 16th August.¹ He said that this would be of enormous assistance to him, and he assured me that I need not be anxious lest Turkey should be drawn into war with Great Britain or with Russia. The present crisis would pass.

I am convinced of the absolute personal sincerity of Grand Vizier in these utterances.

No. 21.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallett.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 18, 1914.

I TOLD the Turkish Ambassador, who had expressed uneasiness as to our intentions towards Turkey, that Turkey would have nothing to fear from us, and that her integrity would be preserved in any conditions of peace which affected the Near East, provided that she preserved a real neutrality during the war, made the *Breslau* and *Goeben* entirely Turkish by sending away the German crews of these vessels, and gave all ordinary facilities to British merchant vessels.

No. 22.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 19, 1914.

IN view of the possibility that a *coup d'État* may be attempted with the assistance of the *Goeben*, in co-operation with the military authorities under German influence, who exercise complete control, I wish to make it clear that in my opinion the precaution of presence of British Fleet at

¹ See No. 17.

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the Dardanelles is wise. I am anxious to avoid any misunderstanding as to the gravity of the situation, notwithstanding the assurances received from the Grand Vizier.

No. 23.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 20.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 19, 1914.*

I SAW the Grand Vizier on the afternoon of 17th August, and made strong representations to him with regard to the detention of vessels laden with cargoes consigned from Russian ports to the Mediterranean.

He promised to give immediate instructions that ships should be allowed to proceed.

The port authorities were undoubtedly instructed yesterday morning to permit seven ships loaded with grain and one with petroleum for the Mediterranean, and one ship with coal for the Danube, to depart, but this permission was cancelled later.

It appears from this as if the military party, supported by the Germans, were determined to reassert themselves, and that a serious conflict of authority has arisen.

I propose to see Grand Vizier, whom I was unable to see last night, as early as possible this morning, and to insist upon his carrying out of his promise with regard to laden ships.

If these are permitted to leave, only four ships will remain, and no others have arrived since yesterday.

Of these four ships only one is a position to leave immediately, but their case is different to that of the nine ships mentioned above, of which the cargoes have never touched Turkish soil, and which are covered by treaties guaranteeing free passage of the Straits at all times, thus making their detention a far more serious matter.

No. 24.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 20, 1914.*

MINISTER of Marine came to see me to-day and expressed his relief at being able to talk to me freely.

He put forward the following proposal :

Firstly, that the Capitulations should be abolished immediately. I pointed out the difficulty of this, and he suggested that the Minister of Finance should come and discuss the question with me.

Secondly, he demanded the immediate return of the two Turkish battleships acquired by His Majesty's Government at the commencement of the war. I told him that this was impossible, but that I would endeavour to obtain as good terms as possible for them, and that I hoped they would not be needed during the war, and would soon be returned to Turkey ; in the meanwhile they should be regarded as a loan from Turkey to a friend.

Thirdly, he asked for renunciation of any interference with the internal affairs of Turkey. This need not be taken seriously, and is, of course, an absurd proposal.

Fourthly, he asked that if Bulgaria should intervene against the Triple *Entente*, Western Thrace should be given back to Turkey.

Fifthly, he wanted the restoration of the Greek islands. I told him that this was impossible, and he finally agreed to the basis arranged just before the present war broke out.

His final proposal was that the allied Powers should undertake to oblige the Triple Alliance to accept any agreements which might be reached with respect to the Capitulations.

Our conversation was of the friendliest description, and at its close the Minister of Marine asked whether I would sanction the chartering of a British oil-tank steamer now at Tenedos to convey oil from Constanza. I asked him the purposes for which this oil was required, and he replied that it was for use in Turkish destroyers. I said that I thought that such a request, when the German crews of the *Breslau* and *Goeben* were masters of the situation here, would greatly surprise His Majesty's Government, and he replied that he did not wish to create any suspicion in their minds, and would therefore withdraw his request, adding that any suspicion that the German ships would be allowed to attack our shipping was absurd.

I said that, although I personally believed in the sincerity of his assurances, there seemed to be no doubt that the

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German admiral was now the master here. Minister seemed greatly surprised at this, but finally asked me to assure you that he would open the Dardanelles to the British fleet, if the German crews would not leave the two ships when he told them to do so.

No. 25.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 20, 1914.*

FOLLOWING from His Majesty's vice-consul, Dardanelles, dated August 19th :

" Passages were stopped this afternoon, while seventeen more mines were laid in a zigzag line along one side of the channel, which has been rendered extremely narrow. There is a heavy oil-steamer to pass to-morrow, and it may not be easy.

" Mines remain, but I suspect that there are more on board *Rickmers*.

" Weber Pasha, who has returned with other German officers, is believed to be on the latter vessel.

" Several Hotchkiss guns have arrived and have been mounted on both sides of the Straits commanding minefield."

No. 26.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 21, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of August 12th.¹

Reply to representations received from Porte expresses regrets for unfortunate incident of which British merchant vessels at Dardanelles were object, and gives formal assurances that similar acts shall not occur again. Explanation of detention of ships given in Porte's note is that in consequence of some mines having been detached from their moorings, authorities had prevented vessels from continuing their voyage until mines had been picked up, in order to avoid accidents.

No mention is made of real reason, which was wish of military authorities to requisition grain and other cargoes.

¹ See No. 13.

No. 27.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 21, 1914.*

I WAS informed by the Grand Vizier to-night that he wanted all the support that the Triple *Entente* could give him, and that the sooner they could give a written declaration respecting the independence and integrity of Turkey the better.

A sharp struggle, which may come to a head at any moment, is in progress between the Moderates and the German party, headed by the Minister for War, and is meanwhile creating anarchy here.

Marshal Liman¹ and the German Ambassador are recklessly striving to force the Turks into declaring war on Russia, in which case the *Goeben* and *Breslau* would presumably sail for the Black Sea. They are prepared to achieve this object, if necessary, by a *coup d'État*, making the Minister of War dictator.

It is said that the Dardanelles forts have German garrisons, and that the *Goeben*, which has been slightly damaged, will be repaired by September 2nd, or possibly earlier.

No. 28.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, August 22, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of August 20th.²

The demands made by the Turkish Government are excessive; we do not, however, wish to refuse all discussion, and you may therefore, as soon as the French and Russian Ambassadors have received similar instructions, address the following communication to the Porte:

"If the Turkish Government will repatriate immediately the German officers and crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, will give a written assurance that all facilities shall be furnished for the peaceful and uninterrupted passage of merchant vessels, and that all the obligations of neutrality shall be observed by Turkey during the present war, the three allied Powers will return agree, with regard to the Capitulations,

¹ Head of the German Military Mission in Turkey.

² See No. 24.

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to withdraw their extra-territorial jurisdiction as soon as a scheme of judicial administration, which will satisfy modern conditions, is set up.

"They will further give a joint guarantee in writing that they will respect the independence and integrity of Turkey, and will engage that no conditions in the terms of peace at the end of the war shall prejudice this independence and integrity."

No. 29.

Tewfik Pasha to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 22.)

(TRANSLATION.)

Turkish Embassy, London, August 22, 1914.

THE Turkish Ambassador presents his compliments to Sir E. Grey, and with reference to the conversation which he had with him, and which he reported to the Turkish Government in a telegram of the 18th instant, hastens to state that his Highness Saïd Halim Pasha has just replied in a telegram dated yesterday, and just received, as follows :

1. The necessary orders have been given in the proper quarter for the free navigation of Turkish waters by all merchant vessels ;

2. The Turkish Government will replace the German officers and men by those of the *Sultan Osman* as soon as they arrive at Constantinople.

No. 30.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 23.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 22, 1914.*

I SAW Minister of Marine, as the Turkish transport has now arrived, and asked him when the crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* would be repatriated.

He said that it depended upon the Grand Vizier. He was himself in favour of their repatriation.

I shall press the matter strongly, but do not know whether the Moderates are sufficiently strong to insist upon such a step being taken at once.

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No. 31.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 23, 1914.*

I HEAR that a further contingent of German officers has recently arrived via Sophia for service here.

No. 32.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 24, 1914.*

THE Minister of War has not yet recovered from his illness. I have made it absolutely clear to the Grand Vizier that there is evidently no reason for delaying transfer of ships now that changes have come, and I said that His Majesty's Government would not tolerate that the Turkish fleet, as well as the Turkish army, should be in the hands of Germany, warning his Highness that the British fleet would not leave the Dardanelles until His Majesty's Government were satisfied that the Turkish Government had loyally carried out the condition laid down, and until British merchantmen could navigate Turkish waters without either delay or molestation. It was therefore obvious that if there was any idea of manning the Turkish fleet with German officers and men it must be given up. The situation was already quite humiliating enough for the Turkish Empire, which was in peril of total ruin if the Turkish Government allowed the domination of Constantinople by Germany. The Grand Vizier assured me that the Turkish Government had not the slightest intention of Germanising their fleet; and while it is my impression that the forces in favour of the maintenance of strict neutrality by Turkey are slowly gaining, I replied that I should not be satisfied with less than the actual departure of the German crews.

No. 33.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 25, 1914.*

I RECEIVED yesterday a written assurance from Grand Vizier that merchant vessels will be allowed to go and come

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in Turkish ports without hindrance in accordance with treaties.

No. 34.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 25, 1914.

HIS Majesty the King desires that your Excellency should convey to His Imperial Majesty the Sultan of Turkey a personal message from His Majesty, expressing his deep regret at the sorrow caused to the Turkish people by the detention of the two warships which His Imperial Majesty's subjects had made such sacrifices to acquire. His Majesty the King wishes the Sultan to understand that the exigencies of the defence of his dominions are the only cause of the detention of these ships, which His Majesty hopes will not be for long, it being the intention of His Majesty's Government to restore them to the Ottoman Government at the end of the war, in the event of the maintenance of a strict neutrality by Turkey without favour to the King's enemies, as at present shown by the Ottoman Government.

No. 35.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 25, 1914.

I HEAR from His Majesty's consul at Jerusalem that forty camels laden with food-stuffs have been seized from Egyptians at Gaza.

No. 36.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 25, 1914.

SEIZURE of camels reported in my telegram of to-day.¹

I am making strong representations to Ottoman Government. The Germans, who are no doubt responsible for the activity now reported, are doing their best to embroil us with the Turks.

The Grand Vizier vehemently denies that it is his inten-

¹ See No. 35.

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tion to attack Egypt in any way or to attempt any sort of intrigues there. In this, I think, he is sincere. He is forming a Moderate party genuinely in favour of Turkey remaining neutral.

No. 37.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 25, 1914.*

HIS Majesty's vice-consul, Dardanelles, reports that former channel on the European side of the Straits was further mined on August 24th. More buoys have been placed in new channel on the Asiatic side, and that channel may now be followed. Passages were prevented on August 24th by the work of laying these buoys, but they have been resumed from to-day.

No. 38.

Sir Edward Grey to Tewfik Pasha.

Your Excellency, *Foreign Office, August 26, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which your Excellency was so good as to address to me on the 22nd instant.¹

In reply, I have the honour to state that I have taken note that:

1. The necessary orders have been sent by the Imperial Ottoman Government to the competent authorities to allow free passage in Ottoman waters to all foreign merchant vessels.

2. That the Imperial Ottoman Government will replace the German officers and crew of the late *Goeben* and *Breslau* by those of the *Sultan Osman* the moment the latter arrive at Constantinople.

I have, &c.,
E. GREY.

No. 39.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 26, 1914.*

NINETY German sailors passed through Sophia yesterday on their way to Constantinople. I have protested strongly,

¹ See No. 29.

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but Grand Vizier is unable to control the situation, which is dominated by the German Ambassador and generals. Weber Pasha, who is in command at the Dardanelles, is said to be urging closing of the Straits. I have brought this to the notice of the Grand Vizier. His Highness most positively repudiated any such idea, and begged me to have patience, as this situation would not last, and he was gaining authority.

In the meantime, general mobilisation is proceeding feverishly, and preparations are being pushed on in the fleet. Eighty pounds' worth of surgical appliances, dressings, &c., were bought by doctor of the *Corcovado* to-day. I am informed that there is a 5-inch gun hidden by canvas at her stern. She still lies at Therapia. It is not likely that the two German men-of-war will come out of the Dardanelles, but there are grounds for thinking that German plan is to urge Turkey to attack Russia after France is beaten—about ten days hence, in their estimation. Straits would be entirely closed, and, according to the German Ambassador, quite impossible to force, since Germans have taken special measures to make them impregnable.

No. 40.

Sir G. Barclay to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)

(Telegraphic.)

Bucharest, August 27, 1914.

PRESS to-day reports special train from Berlin, carrying 500 German marines, passed through Bucharest yesterday for Constantinople.

Official communication this evening states that this was not a military transport, but that men were workmen, mostly Germans, under the direction of several engineers and functionaries, on the way to Turkey via Bulgaria for work on Bagdad Railway.

Communiqué adds that in future foreign subjects will not be allowed passage through the country in groups of more than twenty, even if their individual passports are in order.

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No. 41.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 27.)
(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, August 27, 1914.

GERMAN ships.

There are grounds for thinking that Germans are urging Turks to send *Goeben* into Black Sea, where they would argue that she has a right to go as a Turkish ship. Germans would count upon Russian warship attacking her, and war would ensue, seemingly provoked by Russia.

Object of Germans is to create a diversion here, draw off some Russian troops and enemies from Austria, and embroil us at the same time.

There are, it is said, 162 German officers here and many reservists.

No. 42.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)
(Telegraphic.) Constantinople, August 27, 1914.

MY telegram of August 27th.¹

Russian Ambassador is at present with Grand Vizier, whom I have just seen. I again impressed upon his Highness my apprehensions lest *Goeben* should make a raid. I expressed my conviction that, should Turkey be so unwise as to provoke the Powers of the Triple *Entente*, it would mean the end of the Ottoman Empire. To these observations on my part, his Highness replied that the *Goeben*, manned as she was with German crew, would never be allowed by the Turkish Government to enter the Black Sea. His language on this point was most emphatic, and I believe that he was sincere in what he said. I did not fail, however, to draw his Highness's attention to the fact that, if the Minister of Marine, the Minister of War, and the German Ambassador ordered the *Goeben* to go there, I did not quite see how his Highness was going to prevent it. If the German Emperor ordered the German admiral to go into the Black Sea, it did not seem to me that the two Turkish Ministers could, even if they would, prevent the admiral from obeying those commands.

Grand Vizier assured me most emphatically that my fears

¹ See No. 41.

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were entirely without foundation, but he did not give me any reasons to back up this optimistic opinion. His Highness was much upset when I rejoined that, so long as German crews remained his Highness was not master of his own house, but at the mercy of the Germans, who had, to all intents and purposes, occupied Constantinople. His Highness admitted that Germans were urging Turkey to depart from her neutrality, and that they wished to embroil her with the Russians and ourselves, but he nevertheless solemnly assured me that Turkish Government would not depart from their neutrality. He fully understood Germany's aims in this matter, and all Turkish Government were determined not to fall into the trap.

Grand Vizier is, I am sure, absolutely sincere himself. But none the less the situation is as I have described it in the preceding paragraphs.

No. 43.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 27, 1914.*

MY telegram of August 24th.¹

In reply to my enquiries, Grand Vizier stated that neither he nor Minister of Marine knew anything about the reported arrival of German sailors. They had not been asked for by the Turkish Government.

I said that, if this really was the case, it furnished yet another proof of how completely Germany had obtained control here. German merchantmen were, to my knowledge, arming in the port of Constantinople, and it was obvious that the German sailors were to be put into these ships or on board the Turkish fleet. This being so, it was my duty to warn his Highness of the unfortunate effect that this continued violation of Turkish neutrality in favour of Germany was bound to have upon the Governments of the Triple *Entente*.

¹ See No. 39.

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No. 44.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, August 28, 1914.*

OTTOMAN forces are being mobilised in Hedjaz and further south, and existing military activity in Red Sea may thus be explained. About sixty Turkish officers arrived at Alexandria recently and passed through Egypt down Red Sea. Their destination was the Yemen.

Twelve thousand Turkish troops are reported in Jeddah region.

Signs are not lacking that, in case of war, an attack on Egypt is contemplated by Turkey. A few Turkish officers are now in the Delta. Steps have been taken to watch all those that are known. I learn from a good source that all information of Turkish mobilisation reported from Constantinople is correct. Meanwhile emissaries are being sent to India, the Yemen, Senoussi, and Egypt, to stir up feeling against Great Britain. Activity at Gaza is reported, but it is uncertain whether this is more than raising of levies to replace regulars withdrawn from the north by mobilisation.

No. 45.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 28, 1914.*

GENERAL situation here.

It is possible, though I consider it highly improbable, that Turks may make a dash out of the Dardanelles when their fleet is better prepared. It is equally possible that Turkey may make some forward movement against Serbia or Greece on land. Nevertheless, I trust that you will not read my various reports to mean that I have abandoned last hope that neutrality will be maintained to extent of not actually attacking Russia in Black Sea. I still think that it is far from probable that Turkey will for the time being make any forward move.

News propagated by German Ambassador here this morning is that Germans are marching on Paris, and that they have decisively worsted the Allies. This message has without doubt come by wireless, as the Ambassador is in direct

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communication with German General Staff. This news will, I fear, tend to shake Turks still further, as they now confidently expect that Triple *Entente* will be annihilated. There is also no doubt that very active preparations are in hand, and that Germans here are confident of hostilities. Consignments of gold from Germany have arrived for German and Austrian banks, private German residents have sent away their wives, and quantities of medical stores have been purchased and put on board German ships.

I hear that German Ambassador is adopting tone of friendly commiseration for Great Britain, who, he asserts, will never assist Russia in any movement against Turkey. He has made the remarkable statement that his Government will now offer favourable terms to France, which she will certainly accept; that Germany will then wage a platonic war with England, whose heart is not in the struggle, and who will make terms to save her fleet; and that Germany and England will then combine against Russia.

German Ambassador's attitude seems to indicate great preoccupation as regards British fleet and as regards Russian advance in East Prussia, and a desire to make terms now in order to save Germany's resources for a final struggle with us under more favourable conditions. I have made it known privately in the proper quarter that under no conditions would Great Britain abandon her allies, and that, whatever the present situation in the field may be, it is still but the beginning of a struggle from which we are firmly resolved to emerge victoriously.

No. 46.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, August 28, 1914.*

FROM information that has reached me, there is no doubt that in course of time the whole area of the Dardanelles, Constantinople, and the Bosphorus will become nothing more nor less than a sort of German enclave. Sailors recently arrived from Sophia will be sent to Straits forts and more will follow. This is over and above German military reservists already allotted to garrison those forts.

I hear that, although Turks have not yet any ordnance of the more modern type for mounting in Straits defences, it is very probable that consignment of guns will arrive in the near future from Germany and Austria through Constanza.

No. 47.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 29.)

(Telegraphic.)

Sophia, August 28, 1914.

SPECIAL train full of German sailors with officers passed Sophia last night for Constantinople, making total passed about 600.

I am informed credibly that large consignment of guns and artillery material has passed through Roumania to Giurgevo and is now being brought across to Rustchuk.

No. 48.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received August 31.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, August 30, 1914.

I AND my colleagues still do not regard situation as hopeless, and are of opinion that we should go on as long as possible without provoking a rupture. I find it hard to believe that, when it comes to the point, Turks would declare war on Russia or on ourselves.

Eventuality of a general war is doubtless counted on by Germany with the object of diverting energies of Russia from the main object of European conflict. Germans may even argue that, in the event of Russians receiving serious check in Germany, they might be induced to desist from struggle by bait of Constantinople.

There is no doubt that it is object of Germany to involve Russia and Great Britain in serious troubles here in the hope of general Balkan conflagration and of complications for us in India and Egypt. I heard to-day on good authority that it is admitted in Berlin that, if necessary, they will encourage a "jihad"¹ with this object.

I have strong impression that Turkish Government, with

¹ i.e., Holy War.

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exception of its extreme chauvinists, are aware of Germany's objects, which I have not ceased to instil into them, and that time may cool their ardour for their German masters. I warned Grand Vizier this morning of inevitable results of siding with Germany against us, and said that our patience was not inexhaustible, and that consequences of allying themselves with our enemies would be serious. His Highness seemed to be impressed, and promised that German sailors should be sent away.

No. 49.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 1, 1914.*

MINISTER of Marine called on Russian Ambassador last night and assured him that he was working hard for neutrality, that he would send away German sailors in fortnight, and that 200 were leaving to-day, truth of which we shall verify. He may only be gaining time.

No. 50.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 1, 1914.*

I AGAIN discussed subject of Turkish neutrality to-day with Grand Vizier. His Highness evidently relies on Minister of Interior, who returns shortly. He assured me most solemnly that Turkish Government would not depart from their neutrality. I replied that we should not be satisfied until the German sailors left, as Turkish neutrality had already been so gravely compromised already. He reiterated with much vehemence that all German sailors should go.

No. 51.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 1.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 1, 1914.*

SULLEIMAN-EL-BUROUTI, a highly-placed senator, is in Egypt, probably in Cairo, engaged in fomenting revolutionary movement.

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No. 52.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 1, 1914.

IN order that there may be no room for misconception, you should inform Turkish Government that Egyptian Government are taking measures to patrol Suez Canal on both banks and that this step is necessary to protect the safe and proper working of the Canal. You should add that no advance into Sinai, nor military operations in that region, are under contemplation.

No. 53.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 2, 1914.

I SHOULD be glad to learn whether British Admiral has instructions in case *Goeben* went into Mediterranean under Turkish flag. Should I tell Turkish Government that, so long as she has Germans on board, we shall regard her as a German ship and treat her as such, and that, before she goes out into Mediterranean, Admiral Limpus must be allowed to assure himself that there are no Germans on board?

I do not anticipate her going out, but should like to make it clear beforehand what our attitude would be in case she does so.

No. 54.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 2, 1914.

AM I authorised to make public statement that Turkey will have nothing to fear from British ships if she maintains strict neutrality and keeps peace during European conflict, if British trade is not interfered with, and if German naval officers and crews are sent out of the country?

No. 55.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 3, 1914.

I SHOULD be glad to have discretion to let it be known that if Turkish fleet leaves the Dardanelles we shall treat it

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as part of the German fleet, as it has German crews and officers on board.

No. 56.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 3, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of September 2nd.¹

So long as German crews have not been sent away, *Goeben* will certainly be treated as a German ship if she comes out of the Straits. It was only on express condition that German crews would be sent away that we waived demand, to which we were strictly entitled, that ship should be interned until the end of the war.

No. 57.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 4, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of September 2nd.²

You may make statement you propose, but we cannot restrict movements of British fleet.

No. 58.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 4, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of September 3rd :³ Turkish fleet.

Proposal approved.

No. 59.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 5, 1914.*

I HEAR that Inspector from Constantinople of Committee of Union and Progress left Erzeroum on September 1st for Persia, where he has previously lived. He was accompanied by three Persian revolutionists from Constantinople, one of them named Agha Mehemet Ali. They have ideas

¹ See No. 53.

² See No. 54.

³ See No. 55.

about Afghan and Indian Moslems, and also intend to stir up anti-Russian trouble in Persia.

No. 60.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 5, 1914.*

I HAVE to-day gone over the whole ground with the Minister of the Interior, who seems more inclined to be reasonable. I think there is an improvement in the situation.

Minister quite understands that *Goeben* will be treated as a German ship if she goes out. They assure me that Turkish fleet will not leave the Dardanelles on any account.

No. 61.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 6.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 6, 1914.*

SURPRISES are always possible, but I feel fairly confident, from what I hear from many prominent people with whom I am in touch, that public opinion will change in our favour.

There is growing discontent among influential people, who are now beginning to realise that they are in German hands. This they resent, and they are openly declaring that they will not allow war.

In view of all this, I think I can safely say that there are many signs of an improvement in the situation here.

No. 62.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)
Constantinople, August 19, 1914.

SIR,

WITH reference to your telegram of August 12th¹ to Mr. Beaumont, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a *note verbale* addressed by him to the Sublime Porte in the sense of your instructions respecting the perquisitions effected by the German cruiser *Breslau* off British ships in the port

¹ See No. 13.

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of Chanak and the detention of British ships in the Dardanelles.

I have, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 62.

*Note verbale communicated to Sublime Porte, Constantinople,
August 14, 1914.*

IT having been brought to the notice of His Britannic Majesty's Government that, while in the neutral port of Chanak (Dardanelles), boats of the cruiser *Breslau*, flying the German flag, boarded and effected perquisitions on British ships, His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has been instructed to request that the Imperial Ottoman Government will not permit German ships to commit acts of war in Turkish ports or in the Straits, the neutrality of which is guaranteed by international treaties.

Mr. Beaumont is instructed at the same time to enquire on what grounds British ships have recently been prevented from leaving the port of Constantinople, and have been detained on arrival at the Dardanelles, in some cases for several days.

According to a telegram received to-day from His Majesty's vice-consul at the Dardanelles, British ships are still being help up there, and His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires has the honour to request that immediate orders may be sent to allow them to proceed.

No. 63.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)

Constantinople, August 21, 1914.

SIR,

WITH reference to my immediately preceding despatch,¹ I have the honour to forward herewith a *note verbale* from the Sublime Porte, expressing regret for the incidents at the Dardanelles and offering explanations.

I have, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

¹ See No. 62.

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ENCLOSURE IN No. 63.

Note verbale communicated by Sublime Porte.

(TRANSLATION.)

THE Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs had the honour of receiving the *note verbale* which His Britannic Majesty's Embassy was good enough to communicate on the 14th instant.

In reply, the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs hastens to express great regret to the *Chargé d'Affaires* for the annoying incident suffered by some merchant vessels flying the British flag in the harbour of Chanak; the Sublime Porte are able to give the most formal assurances that such an act shall not be repeated.

As regards the vessels detained at Chanak, some submarine mines having become detached, the Imperial authorities thought it incumbent upon them to prevent those vessels from continuing their voyage until the said mines had been recovered, in order that annoying incidents might be prevented. This provisional prohibition is, it will thus be seen, the result of a general measure which the Imperial Government have been obliged to take with a view to ensuring the safety of navigation in Turkish waters.

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs has the honour to inform His Britannic Majesty's Embassy that, the mines having been recovered, the competent authorities have been requested by the Government to raise the prohibition of free passage, and to do their best to facilitate navigation for all vessels.

August 16, 1914.

No. 64.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 6, 1914.

MINISTER of Interior yesterday assured me that there was no question of Turkey going to war.

I used every possible argument to dissuade Minister of the Interior from leaping on a military adventure, reminding him that in the end Turkey would inevitably pay. I told him His Majesty's Government regarded Turkish fleet an annex of German fleet, and that if it went out into the *Ægean* we

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should sink it. He quite realised this, and said that fleet had no intention of leaving Dardanelles.

I went carefully over several infringements of neutrality of which Turks had been guilty, and I said that so long as a single German officer, naval or military, remained here I should consider Turkey as a German protectorate; that I had been informed that Turkish Government attached no importance to written declaration which I and my French and Russian colleagues had made them respecting their integrity. I was greatly surprised at this attitude, but personally somewhat relieved, as to guarantee integrity and independence of Turkey was like guaranteeing life of man who was determined to commit suicide.

We sincerely desired independence and integrity of Turkey, but he must not imagine that Great Britain was afraid of Turkey, or that we feared to face alternative if forced upon us. Most ridiculous stories about insurrections in India and Egypt and approaching downfall of British Empire were being circulated broadcast, and were apparently believed by Minister of War. I hoped that Minister of the Interior was not under those and similar dangerous illusions.

Minister of the Interior said that he understood.

He then proceeded to state that Turkish Government now wished to sell us two Turkish ships outright. They wanted money badly, as the economic situation was desperate. I replied that I did not know His Majesty's Government's views, which I would enquire, but that, personally, I should be reluctant to inflict so mortal a stab on the wounded heart of the Turkish people, who were already suffering so much by temporary detention of their ships. Their purchase might give rise to another tempest of indignation.

Moreover, I doubted whether His Majesty's Government would readily pay several millions to a country which was entirely in German hands, and which was breathing out threats against ourselves and our allies.

He replied that His Majesty's Government could make what conditions they liked if they bought ships; and that Turkish Government would send away all Germans. I said that I would reflect on proposal and repeat it to you.

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No. 65.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 7.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 7, 1914.*

THERE is fresh evidence that there has been no sale of the *Goeben* and *Breslau* to Turkey. I learn on unimpeachable authority that German Ambassador has twice sent down orders to customs for admission, duty free, of effects for His Imperial Majesty's ship *Goeben*. I have brought this to notice of Grand Vizier, and have reminded him that we do not recognise sale.

Should I not tell his Highness that His Majesty's Government will require to be satisfied that the sale is a genuine and legal one, before they can recognise the ship as Turkish? I think that this should be done, even if the German crews go.

I have said to both Talaat and Grand Vizier that if *Goeben* and *Breslau* leave Dardanelles they will be treated as German ships. They fully realise this, and have assured me that the ships will on no account leave.

No. 66.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, September 8, 1914.*

PRESENCE of numerous Turkish officers in Egypt is undoubtedly a danger, and measures against suspected individuals may become necessary at any moment. A Turkish naval officer recently left Egypt hurriedly for Beirut. A letter belonging to him has been found, in which it is stated that he has been doing his best to cause a strike amongst Moslem stokers and engineers of four Khedivial mail steamers, which are to be used as transports for our troops. The letter continues that he has not succeeded in his attempts, but that he will do his best to sink the vessels after the troops have embarked. It is worth noting that a strike on steamers in question has now occurred.

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No. 67.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 8, 1914.*

BRITISH Naval Mission.

Before any decision respecting the recall of the mission is taken by His Majesty's Government, I wish to have your views on the subject. I am reluctant to take any step, however justified it may be, that would precipitate unfavourable developments, as long as there is a reasonable chance of avoiding them. What effect do you consider that withdrawal of mission would have upon the political situation?

The Admiralty are of opinion that the position of the mission may become unsafe, and that it is already undignified. They therefore wish it to be recalled and attached to the embassy until you can arrange a safe passage home for Admiral Limpus and the other officers. There is clearly ample justification for the view taken by the Admiralty.

No. 68.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.*¹—(Received September 9.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 8, 1914.*

I HAVE on more than one occasion told Grand Vizier that resentment is probable in England, especially in present circumstances, at the slight put upon British admiral, and that, much as His Majesty's Government desire to remain on friendly terms with Turkey, such proceedings on the part of the Turkish Government cannot be indefinitely overlooked.

In many respects the situation seems to show improvement, but unless His Majesty's Government wish mission to remain indefinitely it seems to me that the present would be a suitable moment to withdraw it. The Turks could not regard this step as a grievance as it is obviously justified by their conduct. The mission are at present treated as non-existent, and their position is consequently both false and invidious. German hold on the navy is becoming stronger daily, and there is no sign of German crews leaving. As a matter of fact, far from being disadvantageous to us, this

¹ This telegram crossed Sir E. Grey's telegram of September 8th, see No. 67.

is becoming embarrassing to the Turkish Government, who are at least beginning to realise that the Germans are not an unmixed blessing. Great discontent reigns among Turkish naval officers, so Admiral Limpus tells me, as they dislike German officers, and they even hint that they would rather mutiny than serve under them.

I am of opinion that the time has come to withdraw the mission, and if this can be approved in principle, I will speak to the admiral, who feels his position acutely, and ask him to make the necessary arrangements.

No. 69.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 9, 1914.*

GRAND VIZIER admitted this morning that the Turkish Government were going to abolish Capitulations.

I said that this information would greatly surprise my Government, whom I would at once apprise.

The Capitulations and conventions were not a unilateral agreement; we had on a former occasion informed the Turkish Government that we were willing to consider any request they might put forward in a generous spirit, but I did not imagine that my Government would acquiesce in their total abolition by a stroke of the pen. We were now under martial law. Did he expect us to allow British subjects to be judged by court-martial, especially so long as army was in hands of Germans?

His Highness made some ineffectual endeavours to defend his action, but I cut them short.

No. 70.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 9, 1914.*

MINISTER of Interior told me to-day that note to embassies on subject of the abolition of the Capitulations had already been despatched. German Ambassador had just called to protest. Earlier in the day the Italian Ambassador

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had informed me that German and Austrian Ambassadors were ready to associate themselves with us in protesting against the abolition.

German Ambassador has disclaimed authorship of this move on the part of Turkey, and I think that he may be speaking the truth ; but every statement he makes must be received with caution. Nevertheless, statement by Minister of Interior, to which I have alluded above, seems to bear him out in this case.

I have discussed the proposed abolition with the Minister of the Interior, and he maintains that they all feel that the time has come to emancipate Turkey from foreign shackles. But he disclaimed any intention of hostility against foreigners. He had already sent instructions to all Valis and police officials not to inflame people against foreigners, and he would give strictest orders that no foreigners should be taken before courts-martial.

I told his Excellency that I thought the action of the Turkish Government would inevitably lead to greater interference than ever in the internal affairs of Turkey. I could only regret that they should have acted so precipitately.

No. 71.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 10.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 9, 1914.*

ABOLITION of Capitulations.

It has been arranged that all the embassies shall send in identic notes to-morrow, acknowledging Turkish note and pointing out that abolition of the Capitulations cannot be accepted, as consent of both contracting parties is necessary.

No. 72.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 10, 1914.*

CONSIGNMENTS of warlike material from Germany traced up to date amount to 3,000 rounds of projectiles for *Goeben*, battery of field guns with ammunition, several

batteries of heavy howitzers, probably for field army use, and some thousands of rifles. More consignments are on the way. All German reservists who have not been able to leave Turkish Empire have been instructed to report for enrolment with Turkish troops.

No. 73.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 10, 1914.*

MY telegram of September 9th.¹

Note abolishing all the Capitulations was received last night. All my colleagues, including German and Austrian Ambassadors, have to-day addressed identic notes to the Sublime Porte stating that, while communicating to our respective Governments note respecting abolition of Capitulations, we must point out that capitulatory régime is not an autonomous institution of the Empire, but the resultant of international treaties, diplomatic agreements, and contractual acts of different kinds. It cannot be abolished in any part, *a fortiori* wholly, without consent of contracting parties. Therefore, in the absence of understanding arrived at before October 1st between Ottoman Government and our respective Governments, we cannot recognise executory force after that date of a unilateral decision of Sublime Porte.

No. 74.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 14.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 13, 1914.*

I HEAR that Germans are now dominant at Alexandretta, and secretly suggest and control everything. From September 7th to morning of September 12th, 24 mountain guns, 400 horses and mules, 500 artillery troops belonging to service of 6th Army Corps, and large quantity of ammunition passed through Alexandretta, proceeding by railway to Constantinople.

¹ See No. 71.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

No. 75.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 14, 1914.*

GERMAN Ambassador has received instructions from Berlin to publish widely report of revolution in India, with addition that His Majesty's Government have asked Japan to assist, and that Japan has agreed, in return for free immigration into the Pacific Coast, a free hand in China, and a 40,000,000*l.* loan. I was warned in time by the Russian Ambassador, and instructed all consuls by telegraph to deny it, if published, and wrote to the Grand Vizier.

Nothing official has appeared here, but the agencies are publishing part of the story.

No. 76.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 15, 1914.*

FLEET is now entirely in German hands, and Minister of Marine is powerless. Germans consider that Dardanelles are now impassable, and they are impressing this upon military authorities. It is said that, if the Turkish fleet moved into the Black Sea, Straits would be entirely closed by additional mines, which have just been sent there on the *Nilufer*.

Though I do not say that this *coup* will actually come off, danger is undoubtedly greater since news has been received of the recent successes of the allies, as the Germans are all the more anxious to create a diversion. My impression is that majority of the Cabinet and the Grand Vizier himself are entirely opposed to any such adventure, and that they are doing their utmost to prevent it; but they are finding out, though they will not admit it, that they are powerless to stop matters.

Both I and my Russian colleague have received independent information that German and Austrian Ambassadors are making a determined effort to force the Minister of War to send the *Goeben* and the rest of the fleet into the Black Sea. Fifty transports have been ready for some time,

and I understand that everything is prepared for the reception on board these vessels of a large number of Turkish troops.

Abolition of the Capitulations is now the principal card in the hands of the peace party. They would, I think, be ready to defer discussion of abolition of judicial Capitulations if abolition of fiscal and commercial treaties could be agreed to forthwith by the three Powers.

I hear that 15 per cent. duties will be applied from October 1st, but a law is at present under consideration exempting existing contracts. As nothing is at present coming into ports, application of these duties is, as a matter of fact, of little consequence. The *temettu* also will be applied to foreigners.

No. 77.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, September 16, 1914.

YOUR telegram of September 15th¹: Abolition of Capitulations.

I am inclined to point out to Turkish Government that, so long as they maintain neutrality, what we have said to them already holds good, and that we shall be prepared to consider reasonable concessions about Capitulations; but they must not expect concessions from us while their present irregular conduct in the matter of the German officers and crews continues. Perhaps we might also say that if they break the peace we cannot be responsible for the consequences; that we hope they will keep the peace, but whether they do so or not is their own affair.

N 78.

United Shipowners' Freight, Demurrage, and Protective Association to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)

*Vienna Chambers, Bute Docks, Cardiff,
September 16, 1914.*

SIR,

WE are instructed by the owners of the steamship *Reliance* to seek your aid for the recovery of compensation from the

¹ See No. 76.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

Turkish Government for the detention of their steamer by the Turkish authorities.

The facts of the case are as follows :

On August 1st last the steamship *Reliance* sailed from Nickolaief with a cargo of barley for Hamburg and arrived off Constantinople at noon on the 3rd. The captain waited at Constantinople for orders from the owners of his steamer until the 6th, but he received no communication from his owners as the Turkish authorities had stopped the delivery of telegrams.

On August 6th the captain proceeded on his voyage and arrived off Nagara Point, Dardanelles, on the following day at 8 a.m. when he sent his permit to pass through the Dardanelles ashore in accordance with the usual practice and received a signal from the fort that the canal was blocked. This blocking signal was kept up on August 8th, 9th and 10th ; on the latter date several Italian vessels were piloted out and the German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau* were piloted in by Turkish torpedo craft and anchored in Nagara Bay. A German merchant vessel, the *General*, was also piloted in.

The captain of the *Reliance* daily saw the British consul at Chanak, but the consul was unable to obtain permission for the *Reliance* to pass through the Dardanelles.

On August 11th, 12th, 13th and 14th the *Reliance* remained off Nagara Point, and on these days Roumanian, French, and Italian steamers were piloted in and out, but no British ships were allowed to leave.

At 5.50 p.m. on August 14th the captain received orders from Turkish officials to proceed to Constantinople and remain there until the cargo had been discharged. Several other British steamers that were waiting received similar orders, amongst them being the steamship *Hillhouse*, the steamship *Countess of Warwick*, and the steamship *Barrowmore*.

The captain proceeded to Constantinople and arrived there at 1 p.m. on August 15th. On arrival he went ashore and noted protest against the detention of his steamer and also saw the British consul. On the following day the *Goeben* and *Breslau* arrived off Constantinople under the Turkish flag. On this day the *Reliance* was boarded by a Turkish officer who asked for the displacement of the vessel and for information as to the capacity for carrying horses and troops.

On the 18th the captains of all British ships at Constantinople were told by the British harbour-master, on instructions from the British consul-general, that they were now allowed to proceed and were again to apply for permits. On the same day the captain of the *Reliance* obtained a permit and sailed from Constantinople and arrived again off Nagara Point at 8 a.m. the following morning (August 19th) when he sent his second permit ashore, but the Turkish authorities cancelled the permit and ordered the *Reliance* to anchor. On August 20th one Italian ship and the British ship *Ryton*, in ballast, were allowed to pass through, and on the following day the steamship *Bullmouth* loaded with kerosene and three other steamers were piloted out. It was not until the 22nd ultimo at 11.40 a.m. that the *Reliance* was allowed to sail.

We respectfully submit that the Turkish authorities should be made to pay compensation for their action in detaining British ships, and on behalf of the owners of the *Reliance* we request that their claim of 640*l.*, being at the ordinary charter-party rate of 40*l.* a day, for the detention of their steamer from August 6th to the 22nd should be made against the Turkish Government by the British Ambassador at Constantinople.

We are, &c.

DOWNING & HANDCOCK.

No. 79.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, Septe ber 16, 1914.*

MINISTER of Marine has assured me that he is quite aware of German intrigues, and that Turkish Government are not so innocent as to fall into the trap that has been laid for them. His Excellency admitted, however, that there had been an idea of sending the fleet to visit Trebizond, as he claimed that the Government had a right to do.

I pointed out, should they do so, as long as German officers were on board, there was bound to be a certain risk of some incident occurring, in view of well-known desire of Germans to provoke trouble between Russia and Turkey. His Excellency did not demur to this opinion, and said that he would at once see the Grand Vizier in order to stop it.

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I have also seen Grand Vizier. His Highness said there was no intention of sending the *Goeben* into the Black Sea, and stated that the Minister of War must obtain the authorisation of the Cabinet before he could issue any such order.

No. 80.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 18, 1914.*

FOLLOWING telegram received from His Majesty's consul at Basra :

"I am informed officially by Turkish commodore that a British man-of-war is lying near boundary line in Shatt-el-Arab, whole of which is within Ottoman waters. Vali intends to ask the captain to allow wireless apparatus to be sealed and to leave, as more than twenty-four hours have elapsed since ship entered the river. Vali knows that I am informing you."

No. 81.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 18, 1914.*

FOLLOWING sent to Basra :

"Turkish authorities have, of course, no right to interfere with wireless on men-of-war."

No. 82.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 19, 1914.*

TURKISH military preparations.

In conversation with the President of the Chamber to-day, I said that if it was really Turkey's intention to go to war with Russia, I considered such a policy absolute madness.

President said that, even if Turkish fleet went into Black Sea, it would not be with any hostile intention towards Russia, with whom they were not going to war. I pointed out to him that Germany was pressing Turkey to send their fleet into the Black Sea with one object only, namely, that

war might be provoked by some incident. I therefore urged him most strongly against any such action. He said that he was against it, and that he saw the force of my argument, to which I replied that as the Minister of War was supreme it was unfortunately no guarantee that it would not be done. President told me that the Cabinet had their own policy, which was to remain neutral, and that they were all alive to the aims of Germany. I pressed him hard as to what was the policy of the Minister of War.

I do not regard situation as hopeless. Party in favour of neutrality is growing, but it would be unsafe to rely on their power to restrain war party.

I hear that 156 more mines and the minelayer *Ghairat* have been sent to Roumeli Kanak, on the Bosphorus. Turkish fleet went to Malki yesterday for review, and will probably remain there till next week, when the *Hamidieh* and *Messudiyeh* will be ready. German officers and men continue to arrive by train. It is probable that there are German reservists resident in Turkey who have been incorporated in Turkish army. Two hundred Germans arrived at the Dardanelles on September 17th.

Cavalry and horse artillery are reported to have moved from Erzeroum towards the frontier.

No. 83.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 20.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, September 20, 1914.

I BELIEVE that Minister of War is the only firebrand. Committee of Union and Progress is exercising a restraining influence. I think it is undoubted that party in favour of peace is daily increasing.

French Ambassador had a conversation yesterday with Minister of Marine. Latter assured his Excellency that Turkish Government were determined not to be drawn into war, to which His Excellency retorted that if this assurance was correct, it was difficult to understand why preparations to send Turkish fleet into Black Sea were being made. Minister of Marine replied that Council of Ministers had decided that two destroyers only should go into Black Sea and that the

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fleet should not go. He admitted that the Minister of War, who was generalissimo of the army and navy, had as a matter of fact ordered the fleet to go, but, as all orders had to pass through him as Minister of Marine, he had insisted that this order should be referred to the Council, with the result above stated.

As an illustration of the entire lack of control possessed by the Cabinet over the Minister of War and the Germans, if any further illustration is needed, I have to report that, despite this assurance from the Minister of Marine, the *Breslau* and three other smaller ships passed us this morning and entered the Black Sea. My Russian colleague trusts that no incident will happen and proposes to ignore this proceeding.

No. 84.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 21.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 20, 1914.*

I HAVE just had an animated interview with the Grand Vizier, and I am convinced that he is sincere. Other Ministers are all peaceably inclined, with the exception of the Minister of War. So long as the latter remains supreme an incident may occur at any moment. I tackled the Grand Vizier on the subject of the *Breslau* entering the Black Sea. He vehemently disclaimed any intention of attacking Russia, and said that Turkish Government had a right to send their fleet into the Black Sea if they wished to. I reminded him that neither the *Goeben* nor the *Breslau* were Turkish ships according to international law, and said that if they left the Dardanelles we would most certainly treat them as enemy ships. He replied that I had told him this often before, and there was no question of the ships leaving the Dardanelles. I then said that information had reached me that Council of Ministers, in order to avoid risk of an incident, had come to the wise decision that the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* should not go into the Black Sea; and yet, on the very day on which this decision had been reached by the Cabinet, it was totally disregarded by the Minister of War, as his Highness was doubtless aware. This showed how much control his Highness now exercised. Constantinople and the neighbourhood formed nothing more nor less than an armed German camp,

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and we all, including his Highness, were at the mercy of Liman Pasha¹ and the Minister of War. Many more German officers and men had arrived, and there must now be between 4,000 and 5,000 German soldiers and sailors here. Grand Vizier replied that he was determined to maintain peace, and that more adherents were joining the peace party every day. He would never allow Minister of War or anyone else to supersede him. Speaking with the utmost energy and even violence he assured me that, in spite of appearances, which he admitted looked bad, nothing would happen.

I said that doubtless peace party was growing, but, nevertheless, Minister of War was pushing forward warlike preparations uninterruptedly. I was receiving constant information respecting British official war news being stopped, cases of requisitions, &c., and I knew as a fact that intrigues against Egypt were being carried on. If his Highness could stop these things, why did he not do so, and when would he be able to do so? His Highness gave me to understand that if a crisis did come there would be a means of stopping Minister of War.

No. 85.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, September 21, 1914.*

INFORMATION respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt receives fresh corroboration. There has been no slackening of military preparation in Palestine and in Syria.

If Turkish preparations continue, it may become necessary to put patrols into Sinai and to support our posts in the peninsula. Action of forces in Egypt has been hitherto confined, as you are aware, to patrol of Suez Canal, but I think that Turkish Government should be warned that measures for the protection of the Egyptian frontier may become necessary.

¹ General Liman von Sanders, Head of the German Military Mission.

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No. 86.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 22, 1914.*

A LETTER was yesterday received by British postmaster from a subordinate official in the Turkish postal administration. In this letter postmaster was informed that foreign post offices in Turkey would be abolished as from October 1st next. I instructed British postmaster to return the letter, and to say that matter had been referred to his Ambassador.

This discourteous manner of communication was my first official information of any intention to abolish foreign post offices in Turkey. I accordingly saw Grand Vizier at once, and said that I resented the manner of communication, and had instructed British postmaster to return the letter. Post offices did not depend upon the Capitulations, and if Turkish Government wished to see the system modified, they should approach His Majesty's Government through the usual diplomatic channel. I warned him that His Majesty's Government would not allow themselves to be ignored in this manner, and I would not, unless by your instructions, consent to summary closing of British post offices on October 1st unless Turkish Government had given guarantees for safeguarding British interests. His Highness said that Great Britain was not aimed at specially. A similar communication had been addressed to all the Powers. I said I was indifferent as to view of the matter taken by my French and Russian colleagues, nor had I yet had time to ascertain what they thought. Grand Vizier assured me that until an understanding had been come to with His Majesty's Government nothing further would be done in the matter.

I would observe that, in my opinion, considerable modification of existing system cannot properly be resisted. If Russian and French Ambassadors agree, may I come to some arrangement on the lines of consenting to incorporation of the British post office as a section of the Ottoman post, if the latter will undertake to take over some of present British employés? I think we might also consent to use Turkish stamps.

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No. 87.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 22, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 25th August.¹

Sultan received me yesterday in audience, when I delivered the King's message. His Majesty expressed his earnest desire for good relations with Great Britain, and emphatically declared his firm intention of maintaining peace. He requested me to thank the King for his message. Full report follows by despatch.

No. 88.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 23, 1914.*

POLITICAL situation in Turkey.

His Majesty's Government regard state of things at Constantinople as most unsatisfactory. On behalf of His Majesty's Government you should speak in the following sense to the Grand Vizier :

British Government contemplate no hostile act towards Turkey by British fleet, and they have no desire to precipitate a conflict with her. But the fact that Great Britain has not taken any hostile action against her must not mislead Turkish Government into supposing that His Majesty's Government consider Turkey's attitude is consistent with the obligations imposed upon her by the neutrality which she has officially declared. German officers and men are participating increasingly in Turkish fleet and Dardanelles defences, and not only has Turkey failed to send away the German officers and crews, as she promised, but she has admitted more overland, and they are now in active control of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*. The capital is undoubtedly now under the control of the Germans. If His Majesty's Government so desired, present state of things affords ample justification for protesting against violation of neutrality. Great Britain has not, however, so far taken action, as she cherishes the hope that the peace party will win the day.

¹ See No. 34.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

It should, however, be realised by the Grand Vizier and his supporters that unless they soon succeed in getting the situation in hand and bringing it within the limits of neutrality, it will become clear that Constantinople is no longer under Turkish but German control, and that open hostility will be forced on by Germany.

No. 89.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 24, 1914.*

I HEAR that Egyptian frontier has been violated by armed mounted Arabs said to be encouraged by Turkish troops, and also that Hedjaz line is being reserved for troops. British military authorities consider that breach of the peace on Egyptian frontier is imminent, whether with or without sanction of Turkish Government. You should bring these facts to the knowledge of the Grand Vizier and of the Khedive, who is at present at Constantinople.

No. 90.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)

(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 24, 1914.*

TURKISH preparations against Egypt.

I have addressed a note to the Grand Vizier recapitulating information recently received on this subject. I reminded His Highness of the assurances which I had several times given him, based upon your telegram of 7th August,¹ and I specially pointed out their conditional nature. Finally I warned him that the information respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt would infallibly produce a most serious impression upon His Majesty's Government.

I later communicated the contents of my note to President of the Council, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Interior, and asked them what explanation they could give, whereupon they enquired why so many thousand Indian troops were being sent to Egypt by His Majesty's Government. To this I answered that it was essential to ensure

¹ See No. 5.

the safety of Egypt and the protection of the Suez Canal, and that as the British garrison of Egypt had been sent to France, it was necessary to replace it by British Indian troops. This seemed to satisfy them.

I cannot believe that they are not alive to the disastrous consequences of going to war with us, or that they seriously can contemplate an expedition against Egypt. They have undoubtedly been strongly urged to send such an expedition by the Germans, and I think that they have allowed preparations to be made, partly to profit as much as possible by German connection and by allowing the Germans to think that they will act, and partly in order to be ready, if Great Britain sustains a serious defeat by land or sea.

Danger of the present situation is obvious, and developments are not improbable, and I shall see the Grand Vizier this morning and endeavour to bring him to book. There is a circumstantial report that the Germans are now making desperate efforts to force the Turks' hands and to compel them to fulfil their part of the bargain, but that at the same time their efforts are meeting with considerable resistance.

No. 91.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 24, 1914.*

I HAVE informed the Grand Vizier that Austro-German intrigues to involve Turkey in an expedition against Egypt are within my knowledge. Grand Vizier denied that such intrigues existed, but he finally admitted that pressure was being exerted. He declared that he was firmly resolved to keep out of any such intrigue, any complicity in which he disclaimed with emphasis. I strongly urged His Highness to make his position clearer, for preparations at the Dardanelles showed that he was either guilty of complicity or that he was not master in his own house. He answered that his intentions were entirely pacific, and that he did not mean to engage in any quarrel with Great Britain.

His Highness seemed more preoccupied with the Balkan situation at the moment than with anything else. He said that Turkish Government would be unable to refrain from

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an attempt to get back what they had lost in Balkan wars if Balkan complications ensued. No arguments of mine would induce him to change his attitude in this respect. He said he would be powerless to prevent it.

No. 92.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 25.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, September 25, 1914.*

TURKISH preparations on Sinai frontier.

Two thousand men with stores passed Gaza on night of September 18th following coast towards frontier. Six more battalions are expected at Gaza. In that neighbourhood very strong and secret military preparations are being made on the frontier. Three battalions of Redif completely mobilised have marched to a place one day south of Jaffa on their way to the frontier.

No. 93.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 25, 1914.*
ABOLITION of post offices.

You should make the best arrangements you can with regard to post offices, but it must be on record that we reserve the subject for future settlement, and that we do not agree to their abolition.

No. 94.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 25, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 23rd September.¹

I have again seen Grand Vizier, and pointed out to him as earnestly as is within my power the fatal result to the Turkish Empire of persisting in a course of veiled hostility and petty intrigue against the British Empire. I recalled to him that time and again he had undertaken that the

¹ See No. 88.

German crews of the *Goeben* and the *Breslau* should be sent out of Turkey, and that not only had these promises been broken, but further German officers and men had actually arrived. This proved conclusively that he was either insincere in his assurances or that he was powerless. His Highness begged that I would credit him with the fact that for eight weeks he had kept the peace. He assured me that he had every intention of seeing to it that peace was maintained. I replied that it was not his good intentions that I doubted, but I did distinctly doubt his ability to control the situation. The Germans had evidently gained complete control. An incident might happen at any moment, and the most serious consequences might be involved. His Highness was evidently nettled at what I said, and angrily replied that he was determined to keep the peace, and that, in a matter of peace and war, he was absolute master. This I met by referring him to the serious character of the preparations at present on foot, and by pointing out that, whether he wished it or not, a repetition of the Arab raid across the Egyptian frontier might lead to incidents which would involve him. His Highness said that Minister of War was returning to-day, and that he would at once ask what the preparations were to which I referred. He asserted with violence that no incident would occur.

I have also seen Halill Bey, to whom news of preparations against Egypt seemed to be unknown. He expressed astonishment to hear of them, and was evidently horrified at the idea of war with us. He promised to go and see the Minister of War at once.

Position of Grand Vizier is difficult, and, to maintain any kind of control, he is obliged to shut his eyes to much that is going on. I am still strongly of opinion that, unless some act of gross antagonism takes place, we should maintain policy of reserve and abstain from making categorical demands with which his Highness is not yet able to reply, continuing to devote all our efforts towards preventing Turkey from taking active part in hostilities which German and especially Austrian Ambassadors are urging. Main fact of the situation is that, in spite of great pressure, Grand Vizier has kept the peace, and that his party is gaining ground.

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No. 95.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 25, 1914.*

ON September 22nd and 23rd, 183 horses, 112 nizam, 2 officers, and 88 carts and carriages, all from Aintab, were entrained at Aleppo for Damascus.

Secret notice was given that in six days' time 120 railway waggons were to be in readiness to convey to Damascus troops arriving from Mosul via Tel Abiyat, and that in all from 25,000 to 30,000 troops were to be drafted from Mosul to Aleppo, of which at least half are destined for Hama or Damascus.

Two Germans connected with Bagdad Railway, one of whom is an expert in blasting operations and mine-laying, left Aleppo this morning for Damascus, the other telling his servant that they were going to Akaba. They had with them 1,600 dynamite cartridges and 1,500 metres of detonating wires. They may, perhaps, be commissioned to lay mines in Red Sea as there has been talk of Turkish military designs regarding Akaba recently.

No. 96.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 26, 1914.*

GRAND VIZIER has been informed of the information reported by Mr. Cheetham in his telegram of September 25th,¹ and in my telegram of the same date.² I warned his Highness that if these preparations against Egypt were allowed to continue, serious consequences would ensue. Minister of War was with Grand Vizier when I made these representations, and his Highness informed me that he fully realised the importance of the question, with which he was occupying himself. I have taken steps to enlighten influential people with what is being done as regards Egypt, and I have seen Minister of Interior and left a memorandum with him on the subject; I have also put the facts before other prominent members of the Cabinet.

¹ See No. 92.

² See No. 95.

No. 97.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)
(Telegraphic.) ~~1914~~ Constantinople, September 27, 1914.

AN incident has occurred outside the Dardanelles. At 6 o'clock this evening I heard that a Turkish destroyer was stopped last night outside the Dardanelles and turned back by one of our destroyers. Upon this, Commandant of the Dardanelles closed the Straits. When the news arrived, the Russian and French Ambassadors were with me, and we at once went to see the Grand Vizier. When I arrived the Grand Vizier was in a state of some perturbation. He said sudden action of British fleet had given rise to the belief that an immediate attack was contemplated. Having reassured his Highness that any such belief was unfounded, I said that it seemed to me highly desirable that the Dardanelles should be opened at once, for should the incident become known, it would certainly create the impression that some desperate step was intended by Turkish Government. I explained to his Highness that we were naturally apprehensive lest Germans on Turkish destroyers might endeavour to torpedo or mine our ships, and that it was for that reason that British fleet had been instructed to prevent any Turkish ships from leaving the Dardanelles, so long as any German officers or crews remained.

Grand Vizier asserted that he, personally, favoured the reopening of the Straits, and he requested me to assure His Majesty's Government, in the most formal and solemn manner, that Turkish Government would never make war upon Great Britain. I said that if the accounts that I had received were accurate, Turkish action on Egyptian frontier required explanation, where they had already committed acts of war. He said that facts had been greatly exaggerated; that I might rest assured that there would be no more acts of aggression; that there was no thought or question of attacking Egypt; and that orders had been sent for the immediate withdrawal of raiding Bedouins. He added that mobilisation was general, and therefore included those parts of the Empire contiguous to Egypt. He has promised to send a formal answer to my representations on the subject.

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No. 98.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 27, 1914.*

MY telegram of to-day.¹

I have just received a message from the Grand Vizier that, if His Majesty's Government will move the fleet a little further from the entrance to the Dardanelles, the Straits will be reopened. I said that I would ask for your instructions.

No. 99.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received September 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, September 29, 1914.*

DARDANELLES.

Germans are making capital out of closure of the Straits, and I hear on good authority that great pressure is being exerted by them to induce Turkey to attack Russia in the Black Sea. Turks have, however, refused so far to fall in with this scheme.

Great umbrage has been caused to the Turks by fact that it was upon the German Ambassador's order that the *Breslau* went into the Black Sea the other day.

Grand Vizier is most anxious to reopen the Straits, and has again begged me this morning to let him know whether His Majesty's Government would not consent to move British fleet a little further off.

No. 100.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 29, 1914.*

INFORMATION has reached His Majesty's Government that Turkish Minister of War telegraphed to Bin Saud, Emir of Nejd, several times towards the end of July that, owing to the imminence of war in Europe, arms, ammunition, and officers for training his Arabs were being sent to him.

Vali of Basra has been informed by Turkish Minister of

¹ See No. 97.

War that thirty-two secret emissaries, including German officers, are on their way to preach a "jihad" in India, Afghanistan, and Baluchistan; that arms and ammunition are being sent to Basra under German flag, and that Turkish Government are prepared to help Germany in return for assistance received during Balkan war.

No. 101.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 29, 1914.*

UNDER instructions from his Government, Turkish Ambassador has reverted to the continued presence in the Shatt-el-Arab of H.M.S. *Odin*. Tewfik Pasha said that we would doubtless observe the rules of neutrality in other countries, since we had gone to war to defend the neutrality of Belgium. I informed him that, as Turkey had violated the rules of neutrality on her own initiative, and so long as she persisted in her present unneutral attitude, His Majesty's Government did not admit that she could appeal to those rules.

In the event of your being approached on this matter by the Grand Vizier, you should state that His Majesty's Government will observe neutrality towards Turkey, if Turkey will do so towards us, and you should inform him of the reply which has been given to Turkish Ambassador.

No. 102.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, September 30, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of 27th September¹ and subsequent telegrams.

Dardanelles were closed unnecessarily by Turkish authorities, and there is no reason why they should not be reopened. Turkish Government are well aware that we have no intention of initiating any aggressive action against Turkey.

The watch maintained by British fleet outside Dar-

¹ See No. 97

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danelles cannot be withdrawn so long as German officers and men remain in Turkish waters and are in control of Turkish fleet. Until, therefore, the German officers and crews are repatriated, the request that the fleet should be moved cannot be entertained.

You should inform Grand Vizier.

No. 103.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 2.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 1, 1914.

CONSUL at Basra reports to-day that British man-of-war has left Turkish waters.

He had previously telegraphed that he heard there was an intention to block Shatt-el-Arab in order to prevent departure of British man-of-war, and I had already called Grand Vizier's notice to this report.

No. 104.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 2, 1914.

INFORMATION continues to reach me corroborating reports of Turkish preparations against Egypt. Large transport camel corps arrived at Jerusalem yesterday, and I hear of transport of warlike materials, food-stuffs, and military stores on line Jenin-Nablus-Jerusalem, and also to Maan. Seven German military officers have been sent to Damascus and neighbourhood. This has stimulated preparations, and it is believed in Syria that Turkish Government has decided upon a movement against Egypt, Damascus division being assembled for advance by Akaba, Jerusalem division for that by Rafa. Inhabitants at Beirout and Haifa are being removed inland as a precautionary measure against any action which may be taken by British fleet when the advance on Egypt begins. It is reported from Haifa that localities along the coast are being garrisoned by newly-arrived troops. I have brought the gravity of the existing situation to the notice of the Grand Vizier in the strongest

terms in a further note, though I do not view any actual movement against Egypt as imminent at the moment. In my note I have informed His Highness that the measures now undertaken can have no reason except as a threat against Egypt, and that they can no longer be regarded as incidental to an ordinary mobilisation of troops in their peace stations, and I have stated that His Majesty's Government can only view any further preparations at Jerusalem or at Maan in a serious light.

In addition to above-mentioned military measures, movements of suspicious individuals have now been supplemented by those of a German naval officer named Hilgendorf, who is at present on his way from Damascus to Petra with a party of eight Germans. It is understood that they will be joined by a smaller party from Haifa viâ Amman, and that they are conveying a large supply of explosives. I have made representations to the Grand Vizier explaining that such hostile enterprises against Great Britain cannot be allowed in a neutral country, and that these people must be arrested.

Speaking generally, I am inclined to think that both in the neighbourhood of Constantinople, on the Black Sea, the Egyptian frontier, and elsewhere, the Turks intend to have their troops all ready for action at a favourable point should the general European situation afford a good opportunity. Should the German admiral take the *Goeben* into the Black Sea and attack the Russian fleet, or should things take an unfavourable turn for the Allies, Turkish troops would be in a position to cross the Egyptian frontier without much further delay. His Majesty's Government will doubtless consider what, if any, military measures are necessary for the strengthening of strategical points in the Sinai peninsula.

No. 105.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 3.)
Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 3, 1914.

CLOSING of Dardanelles.

Germans have certainly long been working for the closing of the Straits, presumably with the object of obtaining a

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freer hand in the Black Sea. There is every reason to suppose that the Dardanelles are closed to shipping not only by administrative act, but also effectively by mines. From information that reaches me from a reliable source, it seems that these mines have been laid by the Germans, and that the Turks are unaware of their position.

No. 106.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 4.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 4, 1914.*
HIS Majesty's consul at Basra telegraphs as follows dated 3rd October:—

“Warships in Shatt-el-Arab.

“I have received a letter from the Vali saying that your Excellency has been informed by the Turkish Government of the measures proposed to be adopted in Turkish waters with regard to foreign belligerent warships; he says that the Shatt-el-Arab from Fao to Durna is closed to foreign warships, being inland waters just as much as Smyrna and the Dardanelles. British men-of-war must therefore leave Shatt-el-Arab within twenty-four hours. Vali ends by saying that he will have to apply strict measures if I cannot induce captains of His Majesty's ships to go outside Fao. I told the Vali that I was asking for instructions from your Excellency, and I informed His Majesty's consul at Moham-merah of the gist of Vali's communication.

“It is possible that H.M.S. *Lawrence* may also be in the river.”

No. 107.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.
(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 4, 1914.*
DARDANELLES.

It is the Germans who keep the Straits closed, to the great detriment of Turkey. If you concur, you may point out to the Turks that the British fleet will move away as soon as the German officers and crews leave and the Turkish navy ceases to be under German control. We should then have no fear of hostile action on the part of the Turks.

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No. 108.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey—Received October 5.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 5, 1914.

TURKEY is now bankrupt. Supply of coal is, I am glad to say, cut off. Fresh provisions are not coming in, and there is some discontent in the navy and even in the army. Situation is doubtless very delicate, but Turks would be unlikely to go all lengths with Germany, at any rate until German success in the war seems more assured. I think that Turks are possibly less blind to their interests than is generally supposed, and I am still of opinion that situation may be saved. Time is now on our side, and I am strongly in favour of avoiding all occasion of conflict by temporising.

The question of reopening the Dardanelles is really no longer a practical one, for the Straits are now effectively closed by mines, and I am informed that their position is unknown to the Turks themselves.

Russian and French Ambassadors agree with me that our interests are not primarily affected by the closure, as the requisitioning and other measures taken by the Turks against our nationals had already stopped our trade. This is the line I am taking with the Turks. I think they will begin to realise the facts before long. Total cessation of imports is already causing anxiety to Minister of Finance, and Turkish Government will soon become aware that they are the chief losers. The Germans have closed the Straits from political motives, partly, no doubt, because they believe that, by closing the Straits and preventing the entry of the British fleet, it will be easier for them to induce the Turks to take action against Russia in the Black Sea; partly, no doubt, in order to injure the trade of the allies and to prevent communication by sea with Russia.

I think that self-interested designs of Germany are not unknown to the Turks, who are playing up to Germany, not with the intention of falling in with those designs, at any rate for the present, to the extent of making war, but in order to extract as much as possible from her. In the opinion of many people, Germans are now in a position to take matters into their own hands, if they think that German interests demand it. If, however, the Turks' game is such

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as I have outlined above, it is undoubtedly a dangerous one. As is only natural, Turkish Government profess their ability to check any attempt on the part of Germany to take matters into their own hands, but it is not quite clear how they would be able to prevent it.

No. 109.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 6.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 6, 1914.

MILITARY attaché had a long interview with Minister of War yesterday, from which he derived the impression that His Excellency had ambitious schemes in the Arab world and in Egypt. These may perhaps refer more to the future, and possibly measures are now being taken so as to prepare for the eventuality of Great Britain being worsted in war with Germany; meanwhile the way is being paved indirectly for present or future action. During the conversation, Minister of War disclaimed any intention on the part of the Turks of initiating, themselves, any offensive movements against Egypt, and pointed out that ordinary Syrian garrison had not been reinforced. He said that, as in the case of other troops within the Empire, Syrian garrison had been fully mobilised. It was being equipped with necessary transport animals, &c., on a war scale, and it was being carefully trained with the help of the officers of the German mission as elsewhere throughout Turkey. Everything, he said, depended on the political situation, for which he was not responsible individually; and it was quite possible that the Syrian army corps might finally be moved in another direction, even, perhaps, to Constantinople. He scouted the idea of individual Germans undertaking enterprises against the Suez Canal or elsewhere, but he admitted that proposals had certainly been made to the Bedouin tribes to enlist their sympathies as supporters of the Empire in all eventualities. He defended the concentration of stores at Maan, Nablus, and Jerusalem, and he added that no troops, but only gendarmes, had been moved in the direction of Gaza. Nevertheless, he could not deny that some of the measures taken were certainly precautionary against Great Britain, and in

justification of this he pointed to the entrance of British men-of-war into the Shatt-el-Arab, to the arrival of Indian troops in Egypt, and to the presence of the British fleet in Turkish territorial waters outside the Dardanelles. Military attaché said that, as far as the action of the fleet and of his Majesty's Government were concerned, this was due to infringement of neutrality by Turks, and Great Britain certainly had not the slightest intention of making any attack upon Turkey. It was quite ridiculous to suppose that the arrival of Indian troops in Egypt had anything to do with hostility to Turkey. Minister of War at once advanced such arguments as that Turkey had maintained her neutrality; that German officers and men on auxiliary ships were entirely under Turkish control, indeed they were in the Turkish service. Military attaché said that Turks could not be surprised that Great Britain should be pre-occupied if Turkish troops were assembled further south than Jerusalem or Beersheba on the one side, or Maan on the other.

No. 110.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 7.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 6, 1914.*

HIS Majesty's consul at Basra telegraphs to-day as follows :—

“Vali says that he must obey the orders which he has received. They are to the effect that the whole of the Shatt-el-Arab and sea within six miles of the shore are closed to warships, as they are territorial waters. Any men-of-war disregarding this prohibition will be fired upon by the guns at Fao. These regulations will be enforced from to-morrow evening, Wednesday, 7th October. They are somewhat obscure, but they mean that H.M.S. *Espiègle* in the Karun and H.M.S. *Dalhousie* at Abadan will be interned, unless they leave before the time fixed. No other British man-of-war is this side of Fao. H.M.S. *Lawrence* is in the Shatt-el-Arab to the best of my belief. His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah has been informed of the above.”

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NO. III.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 7, 1914.

BRITISH warships in the Shatt-el-Arab.

H.M.S. *Espidgle*, *Odin*, and *Dalhousie* are not in Turkish waters. There can be no question of their being ordered out by the Turkish Government. According to generally accepted principles of international law, Turkish territorial waters extend to 3 miles out to sea from the coast. Two of His Majesty's ships are being instructed to keep outside the 3-mile limit, while the remaining ship is being told to remain at Mohammerah, which does not belong to Turkey. Our long-established right to pass freely up and down Shatt-el-Arab at all times is not in question, and it must be recognised that we fully reserve that right.

NO. II2.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)

Sir,

Constantinople, September 22, 1914.

REFERRING to your telegram of 25th August,¹ in which I was authorised to convey to His Imperial Majesty a message from the King, on the occasion of my reception in audience after my return from leave of absence, I have the honour to state that I was received in audience by His Imperial Majesty yesterday.

In view of the difficulty of conversing with His Majesty in an ordinary way, I prepared a written statement containing the message, and I read a separate statement of my own on the subject of the withdrawal of Admiral Limpus, having previously arranged with the Master of the Ceremonies, who was to act as interpreter, that this should be translated clause by clause as I read it. I enclose a copy of these statements which I read as arranged, subject to some slight modifications necessitated by the turn which the interview took.

His Imperial Majesty seemed not only fully to grasp the sense of the communication, to which he listened with eager

¹ See No. 34.

attention, but responded to it immediately with great vivacity and vehemence, showing a considerable grasp of the issues with which his country is now confronted.

I was much impressed with the earnestness of His Imperial Majesty's repeated assurances of his desire and determination to maintain the ancient friendship between the two Empires and to avoid war with any Power.

A memorandum is enclosed recording what passed at my audience.

I have, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. II2.

*Communication read to the Sultan by Sir L. Mallet on
September 21, 1914.*

·(TRANSLATION.)

MY Sovereign has commanded me to express his profound regret to your Majesty that the exigencies of unforeseen circumstances have compelled his Government to detain the two warships intended for the Imperial Turkish Navy. His Majesty the King is aware of the painful impression that this action must have made upon your Majesty, but he thinks that the decision of his Government to return these vessels to Turkey at the end of the present war will suffice to convince you that their detention was due to no unfriendly intention towards an Empire bound to his by a friendship of more than a century. It is owing to the fact that this friendship has never been broken that my Sovereign trusts that Turkey will do nothing to prevent his Government from acting up to this decision, that she will maintain strict and absolute neutrality during the present war, and that there will be no delay in putting an end to certain facts contrary to neutrality which have caused some anxiety as to the attitude of the Turkish Government.

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ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 112.

*Statement by Sir L. Mallet with regard to Admiral Limpus
on September 22, 1914.*

(TRANSLATION.)

ADMIRAL LIMPUS, who, under your Majesty's auspices, has rendered such great services to the Turkish navy, has begged me to inform your Majesty of his regret that he was unable to pay his respects to your Majesty before leaving Constantinople. Your Majesty is aware of circumstances necessitating his departure from the moment when he and the naval mission under his command were relegated to a position in which they could do nothing further for the welfare of the Turkish navy. Recalled in these regrettable circumstances by my Government, Admiral Limpus was obliged to obey the orders of his superiors and to leave Constantinople within too short a space to be able to request an audience of your Majesty.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 112.

Memorandum.

THE Sultan listened to my communication in silence until the Master of the Ceremonies translated the clause containing the words "quelques faits contraires à la neutralité." He then broke in with an eager disclaimer of any unneutral conduct on the part of Turkey. On my mentioning, as a specific instance, the retention of German officers and crews on board the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, His Majesty explained with some lucidity that they had been kept for a short time to train the Turkish crews. The "captains" available in the Turkish navy were unequal to the task, and it was necessary for that reason to do what had been done. The German crews would be sent away in "five or ten days," and the officers also. Only one or two of the latter would be retained. He would speak frankly, he said. Great Britain was a great Power with a great navy, and had no need of the two ships of the Ottoman fleet. Great Britain had taken them, but he knew they would be given back at the end of the war. On my remarking that Great Britain wished to make absolutely sure of the position at sea, the

Sultan again said that she was too great a maritime Power to need these ships, but he once more stated his conviction that they would be given back. Anyhow, he and his Government were not going to depart from their neutrality. His Majesty repeated this once more, saying that they knew that that was the only path of safety, and that his great desire was to keep the peace. He laid stress on the friendship between Great Britain and Turkey. This was the more striking, because the words were not put into his mouth, as might be supposed, by myself, the Master of Ceremonies having quite failed to render the parts of my communication in which I dwelt on past relations between England and Turkey.

When, referring to what the Sultan had said about the need for training his navy, I expressed regret that the British naval mission had not been allowed to complete that task. His Majesty did not seem to grasp the main point, but on my referring to the circumstances of Admiral Limpus's departure, he broke in with some emotion, and said twice over that it was not by his wish that the admiral had left Constantinople without an audience. The admiral had not asked for one or come to the Palace. Had he done so he, the Sultan, would have postponed all other business in order to see him. I said I would convey this to Admiral Limpus. I also promised to communicate the Sultan's assurances, which I said I sincerely believed, to the King, who would be gratified at receiving them.

Just before I took my leave, his Majesty was good enough to express his warm personal regard, and made some further kind remarks about the value which he attached to his personal relations with me. The Sultan spoke throughout in the most homely language, but with great liveliness and point, and with obvious sincerity. His assurances about his desire to observe neutrality and remain at peace, rather lost than gained in force by the way in which the Master of Ceremonies (whose mind is slow and whose French is defective) translated them. His remarks on the embargo on the two ships were plainly, but not discourteously or resentfully, worded.

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NO. 113.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 7, 1914.*

BRITISH warships in Shatt-el-Arab.

Grand Vizier assured me this afternoon that Vali of Basra had been instructed to avoid all interference with His Majesty's ships in the Shatt-el-Arab.

NO. 114.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 8.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 7, 1914.*

THERE has been fighting during the last few days on frontier between Russian troops and Kurds supported by Turkish troops. Last night Russian Ambassador made strong representations to the Grand Vizier, and said that the Turkish Government must restrain the activities of their troops on the frontier. Furthermore, Russian consul had been arrested. Replying to these representations, Grand Vizier assured Russian Ambassador, in writing, that the consul should be released at once and that the fighting should cease. Russian Ambassador has certain information that Turks are being incited to fight by Germans and Austrians. His Excellency agrees with me that Grand Vizier is honestly exercising what influence he has in favour of peace, but it is doubtful if he has the power to restrain the military party under Enver Pasha.

NO. 115.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 11.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 10, 1914.*

IT is highly probable that for some time past money has been sent to Syria mainly with the object of subsidising the Bedouins. It is also supposed that the Germans in Syria have had sums of money with them. The following is the number of German military officers known to be in Syria at present: Seven who went there some time ago, of whom Colonel Kress von Kressenstein is one, four who arrived October 2nd at Damascus, and five more who arrived there

on October 6th. My information is to the effect that seven more may since have arrived at Alexandretta. Meanwhile, another party of Turkish sailors is leaving Constantinople overland for Bagdad and the Tigris. Information has just reached me from Damascus to the effect that Colonel von Kressenstein had gone to Maan to inspect, but only two military trains with details and stores had left in the last two days. West of the Jordan no movements had taken place. Two railway vans of dynamite had left Damascus for Beirout; 4,000 Mosul troops had reached Aleppo, but were waiting there for the present.

NO. 116.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 11, 1914.

IT seems to me that the key of the situation lies in Constantinople. It would be fatal to give way to Turkish demands beyond a certain point, especially in the Persian Gulf, but, nevertheless, I entirely share your view that His Majesty's Government should avoid giving even a plausible cause of offence to Turkey. I think that our attitude during the past eight weeks has shown irrefutably that we desire to avoid a rupture with Turkey.

NO. 117.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 12, 1914.

I HAVE received note dated October 11th from Porte, of which following is substance :

From information received by Porte, two British men-of-war have one after the other passed up the Shatt-el-Arab to anchor at Mohammerah.

According to Treaty of Erzeroum, the town of Mohammerah and its port belong to Persia, whilst Shatt-el-Arab is under Turkish domination.

This principle was re-affirmed by Turco-British Declaration of July 29th, 1913, which specifies that from Nahr

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Nazaille, above Mohammerah, frontier follows river to sea, leaving under Turkish sovereignty river itself and all the islands except ten, and modern port and anchorage of Mohammerah. This port and the anchorage thus formed an enclave in Ottoman waters which must be traversed in order to reach them. Consequently men-of-war in question have not respected Imperial territory in penetrating into her internal waters and have disregarded neutrality of the Porte, whose duty it is not to allow passage of foreign men-of-war.

On these grounds the Porte asks me to cause instructions to be sent to commanders of men-of-war in question to leave the port of Mohammerah within eight days and to go to sea.

No. 118.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 12, 1914.

MY despatch of October 4th.¹

I have received note from the Porte in reply to my note of October 2nd respecting Turkish preparations against Egypt.

It says that military activity in Syria is common to all provinces of the Empire, and is natural consequence of mobilisation, having no other object than to put Turkey on a footing to defend her neutrality. Turkey's position being one of simple and legitimate precautions, it will be readily recognised that it would not be conceivable that she should change it in order to attack Egypt, which is one of her own provinces.

The Porte goes on to observe that, although I have on several occasions assured Grand Vizier that His Majesty's Government have no intention of altering status of Egypt, yet declaration that Egypt is in a state of war, dismissal of German and Austrian agents, who receive their exequaturs from the Porte, and above all arrival in Egypt of important contingents from India as well as other acts, have attracted serious attention of Imperial Government and have created real anxiety.

Note concludes by reiterating to me assurance that

¹ Received on October 19th. See No. 143.

Turkey has no hostile intention towards any Power whatever, and that military preparations have purely and exclusively defensive character.

I think that it would be right to remind Grand Vizier that I have always made it perfectly clear that undertaking not to change the status of Egypt was conditional on Turkey maintaining strict neutrality.

No. 119.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 12, 1914.*

THIS morning Turkish fleet left Constantinople and steamed into the Black Sea.

No. 120.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 12.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 12, 1914.*

I DO not think that we could now leave Mohammerah without loss of prestige. In view of receipt of Vali's note respecting presence of British men-of-war in the Shatt-el-Arab, effect of moving His Majesty's ships at the request of the Turkish Government, once they were sent to Mohammerah, might have led the Arabs to misinterpret the action of His Majesty's Government.

I would not regard the note in the light of an ultimatum, though it is not impossible that Turks might close the channel, and thus prevent His Majesty's ships from going out, except in agreement with the Turkish authorities.

General belief is that Germans are at present applying considerable pressure upon the Turks to take part in the war, but that the Turks are so far resisting. My anxiety is lest the resistance which the Minister of War is encountering from the Moderates should be weakened by any act on our part which could be interpreted as aggressive by the Turks. Enver Pasha is said to be in favour of immediate co-operation with the Germans.

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No. 121.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 12, 1914.*

MY telegram of October 12th.¹

I have informed Grand Vizier that I was surprised to receive his Highness's note, inviting His Majesty's ships to leave Mohammerah within eight days. I knew his Highness had no intention of creating difficulties, but it sounded almost like an ultimatum. Mohammerah was, as his Highness was aware, a Persian port. Grand Vizier replied at once that there was no question of an ultimatum. I explained His Majesty's Government's point of view, and he said that he was at present awaiting your reply to Turkish note.

In the course of ensuing conversation, His Highness seemed as confident as ever that he was able to resist German pressure, and he repeated that he was absolutely determined to avoid war in any case.

In reply to some observations of mine in regard to Turkish fighting recently reported in Persia, he said that strict orders had been sent that no Turkish troops were to cross the frontier.

No. 122.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 13.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 13, 1914.*

CONSULAR officer at Basra telegraphs as follows:

"I have been notified by Vali that H.M.S. *Espiègle* must be interned until the end of the war unless she departs from Mohammerah and the Shatt-el-Arab within eight days from the 11th instant. If she attempts to leave after the expiration of the said period, her passage through the Shatt-el-Arab will be stopped by force of arms. The *Dalhousie* departed several days ago.

"I have informed His Majesty's consul at Mohammerah of the Vali's communication."

¹ See No. 117.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

No. 123.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 13, 1914.

YOUR telegram of October 12th.¹

Your Excellency should make the following reply to the Turkish note protesting against the presence of British men-of-war in the Shatt-el-Arab :

“As regards the passage through the Shatt-el-Arab to and from the port of Mohammerah, His Majesty's Government maintain in principle the legitimacy of such passage, but express themselves quite ready to examine in a friendly spirit any representation that the Ottoman Government may make on the subject, if the Sublime Porte themselves strictly observe their neutrality, which they have gravely violated by continuing to retain the German officers and crews on the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, in spite of all assurances and promises to the contrary.

“His Majesty's Government are prepared to respond in a conciliatory spirit whenever the Ottoman Government shall have conformed, as a neutral, to the principles of international law prescribing the duties of neutral Powers.

“As regards the presence of British warships at the port of Mohammerah, this is a matter with which the Sublime Porte is in no wise concerned, since Mohammerah is not in Ottoman territory ; Porte have, therefore, no right to request their departure.”

No. 124.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 14.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 14, 1914.

MOSLEMS in Aleppo district are reported to have been so inveigled and incited by German and Turkish deliberate official misrepresentations and falsehoods of every kind that masses seem to believe German Emperor has embraced Islamic faith, and that Germans are fighting for Islam against Russia.

¹ See No. 117.

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No. 125.

*Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)
Cairo, September 30, 1914.*

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to transmit to you herewith copies of two interrogatories which I have received from the Adviser to the Ministry of the Interior, regarding the case of Lieutenant Robert Mors, a German employé of the Alexandria City Police, who was arrested on his return from leave, via Constantinople. He explained his return by stating that he had been excused from military service in Germany.

I have, &c.,

MILNE CHEETHAM.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 125.

Interrogatories of Lieutenant Mors.

(1.)

MULAZIM AWAL ROBERT CASIMIR OTTO MORS, Egyptian Police, examined, states:

“At Constantinople I was acquainted with a German official who was formerly in the German diplomatic agency in Cairo. This gentleman, whose name I must refuse to give, was in agreement with the Turkish Government on the subject of military operations in Egypt, and as he knew that I knew Egypt very well, he conducted me to Enver Pasha, the Turkish Minister of War. The latter questioned me on the military situation; if it were true that the British had disarmed the Egyptian army, &c. I replied that I did not know, and thought it unlikely. I then left the presence of Enver, and he remained talking with the German official. I forgot to mention that he asked me if I would participate in operations in Egypt. I replied that I would only participate in open military action. I was afterwards informed by the German official that Enver had sent officers from the Turkish army to Egypt to prepare native public opinion for action in favour of Turkey. I also heard from the German official that one of Enver's emissaries was an officer of the Egyptian

army, but I did not know his name then. I must mention here that I understood from various things and from conversations that I overheard between the said German official and various people that he had the intention of sending printed matters and explosives to Egypt. I also understood that it was the Egyptian army officer who was charged with the transport of these things. We were held up in the Dardanelles for six days owing to the wreck of a cargo boat. On the second we were stopped there; the 'Bash Reis' (boatswain) of the 'Saidieh' brought me a small leather bag (which I recognised as being the property of the said German official), and told me that somebody on board had given it to him to give to the passenger in No. 7 cabin, viz., my cabin. At the same time the 'Bash Reis' asked me if it belonged to me. I said 'Yes,' because I began to suspect that the contents of the bag were the explosives that I had heard about. I opened the bag and found it was half full of packing material; and on probing it I found there were hard substances underneath. I thought that if I said that the sack did not belong to me it might be handed over to the ship's captain, and it would then be discovered what the contents were, and an accident might even occur. I did not know at this time that the 'Bash Reis' had guilty knowledge of the contents of the bag, and therefore told him that there was nothing in it. I then took it into my cabin to examine it, and found the two tin boxes which you seized. Whilst we were still in the Dardanelles—as far as I can remember it was the fourth day there—the Egyptian officer came to me and said in Arabic: 'Are you not the passenger occupying No. 7 cabin?' I said: 'Yes; why?' and he said: 'Have you received the things?' ('Wasal-lak el shay?') I replied: 'Was it you who sent it to me?' He said: 'Perhaps' ('Yimkin.')

"I then said: 'What have such things to do with me?' He said: 'I cannot keep such things myself.' I then asked him who gave them to him. He replied: 'Fouad.' I do not know who this Fouad is exactly, but it is possibly Ahmad Fouad at Constantinople, whom I have seen with the German official, and who is an intimate friend of Sheikh Abd-el-Aziz Shawish, according to all reports. He then told me his name was Ahmad Hamuda, and that he had fought against the Italians in Tripoli. He showed me his card, on which

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was written: 'Ahmad Hamuda, Officer of the Egyptian Army.' I do not remember if the card bore his rank or not. I saw Ahmad Hamuda Effendi after leaving Piræus, when he came and asked me what I had done with the tin boxes. I understood, from the way he put it, that he wanted to take them from me, but this is only an idea I had. I told him I had thrown them overboard. When we were anchored in the harbour, he again came and asked me to take his revolver ashore. I replied that I had my own revolver, and that I should be searched like everybody else. He then asked me if they would search his wife. I said: 'Naturally; they have female searchers at the Customs.'

"I had the intention of throwing the tin boxes overboard, but I was afraid that they might explode on striking the water. I therefore procured some cord with which I meant to lower them into the water. I never got a chance, and I was afraid that the propeller would catch the cord, and the steamer might be blown up or damaged.

"Another thing which deterred me was that I was afraid the boxes might float and be dangerous to shipping, so I postponed it until our arrival at Smyrna, where I telegraphed to the German official at Constantinople stating that two tin boxes with unknown contents had been handed to me, and I desired instructions. At Piræus I received a telegram telling me to throw them overboard, which, for the reasons I have just given, I again postponed."

Q. Have you any witnesses to prove that the boatswain gave you the bag containing the tin boxes?—A. Yes, a certain Fortunato, the cabin steward, was present, and I gave him the bag with the packing after removing the tin boxes, asking him to throw the packing overboard. He did so, and returned me the bag.

On arrival in port here I gave the tin boxes to Mohamed Ali, the purser, and asked him to keep them with him until he had a chance to throw them overboard without being observed by the various launches. I also recommended him not to throw them from the deck, but to descend the gangway and drop them into the sea carefully after weighting them with a piece of iron. I told him they contained dangerous substances, and to be very careful. I noticed he seemed afraid, and told him if he did not wish to do it he should give

them back to me. He said he did not mind doing it, and if I wished he would pass them through the Customs for me without difficulty.

Q. Why did you select Mohamed Ali for the mission?—

A. Because I heard at Piræus that he was a Turkish agent.

Q. From whom did you hear this?—*A.* From a Turk at the German consulate at Piræus.

Q. How did you meet this Turk?—*A.* He was introduced to me by the German vice-consul.

Q. What is his name? *A.* I do not remember. He gave me his visiting card, and I destroyed it.

Q. How did you approach Mohamed Ali on the subject?—

A. I showed him the visiting card of the Turk, to which he said at once, salaaming with his hand, "Ahlan wa Sahlan."

Q. Where did you procure the map of the Suez Canal?—

A. It was given to me by the German official.

Q. Why did he give you the map?—I do not know. We were talking together, and he showed me the map. I admired it, and he told me to take it.

Q. Where did you get the cypher found with your effects?—*A.* I invented it with the assistance of the German official, for correspondence with him at Constantinople.

Q. Where is the key to it?—*A.* I destroyed it.

Q. Can you tell me what it was?—*A.* It was to let him know if the Egyptian army had been disbanded; if there were difficulties for me here to enter the country; by what route I intended to return, &c.

R. MORS.

Alexandria, September 28, 1914.

(2.)

Enquiry into Mors's Case, held on September 28, 1914.

1. *Mors interrogated.*

Q. Can you explain this telegram (telegram addressed to "Prill, Bacos, Bulkely, Alexandria," from Schneider)?—

A. No. You must ask the French lady who is staying with us ("il faut demander à Mademoiselle chez nous"), as it is a private telegram of hers. It seems to be asking news of her health.

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Q. Who is Schneider?—A. I do not know.

Q. Who is Omar Fawzi and Suliman Askari?—A. Two officers I met in Constantinople whom the German introduced to me.

Q. Where did you meet them?—A. At the hotel Tokatlian in Constantinople.

Q. What is the name of this German official?—A. I do not know.

Q. When was he in Cairo?—A. Two years ago.

Q. Was this your first visit to Constantinople?—A. Yes.

Q. Did you know this gentleman before?—A. No.

Q. You realise that your position is a serious one?—A. Yes.

Q. You refuse to give his name?—A. Yes.

Q. Can you tell me the name of the Turk whom you met in Alexandria?—A. I must refuse, but if you suggest his name I will tell you if you are right or wrong.

Q. Do you deny that the German official is Baron Oppenheim?—A. Yes; Oppenheim is at Berlin.

Q. Do you know Baron Oppenheim?—A. I have never seen, but often heard of him. He is over 50 years of age. According to Berlin opinion, he is merely a "blagueur," and of no importance.

Q. Did you see Ezzedin Fawzi in Constantinople?—A. No; he had left before I arrived.

Q. What did he do there?—A. I do not know. I heard from my sister-in-law that he had left for Constantinople. He was charged with my private affairs.

Q. Was not this rather a serious arrangement to make?—A. No; he was always a great friend of mine.

Q. Do you know his political opinions?—A. No.

Q. You appear to have had some previous knowledge of the preparation of explosives for use in Egypt?—A. I heard in Constantinople that something of the nature of explosives were to be prepared and sent to Egypt.

Q. What was the ultimate destination of these things?—A. I don't know. I was only three days at Constantinople.

Q. Have these explosives penetrated into Egypt?—A. I don't know. Perhaps other emissaries arrived in Egypt at the same time as I did.

Q. Who is Fahmy Bey?—A. Mohamed Bey Fahmy,

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Master of Ceremonies in the Khedive's household, who arrived in Constantinople in the *Saidieh*.

Q. How did you get to know him?—A. He rented our house three years ago.

Q. Who sent you this telegram?—A. It was the answer to my telegram.

Q. Why did you send the first telegram?—A. To see if it were possible and advisable, in view of the reported state of things in Egypt, for me to return here, or if it would be better for my family to join me there.

Q. Is this the bag you brought with you?—A. Yes.

Q. Who sent it to you?—A. I do not know. The boat-swain brought it to me saying it was for whoever occupied cabin No. 7. Probably Ahmed Hamuda gave it to him to give to me.

Q. Did you see Enver Pasha in Constantinople?—A. Yes. I had a conversation with him.

Q. How was it that you had this conversation?—A. The German official introduced me to Enver at the War Office.

Q. What did Enver Pasha say to you?—A. He questioned me as to the state of affairs in Egypt.

Q. Is the German official a German naval officer?—A. No.

Q. Did Enver Pasha express any opinions?—A. He said that he wanted a campaign against Egypt, should war break out, for which two army corps would be required.

Q. What did he want you to do here?—A. He asked me if I would help.

Q. What did you reply?—A. I agreed to do so in the event of a military expedition.

Q. Who gave you the idea that explosives were being prepared to be sent to Egypt?—A. I suspected the German officer, whom I saw with an Egyptian Effendi unknown to me.

Q. How did Ahmed Hamuda get to know you?—A. He came to see me on the voyage—in the Dardanelles, I think.

Q. Why did he trust you?—A. I do not know.

Q. Had you made no previous promises?—A. No.

Q. Whom did you see at the Piræus?—A. The consul, where I saw the telegrams and the Turkish gentleman who told me of Mohamed Ali, the purser.

Q. Why did you send this telegram?—A. Because I knew

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something was being prepared, and suspected that the bag had some connection with it. Besides, there were several emissaries on board, and there had been many circulars in the hotels in Constantinople.

Q. Who were these emissaries?—A. I do not know, but I heard that Sheikh Shawish had said there were thirteen who had left.

Q. Will you explain how you knew of these preparations?—A. Through the German official and various people I met casually at odd times. The German official arrived in Constantinople from Berlin the day before me.

Q. Did Omar Fawzi speak to you of Egypt?—A. Yes; he said he had fought in Tripoli and had been to Egypt where he had many friends.

Q. Where did you meet the Turk at Piræus?—A. At the German consulate.

Q. Have you ever visited Tchiboukli Palace?—A. No.

Q. Why did you write Omar Fawzi's name in the piece of paper?—A. Because I had to meet him at the "Petit Champs," a restaurant in Constantinople, and I wished to remember.

Q. Will you explain what the code found in your tarbush was?—A. The references to cotton were information about troops, the best quality denoted British and the inferior Native soldiers. Kantars referred to the number of men. Certain phrases referred to the disarmament of Egyptian troops. "Suis disposé," I recollect, meant that I should return.

Q. When did you want to leave the country?—A. As soon as possible, for I understood that all Germans serving under foreign Governments had to resign.

Q. What did "venez par le premier bateau" mean?—A. That things were in a dangerous state here.

Q. And No. 15?—A. "Don't come to Turkey."

Q. "Ne venez pas-tout arrangé"?—A. I have forgotten.

Q. "Venez de suite"?—A. I have forgotten.

Q. "Bébé va mieux"?—A. I have forgotten—all this was made up hurriedly before I left Constantinople during the last half-hour when I was packing my luggage. I did not look at it again before I destroyed the key; it is now three weeks since I left Constantinople.

Q. How is it that you know some of the expressions and not others?—A. In view of what I have explained, it seems clear. Those referring to the “*Santé de la famille*” refer to Turkish officers, but I cannot remember the details.

Q. Did it refer to their going to the Red Sea?—A. I don’t know, but I have an idea it was with a view to finding out what difficulties were placed in the way of Turkish officers in Egypt.

Q. Who was to have taken charge of the explosives here?—A. The agents of Sheikh Shawish.

Q. Who?—A. I do not know.

Q. Did you not know that the German official was going to give you these things?—A. No.

Q. How did you recognise the bag?—A. I saw it in the hotel at Constantinople and recognised the repair which I had seen at a restaurant in the hands of an effendi.

Q. How did you get to know so many people?—A. I met them casually at the hotel and the German Embassy, where I called and learnt that it was difficult to get to Egypt.

Q. How did you meet the German official?—A. I met him at the embassy.

2. Boatswain interrogated.

Q. Have you seen this bag before?—A. Yes. I first saw it on board the *Saidieh* in Constantinople on September 3rd with a sailor called Ali, who asked me to give it to the occupant of cabin No. 7.

Q. Where was it given to you?—A. I think on deck. I told Ali that he had better give it to a steward in the first class, which he did. The next morning Mors asked me who had given me the bag.

Q. Why should Mors have asked you this? How was it that he connected the bag with you?—A. Because I told the steward to give it to him, and perhaps he told Mors so.

Q. When did Mors speak to you?—A. The next morning at about 8 a.m. He brought me the bag and asked me who gave it to me, as he wanted to give me a tip. I refused the latter as it was not I who brought the bag.

Q. Who gave Ali the bag?—A. He told me an Arab did so.

Q. Was the latter on the steamer?—A. I do not know.

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3. *Mors and Boatswain confronted.*

Q. (To Mors.) Who brought you this bag?—A. This boatswain with the steward.

Q. Did you offer the boatswain a tip?—A. Yes, but he refused it.

Q. Why did you want to give it to him if the bag was not yours?—A. I accepted the bag for the reasons I have already given you.

Q. Why offer him a tip?—A. For the sake of my friend, and because I did not want the matter exposed.

Q. Who gave him the bag?—A. I do not know, but it must have been Ahmad Hamuda.

Q. (To the Boatswain.) Do you know Ahmad Hamuda?—A. No.

Alexandria, September 29, 1914.

No. 126.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 14, 1914.*

THE whole of the Turkish fleet has re-entered the Bosphorus.

The *Leros* and *Erissos*, two German steamers which have been convoyed from Sulina by the *Breslau*, sailed under the Turkish flag until they were inside the Bosphorus. The same thing was done on a former occasion, when two ships from Black Sea ports were similarly convoyed by the *Breslau*.

No. 127.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 14, 1914.*

ABOUT 600 Moslem "fedahis," dressed in various guises, have arrived at Aleppo in batches during past fortnight, their head being an officer related to Ottoman Minister of War; 400 of these came from Smyrna, where they had incited Moslems against Greeks. At Aleppo they intrigued, with the aid of Committee of Union and Progress, with sheikhs against Great Britain. Discourses of a guarded anti-British tendency

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were pronounced in mosques. The last batch left Aleppo October 12th by rail. Parties of them have proceed to Hama, Homs, Baalbek, Damascus, the Hauran, to incite sheikhs against Great Britain, and they are to continue their journey south by Hedjaz Railway, and to find their way into Egypt to incite Moslems there. Many of the principal sheikhs of Aleppo seem now gained over to side of Germany.

No. 128.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 15.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 14, 1914.*

WITH the object of spreading the belief that Great Britain is the enemy of Islam, the German Embassy daily emits a stream of mendacity and calumny, which is circulated throughout the country by the Turkish newspapers, all of those in the capital being in the pay of the German Embassy as a result of the large sums spent by it in corruption both in Constantinople and in the provinces.

No. 129.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 15, 1914.*

SON of Kurdish chief Issa, who is stated to have influence in Mesopotamia, and who has been in Constantinople for instructions, is said to have left for Basra to work anti-English propaganda, and other agents, including Germans, are said to be on their way to Afghanistan on similar errand.

I learn that Zekki Pasha, commander of 8th corps, has lately received 5,000*l.* to distribute amongst Bedouins, and that as much as 35,000*l.* in gold left here by train on 12th for Syria. Senator Abdurrahman is working among Bedouins at Maan and Muntaz Bey on the west by Beersheba and Jerusalem.

Party of Turkish sailors mentioned as having left here by train for Basra are now stated to be on the way to Akaba with consignment of metal boats. Another lot of boats is at Rayak, possibly on the way to Beirout. Quantities of dynamite have been sent to the coast towns of Syria, probably

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to serve for mining purposes of land defence. This is in addition to sea mines which have been also forwarded. Numbers of "working battalions" (soldiers as yet untrained), are road constructing in southern Syria.

All above and previous reports in a similar sense show that there is very considerable activity being directed in a sense hostile to us, and this activity is being worked by German influence and agents in every conceivable direction. Probably Government as a whole have little control over these activities, but do not disapprove of them. As regards actual military preparations, German element has sufficient power to persuade the authorities on certain points. German press is directing movement, and has obtained despatch of numbers of German officers to Syria to superintend preparations and training of corps there for war, concentration of stores and supplies at suitable spots, preparation of lines of communication and defence of coast.

No. 130.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 15, 1914.*

GERMAN plots have been so extensive that it is conceivable that they may introduce individuals into Egypt who, impersonating Indian soldiers, may cause mischief.

In substantiation of this I have to state that His Majesty's consul at Aleppo has learnt that a tailor in that town has been commissioned to make a variety of Indian costumes and head-dresses on design and measurement supplied by German officers there.

No. 131.

Sir H. Bax-Ironside to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Sophia, October 16, 1914.*

NINETY-SEVEN cases of bullion passed through Rustchuk yesterday for Constantinople, accompanied by six Germans. This consignment was preceded by 200 other cases. In the last three weeks many heavy cases and stores have passed through same town.

Armaments are believed to be sent through in the night.

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No. 132.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 16.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 16, 1914.*

LOCAL authorities at Jaffa have distributed 10,000 rifles amongst Bedouins, each with 100 cartridges, 5,000 ten-shot to owners of horses and riding camels, and 5,000 single-shot to owners of baggage camels. Bedouins have been employed to dig wells, and Germans to fit them with motor pumps; ovens have been built near frontier.

It is believed that Bedouins' next move is to be towards Akaba.

Horses and mules throughout the whole district are being requisitioned most energetically.

No. 133.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 16, 1914.*

MAJOR OMAR FEVZI BEY, son of Arimm Effendi, ex-Governor-General of Damascus, accompanied by five German officers, arrived at Aleppo October 14th from Constantinople bringing 25,000 liras. The officers passed for engineers, and are buying saddle horses to proceed to Bagdad via Ana. From Ana they are to take two batteries of guns, which, together with money and loads of rifles and ammunition taken from Aleppo, they are to deliver to Ibn-el-Reshid.

Railway trucks full of dynamite for Alexandretta and Damascus are expected to arrive from Constantinople. German officers of *Breslau* have already laid thirteen mines at Alexandretta according to report that has now reached me.

No. 134.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 16, 1914.*

MINISTER of War, who is willing tool of Germans, is now supreme. Minister of the Interior was most influential Minister before mobilisation, but is so no longer. His position now is rather mysterious. Whilst taking advantage of

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European struggle to carry through so-called emancipation of Turks from foreign control, he is not supposed to be in favour of war, which he thinks would end badly for Turkey. If this diagnosis is correct, he and others like him are more or less powerless at present, and, though they declare their ability and intention to stop military preparations, evidently are unable to check them.

No. 135.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 17, 1914.*

RELIABLE information reaches me that mines are being sent to Basra, and will reach Bagdad in a day or two.

No. 136.

Sir F. Elliot to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 17.)
(Telegraphic.) *Athens, October 17, 1914.*

ONE Bouhadi Sadil has been discovered buying arms for importation into Egypt. He had already bought 700 Gras rifles and ammunition. I understand that two of this man's accomplices were recently convicted in Egypt.

No. 137.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 17, 1914.*

ANY attack upon H.M.S. *Espiègle* by Turkish authorities will be a wanton act of aggression, as she is not in Turkish territorial waters.

You should inform Turkish Government that there is no present intention of her passing down the Shatt-el-Arab, but His Majesty's Government consider they have a right to claim that passage so long as *Goeben* and *Breslau*, with German crews and officers, have free use of Turkish territorial waters and the Straits.

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No. 138.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 17, 1914.*

SINCE end of September following have reached Constantinople :

Six thousand nine hundred cases of Mauser ammunition, 540 cases of Mauser rifles, 13 trucks of war material, and about 800,000*l.* in bar gold.

Arrival of a submarine in sections is expected shortly, and I am informed that such a consignment, together with two aeroplanes, left Rustchuk on October 8th.

Two German ships were recently escorted from Sulina by *Breslau*, and are reported to have brought submarine. But there is no evidence at present to prove this.

No. 139.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 18.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 18, 1914.*

AEROPLANE, three airmen, and several mechanics left Beersheba yesterday.

Governor left Jaffa with a view to allaying panic.

Following is résumé of a telegram from Minister of War to commandant at Jaffa which has come to my knowledge :

“ On the approach of enemy warships destroy boats and lighters, kill horses, break carriages, and destroy railway. Strictly guard telegraph. When surrender of town is demanded ask for time to consult Jerusalem. If Jerusalem instructs you not to surrender, oppose landing of the enemy by force of arms. See no looting of town takes place, and find suitable place to shelter your archives. Explain above to the population and arm them, taking oath from them. At signal not to surrender send away women and children. Hoist flag on konak and barracks so as not to have other places bombarded. Break enemy's flagstaff and remove insignia from the door of his consulate.”

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No. 140.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)
Constantinople, October 2, 1914.

SIR,
WITH reference to my telegram of September 22nd¹ and your telegram of September 25th,² I have the honour to forward herewith copies of notes exchanged between the Grand Vizier and myself respecting the suppression of the British post offices in the Turkish Empire.

I have, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE 1 IN NO. 140.

Grand Vizier to Sir L. Mallet.

(TRANSLATION.)

Constantinople, September 27, 1914.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

IN continuation of my note of the 9th instant, I have the honour to inform you that, in consequence of the abolition of the Capitulations as from October 1st, 1914, the foreign post offices provisionally existing in the Turkish Empire must cease working from that date.

I accordingly request your Excellency to be so good as to request the directors of British post offices in Turkey to act in conformity with the communications addressed to them by the Imperial Minister of Ports and Telegraphs, copies of which have already been communicated to His Britannic Majesty's Embassy on September 24th, 1914.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 140.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

Constantinople, October 1, 1914.

M. LE MINISTRE,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note dated September 27th, by which your Highness requests

¹ See No. 86.

² See No. 93.

me to instruct the directors of the British post offices established in the Ottoman Empire to act in accordance with the communications which have been addressed to them by officials of the Imperial Ministry of Posts and Telegraphs with a view to their ceasing their operations from to-day onwards.

The fact that a measure of such importance affecting an official department of His Majesty's Government should have been adopted in virtue of an unilateral decision of the Sublime Porte, and that effect has been given to the measure in so precipitate a manner, compels me to formulate the most express reservations both as to the procedure followed and as to the principle underlying the question.

With a view to avoiding incidents of a public nature I have instructed the British post offices in the Empire to suspend their ordinary postal operations from to-day onwards. By so doing and by authorising a verbal exchange of views, in order to mitigate the inconvenience resulting from this suspension, I must not be considered to have prejudiced the question of principle. It will be for my Government to consider what further action shall be taken in the matter.

I avail, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 141.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

Constantinople, October 2, 1914.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a note which I have addressed to the Sublime Porte referring to the repeated assurances which the Grand Vizier has given me that the German crews will be sent back to Germany, assurances which were confirmed to me by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan on the occasion of my audience of His Imperial Majesty on the 21st ultimo, and enquiring whether the Ottoman Government have the intention of fulfilling their undertakings, and, if so, on what date this will take effect.

I have, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

ENCLOSURE IN No. 141.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

Constantinople, October 2, 1914.

YOUR HIGHNESS,

ON the occasion of the audience which His Imperial Majesty the Sultan was graciously pleased to accord me on the 21st ultimo, I had the honour to convey to His Imperial Majesty a message from the King, my Sovereign, respecting the detention in England of the two Turkish vessels of war. I had previously communicated to your Highness the substance of this message, as your Highness will doubtless remember. His Imperial Majesty deigned in reply to charge me with his thanks to the King, my Sovereign, and whilst regretting that His Majesty's Government should have detained the vessels, which seemed unnecessary in view of the large naval supremacy of Great Britain, His Imperial Majesty said that he was unalterably determined to maintain the historic friendship between the two countries and on no account to depart from the neutrality which had hitherto been observed by his Government. Referring to a passage in the King's message, expressing His Majesty's regret at certain events which had seemed to impair that neutrality, His Imperial Majesty authorised me to inform the King that the services of the German admiral, officers, and crews of the German warships had been temporarily retained in order to train the Turkish officers and crews, but that the task was on the point of accomplishment, and that they would return to Germany within a few days' time.

I replied that these assurances—which I had also received repeatedly from your Highness—would not fail to give great satisfaction to the King, coming as they did from the lips of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan himself.

I now address myself to your Highness to enquire whether the Ottoman Government have the intention of repatriating the German officers and crews in accordance with the oft-repeated assurances of your Highness, which have now been solemnly confirmed by His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.

If such is their intention, I should be grateful if I might be informed of the date on which their departure will take place.

I avail, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 142.

*Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)
Constantinople, October 4, 1914.*

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a copy of a note which I addressed to the Sublime Porte, protesting against the abrogation of the Capitulations.

I have, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 142.*Note Verbale communicated to Sublime Porte.*

His Britannic Majesty's Embassy has received instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to make the following statement to the Imperial Ministry for Foreign Affairs:

His Britannic Majesty's Government expressly confirm the protest against the suppression of the Capitulations which His Majesty's Ambassador addressed to the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 10th ultimo.

The régime of the Capitulations being founded on synallagmatic instruments the Porte cannot abrogate them by a unilateral act. His Majesty's Government therefore reserve their full liberty of action as regards the measures which the Ottoman authorities may have taken or may take in violation of the Capitulations and will demand due reparation for any prejudice which their subjects may suffer in consequence of such measures.

His Majesty's Government, desirous of maintaining the friendly relations which have hitherto existed with the Ottoman Empire, feel constrained to call the serious attention of the Porte to the consequences which may follow upon the adoption of the new policy upon which the Imperial Government would seem to have embarked.

It is not in the interests of the Ottoman Government to alienate the sympathy of Great Britain, which constitutes a guarantee of present tranquillity and a pledge of future support.

Constantinople, October 1, 1914.

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No. 143.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)
Constantinople, October 4, 1914.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a note which I addressed to the Grand Vizier protesting against certain military preparations in Syria.

On October 2nd I addressed a further note, copy of which is also enclosed, pointing out that no answer had been received either to my previous note or to two letters of the 25th and 26th on the same subject.

I have, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 143.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

(TRANSLATION.)

Constantinople, September 23, 1914.

YOUR HIGHNESS,

IN the course of our interview of yesterday morning, I had the honour to inform your Highness of the anxiety that the news which reached me from Syria in regard to the military preparations and plots against Egypt now going on in that province, was causing me. So long as it was a question of preparations similar to those made in other parts of the Empire, as a consequence of the general mobilisation, I did not mention the matter to your Highness, although special importance might attach to all such doings in the neighbourhood of the Egyptian frontier. Similarly, I have been able up to the present to reject, as improbable tales, the rumours which have reached me from more than one source, according to which a sudden blow directed against the Suez Canal was being planned with the object of rendering it impassable, although I am aware that the enemies of Great Britain are intriguing with the object of leading your Highness's Government into adventures as insensate, and even more insensate, than this. I should, however, fail in my duty towards my Government, and I may add also towards the Government of

your Highness, if I did not bring to your Highness's knowledge the latest reports which have reached me. It appears from these reports that the minds of the Bedouins are being excited by professional agitators, who, encouraged by the Ottoman Government, are desirous of inflaming them against England. The military preparations, which up to a certain moment bore a similar character to those in the other provinces of the Empire, have lately changed into a converging movement towards the south. Troops are being brought from such distant centres as Mosul. General activity reigns everywhere from Damascus to Maan, and cumulative evidence leads my consul at Jerusalem to the belief that an organised expedition against Egypt is in project for the next few days.

I trust that the reports, the contents of which I have just summed up to your Highness, put a wrong interpretation on facts which, as such, cannot be discussed. But I repeat that I should fail in my duty if I did not bring to your Highness's knowledge the grave pre-occupation which they cause me, and the impression which they make upon His Britannic Majesty's Government, and if I did not place you on your guard against the disastrous consequences, which would ensue for your Highness's Government, if they were to follow a course so contrary to their own interests as that of becoming the accomplice of Germany in an attack upon Egypt.

Your Highness will remember that at the beginning of the present war, Sir E. Grey instructed Mr. Beaumont to give you the assurance that, provided that Turkey maintained strict and absolute neutrality during the war, and so long as unforeseen circumstances did not arise, His Britannic Majesty's Government had no desire to, nor intention of annexing Egypt, nor of modifying her régime in any way whatsoever. I had the honour to confirm this assurance to your Highness shortly after my return to Constantinople. Since then, being desirous of avoiding any possibility of misunderstanding with the Imperial Government, I have repeatedly called your Highness's attention to the conditional character of the assurances given by Sir E. Grey. Now, I hold it to be my duty to declare once more to your Highness that my Government take the most serious view of the unprecedented violations of neutrality already committed by the Turkish Government in retaining German officers and men on board the German

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warships, and by subsequently taking into their service numerous other Germans in a similar military capacity.

It does not seem to me necessary at this moment to recapitulate the details of still further departures from neutrality committed by Turkey in favour of the enemies of Great Britain. Nor need I insist on the consequences which might ensue if, to add the last touch to so grave a situation, my Government were to become convinced that the Imperial Government were seriously meditating an attack against Egypt, or that they were a party to disloyal intrigues against the security of the Suez Canal, or against the present régime in Egypt. Your Highness can judge of the whole importance and possible extent of these consequences.

I enclose in this note a Memorandum, enumerating in detail the facts which can be considered as indications of a forthcoming attack upon Egypt.

I avail, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

Memorandum.

(TRANSLATION.)

From a report dated the 18th instant, it appears that the authorities were using all their efforts in order to excite the Bedouin tribes against England by representing her as the enemy of Islam, and that 30,000 men belonging to these tribes were ready to rise. A supplementary report states that the instigators of this movement are Muntaz Bey, an officer of the army, Essad Shoucair, deputy or former deputy, and a certain Beheddine Bey, aided by several other persons, and with the support of the local, civil, and military authorities. The report adds categorically that, according to current rumour, these tribes were to arm immediately in order to march on Egypt.

From a further report dated the 18th instant, it appears that a military movement from Damascus towards the south was expected about September 20th; that the Mosul troops were on their way to Damascus; that large stores of food-stuffs were being prepared; that 3,000 camels had been collected at Maan; and that two staff officers had returned from Akaba after studying the possibility of a movement

across the desert. This report was supplemented by another of the same date to the effect that it was intended to send a large number of men from Homs to Damascus by rail, between September 20th and 23rd, and that a great concentration converging towards the south was expected. From a third report, which was received subsequently, it appears that another 5,000 camels had been requisitioned at Maan; that all the rolling-stock of the southern section of the Hedjaz Railway was being concentrated at Deraa; and that the Mosul troops had reached Tel-Abiad, near Aleppo.

A report, dated the 21st instant, stated that there was cumulative evidence to show almost certainly that an attack against Egypt on a large scale would take place in the very near future; that the troops would advance on both sides by way of Akaba and by way of El Arish; and that a large provision of things necessary for their transport across the desert was being prepared. A further report of the same date stated that camels and men had arrived at Damascus from Homs; that thirty battalions were expected to arrive during the week; that the chief staff officer from Damascus had proceeded to Maan; and that the chiefs of the Bedouin tribes had left for the south after a conference with the Vali.

Constantinople, September 23, 1914.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 143.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

Constantinople, October 2, 1914.

YOUR HIGHNESS,

IN my communication of September 23rd and subsequent letters of the 25th and 26th, various military and other preparations in Syria, initiated by the Ottoman Government, were brought to the notice of your Highness, as likely to cause apprehension to His Majesty's Government.

To the representations made in these communications, no written reply has yet been received, and it appears that not only has the verification of the details already given been confirmed, but further news of a disquieting nature has now arrived. For instance, the transport of food-stuffs, military stores, and material of war to Maan continues. As this place

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is in nowise a Turkish military centre in peace, and has no connection with a mobilisation of the Syrian divisions in their ordinary stations, but is, on the other hand, in proximity to the Egyptian frontier, His Majesty's Government would desire to be informed why it is considered necessary to make the preparations in question, which are evidently for the maintenance of a considerable body of troops, or for their transit further in the direction of Akaba.

2. Similar preparations are also apparently being made on the road Jenim-Nablus-Jerusalem, and the collection of a camel corps at the latter place was announced yesterday. These measures tend to show a projected concentration of troops on the limits of Syria to the west, and again in proximity to the Egyptian frontier.

3. The above steps have latterly coincided with the sudden arrival of Colonel Kress von Kressenstein and six other German officers, with the result that it is openly rumoured in Syria that the Jerusalem division is preparing to move towards Rafa and that of Damascus towards Akaba.

4. From Beirout arrive reports that the inhabitants are retiring inland, and from Haiffa that the customs and railway staff have also been transferred from the coast. These measures are stated to be taken as precautionary steps against the hostile action of the British fleet, which is expected to ensue on the movement of Turkish forces against Egypt.

5. In view of all these circumstances, it is undoubtedly the case that it is fully believed in Syria that an offensive movement against Egypt is contemplated by the Ottoman authorities, and, although His Majesty's Government do not necessarily share this view, they cannot but regard any continuance of the military movement in anything but the most serious light.

6. Apart from recognised military measures, the movements of a German engineer belonging to the Bagdad Railway with a large consignment of explosives destined for an attempt on the Suez Canal has already been brought to your Highness's notice in my letter of the 25th ultimo.

Not only have the movements of this individual been confirmed, but the departure of a German naval officer named Hilgendorff is now also announced with the same purpose. This individual has left Petra with a party of eight

Germans, ostensibly on a shooting expedition, but with a large amount of stores, including explosives, and intending to meet another similar party journeying via Haiffa-Amman.

As both these parties are acting from neutral territory with the avowed intention of committing acts hostile to Great Britain, it is incumbent on the Porte to secure their apprehension, coupled with an assurance that all necessary steps will be taken to put an end to any enterprises of this nature.

I have been repeatedly assured by your Highness and by other members of the Ottoman Government that Turkey is firmly determined to maintain an attitude of strict neutrality during the European war. To these assurances I have been unfortunately obliged to reply that the Ottoman Government have failed in several most essential particulars to maintain their neutrality, and I would now desire to point out, with all the emphasis at my command, that, if these preparations continue, only one conclusion can be deduced—namely, that the Ottoman Government are taking preliminary steps to send an expedition against Egypt and that they are conniving at the preparation of a plot against the Suez Canal on the part of German subjects, who are either in the Ottoman service or are acting independently.

I cannot too earnestly impress upon your Highness the absolute necessity of putting an end to this situation of uncertainty at the earliest moment possible, in order that those relations of confidence and sincerity may be restored between the two Governments which it has constantly been my object to foster.

I avail, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 144.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

Constantinople, October 6, 1914.

SIR.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a note which I have addressed to the Grand Vizier referring to the circular note¹ enclosed in my immediately succeeding des-

¹ See Enclosure in No. 145.

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patch, recently received from the Sublime Porte, defining the rules which they propose to apply during the war in order to defend their neutrality, expressing my satisfaction that they should have adopted views in regard to the use of wireless in neutral waters, by belligerent merchantmen, identical with those of His Majesty's Government, and enquiring when they propose to dismantle the wireless apparatus on the *Corcovado*.

I have, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE IN NO. 144.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

Constantinople, October 2, 1914.

YOUR HIGHNESS,

I HAVE received a *note verbale* from the Sublime Porte dated the 28th ultimo defining the rules which the Government of your Highness propose to apply during the present war in order to secure respect for their neutrality and to enable them to perform what they recognise to be their duty as neutrals.

I propose to reply to this circular in detail, but in the meantime I desire at once to express my satisfaction that the Imperial Government should have adopted views which, in so far as the installation of wireless stations on land and the use of wireless apparatus by belligerent merchantmen in neutral ports and waters are concerned, are identical with those of His Majesty's Government.

I have had the honour to discuss this question on frequent occasions with your Highness during the last few weeks, in special reference to the notorious case of the German vessel *Corcovado*, amongst others.

The *Corcovado* has since the beginning of the war laid at Beicos, almost opposite to the British Embassy, and has, in gross violation of the laws of neutrality, which should have been enforced by the Ottoman Government, regularly received and transmitted, and still, so far as I am aware, continues to receive and transmit, wireless messages in such a way as to serve as a base of radio-telegraphic communication for the general purposes of the German Government.

In deference to the wishes of your Highness, I have hitherto confined my remonstrances to verbal representations, but in view of the circular note now received from the Sublime Porte defining the attitude of the Government of your Highness in regard to the question, I feel at liberty to address to your Highness a formal note asking, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, that the Ottoman regulations may be applied without further delay to the *Corcovado* and other vessels which still fly the German flag, or which flew it at the beginning of the present war, and that their wireless installations may be at once dismantled.

I feel convinced that your Highness will see the justice and the propriety of this step.

I avail, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

No. 145.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)
Constantinople, October 6, 1914.

SIR,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copies of notes from and to the Sublime Porte on the subject of the Turkish regulations for belligerent warships in Turkish territorial waters.

I have, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 145.

Note verbale communicated by Sublime Porte.

(TRANSLATION.)

THE Ministry for Foreign Affairs, with a view to the observance of their duties of neutrality throughout the hostilities, brings the following regulations to the notice of the British Embassy :

1. Entry to Turkish ports, roadsteads, and territorial waters, is forbidden to warships belonging to belligerent Powers, except in the case of damage; or by reason of the state of the sea. In these cases they may only remain strictly

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the length of time actually necessary for the repair of the said damage, or to wait until the state of the sea has improved.

2. Every belligerent vessel, which shall ask permission to enter a Turkish port or roadstead for purposes of refuelling or revictualling, may be authorised to do so, on condition that the authorisation of the local Turkish authority is obtained, after having declared the reasons for her arrival; that she does not remain more than twenty-four hours in the said port or roadstead; and that there be not more than three vessels under the same flag simultaneously in the same port or roadstead.

3. The ports of Smyrna and Beirout are prohibited to the said ships, as are the inland waters, access to which is barred either by submarine mines or by other defensive means.

4. If the warship does not leave Turkish waters within the period provided for above, the Turkish Government will take such steps as they may deem necessary to render the vessel incapable of putting to sea during the war.

5. Warships are expected to respect the sovereign rights of the Turkish Empire, to refrain from all acts prejudicial to Turkish neutrality, and not to commit any hostile acts in Turkish territorial waters, including capture and the right of search.

6. If enemy belligerent warships happen to be simultaneously in the same Turkish port or roadstead, at least twenty-four hours must elapse between the departure of one belligerent warship and that of the other enemy belligerent warship, the order of departure being decided by that of arrival, unless the vessel which arrived first be obliged to remain for reasons foreseen above in No. 1. Similarly a belligerent warship may only leave a Turkish port or roadstead twenty-four hours after the departure of a merchant vessel under an enemy flag.

7. In non-prohibited Turkish ports and roadsteads belligerent warships may only repair their damages to such an extent as is consonant with the safety of navigation, and may not increase their military strength in any manner whatsoever. The Turkish authorities will verify the nature of the repairs to be made; these must be carried out as quickly as possible.

8. The said vessels may only revictual up to their normal

supply in peace time. Nevertheless, in the exceptional circumstances of the present war, the Turkish authorities may, in the first instance, reduce this supply, according to the requirements of the districts, to what is strictly necessary to reach the nearest neutral foreign port, and may refuse all supplies in the case of a second return by vessels of a like belligerent nation.

9. Such vessels may only take in sufficient fuel to reach the nearest harbour in their own country, or of a country the administration of which is entrusted to their Government, or of an allied country, at the discretion of the local Turkish authority. The preceding restrictions concerning supplies will be applicable to fuel.

10. The Turkish sanitary, pilotage, customs, port and lighthouse regulations must be observed and respected by belligerent warships.

11. It is forbidden to bring prizes into any of the (non-prohibited) Turkish ports or roadsteads, save in the case of impossibility of navigation, of roughness of the sea, lack of fuel or provisions, in which case permission must be asked from the local Turkish authorities; the latter will grant it after verification of the aforesaid cause. The prize shall be required to leave as soon as the said cause shall have ceased to exist; the taking in of fuel and provisions shall be carried out in accordance with the conditions laid down for warships.

No Prize Court may be established by a belligerent either on Turkish territory or on a vessel in Turkish territorial waters.

12. Belligerents are forbidden to make Turkish harbours and roadsteads a base for naval operations against their adversaries; to erect on land or in territorial waters any wireless telegraphy station or installation destined to serve as a means of communication with belligerent forces by land or sea; to establish depots of fuel either on Turkish territory or on ships stationed in Turkish territorial waters.

13. The above provisions in no way supersede the regulations governing the Straits, which remain as established by international treaty.

14. General international law is applicable in all questions not provided for in the above regulations.

Constantinople, September 28, 1914.

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ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 145.

Note verbale communicated to Sublime Porte.

HIS Britannic Majesty's Embassy is in receipt of the *note verbale* of the Imperial Ministry of Foreign Affairs of September 28th, in which are set forth at length the rules laid down by the Imperial Ottoman Government with a view to securing proper respect for their neutrality during the present hostilities in Europe.

In the preamble to this *note verbale* the Imperial Ministry states that the rules contained in it have been adopted in order to enable the Imperial Government to discharge their duties as neutrals. The rules themselves indicate a conception of those duties closely in accord with the general principles held by His Majesty's Government. It is all the more, therefore, a matter of surprise to His Majesty's Embassy that the practice of the Ottoman Government should have hitherto been so entirely at variance with these principles.

Rule 1 prohibits the entrance into Ottoman ports of belligerent warships, except in case of damage or on account of the state of the sea, and requires their departure as soon as circumstances permit.

Rule 2 prescribes that no belligerent warship, even though authorised for special reasons to enter an Ottoman harbour, shall remain more than twenty-four hours. These rules were not applied by the Imperial Ottoman Government when they allowed the German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau* to enter the Dardanelles and to remain in Turkish waters for an indefinite period, on the pretext that a sale, as to the genuineness of which no evidence exists, had taken place.

Neither did the Imperial Ottoman Government apply to these ships the provisions of Rule 4, which requires that vessels which have exceeded a visit of twenty-four hours should be incapacitated from taking part in any hostilities during the war, as both these vessels, which remain under German control, are notoriously in a state of complete preparation to proceed to sea.

Rule 5, which prohibits the performance of acts prejudicial to Ottoman neutrality, including acts of capture and search, was violated in a flagrant manner by the *Breslau*,

when it visited and searched British ships in the Dardanelles shortly after its arrival in those waters. The Imperial Government have never demanded any public satisfaction from the Government whose ship committed this indefensible outrage on their neutrality. By thus condoning the act of the *Breslau*, the Imperial Government failed signally in their own duties as a neutral.

The Imperial Ottoman Government have not applied the provisions of Rule 7, prohibiting foreign war vessels from increasing their military value in an Ottoman port, where they are only permitted to make such repairs as their own security demands and within the shortest possible period of time, nor the provisions of Rule 8, regarding the prohibition of all revictualling, &c., of belligerent warships returning a second time to the same Ottoman port. The *Goeben* and the *Breslau* remaining, as has been said above, under German control, have been repaired under the auspices of the official representatives of the German Government, have put to sea under German command, and have been revictualled at German expense on returning from the various cruises in the Black Sea. By tolerating these violations of their own rules the Turkish Government have again failed in their duty as neutrals.

The Imperial Ottoman Government have further neglected the obligation to prevent foreign warships from making an Ottoman port a base of naval operations against their enemies; from installing wireless stations on land or in territorial waters, to serve as a means of communication with the belligerent forces on land or sea, obligations which are clearly recognised by the adoption of Rule 12. The flagrant violation of this rule by ships like the *General*, the *Lily Rickmers*, and the *Corcovado*, has not been checked by the Imperial Government. They have, indeed, departed from their duty as neutrals, not merely by tolerating the proceedings of those ships, but they have in some cases facilitated them by allowing German ships to fly the Ottoman flag, as a result of illegal and fictitious transfers. The special case of the *Corcovado* has formed the subject of a separate communication, to which His Majesty's Embassy trusts that an early reply will be returned.

Finally, Rule 13, which states that the status of the Straits is unaffected by the measures taken by the Imperial Govern-

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ment, has been violated by the Ottoman authorities themselves, who, in violation of a series of international acts, have interfered with the free passage of the Dardanelles by British merchant vessels.

In the presence of the facts set forth above, it is impossible for the Imperial Ottoman Government to maintain that they have hitherto observed that duty as neutrals, the performance of which the Imperial Minister for Foreign Affairs declares them to have had in view when drawing up the rules embodied in its circular note of September 28th. If, after consecrating their recognition of these duties by an official communication, the Imperial Government should continue to tolerate the use of its territory by German ships and agents for purposes connected with the war, His Majesty's Embassy will feel itself constrained to protest with renewed vigour against what it cannot but consider a partial and unneutral attitude on the part of the Imperial Ottoman Government, and must reserve to His Majesty's Government complete liberty of action. If, on the other hand, the object of the communication is to prove that the Imperial Government are prepared to embark on a new line of action, His Britannic Majesty's Embassy will have the utmost satisfaction in taking act of an assurance in that sense and bringing it to the knowledge of His Britannic Majesty's Government.

Constantinople, October 4, 1914.

NO. 146.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

SIR, *Constantinople, October 6, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith copy of a note I have addressed to the Grand Vizier on the subject of the measures the Porte propose to take against British warships in the Shatt-el-Arab, expressing the hope that no action be taken which might have serious consequences.

I have, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

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ENCLOSURE IN NO. 146.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

YOUR HIGHNESS, *Constantinople, October 4, 1914.*

I HAVE just received a telegram from His Majesty's consul at Basra stating that the Vali has written to him saying that the Porte have communicated to me the measures which they propose to take against a British man-of-war which is in the Shatt-el-Arab unless it leaves within twenty-four hours, and that the Shatt-el-Arab from Fao to Gurna is inland water, like the Dardanelles, and closed to foreign warships.

I am instructed by His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to enquire on what grounds the Sublime Porte base their objection to His Majesty's ship remaining in Mohammerah, a Persian port?

In the meantime I would express the hope that your Highness will instruct the Vali without loss of time to avoid taking any measures against a British man-of-war which might have serious consequences at this critical period.

As a matter of fact, H.M.S. *Odin* left the Shatt-el-Arab some days ago, and I am not aware what British ship has taken her place.

I avail, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

No. 147.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)

SIR, *Constantinople, October 6, 1914.*

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copy of a note addressed by me to the Imperial Ottoman Government on the 5th instant with regard to the hostile attitude of the Ottoman press towards Great Britain and British interests.

I also enclose copy of a letter I addressed to Talaat Bey on the previous day on the same subject.

I have, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

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ENCLOSURE I IN NO. 147.

Sir L. Mallet to Grand Vizier.

Constantinople, October 5, 1914.

YOUR HIGHNESS,

I HAVE on several occasions complained to your Highness of the hostile tone of the Ottoman press towards Great Britain and British interests, and I have frequently represented to your Highness and to the Minister of the Interior the unfavourable impression which His Majesty's Government will derive of the sentiments of the Ottoman Government from the deliberate misrepresentations and the malicious accusations of the organs of public opinion.

Your Highness has assured me from time to time of your regret that the press should display so hostile a spirit towards my country and to the cause for which we have taken up arms, and owing to your Highness's intervention I most willingly admit that there have been short periods during which it has displayed a greater moderation in the volume and frequency of its abuse. Your Highness has also begged me not to attach too great an importance to the newspapers, which you have assured me do not influence public opinion to any appreciable extent, and are not therefore deserving of serious attention.

In ordinary circumstances I should have been in agreement with your Highness, except in regard to the extent of the harm done by these irresponsible writers, a matter of which I am incompetent to judge, but it must be remembered that the Ottoman Empire is now living under martial law, and that vigorous press censorship is enforced—apparently in the interests of Germany—which has rendered the publication of news from British sources difficult, and the public expression of opinion favourable to England impossible both at Constantinople and in the provinces.

The press articles of which I complain are, therefore, authorised and approved by the press censor, or in other words by the Ottoman Government, whose views they must be held to represent.

This state of affairs is the more grave, as one of the main objects which certain newspapers have had in view has been to misinform public opinion in this country as to the true

character of British rule in India and British control in Egypt, and as to the attitude of the populations of those countries towards Great Britain.

It is, however, difficult to reconcile these hostile utterances with those of your Highness, who has always assured me of the friendly sentiments of the Ottoman Government towards Great Britain, and of their desire and intention to maintain good relations with His Majesty's Government.

In these circumstances, I am at a loss to know what I should report to my Government, who will doubtless desire to know why the Ottoman Government permit the publication of inflammatory articles against Great Britain if their sentiments are well-intentioned. I would call your Highness's special attention to two articles which have appeared in the *Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat* of the 16th (29th) September and the 19th September (October 2nd). The first of these articles gives an entirely untrue account of the action of the British fleet outside the Dardanelles, which it accuses of preventing merchandise from coming into the port. The object of these accusations is to mislead public opinion with regard to the intentions of Great Britain, and to hide the real reason for the presence of the British fleet, which, as is well known to your Highness, is the retention of the German officers and crews.

The second article which I enclose¹ not only misrepresents the motives which induced my Government to embark on the present war, but characterises England as the enemy of small nations, declares that she wishes to drive the Moslem Powers into a holy war against Germany, and traduces the character of British control in Egypt. Both articles are only examples of the innumerable utterances of a similar kind in which the *Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat* and other papers indulge. I will not weary your Highness with other specimens in Turkish, but to prove how varied are the attacks made on my country and my Government with the express sanction of the authorities responsible for the press, I enclose a copy¹ of a paper called the *Défense nationale*, a French organ which is specially distinguished for its virulent and calumnious attacks on Great Britain, and which, while purporting to represent authorised military opinion, is in reality,

¹ Not printed.

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as your Highness is doubtless aware, produced by a person of non-Ottoman and non-Moslem origin and of most disreputable antecedents.

I venture to beg your Highness, who has laboured unceasingly and devotedly in the interests of peace, to give instructions to the responsible authorities not to allow the publication in future of articles so totally at variance with what your Highness has repeatedly declared to be the policy of the Imperial Government. I would at the same time beg of your Highness to secure publicity for the enclosed statement which I have prepared, the object of which is, as your Highness will see, to correct one of the most specific calumnies recently published.

I avail, &c.,
LOUIS MALLET.

ENCLOSURE 2 IN NO. 147.

Statement.

THE statement made in the *Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat* of the 16th (29th) September that the British and French fleets outside the Dardanelles have prevented the importation of merchandise into the port of Constantinople is an entire misrepresentation. The allied fleet has never in a single instance interfered with the export or import trade of this country.

The retention of the allied fleets in the neighbourhood of the entrances to the Straits is solely due to the continued presence of the German admiral, officers, and crews on the warships recently sold to Turkey, and to the officering of the rest of the Turkish fleet by Germans.

ENCLOSURE 3 IN NO. 147.

Sir L. Mallet to Talaat Bey.

(TRANSLATION.)

Constantinople, October 4, 1914.

MY DEAR MINISTER,

CAN you explain to me why the censor suppressed an important part of the speech recently made by the Agha Khan?

I enclose a copy¹ of the speech, showing the part that was suppressed. Would you please have it printed in the Turkish press? It is only right that every opinion should be published in a neutral country.

I would also draw your attention to an article which appeared in the *Terdjuman-i-Hakkikat* of October 2nd, which is untrue and full of malevolence towards Great Britain.

As the press is censored, I can only conclude that the sentiments of Agha-olu Ahmed are approved or inspired by the Government. In any case, so long as the censorship exists the Government are clearly responsible. In the circumstances, whom can we believe? For the Government speak with two conflicting voices, both of which are none the less official.

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 148.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 19, 1914.*

NEW Governor-General of Basra with six army officers, including two German officers, also six naval officers, including two Germans, and 150 Turkish sailors with three columns of ammunition, arrived at Alexandretta on morning of October 18th by railway from Constantinople. Their final destination is believed to be Basra. I am also informed that Maan is their true destination.

No. 149.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 19, 1914.*

WITHIN last few days following have passed through Adana in direction of Syria: 450 gendarmes with 600 sailors, of whom 200 were German, 52 German naval and military officers, a commandant of police, 45 civilian officials, of whom two were German, 10 engines, and 3 or 4 automobiles, said to contain German officers.

¹ Not printed.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

No. 150.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 19).
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 19, 1914.*

I AM informed that Bimbashi Gamil, staff officer in Turkish army, Khoga (Imam) Ali Haider, Khoga (Imam) Amin, and Khoga (Imam) Rustom, have left Smyrna in order to carry on a Turcophile propaganda in India.

No. 151.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 20).
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 19, 1914.*

IT is pretty clear that naval parties are on their way both to Akaba and the Persian Gulf, as well as smaller groups to Syrian coast ports. There are plenty of German reserve mercantile marine officers available, in addition to *Goeben* and *Breslau* officers and others who have subsequently arrived. Although there is at present no actual confirmation of arrival in Constantinople of Austrian officers and sailors, this is regarded as also possible.

It is very likely now that consignment of mines has actually got as far as Maan.

At Akaba it is not impossible that floating mines may be let loose penetrating into the Red Sea; in Persian Gulf defence of waterway will no doubt be prepared.

Consul at Damascus reports that fifty Germans arrived at Akaba quite recently. These are believed to be wounded from East Africa.

No. 152.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22).
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 21, 1914.*

BATTERY of six guns which left Constantinople on 11th instant, and which I think were heavy guns, have, together with aeroplane, arrived at Alexandretta and left for the south.

Since October 18th there have been no movements of troops to or from Damascus. Some trucks of ammunition

went round by rail to Nablus Sidi, and cases of rifles arrived from Aleppo.

No. 153.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 21, 1914.*

IT should not be forgotten that one of the elements in the situation that cannot be overlooked is possibility of *coup d'État* by Minister of War, supported by Germans.

No. 154.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 22, 1914.*

A MANIFESTO, the authorship of which is attributed to Sheikh Aziz Shawish, is being secretly circulated at Beirout. Manifesto bears alleged signatures of ten representatives of Moslem countries under foreign rule. It incites Moslem soldiers to mutiny in their respective countries in defence of Islam, and bids them desert the allies and join Germany. Whole tenor is fanatical and inflammatory.

No. 155.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 22, 1914.*

MY immediately preceding telegram.

I understand that several thousand copies of manifesto are to be smuggled into Egypt and India and other Moslem countries through Syria.

No. 156.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 22, 1914.*

GERMAN officers now on frontier seem bent on forcing matters. General Officer Commanding Egypt anticipates Arab raid at any moment at their instigation.

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No. 157.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 23.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 22, 1914.*

I HAVE seen the Russian Ambassador again this morning. He is sure that unless Turks mean to betray Germans, the possibility of which he does not exclude, they will make war on Russia on receipt of first half of a sum of £4,000,000 which Germany is providing.

It is currently reported about £100,000 has already arrived.

Russian successes on Vistula will spur on Germans to further efforts here, but it is difficult to say whether it will increase or diminish chance of Turkish participation in the war.

Virulent attacks and propaganda against Great Britain seem to show Government are anxious to justify themselves in public estimation if war breaks out, and it may indicate that they mean to provoke war themselves, as they are aware that we shall not do so.

No. 158.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 22.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 22, 1914.*

ONE of objects of press campaign here now is to prove that Great Britain is aiming deliberate blows at Islam, as such, and a statement is being circulated here that British Government are preventing pilgrimages from Egypt this year. One form of this statement is that a Fetva has been issued prescribing that as Egyptian Government cannot protect pilgrims there shall be no pilgrimage. It is insinuated that this Fetva has been extorted by British.

No. 159.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 23, 1914.*

MINING of the Shatt-el-Arab.

Your telegram of October 17th.¹

The ancient right of free navigation of the river was

¹ See No. 135.

solemnly affirmed as late as July 29th, 1913, in Article 1 of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement signed on that day. It is a right which His Majesty's Government cannot allow to be nullified by the mining of the channel. They will be forced to regard any attempt to lay mines in the river as an act of open hostility and provocation to this country, and they must reserve to themselves the right of taking their own measures, if necessary, to maintain the freedom of navigation.

You should make a representation in these terms to the Turkish Government, and add a firm protest against the apparent intention of blocking the international waterway of the Shatt-el-Arab, which offers the only means of access to the port of Mohammerah and the neighbouring Persian littoral.

No. 160.

Sir Edward Grey to Mr. Cheetham.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, October 23, 1914.

I HEAR that Turkish Minister at Sophia has left his post for Germany. Reported object is to arrange with German Government for stirring up of Moslem fanaticism in India, Egypt, Morocco, Algeria, and Tunis.

No. 161.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 23, 1914.

TWENTY projectors, 10 electric mines, 4 electric motors, 500 cases of Mauser ammunition have arrived via Rustchuk in addition to arrivals already reported previously.

No. 162.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 23, 1914.

VERY large quantities of bar gold have recently arrived. Nearly a million's worth was taken to Deutsche Bank three nights ago under escort, and there is information that previous consignments have been similarly conveyed. It is probable that between two and three millions have arrived altogether.

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No. 163.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 23, 1914.*

GERMAN named Kellerman has just left Aleppo for Haifa or the south. Two thousand camels, 1,500 water-skins, 400 bicycles, all canvas and canvas bags, together with food-stuffs, are being requisitioned in Aleppo.

Information goes to show that an Arab raid has been possible during last few weeks, and contingency has certainly to be watched.

No. 164.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 23, 1914.*

LAST night Minister of Marine sent me message to say that neutrality would be maintained by Turkish Government. He gave same assurances in categorical terms yesterday to French Ambassador, and said that Minister of Interior's views were the same. Ambassador said that it was reported that an agreement existed with Germany to go to war on certain terms being fulfilled. Minister of Marine denied this absolutely, and also declared that Turkey was not going to war. My French colleague then enquired what was meaning of preparations in Syria and of all the violent talk about Egypt. Minister of Marine replied that England was treating Egypt as if it belonged to her, whereas it formed part of Ottoman dominions. Turks were indifferent about India, Tripoli, and Tunis, etc., but Egypt was on their frontier, and they felt about it as French did about Alsace-Lorraine. They would do nothing officially, but would shut their eyes to any agitation which was directed against English occupation of Egypt. Continuing, he referred to a proposal which he had made me a fortnight ago, to the effect that England and Turkey should now sign convention on lines of Drummond-Wolff Convention, providing for evacuation of Egypt by British troops at end of war. It is quite true he made this suggestion. I did not report it at the time because it was so entirely unpractical. This shows that Germans are turning all their attention to Egypt, and are inciting the Turks against

us, so that we must expect to have a considerable amount of trouble on frontier.

Turkish newspapers are full of Egypt just now and of our high-handed proceedings. It is, *e.g.*, announced to-day that we have closed El Azhar mosque. There is no doubt that Germans are at bottom of this, and are inciting religious fanaticism of Turks against us.

No. 165.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 24.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 23, 1914.*

UNITED efforts of Germans and Ottoman Government at Haifa are being concentrated on arousing anti-English feeling amongst the Moslems; German consul is touring the district with this view. The worst offender is the Ottoman Telegraph Agency. Yesterday, for example, it announced that the Ameer of Afghanistan will start a Holy War, and that he is invading India.

No. 166.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 24, 1914.*

YOUR telegram of October 23rd¹ gives the impression that Turkey considers sending an armed force over the frontier of Egypt as being in some way different from acts of war against Russia. You should disabuse the Turkish Government of any such idea, and inform them that a military violation of frontier of Egypt will place them in a state of war with three allied Powers.

I think you should enumerate to Grand Vizier the hostile acts of which we complain, and warn him that, if German influences succeed in pushing Turkey to cross the frontiers of Egypt and threaten the international Suez Canal, which we are bound to preserve, it will not be we, but Turkey that will have aggressively disturbed the *status quo*.

The following is a convenient summary of Turkish acts of which we complain, and which, combined, produce a most

¹ See No. 164.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

unfavourable impression. You might send it to Grand Vizier :

" The Mosul and Damascus Army Corps have, since their mobilisation, been constantly sending troops south preparatory to an invasion of Egypt and the Suez Canal from Akaba and Gaza. A large body of Bedouin Arabs has been called out and armed to assist in this venture. Transport has been collected and roads have been prepared up to the frontier of Egypt. Mines have been despatched to be laid in the Gulf of Akaba to protect the force from naval attack, and the notorious Sheikh Aziz Shawish, who has been so well known as a firebrand in raising Moslem feeling against Christians, has published and disseminated through Syria and probably India, an inflammatory document urging Mahommedans to fight against Great Britain. Dr. Prüffer, who was so long engaged in intrigues in Cairo against the British occupation, and is now attached to the German Embassy in Constantinople, has been busily occupied in Syria trying to incite the people to take part in this conflict."

No. 167.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 26.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 25, 1914.*

WHOLE fleet has been at Kadikeui since October 20th.

Breslau took seventy mines on board yesterday, and had steam up in company of mine-layers *Nilufer* and *Samsun*.

There is fairly sure evidence that no submarine has yet arrived in parts or otherwise.

No. 168.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, October 26, 1914.*

FORTY-TWO Germans, disguised as tourists, are said to have arrived at Aleppo. They are members of General Staff and of crews of *Goeben* and *Breslau*. It is believed that they have 150 mines with them. Some of the officers are bound for Bagdad and Basra, others for Beirout and Tripoli.

No. 169.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 27.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 27, 1914.*

ENVER PASHA, Jemel, and Talaat Bey, are making every preparation for an expedition against Egypt, which is evidently now their uppermost thought. A majority of the Committee are, however, said to be against war, and are showing considerable opposition to the scheme. I am unable to vouch for this, but the news appears to be fairly well authenticated. Halill Bey started for Berlin this morning, and he is said to be about to negotiate with the German Government. It seems difficult to explain his journey on any other hypothesis than that the Turks wish to postpone any decisive action.

No. 170.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 27, 1914.*

IT is now clear that, with exception of Minister of War, Turkish Government are seeking to temporise.

I have reliable information that on October 22nd Austrian Ambassador urged immediate war on Minister of Interior and Halill. Both these officials maintained that it would be wiser to wait until the situation in Egypt and Caucasus cleared before moving, and suggested it would be time enough to move in the spring. They were not sure that, if they went to war, Italy might not join the Allies. Austrian Ambassador retorted that spring would be too late, and that it was essential to Germany and Austria that Turkey should declare herself with them at once. His Excellency was clearly greatly dissatisfied at their attitude.

Enver Pasha, on the other hand, whom Austrian Ambassador saw subsequently, said that he was determined to have war, whatever his colleagues might desire. Turkish fleet would be sent into Black Sea, and he could easily arrange with Admiral Suchon to provoke hostilities.

Fleet has, in point of fact, to-day gone into Black Sea, so it is impossible to foretell what is in store.

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No. 171.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 28, 1914.*

PORTE regrets that owing to pressure of military requirements they are unable to accept wireless telegraphy messages sent from England for His Majesty's Embassy.

No. 172.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 28, 1914.*

I HAVE received reliable information that some German officers unsuccessfully endeavoured to persuade commandant of Turk post to attack our post at Kossaimo, and that, on making further efforts with this object, they were arrested and sent to Beersheba. If true, story shows desire of Germans to precipitate matters.

No. 173.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 28.)
(Telegraphic.) *Cairo, October 28, 1914.*

TWO thousand armed Bedouins are advancing to attack the Canal, and have watered at Magdaba, which is 20 miles inside Egyptian frontier, October 26th.

No. 174.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 28, 1914.*

IT is reported that four Turkish gunboats are intending to proceed from Alexandretta.

You should warn Turkish Government that, as long as German officers remain on *Goeben* and *Breslau* and Turkish fleet is practically under German control, we must regard movement of Turkish ships as having a hostile intention, and, should Turkish gunboats proceed to sea, we must in self-defence stop them.

As soon as Turkish Government carry out their promise

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

respecting German crews and officers and observe the laws of neutrality with regard to *Goeben* and *Breslau*, and free the Turkish fleet from German control, we shall regard Turkish ships as neutrals, but, till then, we must protect ourselves against any movements that threaten us.

No. 175.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 28, 1914.*

ON October 26th a special train left Aleppo for Jerablus with two German and four Turkish naval officers and 100 Turkish sailors, with large quantities of ship's tackle and accessories.

No. 176.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)
(Telegraphic.) *Constantinople, October 29, 1914.*

I HAVE seen the Grand Vizier and informed him that, in spite of his assurances, the Bedouins had crossed the frontier and were in occupation of wells of Magdaba, 20 miles within Egyptian territory. I reminded him of the warning which I had addressed to him on the receipt of instructions contained in your telegram of October 24th,¹ and asked him for explanation. His Highness replied that he had instructed Minister of War, after representations which I had made to him, on no account to allow movement of any force across the frontier. If it were true, he would give immediate orders for recall of Bedouins, but he did not believe accuracy of the information.

I replied that it was necessary at such a crisis that I should speak quite frankly, that it was a matter for public notoriety that there were divisions of opinion in the Cabinet, that his Highness was not master of the situation, and that, if Minister of War and extremists had decided upon an expedition against Egypt, his Highness could not prevent it. Grand Vizier replied that I was absolutely mistaken, and that, if it came to that, military party would not act without full assent of the Government. I said that in that case the time had

¹ See No. 166.

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come to put them to the test, and that unless expedition were immediately recalled, I could not answer for the consequences. As it was, I might at any moment receive instructions to ask for my passports, in which case Turkish Government would be at war with the Triple *Entente* at a time when German official communiqués admitted defeat on the Vistula.

No. 177.

Sir G. Buchanan to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Petrograd, October 29, 1914.*

RUSSIAN gunboat at Odessa has been sunk, and Feodosia bombarded by Turkish fleet. Turkish officers who were sent on shore to demand surrender of Novorossiisk were arrested by prefect and ship left without taking further action.

Above information just communicated by Russian Government.

No. 178.

Mr. Roberts to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 29.)

(Telegraphic.) *Odessa, October 29, 1914.*

BEFORE dawn this morning two or three Turkish torpedo-boats raided Odessa harbour and sank Russian gunboat *Donetz*. French ship *Portugal* damaged; two of the crew killed, two wounded. Russian steamships *Vitiaz* and *Liazaref* and *Whanpao* damaged. Some loss of life was caused in the town itself by shell fire.

No. 179.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

(Telegraphic.) *Foreign Office, October 30, 1914.*

IN view of hostile acts that have been committed, Russian Government have instructed Russian Ambassador to leave Constantinople with all his staff.

Should his Excellency leave, you should yourself send in a note to the Sublime Porte to say that His Majesty's Government have learnt with the utmost surprise of the wanton attacks upon open and undefended towns of a friendly

country without any warning and without the slightest provocation, and that these acts constitute an unprecedented violation of the most ordinary rules of international law, usage, and comity. Russia has shown the utmost patience and forbearance in face of repeated violations of the rules of neutrality by Turkey, and in face of most provocative acts, amounting in reality to acts of hostility, and in this attitude of restraint her Allies, Great Britain and France, have co-operated. It is evident that there is no chance of a return to a proper observance of neutrality so long as the German naval and military missions remain at Constantinople, and such a situation cannot be prolonged.

Unless, therefore, the Turkish Government will divest themselves of all responsibility for these unprovoked acts of hostility by dismissing the German military and naval missions, and fulfilling their often repeated promises about the German crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, and will give you a satisfactory reply to this effect within twelve hours from the date of the delivery of the note, you should ask for your passports and leave Constantinople with the staff of the embassy.

No. 180.

Sir L. Mallet to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received October 31.)
(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, October 30, 1914.

RUSSIAN Ambassador asked for his passports this afternoon and I and my French colleague have followed suit.

Minister of the Interior, in conversation with a neutral colleague this afternoon, practically admitted that Turkey had thrown in her lot with Germany.

I have had a very painful interview with the Grand Vizier, who had been kept in the dark as to his colleagues' intentions, and who will doubtless be set aside to-night.

No. 181.

Mr. Cheetham to Sir Edward Grey.—(Received November 2.)
Sir,

Cairo, October 20, 1914.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 30th ultimo,¹

¹ See No. 125.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

I have the honour to submit copies of further interrogatories of the German spy, Robert Mors.

I have, &c.
(For Mr. Cheetham),
ROBERT GREG.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 181.

Further Interrogation of Lieutenant Mors.

MULAZIM AWAL ROBERT MORS, recalled and re-examined, states :

"I arrived in Constantinople on the evening of September 4th, 1914, and put up at the Hotel Germania. I met M. Curt Prüfer there, and he introduced me to Omar Fauzi Bey, the Turkish staff officer who asked me to call upon him at the War Office. I did so on September 6th. He questioned me on the state of Egypt and on the chances of success of a native rising in this country. He mentioned that the German diplomatic and consular officials had been expelled, and that all German subjects had been arrested and were to be deported. He also asked me if I knew M. Dusreicher, who, he declared, had also been sent out of the country. He stated likewise that he had heard that the Egyptian army and police had been disarmed, and asked me if it were true, to which I replied that I thought it was very improbable. He then told me he had emissaries in Egypt fomenting trouble to prepare the way for a Turkish invasion, and to compel the British to split up their forces. In reply to my enquiry, he explained that two bands of native marauders were to be organised in each Imdiria, to attack the railway, and commit outrages on the property of British subjects, &c. These bands were to be recruited from the malefactor class, and there would be a Turkish officer in every province to direct their operations. Each band would be composed of from ten to fifteen men, and when an important *coup* was contemplated in any Imdiria the two bands would unite, the idea being to oblige the British to scatter their forces all over the country. Fauzi Bey said he had a list of fifty Egyptian army and police officers, from whom he expected either active or passive assistance. Four strong bands of Bedouins were

also being formed to operate in the Suez Canal zone, two east and two west. Each band was to be fifty strong. Fauzi Bey made a rough sketch of the Canal to explain to me the rôle of these Bedouins. He said the British had detached posts at intervals along the Canal. Two of the most isolated of these would be attacked simultaneously and, if possible, annihilated. The intermediate posts would then go to their assistance, whereupon the third and fourth troops of Bedouins would raid the weakened points and fire on the steamers in the Canal. The instructions given to the bands were to retire into the desert if the post attacked was strongly reinforced, and then to return and attack another post, &c.

“Fauzi Bey asked me if I would help to carry out these plans, and suggested that I should assist a Turkish officer who was already in Alexandria to carry out these komitajis operations in that district. If not, I could take part in some way in the military operations to be undertaken in Egypt. I replied that, as an officer, I could have nothing to do with the komitajis part of his programme, which, from a German point of view, was beneath the dignity of an officer, but that I was quite disposed to participate in military operations against Egypt on condition (1) I was granted the rank of officer in the Turkish army, (2) that the German Ambassador approved of my decision, and (3) that I was not required to start before my family arrived from Egypt. At this stage of our conversation a Bedawi sheikh arrived, and I rose to take my leave, but Fauzi Bey begged me to remain. The sheikh talked to Fauzi Bey on the Canal part of the programme, and I gathered from their remarks that it had already been discussed between them. I should mention that the sheikh on arriving asked the Bey if he could speak in my presence, to which Fauzi assented. They then discussed plans for destroying the embankment between the fresh-water canal and the Suez Canal, in order to cut off the drinking water supply of Ismaïlia and Suez. I asked the sheikh how he proposed to divert the fresh-water canal into Suez Canal. He replied that with 200 men and sufficient dynamite he could do it in thirty-four hours. Fauzi Bey interposed that he could easily have 1,000 kilog. of dynamite if he required it. I asked the sheikh sarcastically if he meant to employ Bedouin

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or fellaheen on the job, to which he replied, somewhat nettled, that it did not matter which. The sheikh left us and Fauzi Bey and I continued our conversation. I asked him how he was going to organise a revolution in Egypt without arms, and mentioned that the Arms Law had been vigorously applied since two years ago. He replied that he had a sufficient quantity of arms in the country, and in any case arms could be smuggled through with ease. I reverted to the subject of the fresh-water canal, remarking that I thought it an absurd project, to which he replied that he believed it quite practical and that the sheikh was a man of intelligence and sense. He went on to say that it was not the only means which he had with which to deal with the Canal problem. A wealthy Turk had presented the Government with a steamship which sailed under the Italian flag and was commanded by an ex-officer of the Turkish navy. This ship was to take a full cargo of cement from an Italian port and her manifests were to be made out for Massowa. The captain was to submit to any search by British warships without demur, and on reaching Port Sâid to steam at full speed down the Canal. He was then to sink her by one of three methods, viz. : (1) To collide with a British ship ; (2) to provoke a British warship to sink her by ignoring signals ; (3) to sink her himself. Fauzi Bey told me he had a trustworthy Egyptian officer who was leaving for Egypt by the first Khedivial mail steamer to take part in the operations there and to bear instructions to his agents. I afterwards spoke to Dr. Prüfer about Fauzi's Canal project. He did not seem to approve, but gave me the map of the Suez Canal. I met Fauzi again at the passport office as I was about to embark on the steamship *Saidia*. He only greeted me, and said he hoped to see me back soon. He is the officer whom I mentioned in my former evidence as having seen me at the quays and who may have overheard my cabin number."

Q. Who are the police officers in league with Fauzi Bey ?—

A. He did not give me their names. I mentioned the names of several officers of my acquaintance, but after scrutinising the list he gave me a negative answer.

Q. Do you know the names of any of the army officers who figured on the list ?—A. No.

Q. Who were the officers despatched to Egypt in connec-

tion with the organisation of the komitaji bands?—A. I do not know; they left for Egypt before me.

Q. Who was the Bedawi sheikh who discussed the fresh-water canal project?—A. I do not know his name. He was a man of about fifty years of age, with a full grey beard. He was about my height, but broad-shouldered and stout. He spoke educated Arabic without a Bedawi or Maghrabi accent.

Q. Who was the officer in Alexandria with whom you were to co-operate?—A. He gave me no inkling as to who he was.

Q. Did Enver Pasha speak to you on the subject of military operations in Egypt, the destruction of the Canal, &c.?—A. Yes, on the day before I sailed, when I called upon him with Dr. Prüfer and the officer of the *Lorelei*. He questioned me on public opinion here, whether the natives would revolt against the English if the Turks marched against Egypt, and suggested that I should see Fauzi Bey on the subject. I replied that I had already seen him, and I recapitulated what he had told me. Enver Pasha replied that there would be certainly something for me to do in Egypt when the time came for action there if I was then still disposed to accept. He also asked me if I spoke Arabic.

Q. Did Fauzi Bey mention the name of the Egyptian officer who was leaving for Egypt by the first Khedivial mail steamer?—A. No; but in the light of subsequent events I believe it was Hamuda Effendi.

Q. When you told Fauzi Bey that you were disposed to participate in military operations against this country, did he accept your offer?—A. Yes; but it was agreed between us that this should take effect after I returned from Alexandria with my family.

Q. Then why were you given the detonators to take to Egypt?—A. I do not know. I am convinced that Hamuda Effendi was the person designed for the enterprise connected with the detonators. I do not think that this mission was connected with the subject which Omar Fauzi Bey discussed with me. I think it must have been a secret between Sheikh Abd-el-Aziz Shawish, Drs. Ahmad Fuad and Prüfer, and Hamuda Effendi.

Q. Have you no idea what Hamuda was to do with the

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detonators?—A. I knew they were for use with bombs to be manufactured in this country.

Q. How do you know that?—A. Because once I found Sheikh Shawish sitting with Dr. Prüfer in the latter's room at the Hotel Germania. They were copying in Arabic a receipt for making bombs. The paper from which Sheikh Shawish was copying contained directions, a list of the component chemicals, and a sketch of a bomb in the right-hand bottom corner. I heard them mention that it was to be given to the Egyptian officer, and Sheikh Shawish said to me in Arabic "Hua za'it aryak."

Q. To what use were the bombs to be put?—A. I have no idea.

R. O. C. MORS.

NO. 182.

Telegram communicated by Count Benckendorff on November 2.

(TRANSLATION.)

M. SAZONOF telegraphs on November 1st, 1914, as follows:

"The Turkish Chargé d'Affaires has just read me the following telegram from the Grand Vizier: 'I request you to inform the Minister for Foreign Affairs that we infinitely regret that an act of hostility, provoked by the Russian fleet, should have compromised the friendly relations of the two countries. You can assure the Imperial Russian Government that the Sublime Porte will not fail to give the question such solution as it entails, and that they will adopt fitting measures to prevent a recurrence of similar acts. You can declare forthwith to the Minister that we have resolved no more to allow the Imperial fleet to enter the Black Sea, and that we trust that the Russian fleet, on their side, will no longer cruise in our waters. I have the firm hope that the Imperial Russian Government will give proof, on this occurrence, of the same spirit of conciliation in the common interests of both countries.'

"I replied to the Turkish Chargé d'Affaires that I most categorically denied what he had just said respecting the initiation of hostilities by the Russian fleet; I told him that I feared it was too late to negotiate; that nevertheless, if

the Sublime Porte decided upon the immediate dismissal of all the German military and naval officers and men, it might be possible to consider the question, and that discussion might not be impossible to reach some basis of satisfaction to be given by Turkey for the illegal act of aggression against our coasts and for the damage thereby inflicted.

"I authorised Fahr-Eddin to send a cypher telegram in this sense, but pointed out to him at the same time that the representation he had made in no way altered the situation. Fahr-Eddin will receive his passports to-morrow, and the reply from the Turkish Government can be sent through the Italian Embassy."

No. 183.

*Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir G. Buchanan, and Sir C. Greene.
Foreign Office, November 3, 1914.*

SIR,

THE Turkish Ambassador called on the 31st ultimo and enquired whether this Department could give his Highness any information regarding the telegrams which had appeared in the press on the subject of a Turkish attack on certain Russian ports.

Sir A. Nicolson informed his Highness of what had actually occurred in the Black Sea. Tewfik Pasha expressed surprise, and enquired what he should do in the extremely difficult position in which he now found himself. Sir A. Nicolson assured his Highness that His Majesty's Government would treat him personally with all respect and consideration, and that he would be given notice if it became necessary for diplomatic relations between Great Britain and Turkey to cease.

On the 2nd instant Tewfik Pasha again called and communicated to Sir A. Nicolson the text of a telegram which he had just received from the Grand Vizier, a copy of which is enclosed herein.

Sir A. Nicolson replied, and he was sure that I would agree with him, that he strongly demurred to the statement in the last paragraph of the Grand Vizier's telegram, to the effect that "His Majesty's Government had provoked a rupture of diplomatic relations." It was absurd to state that we

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had done so in view of the indisputable fact that Turkish ships had bombarded the ports of one of our allies, and had burnt and sunk a British steamer lying peaceably in a friendly port. Furthermore, there were active, not to say feverish, military and other preparations directed against the Suez Canal and Egypt. If the Ottoman Government were as desirous as they asserted of maintaining friendly relations with Great Britain they should at once dismiss the German naval and military missions.

I am, &c.,
E. GREY.

ENCLOSURE IN No. 183.

Text of Telegram to be communicated to Sir Edward Grey on behalf of Saïd Halim Pasha.

(TRANSLATION.)

I AM much grieved that, in consequence of the deplorable incident that has occurred in the Black Sea, the British Government have decided to recall their Ambassador from Constantinople.

As I have many times declared to Sir Louis Mallet, I am deeply desirous to maintain the relations of friendship existing between our two countries, and I am working without cease in order that they may not be compromised in any way.

I should therefore much regret if an incident, due to unforeseen circumstances, were to be considered by His Britannic Majesty's Government as a cause of conflict between the two countries.

Consequently, I hope that His Majesty's Government will be willing, in witness of their reciprocal desire to maintain intact the friendly relations of the two countries, to put an end at the earliest possible moment to the rupture of diplomatic relations which they have just provoked.

Constantinople, November 1 (14), 1914.

No. 184.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir G. Buchanan, Sir F. Bertie, and Sir C. Greene.

SIR,

Foreign Office, November 4, 1914.

TEWFIK PASHA called upon me this afternoon, and informed me that he had received instructions to ask for his passports, as His Majesty's Ambassador had already left Constantinople.

I expressed to Tewfik Pasha my personal regret at our official relations being terminated, as he had always acted in a loyal, straightforward, and friendly manner, and I had much appreciated the intercourse which we had had together during the past few years. I informed Tewfik Pasha that if his Government wished that hostilities between the two countries should cease, the only chance was to dismiss the German naval and military missions, and especially the officers and crews of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*. So long as German officers remained in complete naval and military control at Constantinople, it was clear that they would continue to make war against us.

I am, &c.,

E. GREY.

DESPATCH FROM HIS MAJESTY'S AMBASSADOR AT
CONSTANTINOPLE SUMMARISING EVENTS
LEADING UP TO RUPTURE OF RELATIONS
WITH TURKEY, AND REPLY THERETO.

MISCELLANEOUS, No. 14 (1914): [Cd. 7716.]

[In continuation of "Miscellaneous, No. 13 (1914)":
Cd. 7628.]

SIR,

London, November 20, 1914.

I HAVE the honour to report on the circumstances which preceded and accompanied my departure from Constantinople on November 1st.

On my return to my post on August 16th, a fortnight after the outbreak of the European war, the situation was already such as to give ground for the apprehension that

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Turkey would be driven by Germany sooner or later to take part in it as her ally. The Ottoman army, under the supreme command of Enver Pasha, who was entirely in German hands, had been mobilised, and although the Government had declared their intention of preserving their neutrality, they had taken no proper steps to ensure its maintenance. They had, on the contrary, jeopardised their ability to do so by the admission of the German warships *Goeben* and *Breslau* into the Dardanelles on August 10th. Events have confirmed what I and my French and Russian colleagues constantly impressed upon the Grand Vizier and other Ministers at the time, that so long as the German admiral and crews remained on board the German warships, the German Government were masters of the situation, and were in a position to force the hand of the Turkish Government if at any given moment it suited them to do so.

So far as the Grand Vizier was concerned, the warning fell upon deaf ears, and it was at no time possible to persuade his Highness to admit that he would not be able to control developments to which he was himself opposed and which had not the approval of the whole Government. It is quite possible that he was sincere in this conviction, but he was fully alive to the precarious nature of his own position and to the fact that any real attempt on his part to run counter to the policy of Enver Pasha and the military authorities would have meant his elimination. This event would have brought matters to a head at once, which would have been contrary to the policy of the allied Powers of postponing for as long as possible, if they were unable to avert altogether, the intervention of Turkey in the war, with the vast and complicated issues involved in the raising of the Eastern question, so that my rôle and that of my French and Russian colleagues, with whom I acted in complete accord throughout, was necessarily restricted to one of remonstrance and to an endeavour to expose and defeat the German intrigues.

In pursuance of a long-prepared policy, the greatest pressure was at once exercised by Germany to force Turkey into hostilities. German success in the European war was said to be assured. The perpetual menace to Turkey from Russia might, it was suggested, be averted by a timely alliance with Germany and Austria. Egypt might be re-

covered for the Empire. India and other Moslem countries represented as groaning under Christian rule might be kindled into a flame of infinite possibilities for the Caliphate of Constantinople. Turkey would emerge from the war the one great Power of the East, even as Germany would be the one great Power of the West. Such was the substance of German misrepresentations. It is a matter of common consent that Enver Pasha, dominated by a quasi-Napoleonic ideal, by political Pan-Islamism, and by a conviction of the superiority of the German arms, was from the first a strong partisan of the German alliance. How far his several colleagues and other directing spirits outside the Ministry entered into his views is to some extent a matter of speculation; but it may be taken as certain that the Sultan, the Heir Apparent, the Grand Vizier, Djavid Bey, a majority of the Ministry, and a considerable section of the Committee of Union and Progress were opposed to so desperate an adventure as war with the allies. At what moment Talaat Bey, the most powerful civilian in the Cabinet and the most conspicuous of the Committee leaders, finally threw in his lot with the war party cannot be ascertained precisely. His sympathies were undoubtedly with them from the beginning, but the part which he actually played in the earlier stages is shrouded in mystery. I have reason to think that for some time he may have thought it possible, by steering a middle course, to postpone a decision until it was clearer what would be the result of the European war; and he may well have been anxious to gain time and to secure in exchange for Turkey's adhesion to the German cause something more solid than promises. These were tendered, indeed, on a lavish scale, but I am not aware that they were given in a form which could be considered binding. It is certain in any case that Talaat Bey's hesitations were overcome, and that he had definitely joined the conspiracy to bring about war this autumn some three weeks before the crisis was precipitated.

Whatever the views of individual Ministers or others may have been, the Turkish Government made no effort to emancipate themselves from German influence or to stem the tide of its progress. The material hold established by the introduction of the two German ships was on the contrary allowed to be strengthened. Not only did these ships remain

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under effective German control, but a strong German element was imported into the remainder of the fleet, even before the British naval mission, which had been reduced to impotence by order of the Minister of Marine, had been recalled by His Majesty's Government. Large numbers of Germans were imported from Germany as unostentatiously as possible, to be employed in the forts of the Dardanelles and Bosphorus and at other crucial points. Numerous German merchant vessels, of which the most important were the *Corcovado* and the *General*, served as bases of communication and as auxiliaries to what had become, in effect, a German Black Sea Fleet. Secret communications with the German General Staff were established at the outbreak of the war by means of the wireless apparatus of the *Corcovado*, which was anchored opposite the German Embassy at Therapia, and which was continuously used for this among other purposes throughout the whole period under review, in spite of my urgent representations and those of my French and Russian colleagues. Other German ships played with the Turkish flag as they pleased, in order to facilitate their voyages or cloak their real character while in port, and a department was constituted at the German Embassy for the purpose of requisitioning supplies for the use of the German Government and their ships. All these things were tolerated by a complaisant Turkish Government, who appeared to be indifferent to the incessant encroachments on their sovereignty if not to welcome them.

On land, the officers of the German military mission displayed a ubiquitous activity. Their supremacy at the Ministry of War, combined with the close co-operation which existed between them and the Militarist party, made it easy to fortify an already strong position. Acting in conjunction with other less accredited agents of their own nationality, they were the main organisers of those military preparations in Syria which so directly menaced Egypt, and which became a serious source of preoccupation and a constant theme of my remonstrances.

The evidence of these preparations became daily more convincing. Emissaries of Enver Pasha were present on the frontier, bribing and organising the Bedouins. Warlike stores were despatched south, and battalions of regular troops

were posted at Rafah, whilst the Syrian and Mosul army corps were held in readiness to move south at short-notice. The Syrian towns were full of German officers, who were provided with large sums of money for suborning the local chiefs. As an illustration of the thoroughness of the German preparations, I was credibly informed that orders were given to obtain estimates for the making of Indian military costumes at Aleppo in order to simulate the appearance of British Indian troops. Under directions from the Central Government the civil authorities of the Syrian coast towns removed all their archives and ready money to the interior, and Moslem families were warned to leave to avoid the consequences of bombardment by the British fleet. The Khedive himself was a party to the conspiracy, and arrangements were actually made with the German Embassy for his presence with a military expedition across the frontier.

However difficult it would have been for the Ottoman Government to regain their control over the armed forces of the State after the arrival of the *Goeben* and *Breslau*, the insidious campaign carried on with their encouragement by means of the press, the preachers in the mosques, and the pamphleteers, is evidence that its most powerful members were in sympathy with the anti-British movement. I had, indeed, actual proof of the inspiration by Talaat Bey and Djemal Pasha of articles directed against Great Britain. Every agency which could be used to stimulate public opinion in favour of Germany and to inflame it against the allies was set at work with the connivance, and often with the co-operation, of the Turkish authorities. All the Turkish newspapers in Constantinople became German organs; they glorified every real or imaginary success of Germany or Austria; they minimised everything favourable to the allies.

The enclosures in an earlier despatch will have shown to what depths of scurrility some of the more corrupt and unbridled of them descended in their onslaughts on Great Britain, and how unequally the censors of the press held the balance when exercising their practically unlimited powers. The provincial papers were no less enthusiastically pro-German; the semi-official telegraphic agency, which is practically worked by the Ministry of the Interior, was placed at the disposal of German propaganda. Through these

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agencies unlimited use was made of Turkey's one concrete and substantial grievance against Great Britain as distinguished from other European Powers, that is, the detention of the *Sultan Osman* and the *Reshadie* at the beginning of the European war. Other grievances, older and less substantial, were raked out of the past; and the indictment of Great Britain and her allies was completed by a series of inventions and distortions of the truth designed to represent them as the enemy, not merely of Turkey, but of the whole of Islam. Attacks of the latter kind became especially frequent in the latter half of October, and were undoubtedly directly inspired by Germany. My urgent representations to the Grand Vizier and to Talaat Bey, both verbal and written, had hardly even a temporary effect in checking this campaign.

It may seem strange that, thus equipped and thus abetted, those who sought to involve Turkey in the European war failed so long to achieve their object. The reasons were manifold. As I have already indicated, the party which stood for neutrality contained men who, lacking though they were in any material means of enforcing their views, could not easily be ignored. By whatever various routes they may have been arrived at, the ideas of these men coincided with a body of less sophisticated and hardly articulate opinion which, however wounded by England's action in preventing delivery of the *Sultan Osman* and the *Reshadie*, could still not reconcile itself to a war with England and France. In my despatch of September 22nd I had the honour to report how frankly and how emphatically the Sultan himself voiced this feeling in conversation with me. There can be little doubt that the Grand Vizier exercised what influence he had in favour of neutrality. Djavid Bey, the Minister of Finance, whose influence in favour of neutrality was of weight as representing the Jewish element, and whose arguments in favour of peace were supported by the fact that Turkey was already absolutely bankrupt, and not in a position to embark upon war with the allies, became towards the end so formidable an obstacle to the fulfilment of the German plan that instructions were sent from Berlin to force his resignation.

Again, seriously convinced as most prominent Turks appear to have been of the ultimate success of Germany, their confidence could not but be a little dashed by the

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actual course of events in the two main theatres of war; and the more thoughtful realised that even in the event of Germany being victorious, the fact of Turkey having fought by her side would not necessarily ensure any advantage to the Ottoman Empire. As for the Germans themselves, it was true, as I have said, that they could at any moment force Turkey to march with them, but to do so before every means of suasion had proved useless would obviously not have been politic. It was clearly only in the last resort that the Monarch whom Pan-Islamic pro-Germans acclaimed as the hope of Islam, and whom the devout in some places had been taught to regard as hardly distinguishable from a true believer, would run the risk of scandalising the Moslem world, whom he hoped to set ablaze to the undoing of England, Russia, and France, by using the guns of the *Goeben* to force the hands of the Sultan-Caliph. But the factor which more than any other delayed the realisation of the German plans, and which enabled me and my French and Russian colleagues to protract the crisis until they could only be realised in such a way as to open the eyes of the Moslem world to the real nature of the conspiracy, was the inherent tendency of Turkish statesmen to procrastinate, in the hope that by playing off one side against the other they might gain more in the long run.

However slender the chances in our favour, it was obviously my duty, in conjunction with my French and Russian colleagues, to support and encourage by all possible means those forces which were obscurely striving for the preservation of peace.

If this policy necessarily involved the acceptance of acts on the part of the Ottoman Government which, in ordinary circumstances, would have called for more than remonstrance and the reservation of our rights, and which it would have been easy to make the occasion of a rupture of relations, the patience displayed by the allies was justified by the results achieved.

Although unsuccessful in averting war, two objects of main importance were gained by delaying its commencement. On the one hand, the allied Powers are now in a position to deal with the problem with a freer hand, and, on the other, Germany has been forced to show her cards and to act independently of a majority of the Turkish Cabinet.

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Under the stress of events in the main theatre of the war, and owing to the vital necessity of providing a diversion in the Near East, Germany was constrained to intensify still further their pressure on the Turks. During the first three weeks of October their pressure took yet another form, and a new weight was cast into the scale by the importation into Constantinople, with every circumstance of secrecy, of large quantities of bullion consigned to the German Ambassador and delivered under military guard at the Deutsche Bank. The total amount was estimated at some 4,000,000*l.* This sum was far more than was necessary for the maintenance of the German military and naval establishments, and I have every reason to believe that a definite arrangement was arrived at between the Germans and a group of Ministers, including Enver Pasha, Talaat Bey, and Djemal Pasha, that Turkey should declare war as soon as the financial provision should have attained a stated figure. My information establishes the fact that a climax was reached about the middle of the third week in October, when it had been decided to confront the Grand Vizier with the alternative of complicity or resignation, and that only the Russian successes on the Vistula, or some other more obscure cause, prevented this plan from being carried out.

Whatever the exact history of the first three weeks of October, it is certain that on or about the 26th of that month the German conspirators realised that the pace must be forced by still more drastic measures than they had yet used, and that any further attempts to win over the Grand Vizier and the Turkish Government as a whole to their ideas and to induce them to declare war would be useless. On that afternoon an important meeting of Committee leaders was held, at which Enver Pasha was present, but which only decided to send Halil Bey, the President of the Chamber, on a mission to Berlin. In the circles in which this decision became known it was regarded as a partial triumph for the Peace party, and as a fresh attempt to gain time for the sake either of mere procrastination or of securing more concrete offers from Germany. Be that as it may, Halil Bey never left on his mission, and it is believed that its abandonment was due to a more than usually blunt hint from the German representative in Constantinople. Whilst Constantinople

generally was comforting itself with the reflection that nothing could well happen until after the four days' Bairam festival, beginning on October 30th, two events of capital importance occurred.

On the morning of the 29th I received intelligence from Egypt of the incursion into the Sinai peninsula of an armed body of 2,000 Bedouins, who had occupied the wells of Magdaba, and whose objective was an attack upon the Suez Canal. On learning this news I at once proceeded to the Yali of the Grand Vizier, to acquaint him of the serious consequences which must ensue if the expedition were not at once recalled. His Highness received the intelligence with every appearance of surprise. He emphatically disclaimed all knowledge of it, and gave me the most solemn assurance that if the facts were as stated he would at once issue orders for the withdrawal of the invading party. He assured me once more that nothing was further from the intention of the Government than war with Great Britain. It was unthinkable, he said, that an expedition of this kind could have been organised by any member of the Government; and he felt certain that if anything of the kind had occurred, it could only have been a raid by irresponsible Bedouins. I told his Highness that I feared that he deceived himself. I reminded him of the various occasions on which he had given me similar assurances, and of the negative results of the instructions which he had given on previous occasions. I warned him of the disastrous consequences to the Ottoman Empire of a crisis which could not now be long postponed unless he and the friends of peace were prepared to take some serious stand against the conspiracy of which I was fully cognisant, to involve it irretrievably in the general war. On this, as on every occasion of my interviews with the Grand Vizier, I was impressed with his inability to realise the facts or to disabuse himself of the conviction, in spite of his many unfortunate experiences, that he would be able, in a really serious crisis, to exert his authority with effect.

The second event of capital importance was the attack on Odessa and other Russian ports in the Black Sea on the morning of the same day, October 29th. It is now certain that the actual orders for these attacks were given by the German admiral on the evening of October 27th, but it was

not until after they had actually taken place, that is, on the afternoon of October 29th, when news of the raid on Odessa was telegraphed to me direct by Mr. Consul-General Roberts, that my Russian and French colleagues and myself realised that the die had actually been cast and the crisis that we had so long feared and striven to avert had occurred. Immediately on receiving the news M. Bompard and I called on M. de Giers and decided to ask for authority from our respective Governments to confront the Porte with the alternative of rupture or dismissal of the German naval and military missions. On the morning of the 30th, however, I learnt from my Russian colleague that he had received instructions from his Government immediately to ask for his passports. He had written to the Grand Vizier to ask for an interview, which his Highness had begged him to postpone until the following day owing to indisposition. The instructions of my Russian colleague being in a categorical form, he had therefore been constrained to address a note to the Grand Vizier demanding his passports; and I and my French colleague, acting on the instructions with which the Ambassadors of the allied Powers had at my suggestion already been furnished to leave Constantinople simultaneously, should any one of them be compelled to ask for his passports, owing either to a Turkish declaration of war or to some intolerable act of hostility, decided without further delay to write to the Grand Vizier and ask in our turn for interviews to enable us to carry out these instructions. In view of his Highness's indisposition we had not expected to be received that day, but a few hours later the Grand Vizier sent us word that he would, nevertheless, be glad to see us, and notwithstanding the excuse which he had made earlier in the day he received the Russian Ambassador also in the course of the afternoon. My interview with the Grand Vizier partly coincided with that of M. de Giers, and preceded that of M. Bompard. It was of a painful description. His Highness convinced me of his sincerity in disclaiming all knowledge of or participation in the events which had led to the rupture, and entreated me to believe that the situation was even now not irretrievable. I replied that the time had passed for assurances. The crisis which I had predicted to his Highness at almost every interview which I had had with him since my return had actually

occurred, and unless some adequate satisfaction were immediately given by the dismissal of the German missions, which could alone prevent the recurrence of attempts upon Egyptian territory and attacks on Russia, war with the allies was inevitable. My Russian colleague had already demanded his passports, and I must, in pursuance of the instructions I had received, follow the same course. The Grand Vizier again protested that even now he could undo what the War party had done without his knowledge or consent. In reply to the doubt which I expressed as to the means at his disposal, he said that he had on his side moral forces which could not but triumph, and that he meant to fight on to the end. He did not, indeed, hint at a possibility of immediately dismissing the German mission, but he informed me that there was to be a meeting of the Council at his house that evening, when he would call upon his colleagues to support him in his determination to avert war with the allied Powers.

The Council was duly held, and, as he had predicted, the majority of the Ministers supported the Grand Vizier, who made a strong appeal in favour of peace, and was seconded by Djavid Bey. But the powerlessness of the Sultan's Ministers to do more than vote in the Council Chamber was evident. The question of dismissing the German naval officers was discussed, but no decision to do so was taken, and no Minister ventured even to propose the expulsion of the military mission. In the interval the War party had sealed their resolution to go forward, by publishing a communiqué in which it was stated that the first acts of hostility in the Black Sea had come from the Russian side. Untrue and grotesque as it was, this invention succeeded in deceiving many of the public.

It is not possible to establish by proof which of the Ministers had pre-knowledge of the German admiral's *coup*, but it may be regarded as certain that Enver Pasha was aware of it, and highly probable that Talaat Bey was also an accomplice.

The story of a Russian provocation was plainly an after-thought, and if the official report of the Russian Government were not sufficient to disprove it, I could produce independent evidence to show that the orders to begin hostilities were given at the mouth of the Bosphorus on the evening of October 27th, as the result of a conspiracy hatched between

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the German representatives in Constantinople and a small and unscrupulous Turkish faction.

My Russian colleague left Constantinople without incident on the evening of October 31st. My own departure was eventually arranged for the following evening, when I left for Dedeagatch, accompanied by my staff of sixty officials and their families, the British advisers in the service of the Turkish Government and some other British subjects also travelled with me. My French colleague and his staff left by the same train.

Owing to the wanton refusal of the military authorities at the last moment to allow the departure of a great number of British and French subjects who were to have left by an earlier train than that which had been placed at my disposal, the station was for some hours the scene of indescribable confusion and turmoil.

My protests and those of the French Ambassador were disregarded, and after protracted discussion we agreed to leave matters in the hands of the United States Ambassador, who undertook to use all his influence to procure the departure of our fellow subjects on the following day. The "sous-chef de protocole" of the Sublime Porte and the "chef de cabinet particulier" of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs were sent to bid farewell to M. Bompard and myself at the railway station, and two Secretaries of the Political Department of the Ministry accompanied us to the frontier.

It would be impossible to exaggerate the assistance which I have received from Mr. Morgenthau, the United States Ambassador. During the last two days especially the difficulties arising out of the abnormality of the situation would have been immeasurably greater had it not been for his invaluable help and his untiring efforts on behalf of myself and my staff. We are heavily indebted not only to Mr. Morgenthau himself, but to every member of the United States Embassy. It is entirely owing to their exertions that the British and French subjects who were detained at the station on the night of my departure were allowed to leave on the following evening.

Before concluding this despatch I desire also to place on record my sense of the cheerful courage displayed by the British community in Constantinople, as well as in other

towns, during the whole of this trying period. A large proportion of them have suffered severely in their business from the instability of the situation in Turkey. Many have suffered heavily and more directly by the military requisitions which from the beginning of August were carried out in an inconceivably arbitrary manner. By the suppression of the Capitulations all saw themselves deprived at a moment's notice of the secular privileges which had hitherto secured the persons and the property of foreigners against caprice and injustice. But they have one and all faced these adversities with a reasonable and manly fortitude.

Shortly after my return to my post, I recommended those British subjects who applied to me for advice to send home, when opportunity offered, those members of their families who had no particular reason to stay in the country.

A certain number left during the autumn, and many have left since. Those who have chosen to stay, or who have not been in a position to leave, remain under the protection of the United States Ambassador. As regards the British community at Bagdad, I instructed the acting British consul-general at Bagdad, early in October, to charter a steamer for the conveyance to the coast of any British subjects who might wish to leave. A large number of British and British-Indian subjects availed themselves of this opportunity.

I cannot conclude this report without calling your attention to the zeal shown by the junior members of my staff, including Mr. Ovey, Lord Gerald Wellesley, Mr. Charles Lister, Mr. Thomas, Mr. Wilson, Mr. Astell, and by Mr. Fuller, Archivist to His Majesty's Embassy, in the performance of their duties in the Chancery, as well as to the able and conscientious work of the members of the Dragomanate and consulate-general.

The Chancery was greatly assisted by the voluntary help kindly offered to them by Judge Cator, the Rev. Canon Whitehouse, Chaplain to His Majesty's Embassy, and by Dr. Clemow, Physician to His Majesty's Embassy, as well as by Mr. Weakley, Commercial Attaché.

I need not do more than refer to the work of Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe Owen, Military Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy, whose information respecting the military preparations was often obtained with considerable difficulty.

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I should like to place on record my high appreciation of the conduct of His Majesty's consular officers throughout the Ottoman Empire during the whole period of the crisis. They one and all performed their often difficult duties with zeal and discretion. I was especially indebted to Mr. Cumberbatch, His Majesty's consul-general at Beirut, Mr. Heathcote Smith, acting British consul-general at Smyrna, and to Mr. Palmer, vice-consul at the Dardanelles, for the valuable information which they supplied.

I would wish to bring to your particular notice the services rendered by Mr. Ryan, Acting First Dragoman of His Majesty's Embassy. His ability, knowledge of Turkey, sound judgment and untiring industry, were of invaluable assistance to me, and are deserving of your special commendation.

I have, &c.,

LOUIS MALLET.

No. 2.

Sir Edward Grey to Sir L. Mallet.

Foreign Office, December 4, 1914.

SIR,

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 20th ultimo, in which you summarise the events since your return to your post on August 16th last until your departure on November 1st.

I have read with great appreciation and pleasure of the invaluable assistance rendered to your Excellency in the difficult circumstances of your departure by the United States Ambassador and every member of the United States Embassy, and I have already requested the United States Government to convey to Mr. Morgenthau the most sincere thanks of His Majesty's Government for the valuable services rendered by his Excellency on that occasion, and subsequently in helping the British community to leave Constantinople.

I have also been much gratified to receive your Excellency's testimony of the cheerful courage of the British community in Turkey under exceptionally trying circumstances, and I have noted with great satisfaction your Excellency's appreciation of the valuable services of the embassy and consulate

staff, and of the members of His Majesty's consular service throughout the Ottoman Empire.

I desire also to convey to your Excellency my high sense of the marked ability, patience, and discretion shown by your Excellency in carrying out, in the face of great difficulties, the policy of His Majesty's Government. War was eventually forced by wanton and unprovoked hostilities of the Turkish fleet under German inspiration and orders, but it was the desire of His Majesty's Government to avoid a rupture with Turkey; and your Excellency rightly directed all your efforts to encourage those influences at Constantinople that were moderate and reasonable. To your efforts it was at any rate in some degree due that the inevitable catastrophe did not occur sooner.

I am, &c.,
E. GREY.

THE KAISER AND PRINCE HENRY STRUCK OUT OF NAVY LIST.

Times,
Nov. 6,
1914.

THE Navy List for November omits the name of the German Emperor and his brother, Prince Henry of Prussia, from the list of Honorary Admirals of the British Fleet. The Tsar alone now possesses that distinction.

OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND IN MESOPOTAMIA.

FIELD OPERATIONS.

Parl.
Paper,
Cd. 8074),
1915.

No. 205.—The Governor-General in Council has much pleasure in directing the publication of the following letter from the Chief of the General Staff, dated the 2nd February, 1915, submitting despatches from Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., and Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., describing the operations of I.E.F. "D" at the head of the Persian Gulf up to the 28th November, 1914. The Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion expressed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief regarding the manner in which the operations were conducted and the behaviour of the troops engaged. His

Excellency in Council also shares the Commander-in-Chief's appreciation of the support rendered by the Royal Navy which conduced so materially to the success of the operations.

From the Chief of the General Staff to the Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department, dated Delhi, February 2nd, 1915.

I am directed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to submit for the information of the Government of India the undermentioned reports on the operations of Indian Expeditionary Force "D" up to the 28th November, 1914:

(i.) Report by Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., on the operations of I.E.F. "D," up to the 14th November, 1914; and

(ii.) Report by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding I.E.F. "D," on the operations of his force at the head of the Persian Gulf, from the 14th to the 28th November, 1914.

2. His Excellency considers that the operations were conducted with skill and energy and that the discipline and steadiness of the troops reflect the greatest credit on all ranks. He desires to commend to the favourable consideration of Government the officers, non-commissioned officers and men whose services are brought to notice in the reports, and wishes specially to invite attention to Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Barrett's remarks in regard to the very valuable assistance rendered by the Royal Navy which he cordially endorses.

3. His Excellency recommends that the reports be treated as despatches and published in the *Gazette of India*.

From Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O., Commanding 16th Brigade, I.E.F. "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Simla, dated Camp Saniyeh, November 16th, 1914.

On the arrival of Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett at this camp and on conclusion of my period of independent command I have the honour to report as follows:

2. The force under my command, known as I.E.F. "D," left Bombay on the 16th October in four transports, part of a large convoy. On 19th October we parted company and steered for Bahrain Islands, under escort of H.M.S. *Ocean*. No. 1 Brigade, Indian Mountain Artillery, joined the force off Jask on the 21st. We arrived on the 23rd and anchored off Manama. Here we remained until the 2nd November.

3. On that date the Force sailed for the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab in compliance with instructions contained in your radio-telegram No. 6571. Pilots were taken on board off Bushire, and the Force arrived at the outer bar of the river on the evening of the 3rd November.

4. The 4th and 5th November were occupied with naval preparations, and the transports themselves were prepared with bullet-proof cover on the upper decks for the use of parties detailed for covering fire.

Major Radcliffe, 2nd Dorset Regiment, returned from Kuwait on 5th with information that the Fort was in ruins, but that guns were in position. A landing force was detailed for the capture of Fao, under Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. Rosher, 2nd Dorset Regiment, and orders issued. On the 5th the transports crossed the outer bar of the Shatt-el-Arab and anchored just outside the inner bar.

5. At 6 a.m. on 6th November H.M.S. *Odin*, preceded by launches sweeping for mines, stood in and bombarded the Turkish guns outside the Fort, 3 miles south-east of the telegraph station at Fao. The hostile guns were soon silenced; they were well served for a time and hit the *Odin* twice. On the signal being made that the guns were silenced, the transports *Umaria* and *Varela* advanced in that order, each towing eight boats full of troops alongside; the *Mashona* (armed launch) towed seven boats full of troops and the Royal Navy steam launches towed the detachment of Marines from H.M.S. *Ocean*. Off the telegraph station the boats were cast off and made for the shore. Some 600 Infantry landed with one section, Mountain Artillery, complete with mules and one squad, Sappers and Miners. There was no opposition. When the first and second reinforcements had also landed, Colonel Rosher assembled his force and marched south-eastwards to occupy the Fort. This was accomplished during the night of the 6th-7th, the guns were dismounted and

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thrown into the river, and Colonel Rosher's command returned to Fao.

6. While the troops who had landed were being re-embarked on the 7th November, the General Officer Commanding with remaining transports proceeded up the river till within sight of the Oil Refinery on Abadan Island. On the 8th November the river was reconnoitred for a suitable landing place. A firm, high bank with deep water close up to it was found at Saniyeh; the transports were called up and troops began to disembark. The disembarkation continued during 9th and 10th November being practically complete by evening of latter date.

7. It was proposed to advance from this camp and attack the Turks at Shamshumiya by land, but the reported advance of Turkish troops from Basrah and the necessity of safeguarding the Oil Works, combined with the absence of news from India regarding the arrival of reinforcements, decided me to remain at Saniyeh. With the intention of an early forward movement, as little baggage and supplies as possible were landed at this camp. Reconnaissances both up and down stream on the 9th and 10th failed to discover any enemy.

8. On the evening of the 10th reliable news was received from the Sheikh of Mohammerah that Sami Bey, with a strong combined force of Turks and Arabs had arrived from Basrah at a point opposite Mohammerah with the intention of attacking our camp. At 3 a.m. on the 11th the Sheikh reported that Sami Bey had started to make the attack. Troops were turned out and outposts strengthened. The Turkish force, of whom over 300 were actually seen, delivered a determined attack at 5.30 a.m. on an advanced post held by one double company 117th Mahrattas with two machine guns. They advanced to within 50 yards of the post, but were driven off by a dashing counter-attack delivered by the 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry, with the assistance of the 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery. The enemy lost heavily in their retirement across the desert, nineteen dead were counted, fourteen wounded were brought in by us and six prisoners were taken. Abandoned rifles and equipment were found. The Turks officially acknowledged a loss of eighty men.

9. The defences of the camp were further strengthened and

daily reconnaissances made. On the 14th November, Lieutenant-General Sir A. Barrett with the 18th Brigade and Divisional Troops arrived at this camp.

10. I would invite attention to the difficulties of communication in the Persian Gulf during the period covered by this report. Constant thunderstorms interrupted the wireless system. The installation on R.I.M.S. *Dalhousie* is apparently of poor quality, and the operators not very experienced. This ship had to be stationed at Bushire to connect with the cable there. The wireless station at Jask was frequently in communication with H.M.S. *Ocean*, in the sense that the station would answer the call of the warship, but it would not take in any message for transmission. No night watch is kept at Jask.

11. Several points to which I would earnestly invite attention are mentioned in the "Notes" made at intervals in the "War Diary" which is forwarded by the same mail as this report.

12. I would mention that the stay of the Force at Bahrain was of advantage as it enabled me to have British and Indian Corps instructed in rowing and handling of boats and to rehearse the operation of a landing in force.

13. All ranks have performed their duties in a most zealous and creditable manner.

14. I would bring to notice the great assistance given me by the following officers in planning and carrying out the operations for the occupation of Fao and the landing at this camp:

Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., Senior Naval Officer,
H.M.S. *Ocean*.

Commander Hamilton, Royal Indian Marine, Principal Marine Transport Officer.

15. I would also report that the masters of the various transports¹ gave all the assistance in their power. I would specially bring to notice the name of Mr. T. L. Mills, R.N.R.,

¹ *Varela.*
Umaria.
Umta.
Berbera. } British India Steam Navigation Company.

—
Masunda

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Master of the S.S. *Varela*, British India Steam Navigation Company, who displayed great zeal and willingness to perform operations beyond those usually required of a master of a merchant vessel. I trust that it will be found possible to recognise his services.

16. In connection with the Turkish night attack on the 11th November I would report that the counter-attack I ordered on the attacking force was carried out in a most dashing and skilful manner by the 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry and the 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel C. Rattray, 20th Infantry.

REPORT OF OPERATIONS OF INDIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE "D" FROM NOVEMBER 14TH TO 28TH, 1914.

*From Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.,
Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D," to the
Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, Delhi.
No. 101-G, dated Basrah, December 7th, 1914.*

I have the honour to submit for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the following report of the operations of the troops under my command from the 14th to the 28th November, 1914.

2. On the morning of the 14th November, the SS. *Elephanta* with my Headquarters, and four other transports anchored in the river opposite Saniyeh, where Brigadier-General Delamain's force was already bivouacked. The disembarkation of the troops was commenced at once. Infantry used the ships' boats and experienced no difficulty in getting ashore. The landing of the guns, wagons and horses of the field artillery and of the cavalry horses in lighters and dhows was greatly delayed by the strong tide and current, the want of proper landing places, and by the shortage of lighters and steam craft for towing purposes. Every possible use was made of all the craft available, and with the hearty co-operation of the officers and men of the Royal Navy, the Indian Marine and the transports, considerable progress was made. The hatch covers of the transports were utilised as ramps for horses and guns, while excellent work was done by the Sapper companies.

3. In the course of the day I learnt from General Delamain of the presence of a hostile force at Saihan, four miles distant, and I ordered him to attack it the following morning. A full account of the action which ensued will be found in the attached report from General Delamain. I have already mentioned, in my telegraphic report of this action, my appreciation of the skilful and spirited manner in which this attack was carried out, and of the credit due to all who were engaged. The result was entirely satisfactory, as it enabled our advance on the 17th November to take place without our right flank being harassed.

4. Our information on the evening of the 16th was to the effect that a force of the enemy would probably be met with about Sahil and Zain, while his main body was believed to be in position at Balyaniyeh. At that time the whole of the cavalry, sappers, and the infantry of the 18th Brigade had been landed, but only one battery of the 10th Brigade, Royal Field Artillery. I was informed that the Sheikh of Mohammerah was apprehensive of an attack on Failieh from the enemy's forces on the left bank, and also that the attitude of the neighbouring Arabs would depend, to a great extent, upon our ability to make headway against the Turks without undue delay. I therefore decided that it would be in our best interests to advance at once, with the whole of the force then at my disposal, leaving the remaining field batteries to be disembarked as rapidly as possible and to follow us as soon as circumstances would permit.

5. A copy of operation orders issued for Tuesday the 17th November will be found attached.¹ My intention was to turn the enemy's right flank, and drive him through the palm groves on to the river, so that the two sloops, *Odin* and *Espiègle*, which moved up the river on a level with our advance, might be able to co-operate.

6. After leaving the bivouac we moved across the open desert, the surface of which, owing to recent rain, was still very muddy in places, though fortunately free from creeks or other obstructions.

At 8.50 a.m. a report was received from the advanced guard to the effect that the enemy's position extended from a ruined mud fort, which was plainly visible, somewhat to the right of

¹ Appendix II.

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our line of advance, north-westwards through Hassanain to Zain.¹ At 10 a.m. the enemy's guns opened fire. I then ordered the 110th Mahratta L.I. to reinforce the advanced guard and moved up the 16th Brigade on its right, leaving a space between the two brigades for the artillery to come into action, and retaining as reserves the 48th Pioneers and the 120th Infantry. Each of the two Brigade commanders had then at his disposal three battalions of infantry and a company of sappers, with the cavalry covering the left flank of the whole force, and the two sloops on the river to our right, though at some distance, with only the tops of their masts appearing above the belt of palm trees. The whole of the artillery, consisting of the 23rd and 30th Mountain Batteries, and the 63rd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, subsequently joined by three guns of the 76th Battery, which were hurried up during the action from the landing place, were placed under the Commander, Royal Artillery.

7. While these dispositions were being made, a heavy downpour lasting for half an hour came on. The front was entirely obscured, while the surface of the ground was converted into a quagmire ankle deep over which guns and horses could only move at a walk. The enemy's guns ceased firing, and I was in some doubt as to whether he intended to maintain his position. Our troops continued to advance steadily until 11.45 a.m., when the enemy simultaneously opened a heavy gun, rifle and machine-gun fire along his whole front. Our artillery and infantry also came into action. After watching the course of the engagement for some time, I came to the conclusion that it would be advisable to abandon my original intention of turning the enemy's right, which extended some distance, and was echeloned back into broken ground and palm groves. The key of his position appeared to be the old mud fort. I therefore sent word to General Fry with the 18th Brigade to engage the enemy's right and centre with a frontal attack, while General Delamain with the 16th Brigade turned his left flank and captured the fort. At the same time I reinforced General Delamain with a battalion from the reserve. General Delamain had meanwhile anticipated my intentions and had

¹ This report proved substantially correct, except that their position extended about $\frac{3}{4}$ mile to the south of Old Fort along the date-palm belt.

already commenced the turning movement. It was at this stage that a large number of casualties occurred on our right, especially in the 2nd Dorset Regiment, which had been the first to come into action, and had met with heavy fire in an exposed position, not only from the mud fort and trenches in front of it, but also from a body of the enemy entrenched on the edge of the palm groves behind and to the south of it. These Turkish regulars were using smokeless powder and were invisible from the point where the guns were in action, the latter being fully engaged with the enemy's artillery and with the long line of entrenchments on the main front Hassanain-Zain. The sloops on the river managed to put a few shells into the mud fort, but were soon obliged to desist owing to their view being obstructed by the belt of palm trees. The turning movement was very skilfully carried out by portions of the 104th Infantry, the 117th Mahrattas and the 22nd Company, Sappers and Miners, and was directed by General Delamain himself. The 18th Brigade and the main body of the 16th Brigade also pressed on steadily, supported by very efficient fire from our artillery. At 1.15 p.m. the whole of the enemy's line quitted its entrenchments and fled rapidly to the right rear into the broken ground and palm trees, his guns covering the retirement, and finally being skilfully withdrawn from successive positions in the same direction under cover of long earthen embankments, which concealed them from view. The whole of our force advanced firing heavily and doing considerable execution, but the enemy's losses would have been much greater if the state of the ground had not precluded rapid movement, more especially on the part of the cavalry and artillery.

Two abandoned mountain guns fell into the hands of the 7th Rajputs, who were on the left of the line, and numerous prisoners were captured.

At 2.50 p.m. I thought it advisable to issue orders for the pursuit to be stopped. The enemy were then retiring through the palm groves, with banks and mud walls affording facilities for defence, and their retirement was covered by distant fire from their guns. I had to form an entrenched camp before nightfall, and to bring in a large number of wounded, who were scattered over a considerable extent of country.

The enemy's losses have been variously estimated, and

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probably amounted to about 2,000. Two days after the action sixty-nine dead bodies were found lying in one portion of the position. His total strength is estimated at 3,000 Turks and 1,500 Arabs, with twelve guns.

The troops bivouacked at Sahil on the banks of the river with outposts on the line Sahil—Old Fort—to river bank.

The conduct of the troops throughout this engagement excited my warmest admiration. A very large majority of the men had never been under fire before, yet they behaved as steadily as if at an ordinary field-day, all the details of their training, as inculcated in peace time, being carried out automatically. The behaviour of the Dorset Regiment, when exposed to both frontal and enfilade fire, is especially to be commended. General Delamain has also brought to notice the 22nd Company, Sappers and Miners, who were on the right of the Dorsets.

The enemy's guns were well served and cleverly handled, but fortunately the fusing of the shells was indifferent and the elevation generally too great. Their rifle fire was also too high, and not very effective at close quarters, otherwise our losses would have been much heavier. Our artillery suffered for want of observation posts, but in spite of this their fire was highly effective, and, as was afterwards ascertained, produced a demoralising effect on the enemy.

As may be gathered from the above report, the duties of the commanders of brigades and of other units, as also of the staff were carried out most efficiently. I propose to defer bringing the names of individual officers to notice until the operations of this Force as a whole are finally recorded. At this stage I need only mention those who were especially conspicuous during the actions of the 15th and 17th, as set forth in the brigade commanders' reports attached.

The work of bringing in the wounded continued far into the night, and one ambulance party actually remained out all night, in spite of the fact that the enemy were firing on our piquets at intervals. I desire to pay a very high tribute to the personnel of the medical services, both for efficiency of organisation, and for devotion to duty. In addition to our own men, a large number of wounded Turks and Arabs had to be cared for and conveyed on board the transports, at a spot where shelving mud flats and a strong current made

boating operations extremely troublesome and at times even hazardous.

On the afternoon of the 17th, it was blowing a hurricane for several hours, in the course of which three large dhows lying alongside the transports, laden with stores ready to disembark, were wrecked, and ten sepoy and two lascars were drowned.

On the 18th, 19th, and 20th we were employed in landing supplies and blankets for the troops, and in reconnoitring the enemy's position at Balyanieh, which was found to be at right angles to the river, with four guns in position on the bank, commanding the north end of Dabba Island, where the SS. *Ekbatana* and two smaller craft had been sunk to block the ship channel. The naval sloops engaged these guns from below the obstruction, and, as was discovered afterwards, placed a shell inside the battery.

I formed a plan of attack to be carried out on the 22nd in which naval and military forces were to co-operate, but on the 21st I received trustworthy information, confirmed by our cavalry, that the enemy had vacated his position. The report stated that the Turks had quitted Basrah and retired northward in boats to Baghdad, that numbers of armed Arabs had deserted, and that the town of Basrah was in danger of being looted.

Accordingly, I ordered a forced march for 8 p.m. that evening, while the naval sloops were to proceed by river to Basrah, and two battalions were hastily got on board shallow draft steamers to follow them. We started across the desert at 8 o'clock, and at 12 noon the next day we reached the outskirts of Basrah, after a march that was extremely trying to the troops. Frequent delays were caused by the high banks of water channels, which had to be levelled, and in some cases bridged to admit the passage of field guns.

On arrival at Basrah, we learned that the two sloops had got in at 9 p.m. the previous evening, and had succeeded in protecting the buildings on the river bank, to which no damage had been done, except the partial burning of the Custom House and destruction of its contents.

The two battalions had arrived at 9 a.m. on the 22nd and were then patrolling the town, which was perfectly orderly.

I therefore decided to defer making a formal entry into

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the town until the next morning, as the troops were badly in need of food and rest, and it would have been difficult to arrange quarters for them until the place had been more fully examined.

On the 23rd the troops made a ceremonial march through the town to a selected spot near the mouth of the Ashar Creek, where the foreign Consuls and notables were assembled to meet us, and were presented to me by Mr. Bullard, our late Consul. A proclamation prepared by Sir Percy Cox was then read, the Union Jack was hoisted on a prominent building, a salute was fired from the sloops, the troops presented arms, and three cheers was given for His Majesty the King-Emperor. The German Consul and five other Germans were placed on board transports for conveyance to India.

We were cordially welcomed by the inhabitants, who appeared eager to transfer their allegiance to the British Government.

In concluding this report, I wish to lay stress upon the very great assistance that I have received throughout from Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., the Senior Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf, and the officers and men serving under him, without which it would have been quite impossible to bring these operations to a successful issue.

I am also much indebted to Sir Percy Cox for his advice and help on all occasions, and for the valuable and accurate information that he was able to procure for me, chiefly through the Sheikh of Mohammerah, who, at the risk of drawing upon himself the hostility of the Turks, has spared no pains to prove himself our true friend and ally.

I reserve for a future report an acknowledgment of the good services done by the officers of the Royal Indian Marine, whose duties in connection with naval transport work have been most onerous.

We have also received very ready help throughout from the officers and men of the transports belonging to the British India Steam Navigation and other companies.

The following is a list of documents that accompany the report :

- (1) Extract from Brigadier-General Delamain's report.
- (2) Operation Order No. 1.

- (3) Details regarding enemy engaged 17th November, 1914.
- (4) Commendations for conspicuous conduct.
- (5) Map¹ 4 miles to 1 inch.
- (6) Sketch¹ map of action.

APPENDIX I.

Extract from a Report by Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, D.S.O., on the Operations of November 14th, 1914.

* * * * *

Information from various sources went to show that Turkish troops were concentrating near Saihan only four miles west of our camp at Saniyeh ; and on the 14th November I received the Force Commander's instructions to reconnoitre and dislodge this hostile gathering without involving my own force too seriously. I thereupon issued Operation Order No. 1.

The force under my command consisted of the 30th Mountain Battery, the 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, and the 104th Rifles, with 23rd Mountain Battery and the 20th Infantry in camp held ready to reinforce if we became engaged.

The force marched at 6 a.m. from Camp Saniyeh and on reaching the southern edge of the date palms turned westwards, the Advanced Guard (Major Clarkson, 1 Section Mountain Battery, 4 Companies 2nd Dorsets) keeping 1,200 yards from the edge of the date groves and followed by the Main Body at approximately the same distance.

The march was continued in this order till the Advanced Guard was approximately south of Saihan village and creek at 7 a.m. At 7.10 a.m. the enemy opened fire on the Advanced Guard from two positions on the edge of the date groves with rifles and machine guns and on the main body with artillery. The 104th Rifles were sent immediately to turn and capture the enemy's first position and then to work through the date groves from the east. The Mountain Battery (2 Sections) assisted the 104th Rifles and 1 Section kept the hostile guns in the Turkish second position in check.

¹ Not reproduced.

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The 104th took the first Turkish position in capital style about 8.30 a.m. At the same hour the reinforcements arrived from camp.

The Advanced Guard was then reinforced by the remaining half-battalion of the 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, and extended to their left so as to outflank the second Turkish position from the desert side. The 30th Mountain Battery was put under the orders of the Officer Commanding 2nd Battalion Dorset Regiment, who now commanded the Advanced Guard. The 20th Infantry (less 4 Companies) filled the gap between the Advanced Guard and the 104th Rifles on our right, leaving the 4 Companies of the 20th Infantry and 23rd Peshawar Mountain Battery in general reserve under my own hand. A general advance was then made on the second Turkish position, assisted by the admirably directed fire of both the Mountain Batteries, from which the enemy suffered severely. The position was entrenched and held by the Turks with determination. It was gallantly rushed by the 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, about 9.30 a.m. The enemy made off northwards through the date palms.

In the meanwhile, the 104th Rifles on our right found the ground inside the wood very difficult owing to the numerous irrigation cuts. They pushed forward slowly till they reached the line held by the 2nd Dorsets and the 20th Infantry, meeting with strong opposition at a fortified village, where there were posted one gun and one machine gun.

The arrival of Turkish reinforcements from their force near Umm-ur-Rowais might now be expected at any minute.

In view, therefore, of my instructions not to get too seriously engaged, I ordered a withdrawal to camp, after doing considerable damage to the Turkish camp. The retirement was unmolested.

H.M.S. *Odin* co-operated in the action by steaming up the river parallel with the troops, but owing to the impossibility of observing fire through and over the belt of date palms, her fire was necessarily restricted to a minimum.

I estimated the enemy's strength at 1,200 with four mountain guns and three machine guns. From information given by prisoners the force appears to have been considerably stronger. I put their losses at 160 dead and wounded unable

to move. We took prisoners six unwounded and nineteen wounded, including a battalion commander.

Our casualties came to :

Captain Maclean, 104th Rifles.	} Severely wounded.
Lieutenant Yeatman, 2nd Battalion,	
Dorset Regiment.	

Rank and File.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment ..	5	38	Nil
104th Rifles	3	14	"
20th Infantry	—	2	"
No. 1 Brigade, Indian Mountain Artillery	—	1	"

The behaviour of all the troops was admirable. The co-operation between artillery and infantry was good.

I would mention that the information regarding the enemy obtained by Major H. Smyth, Special Service Officer, proved to be absolutely correct.

I bring to notice the good work done by the following :

(a) Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. Rosher, 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, who commanded the main attack on the enemy's position in an able manner.

(b) Major H. A. Holdich, Brigade Major, 16th Brigade. An able Staff Officer who gave me the greatest assistance during the engagement.

(c) Lieutenant E. B. Allnutt, R.A.M.C., in medical charge of the 2nd Battalion, Dorset Regiment, reported as having displayed great gallantry in attending the wounded on the open plain.

(d) Bugler Surain Singh, 20th Duke of Cambridge's Own Infantry, reported by the Officer Commanding, 104th Wellesley's Rifles, as having very bravely set fire to a village held by the enemy.

* * * * *

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APPENDIX II.

Operation Order No. 1 by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding Force "D," dated Force Headquarters, Camp Saniyeh, November 16th, 1914.

(Reference 4 miles to 1 inch map.¹)

1. *Information.*—A considerable body of the enemy was driven out of their camp at Saihan yesterday with severe loss. Opposition may be expected from other bodies here and further north-west.

2. *Intention.*—To march as light as possible to new camp on Turkish bank of river, all baggage, &c., being carried on ships. The Naval forces will co-operate under the orders of the Senior Naval Officer.

3. *Ammunition.*—Infantry must carry 200 rounds per rifle on person and other arms as much as possible.

4. *Starting point.*—The starting points are the three bridges south-west of the 16th Brigade camp; they will be marked by red lamps and flags by the 16th Brigade.

Head of Main Body to pass at 6 a.m.

Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General will control traffic.

5. *Advanced Guard.*—Officer Commanding—Major-General C. I. Fry. Guide—Captain Cochran.

Troops :

1 Squadron, 33rd Light Cavalry.

1 Mountain Battery.

17th Company, Sappers and Miners.

2 Battalions 18th Brigade.

6. *Main Body* in order of march :

Cavalry less 1 squadron.

Force Headquarters.

Headquarters and Divisional Signal Section, No. 34

Divisional Signal Company.

Divisional Engineers less 1 Company Sappers and Miners.

Remainder 18th Infantry Brigade.

48th Pioneers.

Divisional Artillery, less 1 Mountain Battery.

16th Infantry Brigade, less 1½ Battalions.

¹ Not reproduced.

Field Ambulances (Bearer Sub-Divisions only) less those allotted to Brigades.

2nd Line Transport.

7. *Flank Guards*.—Right Flank Guard, Officer Commanding—Lieutenant-Colonel McGeorge, 117th Mahrattas.

Troops.— $\frac{3}{4}$ Battalion 16th Brigade.

Left Flank Guard, Officer Commanding—Major Scott.

Troops.—1 Double Company 16th Brigade.

The Right Flank Guard to march 1,000 yards west of date palms.

8. *Rear Guard*.—Officer Commanding, Major Robinson, 117th Mahrattas.

Troops.—1 Double Company 16th Brigade.

9. *Medical*.—Field Ambulances are allotted as follows :

16th Brigade $\frac{17}{B}$ B.F.A. $\frac{125}{A. B. C.}$ Bearer Sub-Division only.
I. F. A.

18th Brigade $\frac{16}{C}$ B.F.A. $\frac{126}{A. B. D.}$ I.F.A.

Unallotted $\frac{16}{D}$ B.F.A. and $\frac{125}{D}$ and $\frac{26}{C}$ I.F.A.

Sick and wounded will be carried with the force by these medical units.

10. *Transport*.—Pack transport will be allotted as follows at 4 p.m. to-day :

British Infantry	50 pack mules per Battalion.
Indian Infantry	38 " "
Mountain Artillery Brigade	..	18
Royal Field Artillery Brigade		<i>Nil.</i>
Divisional Engineers	70
Pioneer Regiment	53
Cavalry	50
Field Ambulances	48 pack and 80 riding mules.
Divisional Signal Company	..	} 23
Headquarters and Divisional Section and each Brigade		
Section	

Reports to Force Headquarters at head of main body.

R. N. GAMBLE, Colonel,
General Staff Force " D."

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APPENDIX III.

ENEMY ENGAGED IN THE BATTLE OF SAHIL, NOVEMBER 17TH,
1914.

Estimated Strength.

4 Q.F. Field guns (3·25 in.).
8 Mountain guns.
3 Machine guns.
3,500 Regular Infantry.
200 Gunners.
350 Gendarmes.
Probably another 1,000 armed Arabs in the palm belt.

They belonged to the following Regiments :

1st Battalion, 113th Regiment.

2nd Battalion, 113th Regiment.

2nd Battalion, 112th Regiment.

160 men of 1st Battalion, 26th Regiment, European
Turks.

Gendarmes of Halim Bey.

Part of the 1st Battalion, 114th Regiment was probably
present.

The enemy were commanded by Bimbashi Adie Bey.

Enemy taken Prisoners.

Major Mahomed Ali
Captain Raouf
Lieutenant Mahhi } of 1st Battalion, 113th Regiment.
47 men (excluding those severely wounded).

** Estimated Enemy's Casualties.*

About 800 killed and severely wounded, and a considerable
number of slightly wounded.

Captured.

Two mountain guns and a large number of rifles.

APPENDIX IV.

*Extract from the Report of the General Officer Commanding,
16th Infantry Brigade, on the Operations of his Brigade
up to November 20th, 1914*

* * * * *

I recommend for reward the following officers, non-commissioned officers and men from those favourably brought to notice by Commanding Officers :

2nd Dorset Regiment.

Major H. St. J. Clarkson, for gallantry.

Lieutenant and Adjutant F. G. Powell, for general assistance and conveying messages under heavy fire.

Second Lieutenant E. L. Stephenson, for commanding his company with conspicuous coolness and dash after his Major and Captain had been killed.

Lieutenant E. B. Allnutt, R.A.M.C., in medical charge, for again displaying conspicuous bravery in attending the wounded under heavy fire in the open. Many men owe their lives to this officer.

No. 3865 Colour-Sergeant and Acting Sergeant-Major Delara, for coolness and gallantry.

No. 8558 Private Moores, who showed great courage in bringing up ammunition under heavy fire.

No. 7712 Private Hughes, who, when the machine-gun officer was wounded, took command of the one uninjured gun, and, under heavy fire, brought it to close range where it was of much use.

No. 6591 Sergeant Drew, who, though wounded, continued to lead his men with coolness and bravery.

3rd Sappers and Miners.

Lieutenant Matthews, R.E., for gallantry in leading a mixed party of Sappers and 104th Rifles and establishing the flank attack on the edge of the date groves.

Jemadar Feroze Ali. After Captain Twiss and the Subadar were wounded, this Indian Officer was in command of about 100 men who did excellent work in spite of heavy casualties.

No. 2855 Naik Dalip Singh, No. 22 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners, behaved with conspicuous gallantry in the action at Sahil on the 17th November, 1914, when, with a party of Sappers under Lieutenant Matthews, R.E., he showed himself very forward in action and led his squad with great determination into Turkish trenches.

104th Wellesley's Rifles.

Captain Chadwick, for gallantry.

Subadar Sabal Singh (first in grove), { for gallantry with
No. 2336 Lance Naik Net Singh, { Lieutenant Mat-
{ thew's party.

117th Mahrattas.

Captain and Adjutant E. G. Hall, for gallantry. This officer was severely wounded.

I regret that I omitted to bring to favourable notice the services of Mr. Bryant, the Marconi operator on board SS. *Varela*, of the British India Steam Navigation Company. Mr. Bryant was untiring in his efforts to secure communication, and when the apparatus on the *Dalhousie* broke down, he volunteered instantly to go across from Bahrain to Bushire to set matters right. The force owed much to his skill and devotion to duty, and I trust that it may be found possible to recognise his services.

*Extract from the Report of the General Officer Commanding,
18th Infantry Brigade, on the operations of his Brigade
up to November 20th, 1914.*

* * * * *

When all did well and where there was no opportunity for conspicuous individual action, I have no special recommendations to make.

Extract from the Report of the Officer Commanding Royal Artillery, I.E.F. "D" on the operations of the Artillery under his command up to November 20th, 1914.

* * * * *

All ranks behaved with exceptional coolness and steadiness, and I wish to bring to notice the good work done by

Lieutenant-Colonel Greer and Major Broke Smith throughout the action.

Extract from Reports of the Assistant Director, Medical Services, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," in connection with the Service under his command up to November 20th, 1914.

I wish to bring to notice the especially excellent work done by the following Medical Officers during the engagement of the 17th instant :

Captain Wright, I.M.S., 126th Indian Field Ambulance.

Captain Hislop, I.M.S., 126th Indian Field Ambulance.

Captain Lambert, R.A.M.C., 17th British Field Ambulance.

Lieutenant Allnutt, R.A.M.C., Medical Officer, Dorset Regiment.

* * * * *

The undermentioned Assistant Surgeons and Sub-assistant Surgeons did conspicuously good work in attending the wounded under heavy fire on the 17th November, 1914, and are recommended for promotion as stated opposite their names :

3rd Class Assistant Surgeon J. H. S. Huffton, to 1st Class Assistant Surgeon.

4th Class Assistant Surgeon J. H. T. Pacheco (wounded) to 3rd Class Assistant Surgeon of three years' standing.

No. 282 1st Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon V. U. R. Pandit, 104th Rifles, to 2nd Class Senior Sub-Assistant Surgeon.

No. 318 2nd Class Sub-Assistant Surgeon Shaikh Azimuddin-Shaik Ismail to 2nd Class Senior Sub-Assistant Surgeon.

SUPPLEMENTARY REPORTS CONCERNING FORE-GOING OPERATIONS.

Times,
Nov. 9,
1914.

THE Secretary of the Admiralty announces that a successful operation against Fao, at the mouth of the Shatt-El-Arab, Persian Gulf, has been conducted by a military force from India covered by H.M.S. *Odin* (Commander Cathcart R. Wason), the armed launch *Sirdar*, a force of Marines with a maxim-gun party, and a boat from the *Ocean*.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

The enemy's guns were silenced after an hour's resistance and the town was occupied by the troops and the Naval Brigade. There were no naval casualties.

It is expected that no further opposition will be met with below Fao.

THE Secretary of State for India communicates the *Times*, following regarding the military operations at the head of Nov. 24, the Persian Gulf : 1914.

The recent operations in the Persian Gulf have been crowned with even greater and more rapid success than was anticipated. After the signal defeat inflicted upon the Turkish forces on the 15th and 17th, the latter, abandoning all further resistance here, fled, leaving eight guns and many wounded in our hands. The Walis of Basrah and Bagdad accompanied the defeated Turkish forces in their flight up the Tigris. Basrah was occupied on 21st instant by both our naval and land forces. All the British in Basrah are reported safe.

(Official Report from Great Headquarters.)

Constantinople, November 7.

In Schatt-El-Arab (the confluence of the Euphrates and *K.D.*, Tigris), in Mesopotamia, a Turkish motor-boat, cruising on Nov. 7, patrol duty, there encountered an English gunboat near 1914. Abadan and exchanged shots with it, causing an explosion on the gunboat. Several shots from the motor-boat struck the English petroleum stores of Abadan and caused a fire.

Our motor-boat returned to Bassorah without any damage. The petroleum stores are still burning.

RUSSIAN OFFENSIVE IN THE BLACK SEA.

Petrograd, November 7.

An official communiqué issued to-day states :

In the Black Sea our fleet has bombarded Zunguldak, *Times*, Nov. 9, sinking four Turkish transports, three of which were laden 1914. with stores and munitions, and the fourth appearing to have troops on board.—*Reuter*.

*Journal de
Petrograd,*
Nov. 11,
1914.

With reference to the destruction of Turkish transports by the Black Sea Fleet, the General Staff communicates the following details: Having approached the port of Zunguldak, the commander of the fleet sent two vessels accompanied by torpedo craft to destroy the establishments of the fort and the workshops. This enterprise was successfully carried out, and we further succeeded in sinking a vessel moored in the roadstead. Meanwhile the cruiser on patrol observed a transport with soldiers in the offing. Seeing that the transport was hastily making for the shore in order to save the troops embarked in her, the cruiser gave chase, opened fire and sank the transport. The fleet then withdrew.

A short time afterwards two vessels were observed to port in the mist, and these proved to be Turkish transports. One of them, the *Midhat Pasha*, had hoisted the military flag. Destroyers ordered to attack them subsequently observed a third. All three were laden with military stores, automobiles, aeroplanes and guns. They were sunk; 243 men were saved and made prisoners; among them were several German officers and a Staff-Officer with documents in his possession. From information obtained from the prisoners it was ascertained that these transports were making for Ounié to take up troops there for Trebizond.

Amsterdam, November 7.

Times,
Nov. 9,
1914.

THE following official communiqué from the Turkish Chief Headquarters was issued yesterday in Constantinople:

Yesterday the Russian Army showed no activity. This morning the Russian Fleet bombarded for two hours Zunguldak and Koslu, on the Black Sea coast. At Koslu the Greek steamer *Nikoa*, 648 tons, was sunk, while at Zunguldak the French church and Consulate and two houses in the French quarter were destroyed. No other damage was done.

Constantinople.

K.V.,
Nov. 8,
1914.

According to an official report, after a portion of the Russian Fleet had fired at Koslu and Zunguldak the Turkish Fleet gave chase to the Russian ships. The latter, however, succeeded in escaping under cover of a mist.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

Constantinople.

An official report from Headquarters says : Nothing has *K.V.*,
been heard of the Turkish transports *Bezemialen*, *Bahriahmen* *Nov. 13,*
and *Midhat Pacha* which left Constantinople eight days ago. *1914.*
As these ships were in the neighbourhood of Zunguldak when
that place was bombarded it seems probable that they were
seized by the Russian Fleet.

Constantinople.

A communication from the Turkish Headquarters says : *K.V.*
Further enquiries about the three missing Turkish transports *Nov. 14,*
show that these ships which left before the bombardment *1914.*
of Zunguldak to serve as transports for our troops fell in
with the Russian Fleet which bombarded Zunguldak and
were sunk by it. According to the Russian report, the crews
and some passengers amounting to 219 men were made
prisoners by the Russians. The loss of these vessels is to be
regretted, but they will be replaced by three better vessels
taken from the Russians which will henceforth bear the
names of the three vessels which have been lost.

TURKISH ATTACK ON POTI.

Tiflis, November 8.

A dispatch from the Headquarters Staff of the Army of *Times,*
the Caucasus says : *Nov. 9,*

This morning an enemy cruiser of the *Breslau* type *1914.*
arrived at Poti and opened fire on the town, the port light-
house, and the station. After firing 120 to 150 rounds the
cruiser came close in to the breakwater and opened fire
with machine-guns on the Russian troops, who replied at
once with artillery and rifles. On the first Russian cannon
shots taking effect, the cruiser made off rapidly in the direction
of Sukhum. We had three soldiers wounded and four bruised.
The damage to the town and port is insignificant. There were
no victims among the inhabitants.—*Reuter.*

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

THE WAR IN EAST AFRICA.

[N

K.D.,
Feb. 14,
1915.

THE following is officially reported from German East Africa : The attempted landing of four armed enemy long boats and a steamer under cover of a bombardment of the Rufigi Delta by three English cruisers was defeated by machine-gun fire on November 7th. A large English steamer which came in under cover of gunfire from cruisers, convoyed by four armed long boats and a steamer, was sunk on November 11th in the estuary near Simba Uranga. Four European coast guards were slightly wounded during the action ; the enemy suffered losses ; details are lacking.

Likewise in November a Belgian company with two machine guns attacked the German position under Lieutenant Hasselbacher near Pambete and Kasakalawe on British territory at the southern extremity of Lake Tanganyika during the absence of the *Kingani* and the *Hedwig Wissmann* which were busy carrying away captured telegraph plants. The *Hedwig Wissmann* returned and took part in the action. After a fight lasting five hours the enemy turned back leaving behind five dead Askaris and taking away several dead and wounded Europeans and Askaris. On our side we had one mate and two Askaris slightly wounded. The English steamer *Cecil Rhodes* which had run aground was blown up.

An English steamer of the same size as our *Kingani* was destroyed near Kituta on Lake Tanganyika by the *Hedwig Wissmann* and the *Kingani* under Captain Lieutenant Hendrick ; an English steel boat was also captured.

FALL OF TSINGTAU.

Tokio, November 7.

IT is officially announced that Tsingtau has surrendered.

The Germans hoisted the white flag at seven o'clock in the morning on the Observatory. Two companies of infantry with a squad of sappers captured the central fort of the main line of defence at midnight and took 200 prisoners. The charge was led by General Yoshimi Yamada.

The Germans made desperate efforts to repair the damage done to their batteries, but the Japanese shells killed the men at work and demolished the batteries anew. It is thought

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

that the capitulation of the port was hastened by stopping the smuggling of provisions from the Ling Chan coast.

The Vice-Minister of the Navy, Baron Suzuki, speaking on the future of Tsingtau, said: "Whilst this war lasts Tsingtau will be administered by Japan. On its conclusion Japan will open negotiations with China."

There are general rejoicings throughout Japan. Tokio is decked out with flags, among which the Union Jack is prominent. A lantern procession is being arranged to celebrate the occasion.

An official report says that after the capture of the Central Fort the left wing of the attacking force advanced and occupied Chan Shan at ten minutes past five yesterday morning. Chan Shan formed the base of the right wing of the German line of defence. Meanwhile other forces captured the forts of the first line at the point of the bayonet and the dangerous defence works connecting the forts. Other forces advanced on the main line of the Iltis, Bismarck, and Moltke forts. Suddenly the flag of surrender was run up in the breeze on the Observatory, which stands on a hill.

The Japanese casualties in the final action were thirty-six killed and 182 wounded. Two British officers were wounded.

—*Reuter.*

London, November 7.

THE Secretary of the Admiralty announces that the following telegrams have been exchanged between the Board of Admiralty and the Japanese Minister of Marine:

The Board of Admiralty send their heartiest congratulations to the gallant Army and Navy of Japan on the prosperous and brilliant issue of the operations which have resulted in the fall of Tsingtau.

Reply.—I fully share with you in the felicitations on the fall of Tsingtau. It affords me great pleasure to assure you that the outcome of the efforts of the Navy of our Ally in co-operation with that of ours during the investment of Tsingtau was splendid.

MINISTER OF MARINE, Tokio.

The War Office announces that the following telegram has been sent to the Japanese Minister of War, Tokio, by the Secretary of State for War :

Please accept my warmest congratulations on the success of the operations against Tsingtau. Will you be so kind as to express my felicitations to the Japanese Forces engaged ? The British Army is proud to have been associated with its gallant Japanese comrades in this enterprise.

KITCHENER.

November 8.

*K.D.,
Nov. 8,
1914.* According to an official report from Reuter's Agency in Tokio, Tsingtau fell on the morning of November 7th, after a heroic defence. Fuller details are still lacking.

The Deputy Chief of the Admiral Staff,
BEHNCKE.

Tokio, November 10.

It is officially stated that the Japanese losses during the final assault on the fortress from the evening of Friday to the morning of Saturday amounted to fourteen officers wounded and 426 men killed and wounded. The British casualties were one man killed and one man wounded. Two thousand three hundred prisoners were taken.—*Reuter.*

Amsterdam, November 12.

*Times,
Nov. 13,
1914.* A Berlin telegram states that the Governor of Tsingtau, through the Japanese Legation at Peking, sent the following telegram to the German Emperor :

Tsingtau, November 9.

After exhausting all its means of defence, the fortress, which was stormed and broken through in the centre, fell. The fortress and the town were badly damaged by 28-centimetre howitzer fire and a strong bombardment from the sea. The force of our artillery was completely overcome.

Our losses have not yet been ascertained, but in spite of the heavy fire they are less than we expected.

MEYER-WALDECK.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

Press Bureau.

The Secretary of the Admiralty announces that information has been received that the following enemy vessels were found sunk through explosion in Tsingtau on the surrender of the fortress : *Times*,
Nov. 16,
1914.

The Austrian light cruiser *Kaiserin Elizabeth*, the German gunboats *Iltis*, *Jaguar*, *Luchs*, *Tiger*, *Cormoran*, the German destroyer *Taku*, and the mine-layer *Ruchin*.

With regard to the sinking of the East Asiatic squadron, the President of the Reichstag, Herr Kaempf, sent a telegram to the Kaiser wherein he states that the entire population knows itself to be at one in its sorrow and grief for the loss of so many promising lives ; also in its admiration and pride in their glorious and heroic death. The nation which produces such heroes may unflinchingly face even the heaviest sacrifices with unbroken courage and be sure of victory. *Times*,
Dec. 16,
1914.

The Kaiser replied, among other things, as follows :

May the heavy sacrifices which we are compelled to make in this battle for our existence be borne by each of us as a single man, supported by the unshaken hope that God our Lord, from whose gracious hand we humbly receive fortune and misfortune, joy and sorrow, will turn even the most difficult hour into a blessing for the nation and the Fatherland.

RATES OF HIRE FOR TRANSPORT.

November 7.

THE Secretary of the Admiralty communicates the following :

The Sub-Committee appointed by the Admiralty Transport Arbitration Board have presented a report suggesting conditions and scales of rates of hire for vessels of different classes requisitioned by the Admiralty for transport and other purposes. Copies of these reports can be obtained on application to the Secretary of the Board (Scotland House, Victoria Embankment, S.W.), by shipowners or brokers having an interest in, and desiring to make themselves acquainted with, their contents.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL
TURKISH REPORTS OF VICTORY.

[No

K.V.,
Nov, 8,
1914.

Constantinople.

GENERAL Headquarters states: With God's help the Egyptian frontier was yesterday crossed by our troops. Since the Russian Fleet has withdrawn to its war harbours, our Fleet has bombarded Poti (*see* p. 195), one of the most important ports of the Caucasus, and has inflicted all kinds of damage. Our gendarmes and the tribes taking our side have annihilated the English troops which had landed at Akaba. Four English ironclads which were there have now withdrawn, and only a single cruiser remains.

NAVAL OPERATIONS OFF BELGIAN COAST,
OCTOBER 17 TO NOVEMBER 9, 1914.

L.G.

Admiralty, April 13, 1915.

The following despatch has been received from Rear-Admiral the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood, C.B., M.V.O., D.S.O., reporting the proceedings of the flotilla off the coast of Belgium between October 17th and November 9th, 1914:

*Office of Rear-Admiral,
Dover Patrol,*

November 11, 1914.

SIR,

I have the honour to report the proceedings of the flotilla acting off the coast of Belgium, between October 17th and November 9th.

The flotilla was organised to prevent the movement of large bodies of German troops along the coast roads from Ostend to Nieuport, to support the left flank of the Belgian Army, and to prevent any movement by sea of the enemy's troops.

Operations commenced during the night of October 17th, when the *Attentive*, flying my flag, accompanied by the monitors *Severn*, *Humber*, and *Mersey*, the light cruiser *Foresight*, and several torpedo-boat destroyers, arrived and anchored off Nieuport Pier.

Early on the morning of October 18th information was received that German infantry were advancing on Westende village, and that a battery was in action at Westende Bains.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

The flotilla at once proceeded up past Westende and Middlekirke to draw the fire and endeavour to silence the guns.

A brisk shrapnel fire was opened from the shore, which was immediately replied to, and this commenced the naval operations on the coast which continued for more than three weeks without intermission.

During the first week the enemy's troops were endeavouring to push forward along the coast roads, and a large accumulation of transport existed within reach of the naval guns.

On October 18th machine guns from the *Severn* were landed at Nieuport to assist in the defence, and Lieutenant E. S. Wise fell, gallantly leading his men.

The *Amazon*, flying my flag, was badly holed on the waterline and was sent to England for repairs, and during these early days most of the vessels suffered casualties, chiefly from shrapnel shell from the field guns of the enemy.

The presence of the ships on the coast soon caused alterations in the enemy's plans, less and less of their troops were seen, while more and more heavy guns were gradually mounted among the sand dunes that fringe the coast.

It soon became evident that more and heavier guns were required in the flotilla. The Scouts therefore returned to England, while H.M.S. *Venerable* and several older cruisers, sloops and gunboats arrived to carry on the operations.

Five French torpedo-boat destroyers were placed under my orders by Admiral Favereau, and on October 30th I had the honour of hoisting my flag in the *Intrépide*, and leading the French flotilla into action off Lombartzyde. The greatest harmony and enthusiasm existed between the allied flotillas.

As the heavier guns of the enemy came into play it was inevitable that the casualties of the flotilla increased the most important being the disablement of the 6-inch turret and several shots on the waterline of the *Mersey*, the death of the Commanding Officer and eight men and the disablement of sixteen others in the *Falcon*, which vessel came under a heavy fire when guarding the *Venerable* against submarine attack; the *Wildfire* and *Vestal* were badly holed, and a number of casualties caused in the *Brilliant* and *Rinaldo*.

Enemy submarines were seen and torpedoes were fired, and during the latter part of the operations the work of the

torpedo craft was chiefly confined to the protection of the larger ships.

It gradually became apparent that the rush of the enemy along the coast had been checked, that the operations were developing into a trench warfare, and that the work of the flotilla had, for the moment, ceased.

The arrival of allied reinforcements and the inundation of the country surrounding Nieuport rendered the further presence of the ships unnecessary.

The work of the squadron was much facilitated by the efforts of Colonel Bridges, attached to the Belgian Headquarters, and to him I am greatly indebted for his constant and unfailing support.

I would like especially to bring to your notice :

Capitaine de frégate Richard, of the *Dunois*, Senior Officer of the French flotilla, whose courtesy and gallantry assisted to make the operations a success.

Captain C. D. Johnson, M.V.O., in charge of 6th Destroyer Flotilla.

Commander Eric J. A. Fullerton, in command of the monitors, whose ships were constantly engaged in the inshore fighting.

Commander A. D. M. Cherry, of the *Vestal*, who commanded the sloops, which were constantly engaged for the whole period. He remained in command of the flotilla after my departure on November 7th, and continued the bombardment on November 8th, returning to England the next day.

Commander H. C. Halahan, of the *Bustard*, whose gunboat was constantly in action close to the shore.

Commander A. L. Snagge, of the *Humber*.

Commander H. G. L. Oliphant, of the *Amazon*.

Lieutenant-Commander R. A. Wilson, of the *Mersey*.

Lieutenant-Commander G. L. D. Gibbs, of the *Crusader*, in which ship my flag was hoisted during most of the operations.

Lieutenant-Commander J. B. Adams, R.N.R., on my staff.

Lieutenant H. O. Wauton, of the *Falcon*, who maintained his position in a heavy fire on the look-out for submarines, and was unfortunately killed.

Lieutenant H. O. Joyce, of the *Vestal*, who was badly wounded by a shell, but rallied his men to attend to the wounded, and then got his gun again into action.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

Sub-Lieutenant C. J. H. DuBoulay, of the *Falcon*, who took command of his ship after the Captain and 24 men were killed and wounded.

Petty-Officer Robert Chappell, O.N. 207788, of the *Falcon*, who, though both legs were shattered and he was dying, continued to try and assist in the tending of the wounded. He shortly afterwards died of his wounds.

Petty-Officer Fredk. William Motteram, of the *Falcon*, O.N. 183216, for immediate attention to the wounded under fire on October 28th.

Able Seaman Ernest Dimmock, of the *Falcon*, O.N. 204549, who directly the casualties occurred in *Falcon*, finding himself the only person unwounded on deck, went immediately to the helm and coned the ship.

Herbert Edward Sturman, of the *Mersey*, Boy, 1st class O.N.J. 24887, who, when wounded by shrapnel, continued to serve the guns.

Leading Seaman John Thos. Knott, O.N.J. 1186, of the *Brilliant*, who, when all men at his gun being killed or wounded, and himself severely wounded, endeavoured to fight his gun.

The following are specially recommended by their Commanding Officers for their good behaviour and coolness under fire :

Chief Engine-Room Artificer William Ernest Brading, of the *Falcon*, O.N. 268579.

Private R.M.L.I. Alfred J. Foster, of the *Brilliant*, O.N. Ch. 110605.

Petty-Officer Sydney Edric Murphy, of the *Mersey*, O.N. 190841.

Petty-Officer Henry Sayce, of the *Mersey*, O.N. 132956.

Herbert Edward Sturman (Boy), of the *Mersey*, O.N.J. 24887.

Leading Signaller Cyril Henry Swan, of the *Sirius*, R.F.R., O.N. 230592.

Petty-Officer James Weatherhead, of the *Rinaldo*, O.N. 127747.

Leading Seaman John Keane, of the *Rinaldo*, O.N. 204128.

Private R.M.L.I. Joseph Martin, of the *Humber* (who landed with Marine detachment), O.N. Ch. 115582.

Stoker, 1st, Samuel Johnston, of the *Humber*, O.N. Ch. 1282822 (R.F.R. Ch.B. 4090).

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

[No

Petty-Officer Robt. Frederick Jennings, of the *Vestal*,
O.N. 157343 (R.F.R. Po. B. 1481.)

Petty-Officer Charles Henry Sutton, of the *Vestal*, O.N.
158086.

Leading Seaman Frederick Stanley Woodruff, of the *Vestal*,
O.N. 237062.

Able Seaman William Chapman, of the *Vestal*, O.N. 183312
(R.F.R. Po. B. 1666).

Officer's Steward James Whiteman, of the *Vestal*, O.N. L.
1275.

I beg to append a list of the vessels engaged.

I have the honour to be, Sir.

Your obedient servant,

HORACE HOOD,

Rear-Admiral, Dover Patrol.

The Secretary of the Admiralty.

Enclosure to Rear-Admiral Hood's Despatch of November 11.

LIST OF SHIPS WHICH TOOK PART IN OPERATIONS OFF
BELGIAN COAST.

Venerable, Captain V. H. G. Bernard.

Attentive, Captain C. D. Johnson, M.V.O.

Foresight, Captain H. N. Garnett.

Brilliant, Captain (ret.) H. Christian.

Sirius, Commander (ret.) W. H. Boys.

Severn, Commander E. J. A. Fullerton.

Humber, Commander A. L. Snagge.

Mersey, Lieutenant-Commander R. A. Wilson.

Vestal, Commander A. D. M. Cherry.

Rinaldo, Commander H. J. Kennard.

Wildfire, Commander E. Altham.

Bustard, Commander H. C. Halahan.

Excellent, Lieutenant-Commander (ret.) E. A. Digby.

Crane, Commander R. H. Coppinger.

Falcon, Lieutenant H. O. Wauton (killed).

Flirt, Lieutenant H. S. Braddyll.

Mermaid, Lieutenant P. R. P. Percival.

Myrmidon, Lieutenant-Commander (ret.) R. H. B. Ham-
mond-Chambers.

Racehorse, Lieutenant E. P. U. Pender.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

Syren, Commander T. C. H. Williams.
Amazon, Commander H. G. L. Oliphant.
Cossack, Lieutenant-Commander G. C. Harrison.
Crusader, Lieutenant-Commander G. L. D. Gibbs.
Maori, Lieutenant-Commander B. W. Barrow.
Mohawk, Commander E. R. G. R. Evans, C.B.
Hazard, Commander N. E. Archdale.
Nubian, Commander C. E. Cundall.
Viking, Lieutenant J. P. Gibbs.
 Submarine C. 32, Lieutenant-Commander B. V. Layard.
 Submarine C. 34, Lieutenant-Commander J. F. Hutchings.
Dunois, Capitaine de frégate Richard.
Capitaine Mehl, Lieutenant de vaisseau Rossignal.
Francis-Garnier, Lieutenant de vaisseau de Pianelli.
Intrépide, Lieutenant de vaisseau Vaudier.
Aventurier, Lieutenant de vaisseau Semichon.

MR. CHURCHILL AT THE GUILDHALL.

MR. CHURCHILL said :

Eighty miles away the greatest battle in the world is *Times*,
 going on. Our countrymen and their Allies are striving Nov. 10,
 from minute to minute to breast and stem the cruel tides of 1914.
 German devastation. And here we sit in this old hall, as
 we have so often sat before in bygone years, and, as we hope,
 future generations will sit when the sorrows of this time are
 forgotten and only the glories remain. Here we sit, and to
 the outward eye, to the material sense, nothing is altered.
 An unthinking stranger coming here to-night would scarcely
 distinguish any characteristic which marks our gathering
 from those which have so often taken place before, when
 each year we celebrate this important civic festival. That
 is the Navy. It is due to the Navy that we are able to sit
 here to-night, and while we do not shirk or shrink from the
 full rigours of war, we are, through the Navy, so far happily
 guarded from most of them.

Some few weeks ago I had a talk with Sir John Jellicoe
 and his principal Admirals. They spoke to me of the distress
 with which all the great Fleet watched the heroic struggles
 of our Army in France and in Belgium, and saw the fearful
 sacrifices demanded of them and given by them. They spoke

also of their keen desire to bring more direct and immediate aid to bear with the mighty weapon which they wield, and of their natural desire to share more immediately in the sufferings and losses of the Army in the field. "But," they said, "Cornwallis was nearly three years off Brest and Admiral Nelson was more than two years off Toulon. We are only just beginning. We must not be impatient. Our turn will come." It is not always easy to be patient, and I express to-night, on behalf of the Navy and Admiralty, our gratitude for the generous confidence you have so abundantly and unswervingly bestowed upon us. The conditions of naval warfare are curious and novel. We have a great preponderance in force and numbers, but we have also a task to discharge infinitely greater and more difficult than that which our enemies are called upon to undertake. We are endeavouring to maintain all the seas; we are endeavouring to secure all the highways across the seas; we are endeavouring to secure the most peaceful commerce of the world against a multitude of new dangers, against methods never before practised in the warfare of civilised nations. We also transport great armies to the decisive theatre of the war. We are endeavouring to preserve the whole trade of this country on an enormous scale in all quarters of the globe. We have conveyed and convoyed expeditions to attack and take every German colony which exists. And this great task forces us to expose a target to the enterprise of the enemy incomparably greater than any target exposed to our own daring and vigilant sailors.

The British people have taken for themselves this motto—"Business carried on as usual during alterations on the map of Europe." They expect the Navy, on which they have lavished so much care and expense, to make that good, and that is what, upon the whole, we are actually achieving at the present time. It is very difficult to measure the full effects of naval pressure in the early stages of the war. The punishment we receive is clear and definite. The punishment we inflict is very often not seen, and even when seen cannot be measured. The economic stringency resulting from a naval blockade requires time, if it is to reach its full effectiveness. We are only looking at it in the third month. But wait a bit. Examine it in the sixth month, in the ninth month, in the twelfth month, and you will begin to see results, results which

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will be gradually achieved, silently achieved, but which spell the doom of Germany as surely as the approach of winter strikes the leaves from the trees. There is another way in which the Navy contributes to the vast decision of this war. It gives to Britain and to the British Empire the time necessary to realise their vast military power. It gives to my noble friend Lord Kitchener the time to organise, equip, discipline, arm, and place in the field a million men of a quality and power such as have never been employed yet in this struggle on the Continent.

At the end of very nearly 100 days the Navy, whose memory and work you have paid your tribute to to-night—in spite of losses of ships of no great consequence, of officers and men irreparable—the Navy, in spite of losses, is actually and relatively stronger than it was on the day war was declared, and it is stronger most particularly in those branches of the Naval Service which all the circumstances of modern war prove exercise most powerful influence upon the struggle.

I shall not stand between you further and the other speakers who present themselves on this memorable occasion, but I will say just one last word. In this famous hall, where we have so often gathered, we must to-night feel ourselves in the company of the great men of the great war. We see the monuments of the men who fought Napoleon. We may feel to-night almost as if we had their counsel and their aid, and we may derive inspiration and encouragement from their memory. The scale of the events to-day is greater—vastly greater—than those with which they had to deal, but the problems they had to face were more desperate, more full of anxiety and peril, than those with which we are confronted, and the resources with which they faced them were infinitely less ample and less wide. They were often alone against the whole of Europe. They never counted, as we can count, upon an absolutely united nation. They only spoke for a little island; we exert and wield the power of a world-wide Empire. Yet with all their difficulties and dangers they came safely through the conflict, and we, by imitating their example and redoubling our exertions, will surely come safely through them too.

THE "KÖNIGSBERG" OUT OF ACTION AND THE
"EMDEN" DESTROYED.*Admiralty, November 10.**Times,
Nov. 11,
1914.*

AFTER the whereabouts of the *Königsberg* was indicated by the attack on the *Pegasus* on September 19th, a concentration of fast cruisers was arranged by the Admiralty in East African waters, and a thorough and prolonged search by vessels in combination was made.

This search resulted on October 30th in the *Königsberg* being discovered by H.M.S. *Chatham* (Captain Sidney R. Drury-Lowe, R.N.), hiding in shoal water about six miles up the Rufigi River, opposite Mafia Island (German East Africa). Owing to her greater draught, the *Chatham* could not reach the *Königsberg*, which is probably aground, except at high water. Part of the crew of the *Königsberg* is landed and entrenched on the banks of the river. Both the entrenchments and the *Königsberg* have been bombarded by the *Chatham*, but owing to the dense palm groves amid which the ship lies, it is not possible to estimate the damage.

Pending operations for her capture or destruction, effective steps have been taken to block the *Königsberg* in by sinking colliers in the only navigable channel, and she is now imprisoned and unable to do any further harm. The fast vessels which had been searching for her are thus released for other service.

Another large combined operation by fast cruisers against the *Emden* has been for some time in progress. In this search, which covered an immense area, the British cruisers have been aided by French, Russian, and Japanese vessels working in harmony. H.M.A.S. *Melbourne* and *Sydney* were also included in these movements. Yesterday morning news was received that the *Emden*, which had been completely lost after her action with the *Zhemtchug*, had arrived at Keeling, Cocos Island, and landed an armed party to destroy the wireless station and cut the cable. Here she was caught, and forced to fight by H.M.A.S. *Sydney* (Captain John C. T. Glossop, R.N.). A sharp action took place, in which the *Sydney* suffered a loss of three killed and fifteen wounded. The *Emden* was driven ashore and burnt. Her losses in *personnel* are reported as very heavy. All possible assistance is being

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given to the survivors by various ships which have been dispatched to the scene.

With the exception of the German squadron now off the coast of Chile, the whole of the Pacific and Indian Oceans are now clear of the enemy's warships.

Admiralty, January 1, 1915.

The following dispatch has been received from Captain L.G. John C. T. Glossop, reporting the capture of the German Cruiser *Emden* by H.M.A.S. *Sydney*.

H.M.A.S. Sydney at Colombo.

SIR,

November 15, 1914.

I have the honour to report that whilst on escort duty with the Convoy under the charge of Captain Silver, H.M.A.S. *Melbourne*, at 6.30 a.m., on Monday, November 9th, a wireless message from Cocos was heard reporting that a foreign warship was off the entrance. I was ordered to raise steam for full speed at 7.0 a.m. and proceeded thither. I worked up to 20 knots, and at 9.15 a.m. sighted land ahead and almost immediately the smoke of a ship, which proved to be H.I.G.M.S. *Emden* coming out towards me at a great rate. At 9.40 a.m. fire was opened, she firing the first shot. I kept my distance as much as possible to obtain the advantage of my guns. Her fire was very accurate and rapid to begin with, but seemed to slacken very quickly, all casualties occurring in this ship almost immediately. First the foremost funnel of her went, secondly the foremast, and she was badly on fire aft, then the second funnel went, and lastly the third funnel, and I saw she was making for the beach on North Keeling Island, where she grounded at 11.20 a.m. I gave her two more broadsides and left her to pursue a merchant ship which had come up during the action.

2. Although I had guns on this merchant ship at odd times during the action I had not fired, and as she was making off fast I pursued and overtook her at 12.10, firing a gun across her bows, and hoisting International Code Signal to stop, which she did. I sent an armed boat and found her to be the s.s. *Buresk*, a captured British collier, with 18 Chinese crew, 1 English Steward, 1 Norwegian Cook, and a German Prize Crew of 3 Officers, 1 Warrant Officer and 12 men. The

ship unfortunately was sinking, the Kingston knocked out and damaged to prevent repairing, so I took all on board, fired four shells into her and returned to *Emden*, passing men swimming in the water, for whom I left two boats I was towing from *Buresk*.

3. On arriving again off *Emden* she still had her colours up at mainmast head. I inquired by signal, International Code, "Will you surrender?" and received a reply in Morse "What signal? No signal books." I then made in Morse "Do you surrender?" and subsequently "Have you received my signal?" to neither of which did I get an answer. The German Officers on board gave me to understand that the Captain would never surrender, and therefore, though very reluctantly, I again fired at her at 4.30 p.m., ceasing at 4.35, as she showed white flags and hauled down her ensign by sending a man aloft.

4. I then left *Emden* and returned and picked up the *Buresk's* two boats, rescuing two sailors (5.0 p.m.), who had been in the water all day. I returned and sent in one boat to *Emden*, manned by her own prize crew from *Buresk*, and one Officer, and stating I would return to their assistance next morning. This I had to do, as I was desirous to find out the condition of cables and Wireless Station at Direction Island. On the passage over I was again delayed by rescuing another sailor (6.30 p.m.), and by the time I was again ready and approaching Direction Island it was too late for the night.

5. I lay on and off all night and communicated with Direction Island at 8.0 a.m., November 10th, to find that the *Emden's* party consisting of 3 Officers and 40 men, 1 launch and 2 cutters had seized and provisioned a 70 tons schooner (the *Ayesha*), having 4 Maxims, with 2 belts to each. They left the previous night at six o'clock. The Wireless Station was entirely destroyed, 1 cable cut, 1 damaged, and 1 intact. I borrowed a Doctor and 2 Assistants, and proceeded as fast as possible to *Emden's* assistance.

6. I sent an Officer on board to see the Captain, and in view of the large number of prisoners and wounded and lack of accommodation, etc., in this ship, and the absolute impossibility of leaving them where they were, he agreed that if I received his Officers and men and all wounded, "then as for such time as they remained in *Sydney* they would cause no

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interference with ship or fittings, and would be amenable to the ship's discipline." I therefore set to work at once to tranship them—a most difficult operation, the ship being on weather side of Island and the send alongside very heavy. The conditions in the *Emden* were indescribable. I received the last from her at 5.0 p.m., then had to go round to the lee side to pick up 20 more men who had managed to get ashore from the ship.

7. Darkness came on before this could be accomplished, and the ship again stood off and on all night, resuming operations at 5.0 a.m. on November 11th, a cutter's crew having to land with stretchers to bring wounded round to embarking point. A German Officer, a Doctor, died ashore the previous day. The ship in the meantime ran over to Direction Island to return their Doctor and Assistants, send cables, and was back again at 10.0 a.m., embarked the remainder of wounded, and proceeded for Colombo by 10.35 a.m. Wednesday, November 11th.

8. Total casualties in *Sydney* : Killed 3, severely wounded (since dead) 1, severely wounded 4, wounded 4, slightly wounded 4. In the *Emden* I can only approximately state the killed at 7 Officers and 108 men from Captain's statement. I had on board 11 Officers, 9 Warrant Officers, and 191 men, of whom 3 Officers and 53 men were wounded, and of this number 1 Officer and 3 men have since died of wounds.

9. The damage to *Sydney*'s hull and fittings was surprisingly small; in all about 10 hits seem to have been made. The engine and boiler rooms and funnels escaped entirely.

13. I have great pleasure in stating that the behaviour of the ship's company was excellent in every way, and with such a large proportion of young hands and people under training it is all the more gratifying. The engines worked magnificently, and higher results than trials were obtained. and I cannot speak too highly of the Medical Staff and arrangements on subsequent trip, the ship being nothing but a hospital of a most painful description.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

JOHN C. T. GLOSSOP,
Captain.

The Secretary of the Admiralty.

Times,
Nov. 12,
1914.

The Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement :

The captain of the *Emden* and Prince Franz Joseph of Hohenzollern are both prisoners and unwounded. The losses of the *Emden* in killed are reported unofficially as 200, with 30 wounded ; no further details have been received.

The Admiralty have given directions that all honours of war are to be accorded to the survivors of the *Emden* and that the captain and officers will not be deprived of their swords.

Times,
Nov. 13,
1914.

The following war news, officially circulated through German wireless stations, has been received by the Marconi Company :

Berlin, November 12.

It is reported from Valparaiso that a transport ship searching for survivors of the naval engagement in the Pacific returned without having sighted any of the missing British cruisers or wreckage from those vessels.

The English newspapers pay the highest respect to the crew of the cruiser *Emden* and its commander, von Müller, whom they credit with the greatest ability and chivalry.

Amsterdam, November 18.

Times,
Nov. 19,
1914.

The Kaiser, replying to a telegram of sympathy from the public authorities of Emden on the occasion of the loss of the *Emden*, says :

Hearty thanks for your telegram of sympathy on the sad but heroic end of my cruiser *Emden*, the brave ship which, even in the latest fight against an overpowering enemy, won laurels. A new and stronger *Emden* shall arise, on whose bow the Iron Cross shall be affixed in remembrance of the old *Emden*.

WILHELM, R.I.

K.V.,
Nov. 26,
1914.

Commander von Müller, of the *Emden*, reports that the English cruiser *Sydney* approached Cocos Island at high speed, at the moment when a landing party despatched from the *Emden* was cutting the cable. An action between the

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two cruisers then began. He states that the *Emden's* shooting was good, but in a very short time the superiority of the English fire caused heavy losses among his gunners, and this resulted in his guns soon being silenced. Notwithstanding the fact that the rudder of the *Emden* was damaged, he fired a torpedo at the *Sydney*, but missed his object. The speed of his vessel was reduced in consequence of damage to her funnel, and he was obliged to run the ship ashore on a reef, from which point a landing party set out followed by the English, who, however, gave up the pursuit and resumed their fire against the wrecked *Emden*. In order to avoid further unnecessary loss of life he surrendered with the officers and crew, consisting of six officers, four deck officers, twenty-eight petty officers, and ninety-three men. One petty officer and seven men were severely wounded.

News has been received concerning S.M.S. *Ayesha* to the *K.D.*,
 effect that Commanding Captain-Lieutenant von Mücke ^{Feb. 1915.}
 has arrived in the neighbourhood of Hodeida (South West coast of Arabia) together with the landing party of S.M.S. *Emden*, and that they have been received with enthusiasm by the Turkish troops. After having successfully passed through the Strait of Perim unobserved by the English and French patrol forces, the landing took place undisturbed on the coast within sight of a French armoured cruiser.

On March 27th, the crew of H.I.M.S. *Ayesha* (the landing *K.D.*, party of H.I.M.S. *Emden*) arrived at the Arabian port Lidd ^{April 23,}
 to the south of Jeddah, having succeeded for the second time ^{1915.}
 in evading the Anglo-French vessels patrolling those waters, and completing their voyage of 300 miles from Hodeida without detection. During their further march on land they were attacked by Arabs who were bribed by the English. After three days' hard fighting, the attacks of these marauding bands were beaten off, and the way towards the Hedjaz Railway was open. Unhappily, the brave band suffered heavy losses on this occasion. A telegram from the Turkish Headquarters informs us that Lieutenant Z. See Roderick Schmidt, Seaman Rademacher and Stoker Lauig were killed,

while some of the Turkish escort, together with Seaman Mauritz von Koschinsky, were severely and Seaman Witte slightly wounded. The wounded are now under good care in the military hospital at Jeddah.

D.R.,
Jan. 3,
1917.

Keeling or Cocos Islands, November 9th, 1914. The landing party left the *Emden* at 6 a.m. There were forty-five men and three officers, equipped with four machine guns. Some 700 souls inhabit the islands, of whom 200 are Europeans. On the island there are wireless and cable electric stations; from the latter three cables go respectively to Batavia, Singapore, and Australia. We knew that the English valued this station, and hence our desire to destroy it.

The steam-pinnacle towed us between coral reefs to the landing stage. In the harbour we saw a sailing-ship—three-master—but little dreamt that this insignificant looking vessel would become of great importance to us. We sprang from the cutters; one party made for the wireless and the other for the cable station.

As we arrived there I saw the operator sending off signals of distress, but I quickly turned the machine off and the work of destruction began. We then proceeded to the cable station and blew it up, as well as the receiver for wireless messages. Then the cables were cut. The installations were very powerful and of great value; in fact we had no idea that the station was so large.

Suddenly at 9 o'clock the *Emden* signalled with her search-lights in the Morse code, telling us to hurry up. We loaded the cutters hurriedly and were towed out again, only to see the *Emden* putting out to sea.

At first this manœuvre was quite incomprehensible; but she next fired a broadside, and then shells began to drop all round her.

We were condemned to look on in complete helplessness, while the *Emden* seemed to be getting the worst of it.

We returned to the landing stage, climbed to the roofs to watch the fight which drew off to the open sea. Next we prepared to hold the island; the machine guns were placed in position and all weapons taken from the inhabitants. Meanwhile the *Emden's* foremast and one funnel had been shot

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away. Lieutenant-Captain von Mücke called us together and ordered those men who had any experience of sailing ships to seize the *Ayesha* and make her ready for sea, his intention being to leave the island before sunset to find the *Emden* in case she had survived the fight.

It was bitterly hard to think of our comrades waging an unequal fight outside with forty-eight of the crew missing. Poor *Emden*! It was now 5 o'clock and the fight not ended. Meanwhile the schooner *Ayesha* had been provisioned and water taken on board—unfortunately very little of the latter for the needs of forty-eight men, for we hoped to make Batavia. Towards sunset the pinnace towed us out of the harbour and the voyage began.

November 10.

At sea. We camped on deck under very primitive conditions. I had never dreamed that I should ever set foot on a sailing-tub again in this life. We are making three knots in the hour. There is no water for washing.

* * *

A stop of only twenty-four hours was made at Padang in order to get provisions, but after *Emden II.* (*i.e.*, *Ayesha*) had left the harbour she was followed by the *Choising*, a freight steamer belonging to the Norddeutscher Lloyd. The *Choising* sighted the sailing ship in heavy weather on December 14th, and held by till the storm passed and a dead calm followed. After a conference it was decided to sink *Emden II.*, and, by means of axes, holes were cut in her hull, everything of use taken off her, and at 5 p.m. she disappeared in 4,000 feet of water.

Black smoke clouds gushed out of *Emden III.*'s (*Choising*) funnels as she steered south-west, and later on changed this to a westerly course. To the amazement of the world *Emden III.* popped up, two and a half months after the crew had left the Keeling Islands, in the Turkish harbour, Hodeida, in the Red Sea. During the voyage quite a number of small coasting steamers had been caught and sunk.

The long voyage had led across the Indian Ocean, past the English fortress, Aden, through the Straits of Bab-el-

Mandeb, past Perim to Hodeida on the Arabian coast, where the men had landed in sight of a French armoured cruiser.

An attempt to leave Hodeida by land ended in failure on account of the climate, but in the night of March 15th they succeeded in dodging the English blockade and got clear in two small sailing ships. One ran aground in the dark in twelve feet of water. All the occupants were rescued, but a quantity of provisions had to be thrown overboard as the other boat was overloaded and there were seventy souls on board.

Dschidda was the next place where provisions could be obtained, and, as it was blockaded by three English ships, the Germans decided to land at Lidd and march the remainder of the way through the robber-infested country. After a six-days' march the caravan was attacked in the night of April 1st by Bedouins, but these ran off when the Germans attacked with the bayonet.

Nevertheless, a continuance of the march was impossible, for there were 300 armed Arabs opposed to sixteen German and thirteen Turkish rifles. One sailor was shot through the heart; Naval Lieutenant Roderick Schmidt was mortally wounded and died during the night. A demand from the Arabs for £22,000, our arms and ammunition, was rejected, but a regular little fortress with trenches, &c., was completed. During a three-days' fight the Germans had several more casualties, but three had already escaped, disguised as Bedouins, to get help from Dschidda.

From this point they employed sailing boats, succeeded again in getting through the English blockading line, and reached El Wesch. A five-days' march brought them to El Ulah, on the Hedjaz railway. Provisions sent by the German Consul in Damascus awaited them at that point. The heroes arrived in Damascus on May 10th, and from there to Constantinople their journey was a triumphal procession. On June 10th they reached Vienna.

[The foregoing narrative is taken from the diary of one of the *Emden's* landing party. For the original source of this document see note on p. 12.]

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THE "KÖNIGSBERG" A TOTAL WRECK.

The Secretary of the Admiralty made the following announcement last night : *Times*,
July 13,
1915

It will be remembered that since the end of October last the *Königsberg* has been sheltering some distance up the Rufigi River (German East Africa) in a position which rendered attack most difficult, only shallow-draught ships being able to get sufficiently close to her to be able to engage effectively.

Two months ago the Admiralty decided to send two river monitors, namely, *Severn* (Captain Eric Fullerton, R.N.) and *Mersey* (Commander Robert A. Wilson, R.N.), to assist the Commander-in-Chief of the Cape Station, Vice-Admiral H. King Hall, C.V.O., C.B., D.S.O., in these operations.

The position of the *Königsberg* was accurately located by aircraft, and as soon as the monitors were ready the operations were begun.

On the morning of July 4th the monitors entered the river and opened fire, to which the *Königsberg* replied immediately, firing salvoes of five guns with accuracy and rapidity. H.M.S. *Mersey* was hit twice, four men being killed and four wounded by one shell.

As the *Königsberg* was surrounded by jungle, the aeroplanes experienced very great difficulty in "spotting" the fall of the shot. She was hit five times early in the action, but after the monitors had fired for six hours the aeroplanes reported that the *Königsberg's* masts were still standing. A salvo then burst on her and she became heavily on fire between the masts.

She continued to fire with one gun intermittently for a while ; but for the last part of the engagement she did not fire at all, either on account of lack of ammunition or disablement of her guns. Although not totally destroyed as a result of this engagement, she was probably incapacitated.

The Commander-in-Chief reports that the task of the monitors was an extremely difficult one on account of the jungle and difficulties of accurate "spotting" ; but they were assisted by H.M.S. *Weymouth*, Captain Denis Crampton, M.V.O. (in which ship the Commander-in-Chief flew his flag), which followed them across the bar of the river and engaged small guns on the banks, whilst H.M.S. *Pioneer* (Acting

Commander T. W. Biddlecombe, R.A.N.) engaged the guns at the mouth of the river.

In order to complete the destruction of the *Königsberg* the Commander-in-Chief ordered a further attack on July 11th, and a telegram has now been received from him stating that the ship is a total wreck. In this last engagement our casualties were only two wounded in H.M.S. *Mersey*.

NAVAL DEBATE IN THE HOUSE OF LORDS.

House of Lords, November 11.

Hansard.

THE EARL OF SELBORNE: My Lords, the gracious Speech from the Throne was entirely concerned with the war, and I ask your Lordships' permission to-night to allude to certain naval aspects of the war. I shall not detain you long, but there are certain observations which I think ought to be made, and certain questions which I think ought to be asked. First of all I wish to speak about the expedition to Antwerp. I have no opinion to express as to the military wisdom or unwisdom of that expedition. I have not the facts on which to form an opinion, and therefore I shall express none. The question I want to ask is, Why was this expedition, which was of a purely military nature, entrusted to the Admiralty to carry out? I should regard with absolute dismay any attempt of the War Office to control the movements of the Grand Fleet and I regard with no less dismay the attempt of the Admiralty to conduct the defence of a fortress. Therefore I ask, Why was this task entrusted to the Admiralty; and was this expedition undertaken on the advice of the military advisers of the Government? My second question is, Why was this expedition to Antwerp entrusted to a Naval Brigade?

I confess that under all circumstances I regard with jealousy the use of a Naval Brigade on shore. Sometimes, of course, it is amply justified. But I think its use always requires explanation, and particularly in this case, because although Marines, as we know, are trained to serve on land as well as afloat, only a portion of this Brigade consisted of Marines. I am only stating a fact which is known to the whole world when I say that Naval Brigades, apart from

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Marines, are not trained to undertake land operations ; therefore under no circumstances could this have been a thoroughly trained military unit. Further than that, we know that many of the men of this Brigade had only recently joined the Naval Volunteer Reserve, and although it is true that Germany is using many untrained troops in the operations in Flanders, there are many German practices which I would rather we should avoid than copy. Therefore many of us regarded the employment of this particular Brigade for this particular purpose with nothing less than amazement, and I think it is wonderful—quite wonderful—how splendidly the men did under the circumstances. We have every reason to be most proud of them. Their deficiencies were no fault of theirs ; they were part of an organisation meant to serve afloat, and they were suddenly called upon to conduct an operation of a purely military character. Therefore I feel it my duty to ask, Was this particular force selected for this particular purpose by the military advisers of the Government as the most suitable to conduct the defence of a fortress ?

Next, my Lords, I wish to allude to our recent defeat in the Pacific. We have had many discussions in this House about the standards of naval strength and the numbers of our squadrons. This is not the moment to continue that discussion ; we shall have to examine that question at the end of the war. But I feel it my duty to ask now, how it could possibly have happened that such a squadron as that which has been in large part destroyed could have been chosen to defend our flag in the Pacific against such a squadron of cruisers as that which the German Admiralty had sent forth ? According to the information at my disposal, the German squadron consisted of three excellent third-class cruisers of the *Emden* class—the class which has become famous owing to the exploits of a gallant captain whose escape from the loss of his ship I am sure all your Lordships are glad to learn—combined with the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*, two very powerful first-class cruisers. All those five ships are fast ships. Now, what was the squadron collected to meet those ships ? The *Glasgow*, a better ship than the *Emden* class ; the *Monmouth* and the *Good Hope*, two good ships of their date, but of a type not to be compared for a single moment with the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*. The inferiority of

those three ships to the German combination was so manifest that we were told by the Admiralty that they had joined to that squadron the battleship *Canopus*.

I want to allude to the Memorandum published by the Admiralty. I must say I did not like it. I did not like its tone altogether. I am sure there was no kind of intention to suggest a reflection on that most gallant seaman, Admiral Cradock, who gave his life for his country when the *Good Hope* went down ; but I could not help thinking when I read it that he might have had something to say about that Memorandum, particularly when he read the part about the *Canopus*. The point is this. If you add the *Canopus* to the *Monmouth* and the *Good Hope* and the *Glasgow*, most surely you have a squadron more powerful than the German squadron it was intended to meet ; yet also you have a squadron which under no possible circumstances could force the German squadron to action, because the *Canopus* is slow. All the cruisers on both sides concerned are over 20-knot cruisers—I think, running up to 22 and 23 knots. I do not suppose the *Canopus* at the most can steam more than 17 knots. Therefore it was perfectly clear that so long as the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* were in company with the *Canopus* they never by any possibility could force the German squadron to action. Consequently for the purpose of catching and defeating the German squadron the addition of the *Canopus* to the cruisers we have lost was obviously futile.

I confess that the explanation about the *Canopus* only filled me with astonishment, and with a greater desire for an explanation from the Government as to how this could ever have come to pass. It is quite clear what happened. The *Good Hope* and the *Monmouth* and the *Glasgow* had to meet the whole of the German squadron alone, and from that moment it was only a contest between the two 9.2 guns of the *Good Hope* and the sixteen 8.2 guns of the *Scharnhorst* and the *Gneisenau*, and there could be no doubt whatever as to the issue. All we can do is to pay our tribute of intense admiration for the officers and men of those two ships who, fighting against hopeless odds, gave their lives for England. But I do think that the country is entitled to a better explanation than has been given as to how such a squadron was sent to meet the German squadron.

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I should like to take this opportunity of making a protest. The Board of Admiralty is an historic body, and the First Lord is not in the position of a Secretary of State. I wish the present First Lord, who has thrown the whole of his great intelligence and power of work into the task entrusted to him, would remember that, and not send messages to foreign Powers, to Fleets, or to Naval Brigades in his own name. I may have offended myself when I was at the Admiralty, but I have no recollection of ever having done so. If I did, I repudiate that precedent altogether, and I apologise for it. But it is a great breach of historic continuity and of real constitutional custom for any communication to be sent as from or to the Navy except by the Secretary in the name of the Board of Admiralty.

Then, my Lords, I wish to say a word about Prince Louis of Battenberg. It was my privilege, when I was First Lord of the Admiralty, to have Prince Louis as Director of Naval intelligence, and I got to know him very well. I wish to say here what I have said elsewhere, that a more devoted, a more loyal, servant of the Crown has never existed in the Navy, the Army, or the Civil Service. Prince Louis of Battenberg is a man of great abilities, who became an Englishman by adoption in his fourteenth year, and who has lived ever since for nearly half a century for no other purpose in the performance of his profession than to give his very best to his King and country. That such a man should be singled out for attack is, I venture to say, nothing less than a national humiliation. I can scarcely find words to express my indignation that there should be people among us who seem unable to distinguish between the man who is as loyal, as true, to the country of his adoption as man can be, and the man who has shamefully abused our national hospitality, merely because both of them had German parents. I should not think it right to let this the first opportunity that has occurred pass by without expressing to all my countrymen my sense of the immense services Prince Louis of Battenberg has rendered to the Crown of England, to the British Navy, and to the English people, and my misery and shame at the attacks which have been made upon him.

In conclusion I wish to associate myself in the strongest possible way with what my noble friend Lord Curzon and

the Leader of the House said about the services rendered by the Fleet in this great war. I wish also—and here I speak for all my noble friends on this side of the House, and I do not think that noble Lords opposite will dissociate themselves from what I say—to express our pride in the Australian Navy of the King, and our gratitude and admiration for the great service rendered by the *Sydney* in the destruction of the *Emden*. And when my noble friend voiced the admiration we all feel for the efforts of our Allies in Europe, I must add—and again I shall carry all your Lordships with me—our great admiration for the way our Japanese Ally has fought in the recent siege of the German fortress which they have captured—captured in the main, of course, by the skill and bravery of Japanese arms, but I am glad to think that a small body of British troops were associated with them in the task. All that my noble friend has said about our Allies in Europe applies equally to Japan.

THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: My Lords, I wish to take this opportunity of referring to an administrative matter—namely, the position of alien enemies in this country and the danger caused by their presence. A few months ago I brought this matter before the notice of the Government, but I am afraid ineffectually. The noble Marquess the Leader of the House received my observations with great courtesy but at the same time with very amiable scepticism, and the district in which I live in Scotland has up to a very few days ago continued, as regards this danger, in a condition which I am afraid has been most unsatisfactory. But the noble Marquess and his colleague Lord Allendale at any rate comforted me by the assurance that the whole of the County of Fife was a prohibited area. Fife is a sea-girt county. It has on the north the submarine base of Dundee, and on the south the great naval base of Rosyth, the Forth Bridge, the fortified island of Inch Keith, and the city of Edinburgh. I live in Fifeshire, and your Lordships will all admit that the strategic importance of this county justifies my laying before you certain facts with regard to it.

Two months ago when I raised this matter, Fife became a prohibited area; in other words, there being no parish in Fife more than ten miles from the sea-coast, the whole of that

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county became *ipso facto* an area in which alien enemies were not entitled to live. None the less alien enemies continued to reside there, to go into that county and to leave it apparently at their own sweet will. Up to last week there was actually an alien enemy living in the county to whom the Home Office had refused naturalisation papers for reasons which, long before this war was thought of, they considered adequate and ample. But up till a few days ago that alien enemy continued to reside, as every German in Fife does reside, at a spot commanding the sea. Next door, or next door but one, to that particular alien enemy is living another notorious German who makes no secret of his relatives serving in the German Army or of his profound contempt for this country. He is living there to-day, although he is an alien and a non-naturalised German who publicly and contemptuously expresses his views about us.

Let me quote a further concrete instance. At the extreme easterly end of the County of Fife, which northwards, with glasses of course, commands the extreme coast of Aberdeen, and to the south the Farne Islands, a German was residing up till the end of August, although this was a prohibited area then. That German was detected tampering with official messages sent along the coast to the coastguards by telephone. He was removed, but somehow or another he persuaded the authorities—military, I presume—that he was innocent, and he came back to Fife to his house, and the only penalty that this person incurred was that he was cut off the telephone. We have got rid of him now, because on October 29th he was removed; but I am not quite certain that he will not get back again, and on that point I should like assurances from the Government.

It is what these people do to which I desire to call your Lordships' attention. I am not talking about the minor spy, the hotel waiter and insignificant people like that, who watch a Territorial in the street and see what shoulder-strap he has on and then communicate it to some one else who may not think it worth while to communicate it to Germany. I am talking about super-*espionage*, something more advanced than collecting materials of that character. I am talking about active and highly organised communication with the enemy direct, and I ask your permission to explain two or

three phases of the forms which this activity takes. In the first place, night signalling from our shores, and from the high ground which rises from our shores in Fife, to ships in the Forth—whether to merchant ships or submarines I cannot say—is continuous. I can if you like give you the names of six places within a very few miles of my own home where this lamp signalling has been in regular progress. But it is not only flash signalling which is a form of communication with the enemy. Only the other day one of these persons who has now left was discovered to have filled up a form of questions—a *questionnaire*—submitted to him from Germany.

A third form of communication with the enemy was discovered quite recently—a very carefully prepared system of communication by post, in such a way as to escape the activities of the Censor: in other words, a private postal system arranged from our Fife ports to Germany and confined to commercial boats which come into the Forth—Swedish, Dutch, Norwegian, Danish, I do not know what. That was discovered the other day, and the person from whom this document was taken is still residing there, or was a few days ago. Now, who are these people? When war breaks out it is understood always that the Ambassador leaves, the Minister leaves, and the Consular staff leave. The Consular work of Fife, such as it was, with Germany and Austria is being conducted in the ordinary way by the Consul of the United States of America at the town of Dunfermline. But Germany is not content with our ordinary hierarchy of Consuls; she has Consular agents as well, and in one of the ports which have given the maximum of trouble to the authorities the Consular agent of Germany and the Consular agent of Austria are still resident or were a week ago. Neither of them is German or British; they both belong to neutral nations; both have been officials of the enemy. Their trade and avocation make it for those two particular individuals ideal that they should remain there, because they are such persons as ship chandlers and so on, who in the ordinary course of their business see every foreign seaman who comes into the port; and the Forth is full of foreign sailors day by day. Our policy has been the fatal one of trying in commercial life to ignore the existence of war, and at all hazards to keep going between Norway and Denmark the butter trade.

Therefore it is quite easy for Germany, which has any number of Danish, Norwegian, Dutch, or Frisian subjects, to send their sailors in and out on those boats.

Then there are cases of illegal export and import of cargoes. There have been two cases of illegal importation of dynamite without the formalities of what is called "entry." Wretched little twopenny-halfpenny boats carrying small negligible cargoes of merchandise but also carrying immense quantities of dynamite—there have been two cases of that within the last few weeks. Again at this particular port by my own home there have been in the last few weeks two cases of illegal export of petrol, not great quantities which would be useful to a belligerent Power as a cargo delivered on land, but small consignments which would be invaluable to enemy ships lying off our own shores. I hope the noble Marquess takes my meaning without my having to be more precise. There have been two cases of that within the last few weeks, and I am only speaking of one or two ports within a whole row of ports on the north and the south side of the Forth. What happened? I only know what occurred in one case. In one of these cases the man who committed this crime was fined £5. The fine was paid. Had the fine been £500 it would have been paid the next day. I ask the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, who has control of these things from the legal point of view, to bear that in mind. A fine is no use. There is more money to pay those fines than a penny on the Income Tax in this country would produce, and it is always available.

My last point is the danger of mines. A ship was brought into one of these ports the other day and searched, and it was discovered that one of her coal bunkers was half filled with sawdust. No sailor in his senses would carry sawdust close to the boilers and engines. Of course the assumption was that this harmless ship had been dropping mines, which we know to our cost have been sown up and down our North-Eastern shores. I have spoken about Fife, the county where I live, and about matters which are common knowledge to us all. I have no doubt from conversations that I have had with noble Lords—Lords Lieutenant and soldiers—and others that these facts can be duplicated with regard to other ports in Scotland, Ireland, or England. On

October 12th the Government issued a statement as to what had actually been achieved by the Home Office. It was a wholly complacent announcement—the spy system was broken up, and so on ; it was so placid in its confidence that it gave a shock to public opinion. Soon afterwards there were very unfortunate disturbances in London, such as will always occur when people think that the Government are not carrying out the law as it should be carried out. I deprecate these hostile demonstrations against aliens, because I think that they defeat our greatest interests ; but none the less they will continue unless the Government are more active than they have been.

I have brought these facts before the highest authorities. There has been a little renewed activity, but none the less conditions to my mind remain very dangerous indeed. Some naturalised British subjects—I refer again now to Fife—have been removed. Others remain against whom there is not the suspicion but the knowledge of offences against the law. German subjects still remain resident, or were until three or four days ago, in this prohibited area ; and if they are removed their wives are allowed to remain and in several cases the sons of these people actually remain. It is obvious, therefore, that there is considerable disparity of treatment and doubt as to the proper course to pursue. I should like, however, to say that most admirable work has been done in Fife by the soldiers, sailors, and police ; but they know that the Government authority is not quite clear in its own mind as to what should be done. The result is that they live in fear of a snub from the Home Office, or from the Scottish Office which follows the policy of the Home Office in England.

I venture to make two or three suggestions. In the first place, I suggest that there should not be the ridiculous farce of fining a man who has committed a crime against the country and an act of war against the State. Such a man should not be fined ; he should be imprisoned. Secondly, I suggest that the authorities should announce that the police, soldiers, and sailors are empowered to remove any naturalised British subject of German birth who is open to reasonable suspicion. This is a matter of life and death, and if there is a German who is a British subject and is open to suspicion, in my opinion we are in many ways more entitled to fear his activities than

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if the man were a *bona fide* German. Finally, we must remove this disparity of treatment. We must let the local authorities know how they are entitled to act. I throw out the suggestion for what it may be worth, that a Joint Aliens Board should be established, on which the military, naval, police, and Home Office authorities should be represented, to work out a policy—the materials are already available—and that that policy should be published so that the public as a whole, both British and non-British, should know what the wish of the Government is. The result, I think, would be that we should be able to remove from our midst some of the dangers to which I have referred. This is a legal matter, and I hope that the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack will give my remarks some consideration, and perhaps in the course of next week he might be able to announce some line of policy. I do not ask him, nor do I expect him, to make any reply at the present juncture ; but to my mind the matter is so important that the sooner it is brought to the knowledge of the House the sooner shall we be able to get something from the Government.

LORD LEITH OF FYVIE : My Lords, I should like to say a few words following upon the Question which I put to the Government on this subject in the early part of September, because the experience of the progress made shows that in some districts, as the noble Earl has told your Lordships, the prohibition does not apply at all. For instance, in Aberdeenshire the prohibited areas were increased very promptly, but they stopped at the bridge. Since then—it took sixty days to bring it about—the Scottish Office has extended the area until it stretches from John o'Groats as far south as to cover the Scottish coast. As to the English coast, it is apparent from the information that has reached me that signalling and interference with shipping is going on actively along the Norfolk coast. I have requested the Home Office several times to have the matter thoroughly investigated, and the Lord Lieutenant of the county wrote to me to say that the local authorities could not make any progress because the Home Office refused to allow them authority.

As I understand, the powers under the Restriction of Aliens Act do not seem to be understood. They are certainly

not practised. For instance, in Devonshire, where I live in the winter months, the Chief Constable of the county does not consider that he has a power which our Chief Constables in the North of Scotland have assumed and already acted upon. When the recent extension by Order in Council was made there was a large number arrested in Torquay and district, but they were returned in a few days by the military authority because no arrangements had been made for them. In Scotland, on the other hand, the military authorities had the orders beforehand and were prepared to remove them out of the prohibited areas, or take them to a camp. While poor men, barbers, waiters, and so on and women workers have been arrested and removed, alien enemies who employ a few men and women have been returned and are living where they were and practising their business as before. This shows the inconsistencies of these two Acts, which were passed perhaps without proper consideration of the finality of them. In other words, the general theory of the Chief Constables I have spoken to about the matter is that they are acting for the Home Office, or, in Scotland, for the Scottish Office, and then they turn the cases over to the military. The military, on the other hand, do not assume authority in all cases. Now I understand the question is going to be thoroughly threshed out, and the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack will doubtless be able to make a statement subsequent to the consideration of the whole subject. There are at present overlapping laws which are inconsistent and not thorough.

In calling attention to this question in your Lordships' House two months ago I said that I particularly desired to see a "clean sweep" of all enemy aliens as a precaution and not as a persecution. It has acted the reverse way. At present the poor alien and the wage-earner are interned; but the rich financiers, the contractors, and the big men in the City of London escape. Those are our enemies; those are the ones you will sooner or later have to arrest. We are acting with Allies, and we must consider the policy which our Allies have pursued with regard to alien enemies in their midst. We are not doing so to-day, but we must do so. I hope the noble and learned Viscount will take this point into consideration with the other subjects. Additional legislation is required to protect the State against these alien enemies,

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who are actively engaged, and who, I have every reason to suppose, robbed this land of an enormous amount of money just previous to the war—robbed the country on such a gigantic scale that it is hard to prove, yet there is no reason why this could not be proved in a Court. As the noble Earl who has just spoken said, there must be a Court of experience and knowledge of the facts, civil, military, and financial, and prepared to act on them. I understand from this morning's report that a very large number of persons are being arrested, and the question must come up how they are to be distributed. There must be equity; there must be justice. We must cease this persecution and arresting of the poor wage-earners and arrest the rich men in our midst who are working against us, employed probably by the Kaiser for a number of years. Let them be arrested and let them be held responsible.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT HALDANE): My Lords, perhaps it will be thought convenient that I should deal with the two speeches to which we have just listened before I proceed to the points raised in the speeches from the Front Opposition Bench. The speech which we have just heard illustrates the extraordinary difficulties attending this subject. I agree with the noble Lord that there has been a most highly-organised and systematic arrangement for obtaining secret information—a most highly-organised system of preparation, not for a few months, but for years before this war. At the time I was Secretary of State for War I was cognizant of it and watched it. When that has gone on for a long time it becomes very difficult, after the outbreak of war, to put your hand upon the people who are giving real information. You are dealing with people of great astuteness, countrymen not only of other countries but of this country. The result is that in well-intentioned efforts to put down the evil you inevitably do an enormous meed of injustice, more than you do by proceeding by summary methods. The result has been that the task not only of the Police but of the naval and military authorities has been very hard.

As the noble Lord who last spoke said, it is very unfortunate to have to lay hold of a man who may be perfectly innocent and in a humble class of life and take him from his wife and children and from his little business and shut him up. Yet

that is what we have had to do in order to cope with this difficulty and meet the demands of public opinion. I trust that the process of sifting is a process which will be pursued in a very thorough fashion, and that we shall succeed in some measure at all events in making sure that we are not getting the wrong man and diverting our attention from the real one. I can only say to the noble Lord and to the noble Earl who spoke before him that the naval and military authorities and the Police are putting their heads together, and that I doubt very much whether any board or committee would be of any good. It would be a slow and abstract kind of institution.

THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: What is really wanted is that the Home Office should know what the soldiers and sailors on the spot require.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: That is quite right. The noble Earl brought forward such remarkable cases that I fear there might be a doubt that, if we sifted them, they might not be all substantiated; but if the noble Earl would not mind jotting down the heads and giving them to me as confidentially as he can I will have them investigated.

THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: It is because these cases have not been investigated by the Home Office that I have raised the matter here. Every case that I have mentioned is—some of them have been for three months—at the disposal of the authorities. If the noble and learned Viscount will inquire of the authorities he will find that that is so.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The case of the merchant ship carrying mines—does the noble Earl say that that has been before the authorities?

THE EARL OF CRAWFORD: That case has not been before the authorities because there is nothing illegal in having a coal bunker full of sawdust. But the authorities know about the matter, and take the gravest view of it.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: I am sure that if they had suspicions in that case the naval authorities would interfere. I do not say this with a view of in the least minimising the

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importance of what the noble Earl has brought forward. The authorities—naval, military, and Home—are applying themselves with, as far as I can judge, great vigour at the present time; and certainly it is the policy and the duty of the Government to see that that vigour is increased rather than relaxed. At the same time we have arrested a great number of people, some of whom may be perfectly innocent. But we must do our best to assist the authorities at the present time.

The noble Earl on the Front Opposition Bench, Lord Selborne, raised certain questions. The first was the question of Antwerp. I will say very little about it, but I will say this. What was done at Antwerp was done not only in consultation with the Admiralty but after consultation with the Secretary of State for War. It had to be done very quickly, and with the resources that were available. But for the encouragement which the swift action taken gave, but for the delay which that encouragement and support brought about, I am not sure that the line on which we are fighting to-day would be the same as it is. I do not desire to go into details upon that subject, further than to state that what was done was done by the First Lord after consulting the Secretary of State for War; in fact, we take the fullest responsibility and think that the intervention was a useful intervention. Then the noble Earl asked why it was entrusted to a Naval Brigade? It was entrusted to the body handiest to do it quickly, and the Naval Brigade behaved very well in the trenches. Then the noble Earl raised the question of the defeat in the Pacific, and asked how such a squadron was chosen. The *Canopus* was there, but he says that the *Canopus* was not a fast boat—17 or 18-knots.

A NOBLE LORD: Sixteen.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: The answer is this. It was impossible to foresee how the German ships would concentrate. It must be remembered that the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* had been thousands of miles away just before, and their concentration was a thing which no one could foresee. We do not yet know the circumstances of the affair sufficiently. I have no doubt that the gallant Admiral whose loss we all mourn and who fought so splendidly exercised the wisest

judgment in what he did. If these ships were separated for the moment from the *Canopus* it was no doubt to carry out an enterprise which seemed to him in the circumstances the wisest course to take. Certainly we have no information from which we can criticise in the least the view which he formed, nor is there information which leads us to think that the Admiralty policy was wrong. Noble Lords must remember that the Atlantic and Pacific oceans have an enormous space ; that we are hunting comparatively few ships ; that it takes a great many ships, and it is impossible to foresee or forecast from day to day or even sometimes from hour to hour, where ships will be found ; and that it is an enterprise involving a certain amount of time and a certain amount of risk.

Then the noble Earl made an allusion to Prince Louis of Battenberg, and I have deep sympathy with the manner in which he spoke of that officer. We all think that there is no more devoted sailor in the British Navy than Prince Louis. For years he has devoted himself to the service of the Crown and the Navy, and I entirely share the sentiments of the noble Earl. I do not think that he spoke one word too strongly when he said that it was monstrous that attacks of the kind that were made should be made upon a sensitive and high-souled man, who felt himself placed in a difficult and impossible position. The noble Earl also alluded to the composition of the Board of Admiralty, and pointed out, quite truly, that the First Lord is not a Secretary of State. That is quite true. But the noble Earl also remembers that under the Order in Council he is in a peculiar position, and he is the Minister responsible to Parliament. Therefore it does come about that more communications are made by the First Lord in his own name than by any other member of the Board. I cannot tax my memory, but my impression is that the bulk of the communications that have been issued have been in the name of the Board, and that whilst the Minister who is at the head of the Department is bound to make speeches and send telegrams and issue manifestoes at times, that has not been done to an extent which is inordinate. At any rate that is a matter on which my right hon. friend is sensitive and anxious to conform to what is the best practice on the subject. You have to discriminate between

his capacity as a Minister and as the head of the Board, and he has conscientious views, as far as I am able to judge, upon that point. I have dealt with the points raised. I cannot go further into details on such matters as the movements of ships. It is very difficult to say much at a time of war, particularly with regard to such movements as those which took place in connection with what happened in the Pacific. We are passing through a time of great difficulty, and the Government is grateful for the tone which noble Lords sitting on the Opposition Benches have adopted to-day and for the support and sympathy which they are giving to the Government in the discharge of one of the most difficult duties that have ever fallen upon the persons responsible for the administration of affairs.

VISCOUNT ST. ALDWYN : My Lords, I will only detain the House for a few minutes, but I must say that I do not think that the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack has at all satisfactorily answered the remarks which have been made by my noble friend Lord Crawford and by the noble Lord who followed him. It must be nearly two months ago since my noble friend Lord Crawford called attention to this very subject. He brought forward cases then of a kind similar to those which he has instanced to-day, and the noble Marquess who leads the House promised that careful attention would be given to the matter by the Government. Yet my noble friend has shown that precisely similar instances are going on now. It was, of course, impossible to expect the noble and learned Viscount to answer particulars with regard to each of these cases to-night, but I wish that he had shown some stronger sense of the inefficiency of the organisation that exists to deal with this matter. Surely the suggestion made by Lord Crawford that there should be some arrangement for co-ordinate action between the three authorities concerned—the Home Office, the Admiralty, and the War Office—was a very good one. I wish that the noble and learned Viscount had given us hope that some arrangement of that kind would be made, for I must confess that what I have heard to-night and on the previous occasion leaves no impression on my mind except this, that there has been on the part of the Home Office a lack of uniform and efficient action which is very much to be deplored.

LORD ST. DAVIDS: My Lords, I listened with great interest to the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Crawford, and, like the noble Viscount who has just sat down—and like many other members of the House, I suspect—I do not consider the Government answer at all a satisfactory one. If I may say so, it was unsatisfactory not on the point of detail but on the broadest line of policy. The noble and learned Viscount said that this spy question could not be gone into, wholesale without causing an immense deal of inconvenience and hardship to innocent persons. A great many of the people of this country are aware that there must be suspicion that a great deal too much information is leaving our shores, especially on naval affairs. To put it broadly, no one doubts it. I do not believe there is one of us in this House who would not subject himself, his family, his county, or his country to an immense amount of hardship in order to prevent one single item of information leaking out. That is what we ourselves and our families would gladly suffer if it would prevent information going out.

Where I dissent strongly from the Government on this matter is that we should consider for one moment any inconvenience or hardship which we may inflict upon alien enemies and their families. If we could bear that hardship for ourselves and our own families, I think we should at least equally let the families of alien enemies bear that inconvenience. The point of view which the Government has taken is one with which the country does not sympathise. We wish that the search for information going out of the country should be made far more drastic than it has been. After all, we do not want to keep these people here. If there are a great number of families of aliens who are suffering hardship because their breadwinners are in concentration camps, why should not we offer to return them to Germany? I believe that the Germans are keeping a number of English people in Germany who are of no use to them and would be no help to us; they are keeping them there for their own reasons. Of course, I do not want to see any aliens suffer hardships unnecessarily; I think the Government might offer them to Germany and pass them through the lines. What we want to see is the stoppage of this leakage of information and the reassurance of the public, who ought to know that the best

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is being done. When the public read a speech like that of the noble and learned Viscount to the effect that we must take great care that the families of alien enemies do not suffer inconvenience and serious hardships, I do not think it is considered that that is the spirit in which this thing ought to be handled. We ought to treat alien enemies and their families as we would treat ourselves. I believe that it is not in detail but in the spirit that the method in which this question is being handled wants to be fundamentally altered.

LOSS OF THE "NIGER."

Admiralty, November 11.

THE Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement :

His Majesty's Ship *Niger* (Lieutenant-Commander Arthur T. Muir, R.N.) was torpedoed by a submarine this morning in the Downs, and foundered.

All the officers and seventy-seven of the crew were saved ; two men are severely and two slightly injured. It is thought there was no loss of life.

His Majesty's Ship *Niger* was a torpedo gunboat of 810 tons, built in 1892. She was employed in semi-combatant duties.

JAPANESE TORPEDO-BOAT LOST.

Tokyo, November 11.

IT is officially announced that the Japanese torpedo-boat No. 33 was sunk to-day whilst dragging for mines at the mouth of Kiao-chau Bay. The majority of the crew were saved.—*Reuter*.

GUNNERY ALLOWANCE (BOATSWAINS).

House of Commons, November 12.

MR. FALLE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if *Hansard*. he is aware that in modern ships boatswains have often gunnery work to perform and that in some ships all the gunners are boatswains ; and if he can grant these men their gunnery allowance for first and second-class certificates ?

DR. MACNAMARA: I am aware that boatswains, in common with the majority of officers of a ship, often have gunnery duties to perform, but am not aware that in some ships all the gunners are boatswains. It is not proposed to grant gunnery allowance to boatswains who have not undergone the training necessary to qualify for such allowance.

THE "GOEBEN" AND "BRESLAU"—THE TROUBRIDGE COURT MARTIAL.

Times,
Nov. 13,
1914.

SINCE Rear-Admiral Troubridge's return to England an exhaustive inquiry has been held, as a result of which he applied to the Admiralty for a trial by court martial. The request having been granted, a court martial was held at Portland, and Rear-Admiral Troubridge was honourably acquitted.

The proceedings of the court martial began on Thursday, November 5th, and sittings were held daily, including Sunday, until Monday last. Admiral Sir George Le C. Egerton, K.C.B., Commander-in-Chief at Devonport, was President of the Court, all the members of which were flag officers. Paymaster-in-Chief F. J. Krabbé, Deputy Judge Advocate of the Fleet, was in attendance, and Rear-Admiral Troubridge was assisted in his defence by Mr. Leslie Scott, K.C., M.P., the charge against him being that he failed to pursue the *Goeben* and *Breslau*. The proceedings of the court martial were strictly private, representatives of the Press being refused admission.

RESTRICTIONS IN FIRTH OF FORTH.

Times,
Nov. 13,
1914.

THE Admiral Commanding the Coast of Scotland has issued an important notice that for purposes of national defence it has become necessary to impose restrictions on all vessels navigating the waters of the Firth of Forth until further notice. After 5 p.m. to-day no vessel of any description will be allowed to come within a distance of one mile from Forth Bridge either eastward or westward, nor will vessels of any description be allowed to remain

under way in the Firth of Forth to the westward of Inchkeith unless under the charge of a pilot authorised by the Admiral Commanding the Coast of Scotland. Further, after November 25th all mercantile traffic is to cease to westward of Oxcars for both outward and inward bound vessels. In the Firth of Forth all navigation is dangerous for vessels except when under the charge of authorised pilots.

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE GERMAN GOVERNMENT WITH REFERENCE TO THE BLOCKADE OF THE NORTH SEA.

November 13.

THE English Government is falsely accusing Germany *K.D.*, of having laid mines in the North Sea and carried out recon-^{Nov. 13,}noitring expeditions under the cloak of hospital ships and ^{1914.}merchant vessels under neutral colours, and on November 2nd it issued a notice ¹ concerning navigation to and ^{1 [See}in the North Sea, in which it recommends to ships the route ^{p. 14.]}through the English Channel, the Downs and along the English east coast, under the pretext of the presence of mines in the northern part of the North Sea; at the same time it warns them against the route through the northern part of the North Sea round the Orkney and Shetland Islands.

As against this it may be pointed out that the waters of the northern North Sea, including the lines Hebrides-Faroe-Iceland, the waters on the Norwegian coasts, and the Skager Rak have such depths of water throughout that the laying of mines is entirely out of the question.

On the other hand, it is known that in the southern part of the North Sea and in the English Channel there are many unexploded mines drifting about, which have been proved to be of English and French origin, and that in many places on the route recommended by England along the English east coast there are mines laid, of which isolated ones have been recently encountered drifting about.

The route recommended by England through the English Channel, the Downs and along the English east coast thus presents grave risks to navigation, whereas the route through the northern North Sea is free from mines and therefore without danger.

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TERMINATION OF BLOCKADE OF KIAO-CHAU.

[Nov.

Foreign Office, November 14, 1914.

L.G.,
Nov. 17,
1914.
HIS MAJESTY'S Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has received a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio reporting that on the 10th instant the Japanese naval authorities officially proclaimed the termination of the blockade of the coast of Kiao-Chau, the establishment of which was notified in the *London Gazette* of September 1st last (see Part I., p. 116).

JAPANESE TORPEDO-BOAT SUNK.

Tokio.

K.V.,
Nov. 14.
OFFICIAL.—A Japanese torpedo-boat has been sunk by a mine while sweeping for mines in Kiao-chau Bay.

BRITISH MEASURES IN NORTH SEA.

(Statement by British Legation.)

The Hague, November 15.

Times,
Nov. 16,
1914.
IN commenting on the measures taken by the British Admiralty, some people appear to have lost sight of the origin of these measures, and it is therefore useful to point out that it is the Germans who are violating international law, and who have rendered the North Sea inaccessible. It was the Germans who scattered floating mines in the North Sea, thereby doing irreparable damage to neutral trade. The rôle of the British Navy is merely to protect neutrals from greater damage, and to keep open certain routes which may still be used by shipping.

NAVAL CADETS.

House of Commons, November 16.

Hansard.
MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty how many naval cadets were discharged from Dartmouth at the commencement of the war and placed on board ship; and how many of these have since been killed in action?

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (MR. CHURCHILL)

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The answer to the first part of the question is 434. Of this number I am very sorry to say that 23 have lost their lives in action. The chance of war has fallen with exceptional severity in the early stages on the ships of the reserve Fleets.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS : Does the right hon. Gentleman include those in the *Monmouth* in that number ? There were ten in the *Monmouth*. I think there must be a mistake.

MR. CHURCHILL : The Return has been compiled from headquarters. It may be so.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what were the reasons which influenced the Admiralty in sending the naval cadets from Dartmouth on board ship at the commencement of the war ; and whether he proposes that they should return to complete their education after the war is over ?

MR. CHURCHILL : The decision to send the naval cadets from Dartmouth to sea in time of war was arrived at a considerable time ago. It was felt that young officers of their age would be of great use on board His Majesty's ships, and that they would learn incomparably more of their profession in war than any educational establishment on shore could teach them. They are a regular part of the ship's complement. The question as to whether these young officers should return to Dartmouth after the war is over must depend upon circumstances, and in particular upon the duration of the war. I do not think it is at all likely.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he intends to send at the end of each term at Dartmouth a fresh supply of naval cadets on to the Fleet, or whether he proposes that those boys now entering Dartmouth should complete their education in the ordinary way ?

MR. CHURCHILL : It is not intended to send any cadets from Dartmouth to sea at the end of the present term, and drafting in the future will depend on the requirements of the Fleet. The syllabus of their education is being arranged accordingly.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty on what date were the naval cadets on the *Aboukir*, *Hogue* and *Cressy* promoted midshipmen, and by whose orders did such promotions take place ?

MR. CHURCHILL : The surviving cadets of the *Aboukir*

were rated midshipmen from September 22nd by order of the Admiralty. The cadets of the *Hogue* were rated by their captain from August 2nd. The cadets of the *Cressy* were understood to have been rated midshipmen by their captain immediately prior to the loss of the ship, but the report did not reach the Admiralty. The captain having been lost, the Admiralty ordered the surviving cadets to be rated midshipmen from September 22nd.

ROYAL NAVAL RESERVE (ASSISTANT PAYMASTERS).

House of Commons, November 16.

Hansard.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether any assistant paymasters, Royal Naval Reserve, direct from the shore, have been granted commissions and appointed to ships in charge of accounts; whether the experience of Royal Naval Reserve officers in naval work of this kind is comparable to the experience of writers in the Royal Navy; and will he say why vacancies for the officers' accountancy branch, Royal Navy, are not filled in the same way as other vacancies in the Royal Navy?

THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA): The answer to the first part of the question is in the affirmative; but generally speaking, vacancies in the accountant branch of the Royal Navy have been filled from the Reserve of officers, as is done in all other branches. With regard to the rest of the question, the claims to advancement to chief writers will not be overlooked.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Is there any truth in the statement that someone has been tried by court-martial and convicted?

DR. MACNAMARA: I have no knowledge. If the hon. Gentleman thinks it desirable to get any information on the point, he had better put down a question.

ALLOWANCES AND PENSIONS (NAVY AND ARMY).

House of Commons, November 16.

Hansard.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the wives of warrant officers serving in the Royal Navy are eligible for the separation allowance; and whether in this respect they are treated in the same

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way as warrant officers of the Royal Marines ; and, if not, can he explain why a difference is made ?

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the wives of naval warrant officers are not receiving separation allowance whilst their husbands are on active service with the Fleet ; and, if so, whether it is proposed to grant such separation allowance to them ?

DR. MACNAMARA : The wives of warrant officers of the Navy are not eligible for separation allowance. I am giving their case consideration, but can give no undertaking in the matter.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether hardship has arisen in the case of widowed mothers of boys who have been lost in ships sunk during the war and who were within a short period of being rated ; and whether he will consider the advisability of asking the State to pay these women something better than twelve months' pay at 7d. a day ?

DR. MACNAMARA : While I fully share the hon. Member's sympathy with the widowed mothers in these cases, I am unable to hold out any hope that the general principle of assessing gratuities upon annual earnings will be modified.

MR. FALLE asked the Secretary to the Admiralty if the grant of allowances to wives and dependants and also to widows and dependants apply to all married persons whether married before or since the War began ?

DR. MACNAMARA : So far as the Navy is concerned, yes, Sir.

MR. NEWTON asked the Prime Minister whether he will at once take the necessary steps to improve the pensions payable to the widows of and persons dependent upon soldiers and sailors killed in the War and to improve the pensions of soldiers and sailors wholly or partially disabled by wounds, illness, or accident sustained in or occasioned by the War ?

THE PRIME MINISTER : I would refer the hon. Member to what I said on this subject on Wednesday last.

II, in the debate on the Address.]

SIR J. D. REES : Has the right hon. Gentleman taken into consideration representations made to him by different bodies ?

THE PRIME MINISTER : Yes, Sir.

MR. BOYTON asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that the wives of soldiers married after the enlistment of their husbands and since August 14th are not receiving separation allowances; and if there are many who if they had remained unmarried would now be receiving separation allowances?

THE FINANCIAL SECRETARY TO THE WAR OFFICE (MR. H. BAKER): Yes, Sir, as a general rule; but it is not intended that a woman who was qualified to receive separation allowance as dependent on a soldier should forfeit it by marrying him.

SIR WILLIAM BULL asked the Prime Minister whether he is aware that, by legislation passed since the beginning of the present War, the French Government has undertaken to pay to the wives resident in France of British, Belgian, Russian, and Serbian Reservists called up for service the same weekly allowance as is paid to the wives of French Reservists; and whether His Majesty's Government will take steps to reciprocate this good office in the case of the wives resident in the United Kingdom of French Reservists, and to extend it similarly in the case of our other allies?

THE PRIME MINISTER: The question has already been brought to the attention of His Majesty's Government. The French Government have been officially informed that there is every reason to suppose that private agencies in this country will be in a position to render the necessary assistance to the families of French citizens serving in the War, but that, in the event of these agencies failing, the French Government may be assured that effective measures to provide the necessary assistance will be taken by His Majesty's Government.

SIR GEORGE TOULMIN asked whether evidence was taken in connection with the inquiry into soldiers' and sailors' pensions and allowances and dependants' allowances; whether it was printed; and whether it can be laid before Parliament?

THE PRIME MINISTER: In the course of inquiries made by the Departments concerned, advice and assistance, for which the Government is most grateful, was freely forthcoming from many of those specially interested and informed; no formal evidence was recorded, and there are therefore no Papers which can be laid.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL ALLOTMENTS FROM HIS MAJESTY'S SHIPS.

House of Commons, November 16.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he has had any adverse reports on the question of forwarding the lists of allotments from His Majesty's ships; is he aware that in many cases, owing to allotments not being forwarded in time, hardship has occurred to the dependants of the men making the allotments; that in several instances these dependants have had to seek advances from the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association when they ought to have been in possession of their own money, and that in some instances aid has had to be sought from charitable organisations; and will he see that in future, when a man makes an allotment, the officer responsible for forwarding the list does not make undue delay?

DR. MACNAMARA: I am aware that there have been some cases of hardship, which have been alleviated by the Soldiers' and Sailors' Families Association, owing to the non-declaration of allotments on the part of the men. As far as active service men are concerned there need have been no hardship, as the Admiralty facilities for regular allotment to their families existed before the War. As regards Reservists, it is probable that in some cases, owing to the necessity for extremely rapid mobilisation and departure for various stations, the men did not find time to declare allotments before sailing, and that such allotments, declared later, could only be forwarded from the next port of call. I am not aware, however, that the allotment once made, there has been any delay on the part of the responsible officers on board ship in forwarding the lists. There has been no delay in making payment when the lists were received, and every endeavour has been made, both by general Admiralty orders and by specific references to ships in particular cases, to induce men to adopt the method of allotment for forwarding part of their wages to their families; and I may add that the number of allotments has since the commencement of the War increased from 73,000 to over 160,000. I can only add for the information of the hon. Member, and any other hon. Members interested, that I shall be glad to receive personally particulars of any cases in which difficulties or delays occur.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Has not the right hon. Gentle-

man received any complaints that the assistant paymasters, Royal Naval Reserve, have not forwarded the allotment?

DR. MACNAMARA: I cannot recall them. I have received complaints that wives have not received their allowances. They have been attended to. I am only too glad of the opportunity to deal with them.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether a man on promotion to warrant rank from the lower deck is as a rule married; whether he has had before him the case of a boatswain who has attained warrant rank receiving 6s. a day and paying 30s. to £2 a month for his mess and washing; and will he say what amount of money that man can allot a month, taking into consideration the basis on which the new separation allowance scheme is formed, and show that this sum is sufficient to support a wife and six children as well as to meet rent and other necessary outgoings?

DR. MACNAMARA: I am aware that a man on promotion to warrant rank from the lower deck is, as a rule, married, and I am, as I have already said, giving consideration to the question whether separation allowance ought to be extended to his case. I may add that a boatswain's pay on promotion is 6s. a day, of which he may allot £6 a month to his wife, but I have some doubt whether his ordinary messing and washing cost him as much as is stated in the question.

ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION (ENGINEER UNITS).

House of Commons, November 16.

Hansard.

SIR WILLIAM BULL asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if the institutions of civil, electrical, and mechanical engineers were invited to obtain picked men for the divisional Engineer units and Signal company of the Royal Naval Division recently formed, and if a number of labourers and other recruits without engineering knowledge were afterwards added to these units on the same terms of enlistment; and, if so, will he explain why these unskilled recruits have been embodied in the units raised for the performance of technical duties which the engineering recruits were asked to undertake?

DR. MACNAMARA: The institutions were invited, as stated, and provided a considerable number of recruits, but

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owing to the nature of the work required of the Engineer company, which includes manual and unskilled labour, and also care of horses, other recruits whose qualifications are suitable have to be taken.

H.M.S. "CANOPUS."

House of Commons, November 16.

MR. MACMASTER asked at what date the *Canopus* was *Hansard*. ordered to join the British squadron in the Pacific on the West Coast of South America ; and when and from what place or port she proceeded to join that squadron ?

MR. CHURCHILL : In order to form a true judgment upon this episode, it would be necessary for the hon. Member to know the dispositions of all the ships involved and to study the actual text of the orders under which they were acting. This is clearly impossible at present.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE : Has the right hon. Gentleman any news of the *Canopus* ?

MR. CHURCHILL : I have every reason to believe she is quite safe.

ALIEN SPIES.

House of Commons, November 16.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked whether one Mark Auerbach, *Hansard*. a German spy, has been found on a mine sweeper in the North Sea, and, instead of being handed over to the naval authorities, has been prosecuted merely as an unregistered alien and sentenced to three months' hard labour : and, if so, why this leniency was shown ?

DR. MACNAMARA : The man was removed from his employment on a hired trawler and full inquiries were made. No sufficient evidence, however, was forthcoming that the man was a spy, and it was therefore intended that he should be handed over to the civil authorities to be dealt with. Owing to a regrettable mistake at the port, this order miscarried, and the man was discharged to the shore. He was, however, rearrested and prosecuted as stated in the question. I may add that he entered and served in the trawler under the name of Alexander Gordon.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS : In these circumstances, would it

not have been better for the Navy to take charge of this man themselves ?

DR. MACNAMARA : It is very doubtful how far we could proceed under the Naval Discipline Act. He was discharged because no charge was formulated against him, and then handed over to the civil authorities, who punished him as stated.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, having regard to the probability that information has been conveyed to the enemy's fleet by alien spies, he proposes to take further and, if so, what steps to prevent this being repeated ?

DR. MACNAMARA : I can assure the hon. Member that every step is being taken that offers any possibility of checking the practice, but he will readily understand that a statement by me as to measures being taken and to be taken would be more likely to defeat their purpose than assist it.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS : May I take it, then, that the right hon. Gentleman agrees with the practice ?

DR. MACNAMARA : You may take it from me that we will take every opportunity of checking it.

ST. JOHN AMBULANCE BRIGADE.

House of Commons, November 16.

Hansard.

MR. THOMAS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is aware that at the outbreak of War members of the St. John Ambulance Brigade were asked to volunteer for service and were paid 4s. per day and 10s. per week separation allowance to the wife ; that similar invitations have been issued to these men from the Admiralty, the remuneration being 3s. per day and 6s. per week separation allowance ; and, having regard to the fact that these men are drawn from the same class and doing the same work, will he take steps to see that the remuneration shall be equal ?

DR. MACNAMARA : Members of the St. John Ambulance Brigade employed by the Admiralty are enrolled in the Royal Naval Auxiliary Sick Berth Reserve, and such enrolments have been made at various dates since the establishment of this Reserve in 1902. There are different grades in the Reserve, the pay ranging from 3s. to 4s. 6d. a day, according

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to rating and nature of employment, with increase of pay after six months' service. The separation allowances are in accordance with the Navy scale, a copy of which I will send my hon. Friend. It is not considered necessary now to alter these conditions of service, which have been accepted by the men on enrolment in the Reserve.

YOUNG BOYS (HIS MAJESTY'S SHIPS).

House of Commons, November 16.

MR. FALLE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if *Hansard.* he is aware that a number of very young boys are carried on His Majesty's ships; and if, in view of the loss of life which has already taken place in the Navy, he will arrange that very young boys shall be employed ashore?

DR. MACNAMARA: Naval ratings designated as "Boys" are not less than sixteen years old when drafted to ships on completion of their harbour training, and the majority of them are well over that age.

MR. JOHN WARD: I should like to know whether the Admiralty has received any complaint as to the employment of these young men, and if there have been any orders excluding them from active service. I hope he will make an exception in the case of my son who wants to get in touch with the enemy at the first opportunity?

ROYAL AUSTRALIAN NAVY (ALLOTMENTS).

House of Commons, November 16.

MR. FALLE asked if the men lent by the Royal Navy *Hansard.* to the Royal Australian Navy can allot money to their wives and children; and if the wives, &c., can obtain the separation allowance?

DR. MACNAMARA: By an arrangement made with the Commonwealth Government men of the Royal Navy who are lent to the Royal Australian Navy can declare allotments to relatives in England, and such allotments are paid monthly by the Admiralty on behalf of the Commonwealth. I understand that owing to the high rates of pay received by these men, it has not been considered necessary to pay separation allowance to families resident in England.

MR. FALLE : Does that mean that separation allowances will not be paid ?

DR. MACNAMARA : That is so. In consideration of higher pay they do not receive allowances. They receive allotments.

ROYAL FLEET RESERVE.

House of Commons, November 16.

Hansard. MR. TOUCHE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he is aware that some ex-quartermaster-sergeants, Royal Marines, who, since being discharged to pension, have been serving in the Royal Fleet Reserve as colour-sergeants, have, on mobilisation, had to retain the rank of colour-sergeant, while ex-quartermaster-sergeants who have not served in the Royal Fleet Reserve have been given their former service rank of quartermaster-sergeant, thus placing them in a senior position, both as regards rank and pay, to those ex-quartermaster-sergeants who have maintained their interest in the Service with the Royal Fleet Reserve ; and will he give consideration to the facts with a view to removing a grievance keenly felt by the non-commissioned officers concerned ?

DR. MACNAMARA : Marine pensioners who do not belong to the Royal Fleet Reserve are entitled when called out for active service to resume the pay of the rank they held on discharge to pension. Pensioners in the Royal Fleet Reserve, however, are in common with other Fleet Reservists required when called out to serve in the rank they held in the Reserve, and it is a condition of enrolment in the Reserve that Royal Marines above the rank of colour-sergeant shall revert to that rank on enrolment. It is not practicable or desirable to vary this condition of service in the Reserve on the outbreak of war, and it is not considered that the non-commissioned officers concerned have any legitimate grievance in the matter, since their service in the Reserve, whether they are called out or not, qualifies them for an increase of pension at the age of fifty years. Pensioners, other than Reservists, are eligible for a similar pension from Greenwich Hospital funds at the age of fifty-five years, but as the amount of money available for these Greenwich Hospital pensions is limited, awards are not usually made to men until they have attained the age of about fifty-nine, or are even older than in the case of men with large naval pensions.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL REQUISITES FOR WINTER CRUISING.

House of Commons, November 16.

SIR GEORGE TOULMIN asked the Secretary to the Admiralty whether the ships of His Majesty's Navy at sea have a sufficient supply of sea-boots and other requisites for winter cruising? *Hansard.*

DR. MACNAMARA: The answer is in the affirmative. To meet the special requirements of the situation, the Admiralty have increased the supply of protective clothing supplied to His Majesty's ships—such as sea-boots, oilskins, &c.—at a cost of over £300,000. They have also provided a very large amount of personal warm clothing for the men, such as caps, gloves, jerseys, &c., involving the expenditure of something like another £300,000. My hon. Friend is no doubt aware that each rating is supplied with a free kit on entry. The Admiralty have thus taken steps to supply the men of the Fleet with all necessities in the way of clothing, though doubtless supplementary comforts would at all times be welcome, and with reference to certain statements which have appeared, we made it clear in our communication to the Press on September 16th (*see below*) that we were not asking for additional supplies from private sources, but merely endeavouring to suggest the direction in which private enterprise might be usefully applied. Information which we have received from the Commander-in-Chief indicates that the results of that enterprise have been very greatly appreciated by the men of the Fleet. Private supplies can usefully consist of woollen caps, jerseys, mitts, woollen drawers, thick socks and stockings, and warm mufflers. Parcels can be sent to particular ships, addressed c/o General Post Office, London; but when the supply is too large to be sent by post, application should be made to the Director of Victualling, Admiralty, London, who will advise as to the dispatch of the goods.

[The following communications were issued to the Press on September 5th, 1914, and September 14th, 1914, respectively:

The Admiralty states that parcels and packages of books, *Times*, periodicals, and clothing intended for the use of the Fleet will be conveyed free of charge over the British railways to ^{Sept. 5,} 1914.

naval ports, provided they are despatched and consigned direct by a properly constituted and recognised organisation, *e.g.*, the secretaries of branches of the Navy League and kindred bodies, recognised charitable organisations, or urban or parish councils.

The naval addresses to which such parcels may be consigned are : Admiral Superintendent, Portsmouth, Plymouth, or Chatham ; Commodore, Portland ; King's Harbour Master, Dover ; S.N.O., Humber, H.M.S. *Victorious* ; the Captain, Shotley Barracks ; Captain Superintendent, Pembroke Dock ; Admiral Commanding, Queenstown or Rosyth.

Societies are desired to send only recent periodicals, &c., and to send chiefly the following articles of clothing : woollen comforters, woollen drawers, thick stockings, thick socks, mitts, woollen caps, body belts.

Parcels should be clearly marked on the outside thus : "Periodicals, clothing, &c., for the Fleet from . . ." the name of the society sending them being stated.

Any communication on the subject of newspapers should be addressed to the London Chamber of Commerce, 1, Oxford Court, Cannon Street, E.C.

Times,
Sept. 14,
1914.

The Secretary of the Admiralty, in response to numerous enquiries, has communicated through the Press Bureau the following particulars for the guidance of those societies and individuals who wish to send gifts of clothing to the Fleet :

The articles which will be most useful are : knitted caps or Balaclava helmets (blue), jerseys (blue), knitted mitts or gloves (blue), woollen drawers, thick stockings, thick socks, comforters (blue). Further particulars of the above will be supplied on application to the Director of Victualling, Admiralty.

Societies or persons interested should acquaint the Director of Victualling periodically with the supplies of each article ready for distribution. Information will then be given as to where to send the goods. The packages will generally be received at one or other of His Majesty's Victualling Yards to await opportunities of transmission to the Fleet ; the particular yard will be notified in each case.

Parcels should be securely packed, articles of different

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kinds being sent in separate packages clearly marked with the description of article and quantity. Instructions relating to gifts of clothing which were set forth in the Press notice issued on September 6th may be regarded as cancelled.]

THE TURKS CLAIM SUCCESS OVER THE ENGLISH AT FAO.

Constantinople, November 16.

OFFICIAL report from Turkish Headquarters: Yesterday we attacked the English at Fao. They lost many killed, the number of which we estimate at 1,000. Abdurrezak Bederkhani, who is held in abhorrence by the whole Mussulman community on account of the revolutionary intrigues to which he has devoted himself for a long time, had crossed the frontier with 300 men in the neighbourhood of Maku to assist the Russians, but he was at once driven back by our troops. A large number of his followers was killed. A Russian flag which they had hoisted in a neighbouring village was captured by our troops. Abdurrezak is a Kurd, and belongs to the tribe of the Bederkhani.

BELLIGERENT RESERVISTS, CONTRABAND AND NORTH SEA MINES.

House of Commons, November 17,

SIR GILBERT PARKER asked the Prime Minister *Hansard.* whether, in view of the anxiety of public opinion in the United States with regard to the search for belligerent reservists in American vessels, the declaration of oil and copper as contraband, and the mining of the North Sea, he will make a general explanatory statement of the policy of His Majesty's Government on these subjects?

THE PRIME MINISTER (MR. ASQUITH): I will deal in turn with each of the matters referred to in the question:

(1) ENEMY RESERVISTS.

In view of the action taken by the German forces in Belgium and France, where they have arrested and removed as prisoners of war all male inhabitants of military age, His Majesty's Government have found it necessary to give instructions that all enemy subjects liable to military service who

may be found on board neutral vessels shall be made prisoners of war. This instruction applies to neutral vessels under whatever flag. As a matter of fact, no case has, so far as I am aware, occurred where enemy reservists have been found in United States ships.

(2) OIL AND COPPER.

As regards oil and copper, His Majesty's Government have reliable information that in the present circumstances any oil, copper, and certain other substances that may be imported into Germany or Austria will certainly be used exclusively for warlike purposes, and His Majesty's Government have for this reason felt justified in adding those items to the list of absolute contraband. Every possible care is being taken to ensure that oil and copper *bona fide* intended for neutral countries should not be interfered with.

(3) MINES.

From the commencement of the War the German naval authorities resorted to the indiscriminate laying of mines in large numbers in the North Sea outside territorial limits. The mines were laid upon the trade routes without regard for the safety of peaceful shipping, and in furtherance of no definite military operation, their purpose being clearly to endanger trade with Great Britain. There is good reason to suppose that in many cases they were laid by fishing vessels disguised as neutral, and ostensibly following their ordinary pursuits.

These proceedings, besides violating the principle of the freedom of the seas for peaceful trading, constituted a breach of the 8th Hague Convention of 1907, which was duly signed and ratified by Germany in the following respects: 1. The mines were not so constructed as to become harmless on breaking adrift from their moorings. 2. No precautions whatever were taken for the security of peaceful shipping. The mines were not kept under observation, and no steps were taken to notify the danger zones by a notice to mariners.

As a result of these proceedings, a number of British and neutral merchant and fishing vessels have been lost, as well as many lives of neutral and non-combatant persons.

His Majesty's Government deliberately abstained, and

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abstained entirely, from the use of mines during the first two months of the War outside British territorial waters, but eventually found it necessary to adopt counter measures in order to cope with the German policy of mine-laying combined with their submarine activities. A mine field was, therefore, laid across the southern portion of the North Sea in such a way as to guard the approaches to the English Channel, and due public warning was given in accordance with the Hague Convention.

In the last week of October the Germans succeeded in laying a mine field off the north coast of Ireland on the main trade route from America to Liverpool via the North of Ireland. More peaceful merchant ships were blown up and lives lost. But for the warnings given by British cruisers, other British and neutral merchant and passenger steamers would have been destroyed. These mines could not have been laid by any German ship of war, nor any vessel under the German flag. They could only have been laid by some merchant vessel flying a neutral flag, which must have come along the trade route as if for the purpose of peaceful commerce and, while profiting to the full by the immunity enjoyed by neutral merchant ships, wantonly and recklessly endangered the lives of all who travel on the sea, regardless of whether they were friend or foe, civilian or military in character.

The menace to peaceful shipping presented by these wholly illegal methods of waging war is so great that His Majesty's Government have been compelled to adopt the only possible means of protection, namely, to declare the whole North Sea to be a military area, and to restrict all shipping crossing it to a narrow passage along which the strictest supervision can be exercised. Access to the coasts of Great Britain and neutral countries has thus been made as safe as is in the power of the British Navy to make it, and although this has been done at the price of certain inconvenience and delay to shipping through its inability to follow its accustomed routes, the price cannot in the circumstances of the case be considered a high one.

His Majesty's Government are fully aware of the anxiety prevailing in the United States and other neutral countries on these subjects, and they trust that their policy will be fully understood. They are confident that public opinion in neutral

countries will appreciate their earnest desire that there should be no interference with neutral trade, provided the vital interests of Great Britain, which are at stake in the present conflict, are adequately maintained.

Any interference by the British Navy is directed not to increase British trade, or to diminish the trade of any neutral foreign country, but solely to prevent goods from reaching the enemy which would increase his power in the War against the British and allied forces.

ROYAL NAVY LOSSES.

House of Commons, November 18.

Hansard.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is able to state the total losses in the Royal Navy since the commencement of the war, giving, if possible, particulars of killed, wounded, and missing, respectively?

MR. CHURCHILL: The figures asked for are as follows:

<i>Officers.</i>				
Killed	222
Wounded (of whom 14 are severely wounded)	37
Missing	5
Total ..				264
<i>Men.</i>				
Killed	3,455
Wounded	428
Missing	1

The figures for men do not include those missing from the Royal Naval Division, or the ship's company of His Majesty's Ship *Good Hope*, the lists in these cases not having been yet completed. As regards the Royal Naval Division the approximate number missing is 1,000. As regards the *Good Hope* the number of men on board was approximately 875. These figures do not include, of course, the officers and men of the Royal Naval Division interned in Holland.

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THE SPY PERIL.

House of Lords, November 18.

THE EARL OF HALSBURY rose to call attention to the various acts of high treason alleged to have been committed in this country, and to ask whether His Majesty's Government have investigated the facts alleged, and, if they have been accurately alleged, why no indictment for high treason has been preferred. *Hansard.*

The noble and learned Earl said: My Lords, I hope that neither the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack nor the noble Marquess who leads the House will misunderstand the object of my Question. The very last thing that I should desire to do would be in any way to embarrass His Majesty's Government. I say most sincerely that I wish to help them in every way in my power, and I regard that as the duty of all in the present emergency. My Question, therefore, has no reference to any criticism of His Majesty's Government. It is put with a wish to get rid of what I think is a great delusion, which is, I believe, leading to very great mischief. We have been so long away from the region of the administration of the law of high treason that nobody seems to think of it. Unfortunately I was not in the House at the time it was made, but I read with something like amazement the speech of the noble Earl, Lord Crawford, last Wednesday, (*see pp. 222-227*), and the instances to which he referred, including a case where certainly there was evidence of high treason, if it was not actually proved, which was punished by a £5 fine. The result of such a punishment is to make people misunderstand the exact position of the law.

We all know that the "chivalrous" and "courageous" mode of making war—that of spending enormous sums of money to induce people to betray their country—is going on. A man may think very lightly of the possibility of being fined £5, or, indeed, of being sent to prison for six months; but if everybody was made to understand that the sending of letters, signalling, or any act by which the enemy could be assisted in what they were doing or in defending themselves was presumably an act of high treason for which the offenders might be hanged, people would probably think a little more

of the risk they were incurring. I know nothing about the facts to which my noble friend Lord Crawford referred, but he professed to know them of his own knowledge. The question which I venture to ask is this. If these facts are known and if they are capable of being proved, what is the reason why the course of procedure has not been taken which I suggest should be taken, and which is the natural and proper and ordinary course in cases of the kind when one country is at war with another?

I am afraid that a great deal of mischief may be done by the manner in which the Criminal Law is approached. We have got so much out of the habit of placing responsibility in the hands of the local magistrates and chief constables that everybody seems to think that the Home Office is the only authority who can authorise or begin a prosecution. I need not tell your Lordships that every grand jury in the country may find a bill for high treason to-morrow if they have evidence upon it; indeed, it has been held that they are entitled to do so upon hearsay. But be that as it may, what seems to me to be the very serious error which is pervading the whole country is that minor offences invented in time of peace in order to avoid the necessity of prosecuting in every case for high treason are taking the place of prosecutions for high treason when we are at war, and when very serious injury indeed may be done by signalling and epistolary correspondence. What my noble friend said the other day was that a regular code had been discovered by which information of every sort and kind might be conveyed to the enemy. A conspiracy of that kind for the purpose of communicating with the enemy is in itself high treason, and has been so held. If the offence is treated as lightly as it has been, the fear is that people will not consider the risk they are running when they enter into a conspiracy of that sort. Should the facts that have been stated be capable of being proved, then the persons concerned ought to be prosecuted for high treason, so that those who are guilty of these offences should learn the serious risk they run in conspiring with the enemy with whom His Majesty is at war.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR (VISCOUNT HALDANE): My Lords, so far from complaining of the speech which the noble and learned Earl has just made I think it is very useful that

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attention should be called to these matters, as it enables us to have the opportunity of sifting them and knowing where truth is and where fiction is, for I need not say that at a time of public excitement like the present fiction and truth are very liberally intermixed. I have no doubt of the *bona fides* of the impressions which people form about these cases. Last week the noble Earl, Lord Crawford, who is not here to-day, referred to certain cases in Scotland. I have had an opportunity since then of conferring with both the military and the civil authorities in Scotland about those cases. I find that the authorities were cognisant of all of these rumours and investigated them, and wherever they found a case where there was the least hope of success they took action. The cases in which they did not take action were based on hearsay—cases in which A had repeated information to B and B had passed it on to C, with the result that one could not get back to the original facts or obtain any evidence to establish the charge. I quite agree that in a case where anything approaching to high treason has been committed a £5 fine is ludicrous, and that the serious proceedings of which the noble and learned Earl spoke ought to be taken.

I am able to state to your Lordships that vigorous action is being taken not only by the military but by the civil authorities. There are three modes of dealing with treasonable acts. First the ordinary Common Law prosecution for high treason, which is done here almost invariably at the instance of the Attorney-General, and in Scotland invariably at the instance of the Lord Advocate. Secondly, when an alien enemy commits an offence of this kind he can be tried before a Court-Martial for a war crime; a man was so tried the other day, and convicted. The third course is a prosecution before a Court-Martial under the Defence of the Realm Act which was passed the other day and under which certain statutory regulations were made to cover offences of almost every kind, extending to what, if tried civilly, would be high treason, the only difference being that although a Court-Martial can give penal servitude for life—at any rate for twenty years; I think for life—it cannot decree the capital sentence. Consequently in all cases in which the offence is one which seems likely to lead to a capital sentence, proceedings have been taken outside the Defence of the Realm Act. The other

day, as I have said, an alien enemy was tried before a Court-Martial for a war crime and convicted ; at this moment there is a prosecution for high treason pending, and there are others under investigation.

I can assure my noble and learned friend that it is not through want of attention on the part of the authorities that any of these cases escape. So far from its being in contemplation that these matters should be tried before magistrates or by inferior criminal tribunals, the desire is that they should be tried with the supreme majesty of the law. Investigations take place into every case to see whether it is one in which there is a reasonable hope of conviction. There is, of course, a class of offence—a serious class of offence—in which it is not necessary or desirable to proceed for high treason ; but in some of these cases very heavy sentences have been given for crimes such as trading with the enemy, which either by Statute or Common Law are taken cognisance of by the Jurisprudence of this realm. Since I had notice of this Question I have had an opportunity of conferring with the Attorney-General, and I can only repeat to your Lordships what I have already said—that all cases that promise to be of the least importance come before him for investigation, and he unhesitatingly directs prosecution when they present a chance of success. A large number of other cases have been inquired into by the military authorities, and I do not think your Lordships need be under any apprehension that any offence of a serious nature will escape punishment. There are other offences of a quite minor character which ought to be dealt with at a time like this, and which are being dealt with, by the inferior tribunals.

At this moment, however, I am talking of cases which amount to high treason. Fortunately there are not a large number of cases of that kind. But whether there are or are not, the authorities are taking the view which the noble and learned Earl has expressed—namely, that these are matters which, at a juncture like this, are of serious moment and should be so dealt with. They are being dealt with, as I have said, wherever there is a fair chance of success—the difficulty of evidence is one which must not be overlooked—and I can assure the House that the authorities are alive to their duties in connection with these cases.

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THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: My Lords, I have listened with interest to the remarks of the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack, but I regret to say that they have given me no confidence whatever. I live on the North-East coast of England, where the position is most precarious. We have reason to believe, as mines have been washed ashore on that coast, that assistance has been given to the enemy by people living on our own shores or by neutral ships. The Home Secretary made a speech the other day in which, as far as I could gather, he placed the responsibility on every single Department except his own. "Please, Sir, it was the other boy, not me." That was his cry—a contemptible cry. He stated that he thought chief constables ought to be in a position to arrest and bring before the authorities those who were suspected of assisting the enemy. I ask, What are the powers of a chief constable? According to the Home Secretary the whole responsibility has been placed on the chief constable. Is he to arrest people at once; is he to have them tried at once; and what is to be done with them? The German Consul at Sunderland has been arrested on account of seditious papers and plans found in his possession, and he has been in Durham Gaol since August. What is going to be done to him? Is he going to be let out on a £5 penalty?

I have not hesitated to write to my noble friend the Lord Lieutenant of my county, Lord Durham—grieved as he is at the moment by a bereavement to which I need not further allude—suggesting that he and the chairman of the county council should call a meeting of the magistrates of the county, at which the chief constable should be requested to attend. I ask, Shall we be justified in giving instructions to the chief constable? If that meeting is called I shall suggest that the chief constable be instructed to order the arrest of any man whom he considers to be a spy and have him tried before a proper tribunal, and that if the man is found guilty of spying and assisting the enemy, we, the magistrates, should take the law into our own hands and have him shot on the spot. That is the only way in which you will stop this; and although we may afterwards be arrested for murder, I doubt whether any jury would not say that in the action we had taken we were doing what the Government ought to have done in defence of the country.

THE EARL OF MAYO : My Lords, I regret to say that the country in which I live is riddled with seditious literature. An enormous quantity of anti-recruiting pamphlets is being issued in Ireland. A great many Irishmen have joined the Colours, but these pamphlets are distributed in out-of-the-way parts of Ireland and are doing considerable harm. There is no printer's name upon them and it is quite impossible to find out by whom they are printed. Then, again, several newspapers in Dublin consistently preach sedition. In old days a newspaper of that sort was easily stopped. A four-wheeled cab drove to the office in the early morning and the occupants broke open the premises, smashed up the type, and took the copies of the newspaper away. I wish the authorities would now follow that example of the Fenian days. This literature is distributed broadcast throughout the country, and that fact is not only exceedingly trying to the Loyalist population but also to the Nationalist Party, who, I am glad to say, have done their best of late to encourage recruiting in Ireland. I venture to urge that steps should be taken to put a stop to these proceedings.

THE EARL OF DESART : My Lords, in reference to what has just been said by my noble friend Lord Mayo, I should like to state that I was informed in September last that in a part of Ireland which I know well a large motor-car had travelled through three counties distributing at every cottage leaflets of the character mentioned. The responsible police officer in the neighbourhood said that he knew the owner of the car and where it was hired, and that he had reported the matter to Dublin Castle. Nothing, however, came of it, and it seemed to me at the time a matter of some surprise that no notice should have been taken of so serious an offence.

In my part of the country we are all a little disappointed at the results of the recruiting campaign that was undertaken by Mr. Redmond and others of his supporters. We know how loyally and earnestly Mr. Redmond has pursued that campaign. But it is interfered with by the fact that there is published week by week in Irish newspapers literature which, whether it constitutes high treason or not, is seditious in character and certainly disloyal to the interests of the Empire at this juncture. It is quite true that the pamphlets that are distributed do not make the recipients of them Sinn Feiners,

but we know that there have been in the last fifty years a number of leagues in Ireland which have influenced the population very largely and have almost exercised judicial functions. Though they may not endorse the views set forth in these pamphlets, the recipients of them think that it is better not to offend these people, and to that extent the distribution of this literature does have an influence upon recruiting.

We who live in the South of Ireland have supported Mr. Redmond as loyally as we could in his campaign. We feel that the insufficiency of the response to his appeal is a reproach to us, and we earnestly desire, whatever other causes there may be for it, that this cause to which attention has been called, which is capable of being removed, as I submit, should be removed by the Government. I think I speak for everybody in Ireland who wants to see the Empire supported at this juncture when I say that we have viewed with apprehension and surprise the inaction of the authorities in connection with this particular kind of literature. In Cork, I think it was, a man was tried by Court-Martial for having one of these papers in his possession, but he was acquitted on the ground that there was nothing to show that he had incited or done anything with it; he simply possessed a copy. It was rightly held that it was rather absurd to prosecute a man for having a paper in his possession when the person who published it was left unscathed. I hope that action will be taken in cases where the evidence is sufficient to put a stop to this form of propaganda.

THE EARL OF MEATH: My Lords, I can corroborate as far as Dublin is concerned what has been said by my noble friends from Ireland. Dublin at this moment is being swamped by literature which I should think came within the category of high treason. A good portion of this literature is issued from America, and is distributed in the poorer parts of the City of Dublin. I know this to be the case, because these leaflets have been distributed over my property in one of the poorest parts of Dublin. It has been done openly, so much so that people are stopped on the road and requested not to do anything which would assist the British Government in any way, whether by recruiting or anything else. Even the children have taken it up. Like children, they play at war; but they all want to be Germans.

The truth is that there is a large amount of German money in Ireland. How it comes there is not known. I am not speaking from a Party point of view. The Lord Mayor of Dublin said openly in the Corporation that he knew there was "a good deal of German money going." We know this is so, because there are a great many people who have not much money of their own and yet are spending a lot. How did those mines get laid off the coast of Ireland? I should like to ask. I do not want any secrets told, but I think the man in the street could say pretty nearly how. I do not suppose that it was done by German men-of-war; that would not be suggested for one moment. The fact of the matter, I suppose, is that it was done by German agents or by disguised German officers in Irish fishing boats. I want to know, Have we a Government in Ireland or have we not? For the last few years I have come to the conclusion that there is nobody at all responsible in Ireland. I have hesitated to approach the Chief Secretary, because I know that I should get the answer which always has been given—namely, that nothing can be done. As a matter of fact, we do not know who governs us in Ireland. When we had the lamentable collision in the streets of Dublin it made one unhappy to feel that everybody threw the blame upon everybody else, and whether the people who eventually got punished were the real offenders nobody knows. But the point is that we are at war now. We are fighting for our very existence, and we must not be mealy-mouthed. We have to tackle this question of spies. It must be tackled somehow or other, and it should be done by noble and learned Lords.

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, as Lord Desart said, not one of us wishes in the smallest degree to attack the Government; on the contrary, we want to render their action more prompt and more effective for the purposes that we have in view. But in my opinion noble Lords like the three noble Lords from Ireland who have addressed us are rendering a public service, not merely to this House but to the Government and to the country, by bringing before us their individual experience in these debates. I venture to say that this discussion will be by no means the last, any more than it is the first, that will take place in this House on the question of spies.

Noble Lords must be already thoroughly familiar with the fact that there is great and widespread uneasiness throughout the country on this matter—an uneasiness which the speeches that have so far been made from the Ministerial Benches either in this House or in the other have done nothing whatever to allay. One noble Lord comes here and speaks as to the scattering of mines on our coasts ; another speaks of the circulation of seditious literature ; another speaks—and we know how true it is—as to the large extent to which German money is employed in our midst. These are only slight evidences among many of a scheme of spy-mongering in this country conceived with consummate ability and secrecy, carried out with a lavish expenditure of money, and at this moment in operation on a scale which would startle every one of us if we knew its internal ramifications.

The noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, was dissatisfied with the speech of the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack. I must confess that I thought it a better speech than the one he made the other evening, though perhaps that is not giving him the praise to which he thinks he is entitled. I own, after hearing the damaging case that was made the other evening by Lord Crawford, that I was both astonished and pained to hear the noble and learned Viscount get up and argue that the test to be applied in these cases was the comfort and convenience of the enemy aliens in our midst rather than the safety of this realm. I heard that doctrine forcibly repudiated by a noble Lord sitting opposite, and I was delighted that, after that unexpected castigation, the argument was not again used by the noble and learned Viscount to-night.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR : I never said that. What I said was that to arrest aliens wholesale, irrespective of their guilt or innocence, irrespective of whether or not they had wives and families dependent upon them, in such a way that you might be subjecting absolutely innocent people to the greatest hardship, was a policy as inhuman as it was inefficacious.

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON : I do not think that was the language used by the noble and learned Viscount on the former occasion, otherwise the speech of Lord St. Davids would not have been delivered. From what he then said, the noble and learned Viscount appeared to be more concerned.

with considering the degree of discomfort of aliens which might be caused in these operations, and which in my view is no matter for alarm or regret, and to bestow insufficient attention on the much greater necessity of the State. My noble friend behind me called attention to the speech of the Home Secretary in the House of Commons. The general apprehension that prevails, so far from being stilled, was rather enhanced by that speech. There appeared to be an effort made by the Home Secretary to throw off the responsibility from his own shoulders on to the shoulders of the War Office. The War Office surely has enough to do at this juncture of our affairs with organising and equipping the Army, with sending it out to the field, with supplying it with drafts and guns and ammunition, not to be charged with the additional labour of rounding up spies on our East coast and elsewhere. And in this respect I was pleased to hear the remarks of the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack just now, because they did seem to me to mark an advance from the position taken up by the Home Secretary. He talked about "vigorous co-operation between the civil and the military authorities." I heard that statement with pleasure. I only wish that the noble and learned Viscount had carried the matter a little further, and that we had heard something about a suggestion which, if I remember rightly, was made in the House of Commons and received a good deal of support the other day—namely, that a special Board should be constituted of all the various Departments and authorities concerned, to deal with this spy question; in other words, that there should be created a Spy Bureau in this country for the purposes of the war. Unless you have some new machinery to relieve the War Office of a burden which it is not able to bear, you will have these discussions from time to time, you will have these cases of discontent and alarm arising, and we shall not satisfactorily deal with the problem with which we are now confronted. Personally, therefore, I am grateful to the noble and learned Viscount for having gone further than he did the other evening, but I should have been much more grateful had he gone still further than he has now done.

THE LORD PRIVY SEAL AND SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INDIA (THE MARQUESS OF CREWE) : My Lords, I venture

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to think that in some of its parts this debate serves as an illustration of the inconvenience which from time to time attaches to our procedure. A considerable and important part of this discussion has been taken up by reference to the particular case of sedition in Ireland and kindred subjects connected with that country. I quite understand that the House might well wish to discuss that subject, but my noble friend who represents the Irish Office is not in his place. He had no notice that any such discussion was likely to be brought forward, and we are therefore not prepared, on behalf of the Irish Office, to state the particular case in the form in which they might—

THE EARL OF DESART : I was at great pains to say that I was making no attack. The whole of my speech constituted an expression of opinion that these matters required consideration. I do not think I suggested that I expected a categorical answer to-day.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE : I never supposed that the noble Earl was making an attack : in fact, all noble Lords who have spoken have expressly disavowed their intention of doing anything of the kind, and we fully accept their statement. But since this question of Ireland has been raised and has been the subject of three important speeches, it would have been an advantage for us to be able to reply with the knowledge which can only be obtained from the particular Department. I shall not, therefore, attempt to pursue the particular question as it concerns Ireland, because I am not prepared to do so. But on the one particular point which the noble Earl, Lord Meath, raised, he stated that it was a presumption, which he appeared to share, that the sowing of mines not far from the Irish coast was in some way the result of Irish sedition, the result of some combined action between the enemy and Irish spies, with the implication, as I gathered, that the mines themselves came from the Irish coast in boats of some kind belonging to Ireland. That is a suggestion which I am sure will interest the Admiralty, but it is one which I confess we have not heard made before. So far as that particular sowing of mines was concerned, our belief has been that they were sown—altogether improperly, as we think, by the obligation of the laws of war—under a neutral flag, but the particular association of them with Irish sedition is, I confess, entirely new to me.

So far as regards the general question of *espionage* and the punishment to be inflicted upon it, I am quite aware that no little excitement has been caused throughout the country at what has been conceived, as I think not quite fairly, as the failure of the Government to deal with sufficient energy or in a sufficiently drastic manner with cases of *espionage*. I may say at once—and I believe that in saying so I speak for all my colleagues—that we are not troubled by any kind of sentimentality or with a desire even to exercise mercy in cases in which action of this kind is proved either against alien enemies or against others in this country who may be guilty of such practices ; because it is always important to bear in mind, in considering this question of *espionage*, that you cannot rely upon action of that sort being simply confined to alien enemies belonging to the nations with whom we are at war. It is, unfortunately, not safe to attempt so to limit the possibilities of the case, and therefore we have to include the possibility of other persons being involved. But when we speak of the punishment of these war crimes, sometimes amounting even to the crime which is the special subject of the noble and learned Earl's question—the actual crime of high treason—we always have to remember that, even though you put the country under what is called martial law, you still demand, if not the full amount of evidence which satisfies a British jury in ordinary cases, something in the nature of positive evidence before you can convict people, even more before you can think of putting them to death. The noble Marquess, Lord Londonderry, spoke of the North-East coast with which he is so well acquainted, and foretold the possibility that the resentment against the absence of convictions might become so serious in that part of England that the ordinary processes of law might be exchanged for a system of something approaching lynch law, carried on even by the magistrates themselves.

THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY : I merely said that if the Lord Lieutenant and the chairman of the county council called the meeting to which I referred, I should advocate that course.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE : I quite understand, and in a matter of this sort one is particularly anxious in no way to misrepresent what the noble Marquess said. Where a

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system of the wild justice of revenge has been instituted in other countries—for instance, in the Southern States of America, where, as we know, for many years lynch law was of frequent occurrence—it has almost always been because juries or courts have refused to convict in the face of reasonable evidence, or where for one reason or another criminals have not been put on their trial ; such wild action has been brought about by what the people of a neighbourhood have believed to be a distinct failure of justice.

I pass for a moment to the cases which were named the other day by the noble Earl, Lord Crawford, who is not now in his place. He mentioned cases in which, according to his statement, a serious public offence had been committed and was punished by a penalty which, as he described the case, appeared to be almost derisory. But, of course, before forming an opinion on the action which the magistrates took in that case one would have to be acquainted with all the circumstances and know what the charge really was, what the evidence was that was brought in support of it, and also what the plea advanced by the defendant was ; and I have no doubt that those cases have received, since the noble Earl spoke, the careful attention of the authorities. I repeat once more, these are, and are bound to be, matters of evidence ; and I cannot help thinking that at the back of the minds of some of those who criticise the Government so freely there exists the thought that, after all, in these cases, where there is great public danger, evidence does not so very much matter, and that even if you are unfortunately wrong and hang or shoot two or three people against whom nothing is really proved—well, you are sorry ; it is their bad luck ; but in a great public crisis you cannot afford to be quite so particular as all that. That is not an attitude which it is possible for the Government or for the legal advisers of the Government, as I venture to think, to take up.

In the first place, the existence of so great a public danger from information given to the enemy from this country—so great a public danger as to justify a regular departure from what we conceive to be the ordinary course of justice—is not sufficiently proved. People may have their own opinion as to the amount and the value of the information which is conveyed to the enemy from this country. Some people

believe that an enormous quantity of information of cardinal importance is somehow or other conveyed to Germany from this country. At the other end of the scale, you will find people who believe that scarcely anything of serious importance from the point of view of our success in the war or of the loss of life of men in our Services can by any means be so conveyed. It is not easy to strike the correct balance between those extreme views, and the positive suggestion that has been made—it was mentioned by the noble Earl who is leading the Opposition—that a special Committee representing various Departments should be formed for the particular purpose of dealing with this spy question, is one of which I do not deny the attraction in some respects, but there are, if the noble Earl will consider, certain difficulties connected with it. At present these matters are in the hands of the naval and military authorities respectively. If you are to have a system which is approaching martial law, it is not easy to place it in any hands except those of the fighting Departments, and I should expect that an attempt to divide up responsibility by creating such a Committee might be somewhat resented by them.

But surely there is a further practical difficulty. Among all these aliens, of whom, by general admission, a large number are quite harmless, you would have to inquire into the circumstances of each particular case before you could decide whether such a person ought to be interned, or possibly deported, or conceivably put on his trial with the possibility of his incurring in the last resort the death penalty. My Lords, can you devise a Committee representing the different Departments which, in the space of three months, six months, or a year, could make an investigation into the case of each one of those aliens? I am arguing on the supposition that you should do what is proposed as the remedy—that every person of German or Austrian birth should be treated as a prisoner and as a more or less guilty person until the contrary is proved. Those investigations would occupy a vast amount of time, and in a great number of cases they certainly would not be worth the trouble which it would take to undertake them.

I can say, on behalf of the Government, that we do not resent, but on the contrary we welcome, any criticism that

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can be made of what has been done, and we also welcome any suggestions that can be made for improvement in the method of dealing with this alien question. This question takes a somewhat different form here from that which it takes in any of the countries on the Continent of Europe. Our insular position introduces somewhat new factors into the situation which you would not find, for instance, in France, in Germany, or in any of the belligerent countries on the Continent. So far as we can, we shall endeavour to improve the methods by which we are working. We do not desire to encourage what I may call a spy panic in the country, to which some organs of the Press, as I venture to think, give a quite unrestrained vent; but we do not in the least deny the gravity or the difficulty of the problem, and I myself am glad that this discussion has taken place.

THE EARL OF HALSBURY: I do not understand that either the noble Marquess or the noble and learned Viscount on the Woolsack has answered my specific question. Has a system of correspondence, a very ingenious and extensive system, been discovered? Has that matter been investigated by any of the authorities, and, if so, have the allegations turned out to be accurate?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: Every case in which there have been traces of anything of the kind has been investigated, with the result that the civil and military authorities have got to the bottom of everything that they can.

THE EARL OF HALSBURY: I would point out that there are no accessaries in treason. That which makes a person an accessory in ordinary crime makes him a principal in treason.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: There is a case in which a true bill has been found.

THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY: The noble and learned Viscount has not answered the question which I put. The Home Secretary has thrown the responsibility of the Home Office on to the shoulders of the chief constables. I ask, What are the powers of chief constables, and what are they to do?

THE LORD CHANCELLOR: A chief constable has the power which arises in a case of serious crime of arresting without warrant. But the proper person to refer these things

to is the Public Prosecutor, who gives directions as to what is to be done. The chief constable has all the powers that are wielded by the constabulary in a county, and the magistrates have the power of issuing warrants. Really those things should be dealt with locally—they can be so dealt with much better ; and if the noble Marquess would take vigorous action and send up the details to the Public Prosecutor these cases would be attended to.

THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY : But that all takes time.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR : The noble Marquess has his police officers on the spot, and there is the bench of magistrates.

THE MARQUESS OF LONDONDERRY : In the meantime we have these mines being washed ashore.

THE LORD CHANCELLOR : Does the noble Marquess think that the Public Prosecutor or the Lord Chancellor will catch the mines more quickly than will the military and civil authorities on the spot ?

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE : I think the reason why the Home Secretary referred to the chief constables was this. The Home Secretary is the superior of the Metropolitan Police, and therefore there is sometimes a disposition to regard him as being the head of the police all over England. That is not the case. As the noble Marquess knows very well, the police in counties are under the statutory joint committee, and their active officer is the chief constable. That, I think, was the reason why the Home Secretary, as the noble Marquess put it, placed the burden on the shoulders of the chief constables. He merely wished to make it clear that he had nothing to do with the country police.

LORD ST. DAVIDS : My Lords, I am sorry to find myself not quite satisfied with the vigour of the Government on this particular matter. I hold very strongly the view that in most Departments of Government no war has ever been waged with greater vigour than the war which is being waged by the present Government ; but as regards the danger of information going out of this country, I do not think the Government quite appreciate the public view. The noble Marquess the Leader of the House said just now that he did not think that sufficient public danger was yet proved for the

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Government to go out of their usual course as regards trials in these cases. I know nothing of this matter except what I see in the newspapers, but there was one item in the newspapers the other day which surely showed that information of enormous value had gone out of this country—I refer to the attempted raid on Yarmouth. We saw it stated that large enemy ships went at full speed through the passages of a mine field. A passage through a mine field is a crooked passage, and no enemy ship could possibly have gone at a fast speed through that crooked passage without most valuable information having left this country. It is possible, if that kind of information does go out of the country, that one item of information might lead in some case to a great national disaster. Surely this is a matter which requires exceptional treatment. With the attitude of the noble Marquess the Leader of the House I do not at all agree. He laid down the fine old English maxim that you must not punish anybody who by any conceivable chance may be innocent—

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE : I must protest against what my noble friend says. What I said was that a great number of persons were apparently desirous, upon this particular subject and at this particular time, to convict people without any positive evidence. I do not know whether my noble friend is one of them.

LORD ST. DAVIDS : I am certainly not one of them, and I am very glad indeed if I misunderstood the noble Marquess. But the position, it seems to me, is this. You want to see that justice is done, that you do not hang an innocent man, and that the man is given the benefit of every possible doubt. In fact, I should say that in England it is almost impossible, under ordinary circumstances, for a man to be put to death who is innocent. But in the case of spies, what you have to do is to stop information going out of this country ; and surely in an emergency like this you have to lean the other way. If there is any doubt as to whether a man is innocent or guilty, that man ought not to be let go. You are not trying to punish a man or wishing to be vindictive because he is a foreigner ; what you are trying to do is to keep your information in your own country. That is the point of view upon which we should act. I am bound to say that that point of view was not laid down with any distinctness

by the noble Marquess. Although on most things the Government are strong enough, on this question of aliens they are not hard enough.

I do not want in the least to make any alien suffer unnecessarily. If you put aliens into concentration camps, I hold that they should be fed as well as our soldiers. I would not have any unnecessary hardship inflicted upon them. But the country must not run any unnecessary risk even if these aliens do suffer hardships. All countries in time of war have to be hard. Take any successful Government, say the Government of Cromwell; that was a hard Government. Take the Government which acted under the greatest possible difficulties which any Government in the world had to face, the Government under the Revolution in France; that Government won by reason of being a hard Government; it won by stamping out everything that was opposed to it. The Government of this country to-day has this advantage, that no class is opposed to it; we are all doing everything we can to assist it. I do think, my Lords, that His Majesty's Ministers should harden their hearts, and that on this particular matter they should adopt a much more drastic point of view.

BRITISH EAST AFRICA AND THE PERSIAN GULF.

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON: My Lords, I beg to ask the Secretary of State for India whether he can, consistently with the public interest, give any information regarding the military operations that are proceeding in British East Africa and neighbouring parts, and I may, perhaps, be allowed to say a few words as to my reason for putting this Question. One of the features of the war in which we are engaged is that it is almost a world-wide war. Wherever the German flag is planted in different parts of the world we and our Allies have been engaged in endeavouring to pull it down. That is a necessary and a proper feature of the campaign, and the operation has been conducted with success, we are glad to say, in many parts of the world. The German flag has been hauled down, as we know, in Samoa, in Kiaochau, in German New Guinea, in some of the Islands of the Pacific, and we have every reason to believe and hope that it will not be flying very much longer in German South-West Africa.

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But as regards British East Africa, where there are very extensive German possessions, extending for many hundreds of miles and covering many millions of acres co-terminous with our own, although military operations have been proceeding, scarcely a word—I think I may say not one word—of information has been vouchsafed to the British public. It was only by accident that I myself was aware that a considerable number of Indian troops were operating in that part of the world ; and the nature of the fighting, which must have been severe, was really brought home to the British public for the first time only a few days ago by the publication in the newspapers of an extensive list of casualties. I am aware of a case where a parent heard for the first time of the part of the world in which his son was being engaged by reading the news of the death of the officer on this distant field of battle. The full extent of those casualties I do not for the moment bear in mind, but I think I am not wrong in saying that the number of killed and wounded has been considerable.

In this position of affairs I was somewhat startled to read only yesterday in *The Times* newspaper the letter of an officer serving at the front in British East Africa, which, as it may have escaped the attention of some of your Lordships, you will perhaps permit me to read. This letter was written on October 11th—that is to say, five weeks ago ; and the writer expressed himself as follows :

“ I have been away at the front for six weeks, fighting—In other words, the war was already in existence six weeks before that date :

“ I volunteered in the East Africa Rifles as a trooper. They then said that they wanted to form a Somali troop to go to the front at once, so —— applied for me. So I went with him down to the Tsavo as a corporal acting as an officer. We had one quite big fight, when we were attached to one company of the King's African Rifles. The Germans, about 150 of them, very nearly surrounded us at dawn. ——, who was in command of the King's African Rifles, got killed in the first ten minutes, but we drove the Germans back and made them absolutely run. We got fifteen of them and wounded eight, and the Germans got six of our soldiers, seven of our mules, and wounded four. We then had to hold the place

for two days until we were relieved by No. 2 Company of the K.A.R. People don't seem to realise at home what a big thing this is out here. The Germans have got anything from 6,000 to 12,000 troops and lots of guns."

My Lords, we have had no opportunity of realising whether it is a big thing or a small thing over here, because we know nothing at all about it. I, of course, have not the slightest desire to press the Secretary of State to give us any information which he considers it necessary in the interests of the Government or military operations to withhold; but I submit that if large forces are engaged in that part of the world, if the danger that is being met is a considerable one, as appears to be the case, and if the number of casualties is large, it would relieve a great deal of legitimate anxiety at home if we could hear something about the operations. The fighting, as I understand, is not merely in British East Africa or on the borders of British East Africa. I believe it extends to the British territory lying to the south of the Province which we call British East Africa—that is to say, the neighbourhood of Lake Tanganyika and on the frontiers of Nyassaland. Where exactly fighting is taking place I do not know, because nothing has appeared about it in the papers; but there, again, I am under the impression that I have seen a list of casualties recorded in the Press.

Although the part of the world to which I am next about to refer is not contiguous to British East Africa, and therefore is not, perhaps, fairly covered by my Question on the Paper, yet I should be grateful if the Secretary of State could also tell us something about the fighting that is also proceeding in another and a very important area of conflict—I mean the Persian Gulf. Here the only information that we have we owe to the Government themselves. About a week ago, I think it was, they published the important and, to me, joyful tidings that they had taken the Turkish fort and port of Fao (*see* p. 192) at the mouth of the Shatt-el-Arab, which is the estuary of the Tigris and the Euphrates. But yesterday I read in the Press that the Secretary of State for India, the noble Marquess, had himself authorised the communication of the following announcement regarding military operations now in progress at the head of the Persian Gulf:

"On the 11th inst., at 5.30 a.m., the Turks made a deter-

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mined attack on our outposts, but were held in check by the 117th Mahrattas and finally routed by a counter-attack made by the 20th Infantry, supported by fire from a mountain battery. Our casualties were few; those of the enemy at least 80. On the 14th further troops arrived from India under the command of Lieutenant-General Sir A. Barrett—The large scale of the operations is sufficiently indicated by the fact that you take one of the most capable Indian officers and place him in command of what is obviously a military expedition of some size. The official statement goes on to say:

“On the 15th the latter (Sir A. Barrett), hearing that a strong force of the enemy with mountain artillery were occupying a post about four miles distant, sent General Delamain with three battalions and two mountain batteries to evict them. After a sharp action in which his Majesty’s ships *Espiègle* and *Odin* co-operated, this was successfully accomplished. The enemy’s entrenched camp was captured and his losses were very heavy. Several prisoners, including a Turkish major, were captured and two of the enemy’s machine guns were destroyed. Our casualties were two officers wounded; rank and file, eight killed and 51 wounded.”

It is obvious that military operations of a rather important and serious nature have been going on there. There is not the slightest indication where they are taking place, except that it is in the area of the Persian Gulf. I assume that it must be somewhere at the upper end of the Gulf. Again I do not want to press the noble Marquess to give information upon this which should be withheld, but if with regard to the operations either in British East Africa or the Persian Gulf he can give us any information I am sure we shall be grateful to receive it.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE: My Lords, it is evident, from what the noble Earl has said, that he fully understands the nature of the limitations that have to be set upon the giving of information in respect of military operations in different parts of the world. It is, of course, clear, if one reflects, that those limitations do not apply with absolute equality in all areas; but, on the other hand, it is probably safer and wiser to lay down the general rule and to say that speaking broadly the sort of information which is given with

regard to operations in Europe must remain as the only kind of information which can be given about operations in other parts of the world. Therefore the noble Earl and his friends will, I am sure, understand that the account which I am about to give of what generally has occurred in East Africa is as far as the Government are able to go at the moment.

As the noble Earl pointed out, German East Africa is a large and important Colony. It covers, I think, some 350,000 square miles. It has, of course, a large native population, and it has a white, German, population of between 5,000 and 6,000 ; and in that connection it is important to note, although I do not know what the proportion of the sexes may be, that in a planter's country of that kind the proportion of males, and probably of males of fighting age, must be infinitely larger than such a population would indicate in a European country. Those forces there, those white inhabitants of German East Africa, a large proportion of whom it must be remembered must have served in the German Army, have been reinforced from different sources ; we are told, to some extent, by Reservists from other parts of the world who were brought there because, I suppose, there was doubt or difficulty about bringing them to Europe. There may have been some despatch of Regular troops even from the East, but of that I am not quite certain ; but I believe that some naval forces were landed also from the Far East. The Germans in East Africa are well provided with guns in the ordinary sense and also with a number of machine guns ; and therefore, as the House will see, they constitute what in America I believe is called a formidable proposition.

British East Africa is not quite so large. It covers, I think, about 250,000 square miles. The white population is somewhere about the same, rather less I imagine, and, of course, it does not contain the military element which the German Colony must contain. In both countries there is a native force. In German East Africa there is a force of native infantry and of native police numbering altogether several thousands. In British East Africa there is a considerable force of similar police, and also a body, though not so large, of the force which the noble Earl mentioned—a quite efficient force, well officered, and by no means badly manned, the King's African Rifles. It was clear, therefore, that

as matters stood at the beginning of the war our position in East Africa could not be an altogether secure one. The initial position of the Germans was stronger than ours. We also had to remember that German East Africa borders both on Nyassaland, as the noble Earl has pointed out, and also on Uganda, in each of which there is a force—in Uganda some King's African Rifles, and in Nyassaland a small force and also a small proportion of white men who act as volunteers. But those colonies also constituted relatively a source rather of weakness than of strength as compared with German East Africa. It was therefore necessary to reinforce the colony from India, and at an early date a small force was sent that was afterwards considerably increased. Fighting, I think, actually began up on the Western side before any of the fresh Indian troops had arrived there, and it has been continuing at a great number of different points since, with various forces engaged and with somewhat varying results. And as we learned more of the German preparations it became necessary further to reinforce from India. Of the different actions that have taken place, no less than seven—small actions of different kinds—have taken place within the confines of British East Africa. There was one, to which I think the noble Earl alluded, in Nyassaland, and there have been others on the borders.

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON : That was on the Tsavo in British East Africa.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE : Yes ; but I think the noble Earl also alluded to some fighting having taken place in Nyassaland about which he said casualty lists had appeared, which was, I think, the case.

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON : Yes.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE : Those different operations have not taken place without considerable losses to ourselves. In one particular case, I am sorry to say, an attack was made in the South (*see* p. 19) on a very strong position which was powerfully held by the enemy with a number of guns and machine guns. Very heavy casualties were suffered by our troops there without their achieving the object for which they were immediately striving. The total casualties in all the operations in East Africa during the two months amount to something over 900.

At an early stage I noticed that some of the German publicists, speaking of the fighting that was likely or sure to take place in or in the neighbourhood of their colonies, pointed out that the result of those actions, which they seemed to assume would in all cases be unfavourable to themselves, could not affect the ultimate result of the war. That, of course, is quite true ; the fate of all the different German possessions in different parts of the world must depend upon the ultimate settlement at the close of the war. But it is necessary for us to preserve the position of Great Britain as the paramount country in Central and Southern Africa. Therefore the Union of South Africa has undertaken a task of its own ; and in East Africa we are bound to maintain our position there and to repel with all the forces we can muster any attacks which are made by our German neighbours, and, where occasions are favourable and the forces available make it possible, to attack in our turn. That is all the information which I am able to give the noble Earl. He will understand that I do not mention the names of the particular places at which various actions have occurred or the particular troops which have been employed, although there is no harm in mentioning some of the particular Indian regiments engaged, and I can do so if it is desired.

The noble Earl passed on to a different part of the world and asked me some questions about the Persian Gulf ; as to which we have been rather more handsome, as he admitted, in the information we have given. So much so that, owing to the difficulty of communication with those parts of the world where the telegraph service is not very easily conducted, that which we have put in the newspapers and which the noble Earl read out about the operations at the head of the Persian Gulf—the noble Earl is right in thinking that the operations that have taken place are in the immediate neighbourhood of the Shatt-el-Arab—practically covers all that we know ourselves ; and I fear, therefore, that I have very little more information that I can give the noble Earl. But may I say this much, that when Turkey went to war with us one of her first steps, carrying out, indeed, what had been her apparent policy some little time previously, was to assert herself at the head of the Persian Gulf in a part of the world where we, as is known, have a very special interest, and where also our

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Ally, the Sheikh of Mohammerah, who is, as we know, under Persian suzerainty but who is on special terms of intimacy with the British Government, was severely threatened by the Turks. They destroyed the telegraph station at Fao, and announced their intention of stopping the navigation of the Shatt-el-Arab (*see* p. 141). It was clearly impossible for us, not merely in view of our positive and actual interests in that region but also in view of the necessity of keeping up our due name in the minds of the Arab world, to tolerate such violent proceedings as those. Therefore we thought it right to send an expedition of considerable strength under a distinguished General—one of our best Indian officers, as the noble Earl has pointed out—in order to make it clear to the Turks that they cannot venture to assert themselves in that region in the manner in which they have been attempting to do. And I say with the utmost confidence that a step of that kind receives as much approval, if not more, in the Moslem world in India as it does in any other part of the British Empire.

THE EARL OF MAYO : Might I ask the noble Marquess whether there will be published a list of the casualties in the operations in British East Africa. He mentioned 900.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE : I think that most of the British officers' casualties have already appeared in the newspapers.

THE EARL OF MAYO : I mean not only officers but white settlers who have enlisted as privates. I have a relation out there.

THE MARQUESS OF CREWE : I have no doubt that their names will appear in due course. As a matter of fact, I think the names of some of the volunteers have appeared already.

EARL CURZON OF KEDLESTON : I should like to thank the noble Marquess for the information he has given me in reply to my Question, and to say that we on this side of the House earnestly wish success to His Majesty's arms in the two theatres of conflict to which reference has been made.

THE TURKS AT NOVOROSSISK AND SHATT-EL-ARAB.

Constantinople. K.V.,

AN official report from Headquarters says : The cruiser *Hamidieh* yesterday bombarded and destroyed the Russian 1914.

oil depôts and the wireless station at Tuapfe in the neighbourhood of Novorossiisk. On November 18th a sharp action which lasted for nine hours took place between the English and our troops at Shatt-el-Arab. The enemy's losses were considerable. English prisoners declared that the Commander-in-Chief of the English troops was among the wounded. One shot fired by our gunboat *Marmariss* hit an English gunboat and caused an explosion on board.

Constantinople.

K.V.,
Nov. 22.
Headquarters report that according to information received after the action at Shatt-el-Arab the ascertained English losses amounted to 750 dead and 1,000 wounded.

Petrograd.

K.V.,
Nov. 22,
1914.
The General Staff of the Army of the Caucasus reports that the Turkish cruiser *Hamidieh* accompanied by torpedo craft appeared before Tuapfe and opened fire. She fired about 125 rounds. Our losses amounted to three soldiers and one sister of mercy wounded, one inhabitant killed, seven others injured. The material damage done was insignificant.

BOMBARDMENT OF LIBAU.

Petrograd.

K.V.
Nov. 19,
1914.
A report of the Admiral Staff says: Yesterday morning a German squadron consisting of two cruisers, several steam ships and ten torpedo craft appeared before Libau. The Germans again bombarded the town and the harbour, causing several fires.

Amsterdam, November 19.*

ACCORDING to a telegram from Berlin the following official announcement is issued there:

On Tuesday [November 17] part of the German Baltic Fleet blockaded the entrance to the port of Libau by sinking some vessels and bombarded important military works. The torpedo-boats which entered the port state that no hostile warships were there.—*Reuter.*

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL BOMBARDMENT OF TREBIZOND.

Petrograd.

ON November 18th the Russian Black Sea Fleet approached K.V., the Fort of Trebizond and bombarded the fort and the barracks, causing a considerable outbreak of fire on the shore. ^{Nov. 19,} 1914. No Turkish ships were observed in the roadstead.

ACTION BETWEEN RUSSIAN AND TURKISH SQUADRONS OFF SEVASTOPOL.

Amsterdam, November 19.

AN official telegram received in Berlin from Constantinople says :

" Our Fleet, on the look-out for the Russian Black Sea Fleet which bombarded Trebizond, met the enemy off Sevastopol. The Russian Fleet consisted of two battleships and five cruisers.

" During the engagement one of the Russian battleships was badly damaged and the others fled in the direction of Sevastopol, pursued by our warships."—*Reuter.*

Petrograd, November 19.

The first discharge of the 12-inch guns from the flagship *Svyatoi Evstafii* struck the *Goeben*, and caused an explosion on board her which gave rise to an outbreak of fire.

The Russian flagship and other vessels continued to make excellent practice, and further explosions occurred in the *Goeben*.

The *Goeben* opened fire after some delay, the enemy very apparently being taken by surprise.

The Germans fired broadsides with their heavy guns, concentrating their fire upon the Russian flagship.

The action lasted 14 minutes, after which the *Goeben* disappeared in the mist.

The *Breslau*, taking advantage of her speed, did not take part in the action, but kept in the offing.

The *Svyatoi Evstafii* was the only Russian vessel to suffer any damage, and that was insignificant.

Our casualties were a lieutenant, three midshipmen, and twenty-nine sailors killed ; one lieutenant and nineteen sailors seriously wounded, and five sailors slightly wounded.—*Reuter.*

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NAVAL CADETS.

[Nov

House of Commons, November 19, 1914.

Hansard.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked how many naval cadets, including those on the *Monmouth*, have been killed in action since the War began?

DR. MACNAMARA: The answer is thirty-one, of whom ten lost their lives in the *Monmouth*. The additional eight above the number given in my right hon. Friend's reply to the question of the hon. Member on the 16th instant were not Dartmouth cadets, but were serving afloat in the Training Cruiser *Cumberland* when War broke out.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty what exact duties the naval cadets perform; and whether he consulted any of the captains of the ships upon which they were placed as to the desirability of sending them to sea before their training was completed?

DR. MACNAMARA: Naval cadets perform the same duties as midshipmen. The answer to the second part of the question is in the negative.

BRITISH MERCANTILE MARINE (MASTERS AND OFFICERS.)

House of Commons, November 20, 1914.

Hansard.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he is considering the desirability of enlisting, wherever possible, the services of the masters and officers of the British mercantile marine, particularly by retaining those at their posts already commanding and officering the merchant vessels taken over by the Admiralty for service with the Fleet?

DR. MACNAMARA: The course suggested by the Noble Lord has been pursued since the beginning of the War, and will be continued.

AIRCRAFT ATTACK ON ZEPPELIN WORKS AT FRIEDRICHSHAFEN.

Memorandum by the Director of the Air Department.

Admiralty, December 17, 1914.

L.G.,
Dec. 29,
1914.

ON November 21st, 1914, Squadron Commander E. F. Briggs, Flight Commander J. T. Babington, and Flight

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Lieutenant S. V. Sippe, Royal Navy, carried out an aerial attack on the Zeppelin airship sheds and factory at Friedrichshafen on Lake Constance.

Leaving French territory shortly before 10 a.m., they arrived over their objective at about noon, and, although under a very heavy rifle, machine-gun and shrapnel fire from the moment they were sighted, they all three dived steeply to within a few hundred feet of the sheds, when they released their bombs—in all eleven.

Squadron Commander Briggs was wounded, brought down, and made a prisoner, but the other two officers regained their starting-point after a flight of more than four hours across hostile country under very bad weather conditions.

It is believed that the damage caused by this attack includes the destruction of one airship and serious damage to the larger shed, and also demolition of the hydrogen-producing plant, which had only lately been completed. Later reports stated that flames of considerable magnitude were seen issuing from the factory immediately after the raid.

Friedrichshafen, November 21.

TOWARDS one o'clock (noon) to-day two English aero-K.D. planes made their appearance over the town and attempted to make an attack on the airship shed. One of the airmen who was circling over the shed at a height of some 400 metres was shot down with shrapnel and machine-gun fire from the anti-aircraft force. The other airman, who kept at a fairly great height and who repeatedly circled round the shed, managed to escape; according to later information he is stated to have fallen into the Lake of Constance. The airmen dropped five bombs which partly fell in the close proximity of the shed. The occupant of the machine which was shot down is an English naval officer. A journeyman tailor named Wiedmann, a native of Switzerland, twenty-one years of age, was killed on the spot by bombs thrown by the airman who was brought down, and who sustained grave injuries in the head and hand. Two women were seriously injured, one in the head and shoulder, the other one had her left fore-arm torn away. The surmise that the second airman was drowned in the Lake of Constance has not been confirmed;

he has in fact dropped a bomb, which, however, missed its effect, over Manzell while flying very low.

Stuttgart, November 21.

ibid.

The Deputy General Staff of the 13th Army Corps in Stuttgart reports officially :

To-day at 12.15 noon an attack took place on the airship shed at Friedrichshafen by two English airmen, as already previously noted and reported. The available anti-aircraft force and the infantry garrison at Friedrichshafen soon shot down and captured one of the airmen, an English naval lieutenant, who was seriously wounded, whilst the other escaped in the direction of the Swiss shore. Most of the bombs dropped by the airmen caused no damage whatever to the airship shed ; on the other hand, one man was killed and several persons injured by fragments of shells among the civilian population. The machine which was brought down is only slightly damaged.

ALLEGED TURKISH ATTACK ON SUEZ CANAL.

Constantinople.

K.V.,

*Nov. 22,
1914.*

HEADQUARTERS officially report : Turkish troops have reached the Suez Canal. In an encounter near Kantara the English were beaten and took to flight with heavy losses.

Constantinople.

ibid.

Further information from Headquarters states : With God's help our troops have occupied the Suez Canal. In the action which took place near Kataba and Kertebe, both 30 kilomètres east of the Canal and near Kantara on the Canal itself, the English losses included Captain Wilson, one Lieutenant, and many men killed, and a large number wounded. We have taken a fair number of prisoners. The English troops withdrew in disorderly flight. Men of the English camel corps who were stationed at the outposts and gendarmes in the English service surrendered to us.

[There appears to be no British or other official account from any Allied source of any attack on the Canal or any action near Kantara at this time ;

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but on November 20th the Bikanir Camel Corps and twenty camelmen of the Camel Guard had a skirmish with the enemy between Bir-el-Nass and Katia. Details of this skirmish will be found in the Military Section.]

MINES IN THE BLACK SEA.

Petrograd, November 22.

IT is officially announced that the Russian littoral in the Black Sea has been mined in many places for a distance of 20 leagues (about 60 miles) out from the coast.

It is absolutely forbidden for vessels to sail by night in or out of Russian ports in the Black Sea, of the mouths of the Dnieper and Bug and of the Gulf of Kertch.—*Reuter.*

SINKING OF U 18 AND A GERMAN DESTROYER.

Admiralty, November 23.

THE German submarine U 18 was reported on the Northern Coast of Scotland this morning at 12.30. A British patrolling vessel reported having rammed her.

She was not sighted again until 1.20, when she was seen on the surface, crew on deck, and flying the white flag.

Shortly after this she foundered, just as the destroyer *Garry* came alongside and rescued three officers and twenty-three of her crew, one only being drowned.

The names of the German officers captured were :

Captain-Leutnant Von Hennig.

Leutnant Zur See Neuerburg.

Marine Ober-Ingenieur Sprenger.

Berlin, November 24.

The Admiralty confirms the statement of the British *Times*, Admiralty that the German submarine U 18 was sunk by a Nov. 25, British patrol boat near the coast of Scotland. Three officers 1914 and twenty-three of the crew were saved by the British destroyer *Garry*. The Danish boat *Anglo-Dane*, a small steamer, rammed a German torpedo-boat, which latter was badly damaged. Two stokers badly injured were taken aboard the steamer, bound for Copenhagen, but one died on the way and the other died on arrival there.

Copenhagen, November 23.

Times,
Nov. 24,
1914.

The German destroyer S 124 was rammed at midnight by the United Steamship Company's oldest and smallest ship *Anglo-Dane*, of 800 tons. With assisting destroyers on either side she made for the Swedish coast, where she is believed to have been beached. The *Anglo-Dane* was undamaged.

SUBMARINE U 21 OFF HAVRE.

C.O.,
Nov. 5,
1914.

ON November 23rd the German submarine U 21 fired at the small English steamer *Malachite* four miles north-west of Cap de la Hève. Five minutes were allowed for abandoning the vessel, and the crew reached Havre in boats. Flotillas of destroyers and torpedo boats were at once sent in pursuit of the submarine which when discovered on the 25th dived and fired three torpedoes at one of its pursuers without success. The next day, the 26th, U 21 reappeared off Cape Antifer and fired at another English steamer, the *Primo*, whose crew were picked up by fishing boats. The *Primo*, which carried a cargo of coal, took fire and drifted away. On the 28th U 21 was again chased off Cape Antifer and fired a torpedo without success at a destroyer. In the end she withdrew to the northward.

COALING GERMAN WARSHIPS.—PROTEST BY CHILE.

Times,
Nov. 23,
1914.

THE Press Bureau issued the following at midnight :

His Majesty's Government has been informed by the Chilean Minister in London that he has received a telegram from the Chilean Minister for Foreign Affairs announcing that the German steamers *Negada* and *Luxor* sailed surreptitiously, the former from the port of Punta Arenas (Straits of Magellan) and the latter from Coronel, laden with coal, without having obtained the necessary permission to clear. In view of this the Chilean Government has prohibited the provisioning in any port of the Republic of the vessels of the Kosmos Company, to which the steamers named belong, and have ordered that no ship be allowed to leave any Chilean port. This provisional measure will become definitive if the

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careful investigation which is being conducted should prove, as is suspected, that the steamers mentioned carried the said coal for the purpose of supplying German warships.

The Chilian Government is determined to punish with the severest penalties every attempt to violate Chilian neutrality.

BOMBARDMENT OF ZEEBRUGGE.

Admiralty, November 24.

ON MONDAY, November 23rd, all points of military significance in Zeebrugge were subjected to severe bombardment by two British battleships. The German opposition was feeble. The extent of the damage is not known.

The British ships returned safely.

NAVAL AND MARINE BRIGADES.

House of Commons, November 23.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord *Hansard.* of the Admiralty whether he can state what are the numbers, what the composition, and what the cost to the country of the Naval and Marine Brigades, a portion of which was recently employed at Antwerp in land service; and whether he can state how many officers and men of the original brigade are interned in Holland, giving the men's ratings?

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (MR. CHURCHILL): The German Admiralty have not published the strength and composition of the Naval and Marine Brigades they are now employing in Belgium, and I see no reason why a similar reticence should not be practised here. I shall be happy to give the Noble Lord, as honorary colonel of one of the brigades, the fullest details of its composition. The names of all officers and men interned in Holland were published in the Press on the 26th of last month.

LORD C. BERESFORD: May I ask the right hon. Gentleman to clear up a point? *The Times* issued a list on the 21st, which they called "Further List of Casualties." On the 18th the right hon. Gentleman said that the list was approximately 1,000. Is the further list in addition to the 1,000 on the 18th?

MR. CHURCHILL: I do not concern myself with the issue of these lists, but I will make inquiries as to what is the full number. My impression is no; certainly not.

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ACTION OFF THE CHILIAN COAST.

[No

House of Commons, November 23.

Hansard.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the two official statements referring to the action off the Chilian coast, issued by the Admiralty on November 5th and 6th (*see pp. 1 and 2*), respectively, were intended to mean that the *Canopus* had already joined Admiral Cradock's flag, or that she had reached a point which would have enabled her, had Admiral Cradock so disposed, to join in the action and whether the Admiralty had good reason to believe, before the news of the action reached them, that the *Canopus* had joined him by the time in question?

MR. CHURCHILL: I must refer the Noble Lord to my answer of the 16th of this month (*see p. 245*) to the Hon. Member for Chertsey.

PENSIONS AND ALLOWANCES.

House of Commons, November 23.

Hansard.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is aware that, looking to recent regulations, separation allowance to wives and dependants is conditional upon the allotment by the man of a certain minimum sum, in two cases from His Majesty's ships *Hogue* and *Aboukir*, and now from His Majesty's ships *Good Hope* and *Monmouth*, no allotment papers have apparently been received at the Admiralty, although there is a strong presumption that the men intended to provide fully for their wives in this way; whether he is aware that, in consequence of these allotment papers not having been received, the wives affected have had no separation allowance since the War began, and in some cases have been almost destitute; and whether the Admiralty will allow as much latitude as possible in this matter?

DR. MACNAMARA: As regards men killed before October 1st, the date as from which separation allowances were payable, any allotment having been declared is paid at the end of the month in which the death took place. Concurrently with this, pensions to the widow and orphans, if any, have been awarded on the old scale. In the case of men killed since October 1st, the allotment, if any, is treated

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similarly ; the allowances are being continued in anticipation of the decision to pay them for six months after the notification of death ; and in certain cases, widows' and orphans' pensions on the old scale had already been paid in advance for a period of three months. With regard to the *Hogue* and *Aboukir*, so far as I know, all pensions or separation allowances payable, have been or will immediately be awarded. Claims arising from the loss of the *Good Hope* and *Monmouth* are being dealt with with all expedition. In the absence of any allotment all that will be payable at the moment will be the widows' and orphans' pensions on the old scale. Should that scale be improved, of course the persons concerned will receive pensions on the revised scale. The question of continuing for twenty-six weeks allotment and allowance in such cases as those indicated in the question, *i.e.*, where it would clearly have been very difficult, if not impossible to have made allotment, is receiving consideration.

LORD C. BERESFORD : Will allotments be made in those cases where they have not yet been received on account of the men being drowned ?

DR. MACNAMARA : I have just said that those cases are being considered.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE : What has been done with regard to the Paymasters who have been unable to make a return of allotments to the Admiralty ?

DR. MACNAMARA : The Paymasters have nothing to do with it. If the hon. Member means that allotments that should have been made in the ordinary way have not been received, I say that we are taking those cases into consideration.

COMPENSATION FOR ACCIDENTS.

House of Commons, November 23.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is aware that in the case of partial incapacity (civil servant, His Majesty's dockyard) a weekly payment must not exceed the difference between the amount of the average weekly earnings of the workman before the accident and the average weekly amount which he is earning, or able to earn, in some suitable employment or business after the accident, but must bear such relation to the amount

of that difference as in the circumstances of the case may appear proper; that a hired hammerman now employed in the Devonport dockyard is for this reason receiving no compensation pension for the months of August and September; that the man in question has been compelled to work overtime owing to the exigencies of war and thought he was doing right in so doing; and whether, in these circumstances, some exception can be made, as otherwise the position would be that a man is compelled to work overtime to save the Government paying him the pension or compensation to which he is by their own action entitled?

DR. MACNAMARA: The reply to the first portion of the question is in the affirmative, the procedure being in conformity with the provisions of Clause 3 of the First Schedule to the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1906. As this procedure is statutory, I cannot hold out any hope of an exception being made in the case referred to in the latter part of the question.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: Does not the right hon. Gentleman think it fair to inform the man of the fact, so that he would not be compelled to go on working overtime and have the amount deducted from his pension?

DR. MACNAMARA: The men had the opportunity of coming under the Workmen's Compensation Act or under our scheme. The matter was fully stated to the men at the time.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE: I am afraid the right hon. Gentleman does not quite understand the case. This occurs in time of War, and, if the man is obliged to work overtime, he could not possibly have had placed before him whether he would come under one scheme or the other. Cannot something be done to relieve this poor man from being compelled to work overtime? [HON. MEMBERS: "Order, order!"] It is very important to the man.

ARMY AND NAVY COMMISSIONS.

House of Commons, November 23.

Hansard.

MR. EVELYN CECIL asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether any person or persons, by birth of German or Austrian nationality, have been given commissions in the

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Army or Navy since the declaration of War; if so, whether he will state his or their names and positions; and on what grounds and by whose recommendation he and they were appointed?

MR. CHURCHILL: Questions relating to the Army should be addressed to my right hon. Friend the Under-Secretary of State for War. I know of no such case in the Navy.

MR. CECIL: Or the Naval Brigade?

MR. CHURCHILL: Or the Naval Brigade.

OIL FUEL (BATTLESHIPS).

House of Commons, November 23.

SIR FRANCIS LOWE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether, in view of the fires which have occurred on battleships in action and of the probability of the risk of fire being increased by the adoption of oil fuel, the Admiralty have considered or are prepared to consider the desirability of in future using, as far as possible, timber and other materials which have been rendered fire-resisting for the internal fittings of these ships; and whether their attention has been drawn to any of the processes which exist for attaining this object?

DR. MACNAMARA: I can assure the hon. Member that all possible steps are being taken to minimise the risks of fire.

SEPARATION ALLOWANCES.

House of Commons, November 23.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether his attention has been called to the separation allowances in the Army and Royal Naval Division, respectively; whether he is aware that, from the pay of a private soldier, the allotment is 3s. 6d. per wife and 7d. per child weekly, with a maximum of 5s. 3d., and that this is not compulsory when a man is serving at home provided the wife agrees to forgo the allotment; whether he is aware that, from the pay of a seaman in the Royal Naval Division, a minimum allotment of 5s. weekly, irrespective of the size or circumstances of his family, must in every case be made, and that the men of the Royal Naval Division are

infantry soldiers all rated as ordinary seamen ; and, seeing that a large compulsory allotment to their families, together with the various deductions, leave most of the men serving without money, whether he can see his way to remedy this state of affairs ?

DR. MACNAMARA : The deduction from the pay of the private soldier is, I understand, less than stated, the 7d. per child having been added to the separation allowance provided by the State. As regards the Navy, we decided to make the payment of separation allowances to wives and children contingent upon the minimum allotment of 20s. a month. We do not propose to waive that condition, and so far as I am aware little or no difficulty has arisen in connection with it. In point of fact, allotments have rapidly increased since the announcement of the contingent separation allowance. On August 1st we paid out 73,400 allotments declared by the men on behalf of their wives and families ; on September 1st, 105,700 ; on October 1st, 126,800 ; and on November 1st, 161,000. The average allotment being paid at the time of the introduction of the new separation allowance was about £2 2s. a month ; 20s. was fixed in order to meet the case of the few married ordinary seamen, but, as the Noble Lord is aware, ordinary seamen are, as a rule, single young fellows between eighteen and nineteen. It is the fact that the men of the Royal Naval Division are entered as ordinary seamen, but under certain circumstances a field allowance of 6d. a day is payable, whereas the private soldier is not entitled to this allowance. I may inform the Noble Lord that field allowance has been payable while in camp at Walmer, and will be payable if and when the Division takes the field, and that the question of paying it when the men go into camp at Blandford is now under consideration.

MR. FALLE asked the Secretary to the Admiralty if the grant of separation allowances and allotments which are to be paid to the widows and dependants of seamen, Marines, and soldiers for twenty-six weeks after notification of the death of the seaman, Marine, or soldier are to be retrospective and paid to the widows and dependants of those men who had already given their lives for their King and country before the separation allowance was granted ?

DR. MACNAMARA : That is a question which will no

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doubt come within the purview of the Select Committee now considering separation allowances and other matters. I should prefer to await their recommendations before giving a definite answer.

THE STATUS OF THE ROYAL MARINES.

House of Lords, November 24.

LORD LATYMER rose to ask His Majesty's Government *Hansard.* whether they will appoint a Committee to inquire into the *status* of the Royal Marines in His Majesty's Forces and to make such recommendations as may appear necessary.

The noble Lord said: I must apologise as a civilian for addressing your Lordships upon a naval or military matter—I am not quite sure in which category this question comes—but I am representing those who are not able to speak for themselves. I may be told that perhaps this is not an opportune moment at which to bring forward such a subject. With that suggestion I could not agree, because I think it is only at such times as these that the country takes an adequate interest in naval and military affairs. I venture to say that the position of the Royal Marines is almost an intolerable one. Many examples could be given of their subjection to rules and customs to which no other part of His Majesty's Service is subjected. As I am anxious not to detain the House unduly, I will bring forward only two examples, but they are typical ones. It may seem almost incredible but it is the fact that Royal Marine officers were once deprived of their right of discipline over their own men. This took place when they were fighting in Egypt, and all punishments were given by captains in the Navy who had to come all the way from Alexandria. It is equally incredible but also a fact that the Marines were, during the same period, deprived of their artillery. Their field guns and their mules were taken away from them and given to the Bluejackets, with the result that at General McNeil's Zareeba, at the most critical moment, the guns jammed, because the Bluejackets had not been used to working them. Surely a force that is liable to such indignities must suffer both in spirit and in efficiency. However, I do not wish to labour details.

I pass on to two great grievances which depress both the

officers and men of the Marines. The first relates to command over the men, and the second to rewards for good service. When in war time the Marines are landed they are liable to have a commodore or some such naval officer put over the heads of their own officers. This occurred also in Egypt. It will, I am sure, surprise many in this House to hear that ; and I am sure it will surprise a great many more outside. Then it is notorious that Royal Marine officers scarcely ever receive the highest rewards for good service, even those for which they have been recommended. I have been told on very good authority that there is a rule of the Admiralty that no Marine officer shall ever get the G.C.B. Whether that is correct or not, I do not venture to say ; I was informed so. These matters ought not to be called stale history. Liability to be treated in this manner exists now exactly as before, and quite recently the Marines were subjected to what I may almost call an insult by having a naval officer put over them as their honorary colonel.

The Marines seem to be not only an amphibious body but also an amorphous body ; you really cannot make out exactly what their shape is. When they are on board ship they are under the paramount control of the captain ; when they are on land they are in connection with the Army without forming part of it. Their position is an exceedingly anomalous one. I cannot conceive any better means of interfering with their efficiency as a force than putting over them commanders who have had no opportunity of commanding them before. It is like changing the conductor of an orchestra at the last moment—always a disastrous matter. Has not the time come when the position of the Royal Marines should be re-adjusted ? The days have gone by when they were required to keep discipline on board ship over unruly men impressed by the Press Gangs. Is it not possible for the Admiralty to find some other means of policing their forces and allow the Marines to take up a better position, either by entirely amalgamating them with the Army or in some other way ? I have said all that I intend to say on the subject, although there is far more to be said. I beg to put the Question standing in my name.

LORD WIMBORNE : My Lords, I do not complain at all of the action of the noble Lord in raising the question of the

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status of the Royal Marines, more especially as I think, from what I shall be able to tell him and the House, there is really very little in the case which he laid before the House as far as I was able to understand it. But I am of opinion that it would be inopportune now to discuss the question of the appointment of a Committee such as the noble Lord suggests. The present time seems to me—I think it will so appear to your Lordships—to be very unsuitable for going into what, after all, is a Departmental question; for it is not a question of the fighting efficiency of the Marines that the noble Lord has in view, but their position in relation to the Army and to the Navy. Therefore I hope the noble Lord will not press, at present, for the appointment of a Committee.

If I may say so with respect, the noble Lord's knowledge of the *status* of the Marines goes back rather far. He talked about their position in the Egyptian campaign, and alluded, I think, to an incident which occurred in the year 1882 with reference to their *status* on land. Since that date material changes have been introduced into the *status* which the Marines occupy, and I do not think it would be the least bit informing for us to go back all that time, for the position has altered very much to the good since those days. I understand that the noble Lord is mainly concerned with the question of discipline. I suppose what he really has in mind is the question of Marine officers serving afloat sitting on Courts-Martial when a Marine is under trial. I am aware of that point. *Prima facie* there might appear to be something in it, but the whole question of naval discipline is involved, and if you were to make Marine officers responsible for naval discipline when Marines were on trial before a Court-Martial it would be difficult to refuse that right to other subordinate services in the Navy, such as the engineering service. I think the noble Lord will see that a much bigger question is raised by that point than appears at first sight.

Perhaps the House will allow me to specify briefly some of the changes that have been introduced, I think to the advantage of the Marine service, in recent years, and to state generally how the situation stands. The House is aware that the Corps of Royal Marines is in fact a military body; it is a branch of the Army, but is specially organised and trained for service in the Fleet as well as ashore. When

a force of Marines is landed from ships for military operations, they may be under the Naval Discipline Act or under the Army Act, that will depend upon the discretion of the senior naval officer on the station. If a Marine force were landed to act for a considerable time with the Army, the probability is that they would be put under the Army Act, but when they are employed in conjunction with a naval party it is generally considered better to keep them under the Naval Discipline Act. That is the principle which governs them in that respect, and I do not think it is inconvenient. With regard to the question of pay, a considerable increase in the then existing rates of pay of Royal Marine officers was authorised in 1903, more especially in the case of the senior ranks. Since then from time to time various additions have been made to their pay in consequence of the increased scope of employment afloat which they now fulfil. For instance, they now carry out certain duties in connection with wireless and the Intelligence Department. Only last year increased rates afloat were authorised, and this year a general increase has been sanctioned to approximate more closely to the rates authorised for Army officers. So that the position of Royal Marine officers has been taken into consideration and improved on several occasions in recent years.

With regard to non-commissioned officers and men, there has been since 1902 a steady improvement in their conditions—first, in connection with increased pay; secondly, awards for efficiency; and, indirectly, by the award of free rations of bread and meat. An additional grade of warrant officers was created in 1912, principally in connection with service afloat, and last year a higher rate was introduced for men serving afloat. Then as to relative rank. In 1913 Marine officers when embarking on His Majesty's ships were given a higher relative rank with respect to naval officers to make their seniority more closely allied to that of naval officers of corresponding age in the Service. That, I understand, has been much appreciated in the Royal Marines. Again, this year the Commandants of Royal Marine Divisions were granted the rank of Brigadier-Generals. With regard to the general scope of the employment of Royal Marine officers, of late years a great deal has been done to improve their position in this respect. Ashore every encouragement is

given to Marine officers to qualify at the Staff College, the Royal Naval War College, and the Ordnance College, and other instructional courses are organised both for the Navy and the Army; and many Marine officers are now employed on the staff of the Army in the Ordnance Department and the War College and on the War Staff at the Admiralty. So that whatever grievance there may have been in the past with regard to the appointment of Marine officers on the same level as other officers of the Army and Navy, that grievance has to a great extent disappeared.

Then, with regard to their work afloat, the duties of Marine officers have been increasingly assimilated to those of executive officers on board ship; they are more and more taking their place in carrying out naval duties afloat, such as being on the bridge and so forth, and the whole tendency is to assimilate the two services to equal position when they are serving afloat. Marine officers are employed as Intelligence officers on various foreign stations and in wireless telegraphy duties in the Fleet itself. They are also employed as physical training officers in ships in conjunction with naval officers, and as musketry instructors. As regards the position of General officers in the Royal Marines, it was, I believe, felt to be somewhat of a grievance that General officers were not employed on Staff work, and last year the Admiralty approached the War Office on the subject with a view to concerting with them some scheme for the employment of Marine General officers in Staff appointments. The Army Council agreed to consider Marine officers for such appointments, and only recently one General officer of Marines was selected for, and is now in command at, Sierra Leone, and I understand that the claims of other officers will be considered as vacancies occur. Therefore there is every indication that the policy concerted between the Admiralty and the War Office on this subject has not only attained already a definite result in the appointment of this particular officer, but that other appointments will be considered as vacancies arise.

I hope I have said enough to show that the Corps of Royal Marines, of which, as the House will remember, His Majesty the King is Colonel-in-Chief, is not by any means, as perhaps the noble Lord would have led your Lordships to believe, left out in the cold or not considered. On the contrary, the

Admiralty and the War Office are fully conscious of the great and valuable services which this distinguished corps has performed, and they are prepared, as they always have been, to consider any point of grievance which might arise with a view to remedying it. I really do not think the noble Lord has made out any case for the inquiry for which he asks, and I hope, especially in the present circumstances, he will see his way to withdraw his request.

LORD LATYMER: The noble Lord has not said anything about the question of honours or that of awards.

LORD WIMBORNE: I was not aware that the noble Lord was going to raise those points. I will consider them and communicate with him.

LORD LATYMER: I gladly accede to the noble Lord's request not to press for the appointment of a Committee.

STEAMSHIP "AQUITANIA."

House of Commons, November 24.

Hansard.

MR. WATT asked the First Lord of the Admiralty at what date the steamer *Aquitania* was launched and what date was ready for sea; what was the price reported to be paid for her by her owners; at what date was she taken over by the Government, and how much money was spent on gutting her out and fitting her for the Admiralty's work; is the Government under contract to replace the whole of the fittings, &c., taken out of her; and, if so, will he say what it is estimated such replacement will cost his Department?

THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA): The *Aquitania* was launched on April 21st, 1913. She was ready for sea about May 30th, 1914, that being the date of starting her first voyage. The Admiralty have no knowledge of the price paid by the Cunard Company for the vessel. She was taken over by the Admiralty on July 31st, 1914. The work of removing superfluous woodwork from the ship, and fitting her out for Admiralty purposes, was carried out by the Cunard Company, the figures of the actual cost not yet being available. Liability as to replacement of fittings, &c., is set forth in the agreement with the company, Command

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Paper, No. 1703, of 1903. Negotiations are now in progress with the company as to the extent of those liabilities.

MERCHANT SHIPPING.

House of Commons, November 24.

SIR GEORGE TOULMIN asked the Prime Minister *Hansard.* whether he is aware that there is at the present moment a considerable demand for merchant shipping; and whether, in order to meet this demand, he can initiate steps for the prompt sale of all merchant ships prizes of war, thus enabling them to be utilised at once for the carriage of merchandise?

DR. MACNAMARA: There is a lack of shipping, and it would be to some extent relieved by the prompt sale of the prizes. The whole matter is receiving careful attention.

NAVAL CASUALTIES.

House of Commons, November 25.

MR. CHURCHILL (in reply to Mr. Nield): The following *Hansard.* is a statement showing all casualties (killed, wounded, missing, and interned) in the Royal Navy and Royal Marines, including the Royal Naval Division, since the beginning of the war:

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[No

Date.	Ship, etc.	Engagements, etc.	Officers.			Men.		
			Killed.	Wounded.	Missing or Interned.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing or Interned.
Aug. 6 ..	H.M.S. <i>Amphion</i>	Mined	1	7	—	148	25	—
Aug. 22 ..	H.M.S. <i>Kennel</i> ..	Action off Tsing-tau	—	—	—	4	6	—
Aug. 27 ..	H.M.S. <i>Highflyer</i>	Action with <i>Kaiser Wilhelm der Grosse</i> .	—	—	—	1	5	—
Aug. 28 ..	Trawlers <i>Crathie</i> and <i>T. D. Irvine</i> .	Mined	—	1	—	5	8	—
Aug. 28 ..	H.M.S. <i>Arethusa</i>	Action in Heligoland Bight	1	1	—	10	15	—
Aug. 28 ..	H.M.S. <i>Laertes</i> ..		—	—	—	2	8	—
Aug. 28 ..	H.M.S. <i>Laurel</i> ..		1	1	—	10	11	—
Aug. 28 ..	H.M.S. <i>Liberty</i> ..		1	—	—	7	10	—
Aug. 28 ..	H.M.S. <i>Druid</i> ..		—	—	—	—	1	—
Aug. 28 ..	H.M.S. <i>Fearless</i>	Mined	—	—	—	—	8	—
Aug. 28 ..	H.M.S. <i>Phenix</i> ..		—	—	—	—	1	—
Sept. 2 ..	Trawler <i>Eyrie</i> ..		1	—	—	6	—	—
Sept. 3 ..	H.M.S. <i>Speedy</i> ..		—	1	—	1	2	—
Sept. 3 ..	Trawler <i>Linsdell</i>		1	—	—	4	—	—
Sept. 5 ..	H.M.S. <i>Pathfinder</i>	Torpedoed	9	2	—	250	14	—
Sept. 11 ..	Royal Australian Navy.	Landing party on Island of New Pommern.	1	1	—	2	2	—
Sept. 11 ..	H.M.S. <i>Dwarf</i> ..	West Coast of Africa	—	—	—	1	—	—
Sept. 14 ..	R.N. Air Service	Aeroplane accident	1	—	—	—	—	—
Sept. 14 ..	A.M.C. <i>Carmania</i>	Action with <i>Cap Trafalgar</i>	—	1	—	9	5	—
Sept. 20 ..	H.M.S. <i>Pegasus</i> ..	Action with <i>Königsberg</i> ..	2	5	—	32	56	—
Sept. 22 ..	H.M.S. <i>Aboukir</i>	Torpedoed	25	—	—	502	—	—
Sept. 22 ..	H.M.S. <i>Cressy</i> ..		25	—	—	535	—	—
Sept. 22 ..	H.M.S. <i>Hogue</i> ..		12	—	—	360	—	—
Sept. 23 ..	H.M.S. <i>Cumberland</i>	Reconnoitring Mungo Bay in picket boat.	—	1	—	—	—	—
Sept. 23 ..	R.N. Air Service	Transport work in Belgium ..	—	1	—	—	2	—
Sept. 28 ..	R.N. Air Service	Armoured car support in Belgium	—	1	—	—	—	—
Sept. 29 ..	R.N. Air Service	Lost in seaplane 77	2	—	—	—	—	—
Oct. 4-9	R.N. Division ..	Operations in Belgium and at Antwerp.	5	4	5 prisoners interned	32	189	967 missing 1,524 interned

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DARTMOUTH CADETS (PROMOTION.)

[Nov.

House of Commons, November 25.

Hansard. MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is aware of the diversity in the promotion of the Dartmouth naval cadets to the rank of midshipmen, and that, for instance, some first-term boys, who could not possibly know anything of officers' duties, were promoted midshipmen, dating from August 2nd; and that some fourth and fifth-term boys were appointed, dating from September 22nd, after the cruiser disasters, thus ranking for all time in the Navy as juniors to the first-term boys previously promoted; and whether he will inquire into the whole question of seniority in future years which has arisen from his action in regard to the Dartmouth cadets?

THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE BOARD OF ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA): I am aware of the diversity in promotion mentioned by the hon. Member. It is, however, not a fact that cadets of any term can be passed over in their future career by cadets of a lower term on account of the seniority given them as midshipmen. A circular will shortly be issued to the Fleet containing regulations which will allay the anxiety as to the future of these young officers apparently existing.

NAVAL BRIGADE.

House of Commons, November 25.

Hansard. LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether he is aware that the members of the Naval Brigade now interned in Holland lost the whole of their kits at Antwerp; whether he is aware that these men allotted most of their pay to those dependent upon them, and are therefore unable to provide themselves with comforts; whether money orders can be sent through the post offices to prisoners of the Naval Brigade; and, if so, can the Admiralty send the interned men their pay?

DR. MACNAMARA: All the kits lost by the Naval Brigade in Antwerp are being replaced by the Government and supplies of warm clothing similar to those issued to the Fleet in Home waters are being sent to Holland. It is the case that a considerable number of the brigade had allotted

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their pay, but letters and parcels are being sent to them free of postage charges, and my information is that officers and men are being treated with great consideration and humanity by the Netherlands Government. The question whether they may receive any part of their pay in excess of the payments that are being made by the Netherlands Government is under consideration, but pending a settlement all allotments declared are being paid, separation allowances are being issued, and those interned are being credited with the full pay of their rank or rating.

LORD C. BERESFORD: Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that there is considerable anxiety among the dependants of officers and men of the Naval Brigade, more particularly with regard to casualties, and that that anxiety has been considerably increased since the statement of the First Lord? Can he inform the House of the large number of missing, of whom no account has been given? Can he give—

MR. SPEAKER: The Noble Lord ought to give notice of that.

NORTH SEA PATROLS (STEAM DRIFTERS).

House of Commons, November 25.

MR. COWAN asked the Secretary to the Admiralty *Hansard.* whether his attention has been called to the fact that the Admiralty, while employing a considerable number of Peterhead steam drifters for patrol purposes in the North Sea, is not similarly employing any Fraserburgh steam drifters, notwithstanding the fact that the whole of the Fraserburgh fishing fleet is at present laid up on account of the War; and whether he will now take steps to provide for the employment by the Admiralty of a proportion of Fraserburgh steam drifters in order to more equitably distribute, as between different ports, moneys expended by the Admiralty for such service?

DR. MACNAMARA: The suggestion of my hon. Friend will be borne in mind.

MR. COWAN: Will the right hon. Gentleman now give me an answer to the letter which I wrote to him on October 20th on this very urgent matter?

DR. MACNAMARA: If my hon. Friend has not had a reply in writing, he will have one.

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THE NAVAL DISASTER IN THE PACIFIC.

[Nov

House of Commons, November 25.

Hansard.

MR. CHARLES ROBERTS (on behalf of the Prime Minister) replied as follows to a question by the Earl of Ronaldshay as to whether the Republics of Colombia and Ecuador were guilty of a breach of neutrality in connection with the naval battle in which H.M.S. *Good Hope* and H.M.S. *Monmouth* were lost: Information in the possession of His Majesty's Government indicates that the Governments of Colombia and Ecuador have, in certain respects, failed to observe an attitude of strict neutrality, and that their failure to do so is likely to be detrimental to the interests of this country.

In the case of Colombia, the principal cause of complaint has reference to the high-power wireless telegraph station at Cartagena. Mr. Bowle, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bogotá, has repeatedly endeavoured, since the outbreak of war, to induce the Colombian Government either to remove the German staff from the station and to institute strict control to prevent the passage of messages of an unneutral nature, or, alternatively, to close the station completely. He has also made every effort to secure the adoption of measures by the Colombian Government which will effectively prevent the use of wireless installations by belligerent merchant ships lying in Colombian ports:

As the reports received from Mr. Bowle left it in doubt whether the steps taken by the Colombian Government, in consequence of his urgent and repeated representations, were of an effective nature, Captain Gaunt, Naval Attaché to His Majesty's Embassy at Washington, was sent to Colombia for the purpose of ascertaining the true position. Captain Gaunt reported, under date of September 28th, that the wireless station at Cartagena was working nominally under censorship, but was in reality entirely subject to German influence, of which he considered it very important to obtain the removal. He also reported, under date of October 8th, that German steamers in Colombian ports, though their wireless installations had ostensibly been dismantled, had been continuing to use them with the attachment of a muffler.

It appeared to His Majesty's Government that further

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representations to the Colombian Government, through His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Bogotá, were unlikely to be of any avail, and they therefore decided to appeal, in conjunction with the French Government, to the good offices of the United States Government, asking them to use their influence at Bogotá to secure a more correct observance of the obligations of Colombian neutrality, and stating that, in the event of Colombia continuing in her existing attitude, the allied Governments might be obliged, in self-defence, to take such measures as they deemed necessary for the protection of their interests.

A similar communication was also made to the United States Government in respect of Ecuador, the grounds in this case being : (1) that the Ecuadorean Minister for Foreign Affairs had himself informed Mr. Jerome, His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Quito, and his French colleague, on October 4th, that German warships had converted the Galápagos Islands, belonging to Ecuador, into a naval base, and (2) that the Ecuadorean Government had failed to comply with the request of the British and French Legations that proper control should be exercised over the wireless station at Guayaquil to prevent its use as an intelligence centre for belligerents. Mr. Jerome and his French colleague were both of opinion that further diplomatic protests to the Ecuadorean Government would be useless, and His Majesty's Government, not being prepared to acquiesce in the disregard of Ecuador's obligations of neutrality, judged it expedient to refer the matter to the United States Government, as explained above.

The latter have consented to make a communication to the two South American Governments, but I am as yet unaware what result has attended their action. The Note addressed to the United States Government by His Majesty's Ambassador at Washington contained no assertion of the nature mentioned in the question.

CHIEF WRITERS (PROMOTION).

House of Commons, November 25.

LORD C. BERESFORD asked the First Lord of the *Hansard*. Admiralty if he will state why chief writers in the Navy are not allowed to attain commissioned rank ; whether, in 1913,

there was a shortage of accountant officers, and whether since that time the Admiralty have endeavoured to provide for this shortage by the special entry of assistant clerks from the shore who, after three and a half years' service, would be promoted to the rank of assistant-paymaster, and thus provide the accountant officers required for peace service and assistant-paymasters R.N.R. (formerly bank clerks, pursers and assistant-pursers of the mercantile marine, and clerks in ordinary commercial life); whether none of these new entry assistant-paymasters have any knowledge of naval accountant work, with the result that official reports have been sent to the Admiralty to the effect that they are not capable of performing the duties required of them; whether he is aware that 200 chief writers have been recommended for promotion; and if he will explain why these chief writers have not been promoted to a rank for which they are qualified?

DR. MACNAMARA: The question of providing the necessary number of officers for the Accountant Branch was under the consideration of the Admiralty when war broke out, and this question, in common with others, had to be deferred. The branch is manned in peace by officers entered as assistant clerks and by warrant writers, supplemented by assistant paymasters of the Royal Naval Reserve. To meet the growing requirements of the Fleet, additional entries of assistant clerks have been made in the past two years, and additional assistant paymasters, R.N.R., have been entered from the shore to meet the heavy demands made upon this branch. Generally speaking it is found that with a little experience the latter officers do their work very well, though in one or two isolated cases adverse reports have been received. The number of chief writers now serving who were recommended for warrant rank by the last half-yearly returns available was 113. To make any large number of promotions from chief writer would seriously deplete their numbers at a time when every available writer is required for his ordinary work, but it is under consideration at the present time to make some advancements. I regret, however, that I am unable to hold out any prospect of immediate advancement to commissioned rank.

LORD C. BERESFORD: Can the right hon. Gentleman

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say how soon he will be able to advance these men? They ought to have been advanced before.

DR. MACNAMARA: The matter is under consideration. I should not like to give an answer now.

THE LOSSES IN THE FIGHTS ROUND TSINGTAU.

November 25.

ACCORDING to the news available up till to-day the *K.D.*, number of prisoners belonging to the garrison taken during Nov. 25, the fights at Tsingtau and at the fall of the fortress amounts ^{1914.} to about 4,250, including 600 wounded. The number of killed is said to be about 170, among whom are 6 officers. On board the Austro-Hungarian cruiser *Kaiserin Elisabeth*, 1 lieutenant and 8 men are wounded, and 8 men killed.

The treatment of the prisoners in Japan is said to be good.

The Japanese Government expects to supply lists of names of the dead, wounded and prisoners at an early date.

TURKISH REPORT ON OPERATIONS AT BASRAH.

Constantinople, December 25.

AN official report from Headquarters says: After the *ibid.* action at Basrah on November 19th (*see* p. 280), which ended with heavy losses in killed and wounded on the English side, the enemy received reinforcements and advanced slowly along the river under cover of the fire of his gunboats. Our troops awaited the enemy in a new position where his guns and his ships could not help him. The ship *Nilufer* has been sunk off Kilia as the result of an accident.

DESTRUCTION OF H.M.S. "BULWARK."

House of Commons, November 26.

MR. CHURCHILL: I regret to say that I have bad news *Hansard.* for the House. The *Bulwark* battleship, which was lying in Sheerness this morning, blew up at 7.53 a.m. The Vice and Rear-Admirals who were present have reported their conviction that it was an internal magazine explosion which rent the ship asunder. There was, apparently, no upheaval of water. The ship had entirely disappeared when the smoke

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had cleared away. An inquiry will be held to-morrow, which may possibly throw more light on the occurrence.

The loss of the ship does not sensibly affect the military position, but I regret to say the loss of life is very severe. Only twelve men are saved. All the officers and the rest of the crew, who I suppose amounted to between 700 and 800, have perished.

I think the House would wish me to express on their behalf the deep sorrow with which the House heard the news, and their sympathy with those who have lost their relatives and friends.

House of Lords, November 26.

Hansard.

VISCOUNT MIDLETON: My Lords, I should like to ask the noble Lord who represents the Admiralty whether he has any information he can give the House with regard to the alleged loss of H.M.S. *Bulwark*.

LORD WIMBORNE: My Lords, I have to say that H.M.S. *Bulwark* was blown up at eight o'clock this morning while at anchor in the Medway. Both the Admirals on the spot are of opinion that the cause was internal magazine explosion. An inquiry will be held to-morrow. I regret to add that all the officers on board lost their lives and that twelve only of the ship's company were saved.

Press Bureau, December 15.

Times,
Dec. 16,
1914.

The Court of Inquiry which was appointed to inquire into the loss of His Majesty's Ship *Bulwark* has now reported, and it is clear from the evidence which has been produced that the explosion which caused the loss of the ship was due to an accidental ignition of ammunition on board the ship.

There is no evidence to support a suggestion that the explosion was due either to treachery on board the ship or to an act of the enemy.

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STATE OF BRITISH AND GERMAN SHIPPING.

TABLE issued by the Board of Trade on November 26th, showing the state of British and German shipping respectively after sixteen weeks of war :

	No. of Steamships of over 100 tons gross.	Percentage of Total Number.	Gross Tonnage.	Percentage of Total Gross Tonnage.
Total Number :				
British	10,123	100	20,523,706	100
German	2,090	100	5,134,720	100
Unavailable for various causes :				
British :				
Captured	49	1·9	585,551	2·9
Detained in German ports	75			
Held up in Baltic and Black Sea	71			
Total.. .. .	195			
German :				
Captured	80	58·4	4,584,926	89·3
Detained in British or Allied ports	166			
Seeking refuge in neutral ports	646			
In German ports	329			
Total.. .. .	1,221			
Plying :				
British	9,928	98·1	20,122,173	97·1
Plying or not accounted for :				
German :				
Known to be at sea	10	41·6	549,794	10·7
Ships over 500 tons not accounted for	125			
Steam trawlers not accounted for	353			
Small coasters not accounted for	381			
Total.. .. .	869			

NOTICE TO MARINERS.

No. 1781 of the year 1914.

UNITED KINGDOM.

*New Pilotage stations to be established at certain Ports on L.G.,
account of defensive Minefields.* Dec 1,

Former Notice.—No. 1752 of 1914 ; hereby cancelled. 1916.

In view of the extension of the system of Mine defence,

notice is hereby given that on and after November 27th, Pilotage will be compulsory at the following ports for all vessels (including fishing vessels) which have a draught of over eight feet, and that it will be highly dangerous for any vessel to enter or leave such ports without a pilot. Fishing and other small vessels having a draught of over eight feet should assemble at the Pilotage stations and will be conducted into and out of port in groups.

(1) RIVER HUMBER.—All incoming vessels must call for a pilot at a station which is to be established seven miles E.S.E. (magnetic) from Spurn Point.

Outgoing vessels are to discharge their pilots at the same station.

(2) RIVER TYNE.—All incoming vessels from the northward must call for a pilot off Blyth, and those from the southward off the River Wear.

Outgoing vessels are to discharge their pilots off one or the other of these places.

(3) FIRTH OF FORTH.—All incoming vessels must call for a pilot at a station to be established on the Isle of May.

Outgoing vessels are to discharge their pilots at the same station.

It will be dangerous for any vessel to be under way to the westward of the Isle of May without a pilot.

(4) MORAY FIRTH.—All vessels bound to Cromarty or Inverness must call for a pilot at Wick or Burghead

Outgoing vessels are to discharge their pilots at one or the other of these places.

It will be dangerous for any vessel to be under way to the south-westward of a line joining Findhorn and Tarbetness without a pilot.

(5) SCAPA FLOW.—All entrances are dangerous.

Examination services have been established in the entrances to Hoxa and Hoy sounds; vessels wishing to enter must communicate with the Examination vessel and follow the instructions received from her very carefully.

The only vessels permitted to enter Hoy sound from

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the westward are those bound for Stromness ; vessels cannot enter Scapa Flow from Stromness.

Authority.—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

By Command of their Lordships,

J. F. PARRY,
Hydrographer.

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,

London, November 26th, 1914.

PRIZE MONEY (ROYAL NAVY).

House of Commons, November 26.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if he can say how much prize money is now lying to the credit of the Navy ; and when the new system of prize bounties, promised by the Royal Proclamation of August 28th, 1914, will be announced ? *Hansard.*

THE PARLIAMENTARY SECRETARY TO THE ADMIRALTY (DR. MACNAMARA) : No information as to the amount of the prize fund can be given as a great many cases are still under adjudication. The system of award is under consideration, but the appropriation of the fund will not be determined until the end of the War.

MR. JOYNSON-HICKS : Has not this been under consideration now for three months ?

DR. MACNAMARA : Certainly, and we have been considering the system of the War as a basis of future distribution.

MR. GERSHOM STEWART : Will there be no distribution until this War is over ?

DR. MACNAMARA : I do not know ; I must have notice of that.

PENSIONER SIGNALMEN.

House of Commons, November 26.

SIR C. KINLOCH-COOKE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty whether the Admiralty order stating that pensioner signalmen are to be given naval rates of pay and such allowances as they may be entitled to under the Naval Regulations covers the cases of all such signalmen employed in similar services since the War began ? *Hansard.*

DR. MACNAMARA : An Admiralty order was issued

on November 16th authorising the payment of active service pay and allowances to pensioner signalmen employed in the Naval Port Signal Stations during the period of hostilities, in lieu of the civilian wages which they have received in time of peace. This decision will have effect as from August 2nd.

FRIEDRICHSHAFEN ZEPPELIN SHEDS (BOMBARDMENT).

House of Commons, November 26.

Hansard.

MR. BOOTH asked the Prime Minister if instructions were given to the aviators who bombarded the Zeppelin sheds at Friedrichshafen to avoid neutral territory; and what is the policy of His Majesty's Government with regard to the passage of warlike machines over the land or territorial waters of neutral countries?

THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (MR. CHURCHILL): My right hon. Friend has asked me to reply to this question. Instructions were given to the Naval Flying officers who attacked the Zeppelin factory at Friedrichshafen to avoid neutral territory, and the course drawn on the maps supplied to them should have taken them well clear of Switzerland. When machines are flying at a great height it is almost impossible for any but a skilled observer to determine with any accuracy the course the aircraft are taking unless he is directly beneath them. No agreement was reached at the Paris Conference, 1910, in regard to the passage of belligerent aircraft over neutral territory.

PAYMENTS TO DEPENDANTS OF SEAMEN.

House of Commons, November 26.

Hansard.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the President of the Board of Trade, if in connection with the payment of allowances to dependants of officers and seamen employed on captured and detained vessels, the Board have now given further consideration to the desirability of extending the scheme so as to cover payments to relatives of officers and men who might lose their lives and compensation for loss of effects?

MR. RUNCIMAN: The question whether the insurance

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scheme can be extended so as to cover payments to dependants of seamen who lose their lives owing to hostilities but who are not already provided for under the Workmen's Compensation Act is being considered, and I hope to come to a decision very shortly. I will give consideration to the question of insurance of seamen's effects.

ASSISTANT PAYMASTERS.

House of Commons, November 26.

LORD CHARLES BERESFORD asked the First Lord *Hansard.* of the Admiralty if he will state the number of commissions as assistant paymaster, Royal Naval Reserve, that have been granted to men from the shore since the outbreak of war; whether any official representations have been made as to the inefficiency of any assistant paymasters, Royal Naval Reserve, since the outbreak of war; how many chief writers now serving were recommended for promotion by the latest half-yearly returns available; whether he is aware that all the highly trained and recommended chief writers are fully competent to carry out the duties of an assistant paymaster; how many have been promoted to that rank since the declaration of war; whether official representations have been made as to the desirability of promotion of chief writers in place of granting commissions to inexperienced men entered from the shore without examination; and, if so, what are the Admiralty proposals and when is it intended to give effect to them?

DR. MACNAMARA: The answer to the first part of the question is 178, of whom 53 were serving as pursers or assistant pursers in ships taken over from the mercantile marine. The second and third parts of the question were dealt with in the reply I gave to the Noble Lord yesterday. I am fully aware that there are many deserving chief writers who are competent to carry out the duties of assistant paymaster, and their claims to advancement to warrant writer are at present under consideration.

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FRENCH REPORT ON NAVAL SITUATION.

[No

• *Bordeaux, November 27.*

Times,
Nov. 28,
1914.

AN official Navy bulletin says :

In the Mediterranean the French and British squadrons continue to block the Adriatic and the Dardanelles, and to protect the coasts of Egypt and the Suez Canal.

In the North Sea British and French ships have made a reconnaissance of the German batteries established on the Belgian coast.

The German cruisers in the Pacific do not appear to have left Chilian waters since the fight of November 1st.—*Reuter.*

ROYAL FLEET NAVAL RESERVE (MOUSTACHES).

House of Commons, November 27.

Hansard.

MR. WILLIAM THORNE asked the First Lord of the Admiralty if it has been the custom to allow the men serving in the Royal Fleet Naval Reserve to wear a moustache ; if he is aware that an order has just been given out that those men must shave off their moustaches ; and if he intends taking any action in the matter ?

DR. MACNAMARA : The wearing of a moustache only is forbidden by the King's Regulations, but this is not usually enforced in the case of Reserve men during peace. On being " called out " they become a part of the Navy proper, and as such would be expected to conform to the Regulations of the Service. If the men objected to shaving their moustaches, they are at liberty to discontinue the use of the razor altogether.

BRITISH MERCANTILE MARINE (ALIEN MASTERS
AND OFFICERS).

House of Commons, November 27.

Hansard.

LORD C. BERESFORD asked the President of the Board of Trade if he can state the number of alien masters and officers who possess the Board of Trade certificate as masters or officers of British ships ; how many of these are alien enemies ; and whether the Board of Trade propose taking any steps to secure that the issue of these certificates is limited to British seamen, in view of the network of communications

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scattered widespread over the ocean, and seeing that merchant ships are more or less the eyes of the Fleet?

MR. RUNCIMAN: I am unable to state the number of alien masters and officers who at present possess Board of Trade certificates as master, mate or engineer in the British mercantile marine, as deaths of holders of certificates are not necessarily reported to the Board. The average number of certificates of competency issued during the twenty years 1896 to 1913 was 4,682 per annum, of which eighty-nine or 1.9 per cent. were issued to aliens and fifteen or 0.3 per cent. to subjects of the three Governments with which we are at present at war. I may add that steps have been taken to prevent the issue of certificates of competency to subjects of enemy States, and to remove all such subjects from British ships, whether officers or crew.

MOTION FOR ADJOURNMENT.

House of Commons, November 27.

LORD C. BERESFORD: Before the House adjourns I *Hansard*. want to bring before Members and the country some matters connected with the Royal Navy. It would be impossible for me to speak of anything in connection with the Royal Navy for the moment without referring to the terrible disaster which occurred yesterday. A similar catastrophe has never before occurred in our Navy, because we do not know the cause of it. In the case of the *Royal George*, which capsized in 1781—a somewhat similar case—the cause is well-known. All I would say about it is this: that I deprecate most strongly any conclusions being formed at present either in the House or the country as to the cause. My brother officers are on their trial by court martial, and the Court of Inquiry is endeavouring to find out the cause of the disaster. I would particularly ask that nobody in the Press or in the country in the present state of excitement about alien enemies, should think that this case is one of treachery. It is much better to wait with a dignified calm until by the constituted authorities we find out really what occurred. The loss to myself is most painful. The *Bulwark* was one of my own flagships. Every seaman has a natural affection for

his ship, and of all the ships I have had I never had more affection than for the *Bulwark*. But the thought of the loss of the ship is eclipsed by the thought of the loss of the officers and men, and our sympathy is with the dependants of those who have lost their lives. I would ask the House to consider that these officers and men have lost their lives in the service of their country quite as much—and the sympathy should be quite as great—as if they had lost them by shot or shell.

What I particularly want to speak about is this : It has come to my knowledge—and I think many hon. Members will concur in what I say—that there is a doubt in the public mind, and a want of confidence in the Navy to carry out its duties. Things have occurred which have caused that doubt. But without a doubt the Navy is really stronger now than before we went into war both in ships, trained men, and in organisation. The Navy is not in sight, but we sometimes hear or read of what it is doing. The Navy has done everything ! The Navy, with its silent vigil, its attention to duty, to discipline, and the loyalty of its officers and men has enabled us to carry out this War at all. It has enabled us, with a certain amount of luck, to do this. The German military bureau hurried the War to such an extent that the naval bureau was not consulted, or we might have had a very serious time if the German naval bureau had got their armoured cruisers into our trade routes. But we do not want to discuss what might have been, but what has happened ; and to ask what is the Navy doing is not to give those officers and men credit for having enabled us so far as it goes at present to carry on the War. So far as invasion goes, in my humble opinion, people need not be the least alarmed, but every precaution should be taken against what may occur. My opinion is that the invasion of this country at the present time, now that we are organised for war, is more or less impossible. With regard to the loss of confidence which I have described, if it exists, as to the Navy not being able to carry out its duties in all and every way, that loss of confidence, in my opinion, is absolutely unwarrantable. The Navy will be able to carry out its duties in every way and in every point for which it is instituted to carry them out. The reason why that sentiment exists is this. A lot of incidents occurred which were more or less disasters, but the officers and men

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of the Fleet are in no way responsible for any of these incidents. There was a leading article in *The Times* of Monday, which rather conveyed the sentiments of the Fleet, and certainly conveyed my sentiments. I am not here to discuss or criticise what occurred in any way whatever. This is not the time. We have got to support authority with all the energy and ability in our power. My only point is to exercise whatever influence I possess to see that our confidence in the Fleet, which ought to exist, and does exist, is in no way removed. The incidents to which I referred are these: There was first the three *Cressys*. There, again, the Navy had nothing whatever to do with that. I am not going to ask why or wherefore, or who is to blame. This is not the time to criticise, if mistakes were made. We must back up authority as well as we can. I am only referring to these incidents in order to say that the men of the Fleet are in no way responsible—

MR. SPEAKER: Message from the Lords

LORD C. BERESFORD (*continuing*): I was referring to the three *Cressys*. The next case was the escape of the *Goeben*, a serious incident which led to the Turkish Declaration of War. The House will remember that the admiral in this case was acquitted of any neglect of duty with regard to that ship. Then there was the loss of the *Pegasus*. With regard to the Pacific action, I will tell the right hon. Gentleman opposite that generally in the Service we regret that some mark of esteem and sympathy for that great admiral (Admiral Cradock) was not brought forward at the instance of the Government. I think that was a mistake, and probably it was unintentional, but we felt it very greatly in the Service. He was one of the most brilliant of our admirals, and his pluck was impossible to overrate. He was a very capable officer. He was very popular and a great leader of men, and there was no better admiral in the whole Service. I say this with some feeling, because I had the honour of commanding a fleet in which he was my captain. Some small attempt has been made to throw blame upon this admiral, but again I say that the Service bitterly resents any remarks of that sort. He fought a superior force and he had ineffective ships and reserve crews, but he maintained the old tradition of our Navy, Are we to be told that on any occasion when we are fighting a

superior force that orders must never be disregarded? It is well-known that our brilliant actions and our Empire have been brought about by some sort of neglect of orders in the presence of the enemy, always with the knowledge that though you may go down yourself the opposing force does not escape damage. Admiral Cradock's action contained the best traditions of the Service, and anything that is said about him of this nature would be resented most violently by me and the whole of the British Navy. With regard to the Antwerp incident, this is not the time to discuss it. This is not the time to give our opinions as to what authority did or did not do. Mistakes are being made, but until the end of the War, and until it has been fought to a finish, we must support authority with all the effort that we can in all parts of the House. I say that the confidence in the Fleet must rest supreme. The only feeling we should have at present is one of gratitude to the Navy for the position in which we find ourselves, of enabling our gallant and heroic Army to get to the front to fight our battles on shore. We must not underrate our enemy. That German fleet will come out in my opinion. She will never line up in line of battle. She may come out in a fog, or she may come out and try and fight a *mélée*, and in that case nobody knows what might happen, but I can assure the House that whatever happens, luck or no luck, we shall win in the end. I would ask the right hon. Gentleman to remember this. The Duke of Wellington laid down a very fine maxim in fighting: "Tell your admirals or your generals what your object is, but do not give orders to them how they are to carry out that object, as a circumstance may occur in which the general or the admiral by obeying your orders will defeat the object." That is a fine sentiment. There cannot be any better for fighting, and I hope the administrative authority will, as is their duty, make out the policy, but will not tell the admirals in command how they are to carry out that policy. I say once more that any little doubt as to the power of the Navy, the discipline of the Navy, and the efficiency of the Navy ought to be removed. There ought to be no doubt cast on those three qualifications by the incidents that have occurred. I say to the House respectfully, "Trust the Royal Navy, and it will never fail you."

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THE FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY (MR. CHURCHILL): I certainly have no cause to complain of the tone of the Noble Lord's (Lord Charles Beresford) brief remarks, and I must say that I think the principle on which he goes, that everything that goes right is to be attributed to the Navy and everything that goes wrong is to be attributed elsewhere is an exceedingly sound principle, one with which I am quite content, and one which cannot be too widely adopted. The Noble Lord sees, as most Members of the House know, that the time has not yet arrived when we can discuss with any profit some and probably most of the particular incidents to which he has referred. It is no use attempting to discuss the rights and wrongs, if rights and wrongs there be, of particular actions unless all the facts can be disclosed. If I take the incidents to which he has referred—the action in the Pacific, the loss of the cruisers off the Dutch coast, or the expedition to Antwerp—as good examples of his principle I would say that before it is possible to form a judgment it is necessary that the orders should be disclosed, that the telegrams which have passed should be disclosed, and that the dispositions which prevail, not only at the particular point, but generally throughout the theatre of war, should also in their broad outline and even in considerable detail be made known. That is clearly impossible at the present time. It would be very dangerous for the Minister representing the Admiralty to be drawn into what would necessarily become a controversial, and what might easily become an acrimonious discussion of these matters. And, above all, to disclose partially what has taken place would only lead to demands for fuller and further publication, which would be very prejudicial, not only to the actual conduct of the war but to the general interests of the Naval Service, during the course of the war.

It is not possible, however desirable it may be, at present for the public or the House to form any judgment on these matters. The only rule which should guide us in regard to information is that nothing must be published which is against the public interest, or hampers naval or military operations. It is the only rule, and it is a rule which must be capable of wide interpretation. Of course, it would be entirely wrong for a Department or a Minister to use the

term "public interest" on naval and military matters in order to shield the Department or himself from blame or censure. This is a war so serious and formidable in its character that persons ought not to be spared. If an improvement can be made in any command the officer ought to give way for others who can better discharge the public duty. That is a rule and principle that should not be confined to naval and military officers, but equally to heads of Departments. The Prime Minister is especially charged by the country at this time, and it is his duty, if he considers any improvement can be made in the conduct of a public Department, not to allow any considerations of party association or personal friendship to stand in the way of making any change that is necessary in the public interest.

The Prime Minister in times like these is the servant of the Crown directly and personally responsible that the withholding of information in the public interest shall not be abused by the Departments of State and Ministers specially affected. It is also the desire of the Admiralty to give as much information as is possible on all these matters without prejudice to the interests to which I have referred, and I think we have done so. I think we have done it, and we shall continue to do so whenever the opportunity offers and the season presents itself. Once information has been given about any action or incident I am of opinion that comment upon it should be perfectly free. Criticism is always advantageous. I have derived continued benefit from criticism at all periods of my life, and I do not remember any time when I was ever short of it. But there is a salutary rule about criticism which applies in time of peace as well as in time of war, in private as well as in public things, and that is that criticism should be very restrained when the party criticised is not able to reply, and it is especially so when he is not able to reply without disclosing facts which would do harm to the critic as well as the party criticised if they were disclosed.

But I recognise the great difficulties of the Press during the present war, and I sympathise very keenly with them in the prohibitions and limitations which fence them about on every side, and which from day to day deny them the opportunity of publishing quantities of information which

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reach them—information which is most interesting and which may have been collected in many cases with great trouble and expense. There is often a tendency to underrate the acute discomfort under which our great newspapers are living at the present time, and speaking as one of the heads of one of the combatant departments I feel bound to say that we owe the Press a very great debt, so far as this war has proceeded, for the way in which it has helped, with inconsiderable exceptions and with only momentary lapses, the course of the military operations, and has upheld the interests of the country. I would like to say that I greatly appreciate the kindness and confidence with which the House during this Session has treated the Admiralty and its representatives in not pressing for information on many matters in which the keenest interest is taken, and upon which there is a natural desire to arrive at conclusions and to pronounce judgment.

Ultimately, and as soon as possible, all the facts connected with past operations, and with the administration of the Navy, now and immediately before the war, will be made public in a form in which they can be studied and weighed by the nation. For my part I look forward hopefully to that day. There is, however, one other reason why I think it is not desirable to dwell too much on particular incidents at the present time. The incidents which are seen are a very small proportion of the work which is going forward all over the world, and it would be a great pity if the mind of the public were disproportionately concerned with particular incidents, and if the departments concerned were occupied in defending themselves or in justifying themselves in regard to these incidents. We are waging this war, on which from day to day our vital safety depends, and no one who is concerned with military departments ought to have his attention drawn away from the immediate needs of the military and naval operations for the purpose of going at undue length into matters which lie in the past. I am going in a few words, if the House will permit me, to draw the attention of the House, and through the House the attention of the country, to some of the larger aspects of the naval situation at the present time.

The British Navy was confronted with four main perils. There was first the peril of being surprised at the outbreak of war before we were ready and in our war stations. That

was the greatest peril of all. Once the Fleet was mobilised and in its war station the greatest danger by which it could be assailed had been surmounted. Then there was the danger, which we had apprehended, from the escape on to the High Seas of very large numbers of fast liners of the enemy, equipped with guns for the purpose of commerce destruction. During the last two years the sittings of the Committee of Imperial Defence have been almost unbroken, and we have been concerned almost exclusively with the study of the problems of a great European war, and I have always, on behalf of the Admiralty, pointed out the great danger which we should run if, at the outset of the war, before our cruisers were on their stations, before our means of dealing with such a menace had been fully developed, we had been confronted with a great excursion on to our trade routes of large numbers of armed liners for the purpose of commerce destruction.

That danger has for the present been successfully surmounted. Our estimate before the war of losses in the first two or three months was at least 5 per cent. of our mercantile marine. I am glad to say that the percentage is only 1·9, and the risks have been fully covered under a system of insurance which was brought into force, the premiums on which it has been found possible steadily and regularly to reduce. The third great danger was due to mines. Our enemy have allowed themselves to pursue methods in regard to the scattering of mines on the highways of peaceful commerce that, until the outbreak of this war, we should not have thought would be practised by any civilised Power. And the risks and difficulties which we have had to face from that cause cannot be underrated. But I am glad to tell the House that, although we have suffered losses, and may, no doubt will, suffer more losses, yet I think the danger from mining, even the unscrupulous and indiscriminate mining of the open seas, is one the limits of which can now be discerned, and which can be and is being further restricted and controlled by the measures, the very extensive measures, which have been taken, and are being taken.

Fourthly, there is the danger from submarines. The submarine introduces entirely novel conditions into naval warfare. The old freedom of movement which belongs to the stronger power is affected and restricted in narrow

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waters by the development of this new and formidable arm. There is a difference between military and naval anxiety, which the House will appreciate. A division of soldiers cannot be annihilated by a cavalry patrol. But at any moment a great ship, equal in war power, and as a war unit, to a division or an army, may be destroyed without a single opportunity of its fighting strength being realised, or a man on board having a chance to strike a blow in self-defence. Yet it is necessary for the safety of this country, it is necessary for the supply of its vital materials, that our ships should move with freedom and with hardihood through the seas on their duties, and no one can pretend that anxiety must not always be present to the minds of those who have the responsibility for their direction. It is satisfactory, however, to reflect that our power in submarines is much greater than that of our enemies, and that the only reason why we are not able to produce results on a large scale in regard to them, is that we so seldom are afforded any target to attack.

Those are the four dangers. I do not include among them what some people would perhaps wish to include as a fifth, the danger of oversea invasion, although that is an enterprise full of danger for those who might attempt it. The economic pressure upon Germany continues to develop in a healthy and satisfactory manner. My right hon. Friend the President of the Board of Trade published some remarkable figures⁽¹⁾ yesterday upon the relative condition of British and German trade since the war. Out of 20,500,000 tons of British shipping, 20,122,000 tons are plying, or 97 per cent. of the whole, whereas out of five millions of German tonnage only 549,000 tons remain plying or unaccounted for, and of those plying it is estimated that only ten ships are at present carrying on German commerce on the sea. On the average very nearly one hundred ships per day of over three hundred tons burden arrive and leave the ports of the United Kingdom, and we are not only carrying on our own business effectively but we are applying special restrictions to certain vital commodities required for military purposes by the German and Austro-Hungarian Empires. The German Army depends primarily on its military matériel. The enormous supplies of all kinds of explosives and of all kinds of scientific apparatus directed to warlike purposes which they have prepared in

⁽¹⁾ (See
P. 309).

times of peace gave them then, and gives them to-day, an advantage most marked in both theatres of war. But that advantage will no longer, as time passes, be wholly theirs. Gradually that advantage will change sides. We are able to draw, in virtue of sea-power, from all over the world, for the cause of the Allies everything that is needed to procure the most abundant flow of munitions of war which can possibly be required, and, on the other hand, the deficiencies in essential commodities necessary for the waging of war is already beginning to show itself clearly marked, as far as we can discern, in our enemy's military organisation.

I see no reason at all for any discontent in regard to the protection of British commerce or the restriction which is being placed on the enemy's supplies. Risks, of course, have to be run. The great number of troops which we have had to move to and fro freely across the world and their conveying, have involved serious risks ; and although one's eye is fixed on the mischances which have occurred in this war, knowing as I do all the circumstances and all the incidents which have occurred, I am bound to say that I think we have had a very fair share of the luck. If our enemies did not attack on the high seas on the outbreak of war or just before it, we must presume that it was because they did not consider themselves strong enough to do so ; because then would have been the moment of greatest advantage, when the dispatch of an army to the Continent might have been prevented or delayed. If that moment was not used, it could only be because they were counting upon reducing the British Fleet, by a process of attrition, to a condition of greater equality with their own. We have been at war for four months. I should like to consider how that process of attrition is working. The losses of submarines have been equal, as far as we know ; but, of course, the proportion of loss has been much greater to the Germans than to ourselves, because we have more than double the number of submarines in constant employment. With regard to torpedo-boat destroyers, our boats have shown their enormous superiority in gun power, which, of course, was not unknown before the war. No loss has been experienced by us, while eight or ten of the enemy's vessels have been destroyed. Of the older armoured cruisers we have lost, I think, six,

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and Germany has lost two. But there again the number of vessels of this class which we have disposed was three or four times as great as that of our opponents, and, of course, we have of necessity to expose them more frequently and more openly to possible attacks.

But the most important class of minor vessels is that of fast modern light cruisers. The modern light cruisers which have been built from the year 1903 onwards by Great Britain and Germany, which are of good speed, fast vessels, are a most important factor in the course of the war. At the outset of the war the Germans disposed of twenty-five of these vessels, and we disposed of thirty-six. Since the war begun we have lost two out of our thirty-six, or one-eighteenth of the number. The Germans have lost, or have got shut up—and I am including the *Breslau* in this calculation—practically a quarter of their modern light cruiser strength. These have been joined since the war broke out by a number of new cruisers greater than those which our opponents have lost, so that our strength to-day is vastly greater—beyond all comparison greater—in this important arm than it was at the outset of the war. The prospects for the future are even more satisfactory, because we have an enormous delivery of cruisers rapidly approaching completion, and the possible cruisers which the enemy can get from all sources during the next twelve months cannot exceed half of those on which we can count.

The relative strength in Dreadnoughts has been so often discussed in this House before the war that it may be interesting to review it at the present time, and see how far our arguments of peace time relate to the actual facts which are now disclosed. I may say that, of course, I am giving no information which is not readily accessible to anybody who studied the published Returns of peace times. When the war broke out we mobilised thirty-one Dreadnoughts and Lord Nelsons, and Germany could have had, and I presume did have—if her latest ships were ready—twenty-one Dreadnoughts—battleships and battle-cruisers—so we were just a little under the 60 per cent. which we had always kept before ourselves. I cannot say how many ships have joined the Fleet since. It is a matter of great importance to keep secret the number of vessels which at any

one moment are available with the Flag of the Commander-in-Chief, and it is the duty of every Englishman, every British subject, and every friend of our country, to do his utmost to wrap that fact in secrecy and mystery. Although, however, I cannot tell the number of ships which have joined the flag since the declaration of war, I can say, firstly, that the relative strength of the Fleet is substantially greater now than it was at the outbreak of the war; and, secondly, I can indicate the reinforcement which both countries will receive between now and the end of 1915. The maximum reinforcement which Germany can receive—it is not possible by any human agency to add to these numbers in the period—is three ships on the figure I have given—the *Lützow*, the *Kronprinz*, the *Salamis*, which is a Greek ship which has presumably been taken over.

Two years ago I set up a Committee of the Admiralty to go into the whole question of the acceleration of new construction immediately after the outbreak of war so that the greatest possible number of deliveries could be made in the shortest possible time and very elaborate reports were furnished, and a complete system was worked out in every detail. In carrying out this system we have been aided by the patriotism and energy of the workmen in all the yards, who have strained their physical strength to the utmost, and have, by so doing, made themselves, in fact, the comrades of their fellow citizens who are fighting in the trenches at the front. During this period—between the beginning of the war and the end of 1915—while the Germans will be receiving an accession of three ships we shall receive the following ships: the *Agincourt* and the *Erin*, acquired from Turkey, the *Tiger*, the *Benbow*, the *Emperor of India*, the *Queen Elizabeth*, the *Warspite*, the *Valiant*, the *Barham*, the *Resolution*, the *Ramilies*, the *Revenge*, the *Royal Sovereign*, and the *Malaya*, and the *Ammirente Latorre*, renamed the *Canada*, that we acquired from Chile—fifteen ships in all. All these ships are, of course, of the greatest power of any vessels that have ever been constructed in naval history, and it is no exaggeration to say that we could afford to lose a super-Dreadnought every month for twelve months without any loss occurring to the enemy and yet be in approximately as good a position of superiority as we were at the declaration of the war.

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I hope that these facts will be of comfort to nervous people during the months that lie before us. They prove that so far as any policy of attrition is concerned the results so far, and the forecast so far as we may judge it, are not unsatisfactory to us: nor is there any attrition by wear and tear. The refits of the Fleet and flotillas are being regularly conducted. The health of the sailors is nearly twice as good as in time of peace. Six hundred thousand pounds has been spent by the Admiralty on warm clothing, and I have every reason to believe that the arrangements are thoroughly satisfactory, though, of course, if friends like to send additional comforts, arrangements are made for their reception and distribution. The sailors have received with warm gratitude the separation allowance which the Navy had, always hitherto, been completely denied. The conduct of the Fleet is exemplary, and any crime there is arises mainly among men who have been a long time in civil life, and who have not fully remembered the excellent precepts of their naval training. In the Grand Fleet the conduct of the men is almost perfect. The whole *personnel* of the Navy consists of a most intelligent class of skilled workmen and mechanics. They have studied fully the conditions of the war, and they follow with the closest interest the heroic struggles of our soldiers in the field, and the zeal and enthusiasm with which they are discharging their duties inspires those who lead them with the utmost confidence.

I have thought it right to offer these few remarks of a general character to the House because despondent views are prejudicial to the public interest, and ought not to be tolerated by persons in the responsible position of Members of Parliament while they are in any public situation. There is absolutely no reason whatever for nervousness, anxiety, or alarm. We are now separating for an adjournment of some weeks, which will probably be very important weeks in the history of this war. There is every reason for complete confidence in the power of the Navy to give effect to the wishes and the purposes of the State and the Empire. We have powerful Allies on the seas. The Russian Navy is developing in strength; the French Navy has complete command of the Mediterranean, and the Japanese Navy has effective command of the Pacific, and the utmost cor-

diality characterises the working of the Admiralties of the four countries. But even if we were single-handed, as we were in the days of the Napoleonic wars, we should have no reason to despair of our capacity—no doubt we should suffer discomfort and privation and loss—but we should have no reason to despair of our capacity to go on indefinitely, drawing our supplies from wherever we needed them, and transporting our troops wherever we required them, and to continue this process with a strength which would grow stronger with each month the war continued until in the end, and perhaps not at any very distant date, the purposes for which we are fighting are achieved.

MR. BONAR LAW: As I listened to the speech of the right hon. Gentleman I had no intention of rising to address the House after he had spoken, but I feel that the statement he has made is so important that it might be misunderstood if some words were not spoken on behalf of the Opposition. I agree with every word the right hon. Gentleman said at the outset about criticism, and what is more important, I think we have shown by our attitude that we realise the importance of the situation. I agree also thoroughly with what the right hon. Gentleman said about the duty of a Prime Minister, on whom the responsibility nominally rests, to allow no consideration of friendship or anything else to influence him in a situation so vital as this. We all know that in the time of the French Revolutionary wars, where public sentiment was effective in creating one of the greatest and most efficient armies that ever existed, a very simple rule was laid down. It was, in effect, that any general who failed lost his head without any further consideration. That was pretty drastic, but I think it was fairly effective, and it was certainly not found that the penalty prevented ambition from finding plenty of others willing to take his place. I do not suggest that a course so drastic as that should be taken in any case, but I do say, if anyone conducting this War, whether soldier or sailor, creates an impression that he is not successful, that in itself is half the battle, and no consideration of a personal kind should apply in regard to any general or admiral.

MR. CHURCHILL: I think in regard to an admiral or a general it should not be a question of creating an

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impression, but of whether, in fact, he is doing right or wrong.

MR. BONAR LAW: I am not sure that I quite agree. I would rather do an injustice to an individual than feel that his power was weakened by a lack of confidence in him on the part of those who are obeying him—soldiers or sailors. That is my point. I consider this statement of the right hon. Gentleman is as necessary and perhaps almost as important as the statement made by Lord Kitchener in regard to the conduct of the War in the House of Lords yesterday. There has undoubtedly grown up a feeling, for which I think there is no justification and never has been, that accidents have happened in the Navy which we might not have expected. There is no justification for that feeling, but I am not sure that it has not partly been created by too optimistic utterances in the country. There is no ground for it whatever. The right hon. Gentleman said that before the War the anticipation was that there would be a much greater loss of commerce than has actually taken place. I made the same statement, I think, at the beginning of this Session. That was the view of everyone, and I think there is every reason for gratification that, taking the work of the Admiralty as a whole, we have every reason to rejoice at what has happened and to feel that, in spite of these accidents, good fortune as well as good management has been on our side. The right hon. Gentleman has called our attention to the tremendous increase in the strength of our Fleet which is coming forward. It is in the highest degree desirable that information should have been given in this formal way—though, of course, it was available to anybody who had studied it—to the whole of the people of this country, for, after all, in such a war as we are engaged in now, the moral influence tells enormously, and nothing could be worse on the whole than that any feeling should grow up that there was any danger of the Navy not being able to carry out the work which we expected from it. It is not so with our Army, but once the impression is created that we cannot rely on the Navy protecting these shores one would feel that everything almost had gone. For that reason it is in the highest degree desirable the country should realise what I have always myself believed to be the fact, that, come what may, whatever may happen, bad luck or

good luck, we can rely on the Navy protecting our commerce and our shores from the enemy.

OPERATIONS AT DAR-ES-SALAAM.

Nairobi, December 15,

By Cable from Cape Town, January 4.

H.M.S. *Fox* and H.M.S. *Goliath* have carried out successful operations at Dar-es-Salaam. [November 28th.]

The enemy was bombarded, the town suffering considerably. All the enemy's vessels in harbour were entirely disabled. Fourteen Europeans and twenty natives were taken prisoners. Our losses were one killed and twelve wounded.—*Reuter.*

Admiralty, April 10, 1915.

The King has been graciously pleased to approve of the grant of the Victoria Cross to Commander Henry Peel Ritchie, R.N., for the conspicuous act of bravery specified below:

“For most conspicuous bravery on November 28th, 1914, when in command of the searching and demolition operations at Dar-es-Salaam, East Africa. Though severely wounded several times, his fortitude and resolution enabled him to continue to do his duty, inspiring all by his example, until at his eighth wound he became unconscious. The interval between his first and last severe wound was between 20 and 25 minutes.”

K.D.,
Feb. 14,
1915.

With reference to the bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam the following is officially reported:

Reuter's Agency announced some time ago that “owing to the misuse of the white flag by the Germans,” the open, undefended town of Dar-es-Salaam had been shelled by English cruisers and a few Europeans taken prisoners. With reference to the above, Governor Schnee reports as follows: On November 28th the battleship *Goliath*, the cruiser *Fox*, a cable steamer and a tug arrived off Dar-es-Salaam. After a parley under a flag of truce, the Government representative granted permission for an English pinnacle to enter the harbour in order to ascertain whether the steamer of the German East Africa line there was in working order. In breach of

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the agreement concluded, two more English pinnaces armed with machine guns followed at intervals and blew up the machinery of the steamers *Feldmarschall*, *König* and *Kaiser Wilhelm*, causing damage to the extent of some hundreds of thousands of rupees. A portion of the crew, including a stewardess, were taken prisoners. When, however, a third armed pinnacle entered the harbour she was fired at by our machine guns. This was followed by the bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam, and under its cover the pinnaces managed to slip out, with losses. Thirteen of the English were taken prisoners including Lieutenant Commander Patterson of the *Goliath*. The Governor's Palace was totally destroyed by gun fire and other houses were damaged.

On November 30th the warships appeared again. Their appeal by signals for a resumption of negotiations was disregarded in view of the breach of contract by the English on November 28th. The warships then at once proceeded to bombard the open undefended town of Dar-es-Salaam once more. A row of houses was seriously damaged and a number of Swahili women killed or wounded. (According to the above account, the events that led up to the bombardment of Dar-es-Salaam appear in an essentially different light to the reports of Reuter's Agency published at the time. No misuse of the white flag on our side took place.)

NAVY AND NAVAL RESERVES.

Pensions and Allowances.

Order in Council under section 3 of the Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 73), altering Regulations as to Pensions and Compassionate Allowances to Widows and Children of Officers of the Navy, Naval Reserve, and Naval Volunteer Reserve.

At the Court at *Buckingham Palace*,

The 28th day of November, 1914.

PRESENT,

The KING'S Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

WHEREAS there was this day read at the Board a

Memorial from the Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 26th day of November, 1914, in the words following, viz. :

“Whereas by Section 3 of the Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865, it is enacted that all pay, wages, pensions, bounty money, grants, or other allowances in the nature thereof, payable in respect of services in Your Majesty's Naval or Marine force to a person being or having been an Officer, Seaman, or Marine, or to the Widow or any relative of a deceased Officer, Seaman, or Marine, shall be paid in such manner, and subject to such restrictions, conditions, and provisions, as are from time to time directed by Order in Council :

“And whereas we have had under our consideration the Regulations governing the award of pensions and compassionate allowances to the Widows and Children of Officers of Your Majesty's Navy, Naval Reserve, and Naval Volunteer Reserve :

“And whereas we are of opinion that certain alterations are desirable in those Regulations :

“We, therefore, beg leave humbly to recommend that Your Majesty may be graciously pleased, by Your Order in Council, to authorize the alterations of Regulations specified in the attached Schedule.

“The Lords Commissioners of Your Majesty's Treasury have signified their concurrence in the proposal.

“SCHEDULE.

“1. The period within which death must have resulted (in cases where it is attributable to the service) in order to render the Widow and Children eligible for the higher rates of pension and compassionate allowances, to be extended from 2 years to 7 years.

“2. The pensions and compassionate allowances at present approved for Assistant Paymasters of 6 years' seniority to be granted in future to Widows and Children of Assistant Paymasters of 4 years' seniority.

“3. Compassionate allowances on the following scale to be provided for the Children of Sub-Lieutenants, Assistant Paymasters of under 4 years' seniority, and Engineer Sub-Lieutenants, viz. :

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“(a) If the Officer be killed in action or die from wounds received in action, scale £12-£14.

“(b) If the Officer be drowned or suffer other violent death in an immediate act of duty, scale £9-£12.

“4. Widows, Children, and other relatives of Officers who may have been granted temporary Commissions, or have held acting appointments, to be eligible for pensions and allowances on the same scales as are prescribed for Officers of similar ranks holding permanent Commissions in the Royal Navy.”

His Majesty, having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed. And the Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

PROMOTIONS, APPOINTMENTS, HONOURS AND REWARDS.

Admiralty, November 4.

ADMIRAL SIR PERCY M. SCOTT, BART., K.C.B., K.C.V.O., LL.D., to the *President*, additional, for special service, to date November 3rd. *Times, Nov. 5, 1914.*

At the Court at *Buckingham Palace*, the 5th day of *L.G., November, 1914.* *Nov. 6, 1914.*

PRESENT,

The KING's Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

THIS day Admiral His Serene Highness Prince Louis Alexander of Battenberg, G.C.B., G.C.V.O., K.C.M.G., was, by His Majesty's Command, sworn of His Majesty's Most Honourable Privy Council, and took his place at the Board accordingly.

ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION.

Colonel (temporary Brigadier-General) Archibald Paris, *L.G., C.B., Royal Marine Artillery*, to command the Royal Naval Division, with the temporary rank of Major-General. Dated *Nov. 6, 1914.* October 3rd, 1914.

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to appoint the undermentioned Officer to be a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order : *L.G., March 16, 1915.*

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Captain Dudley Graham Johnson, 2nd Battalion, the South Wales Borderers. For conspicuous ability on the night of November 5th-6th, 1914, during the operations against the German positions at Tsingtau, and for great gallantry in rescuing several wounded men whilst exposed to heavy machine-gun fire.

Times,
Nov. 6,
1914.

Captain J. E. Drummond, who commanded the armoured cruiser *Aboukir* when she was sunk in the North Sea on September 22nd by a German submarine, is again on active service, having assumed command of the battleship *Illustrious*, vacant by the appointment of Captain B. M. Chambers to the armoured cruiser *Roxburgh*.

Admiralty, November 23, 1914.

L.G.,
Nov. 27,
1914.

The King has been graciously pleased to confer the Royal Naval Reserve Officers' Decoration on Lieutenant-Commander Edward James Minister.

L.G.,
Nov. 27,
1914.

The following Vice-Admirals have been promoted to the rank of Admiral in His Majesty's Fleet :

The Honourable Sir Stanley Cecil James Colville, K.C.B., C.V.O. Dated September 11th, 1914.

Sir Arthur Murray Farquhar, K.C.B., C.V.O. Dated September 14th, 1914.

Ernest Alfred Simons. Dated October 24th, 1914.

Rear-Admiral Sir Richard Henry Peirse, K.C.B., M.V.O., has been promoted to the rank of Vice-Admiral in His Majesty's Fleet. Dated October 24th, 1914.

The following Captains have been promoted to the rank of Rear-Admiral in His Majesty's Fleet :

Ernest Frederic Augustus Gaunt, C.M.G., A.D.C. (Commodore Second Class). Dated October 24th, 1914.

Robert John Prendergast, A.D.C. Dated November 2nd, 1914.

ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION.

Colonel David Mercer, Royal Marine Light Infantry (Assistant Adjutant General, Royal Marines), to command the First Brigade, with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General. Dated November 11th, 1914.

Lieutenant-Colonel Edmund George Eveleigh, Royal Marine

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Light Infantry, to command the 5th (Nelson) Battalion.
Dated November 21st, 1914.

ROYAL MARINE LIGHT INFANTRY.

Major Alexander Richard Hamilton Hutchison to be Lieutenant-Colonel by Brevet, under the provisions of Order in Council of March 19th, 1883. Dated November 20th, 1914.

DETENTIONS AND CAPTURES OF ENEMY SHIPS OR CARGOES.

[The lists which follow dated successively October 9th, October 23rd, and October 27th should have been given in Part I. of the Naval Section. But having been accidentally overlooked in the preparation of that volume they are inserted here.]

SHIPS, WHOSE CARGOES, OR PART OF THEM, HAVE BEEN DETAINED.

(In continuation of previous notice published in the *L.G.*
Supplementary *London Gazette* of October 3rd, 1914.) Oct. 9.

Name of Vessel.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
<i>Aleppo</i>	British	Hull.
<i>Almwick Castle</i>	British	London.
<i>Atreus</i>	British	London.
<i>Celebes</i>	Netherland ..	London.
<i>Cherbury</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Chester</i>	—	Portsmouth.
<i>Clan Cameron</i>	British	London.
<i>Clan Mactavish</i>	British	London.
<i>Clarissa Radcliffe</i>	British	Bristol.
<i>D'Jebres</i>	Netherland ..	Greenock.
<i>Fairhaven</i>	British	London.
<i>Hitachi Maru</i>	Japanese	Liverpool.
<i>Holly Branch</i>	British	Swansea.
<i>India</i>	British	London.
<i>Junin</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Katwijk</i>	Netherland ..	Portsmouth.
<i>Marthara</i>	British	Swansea.
<i>Nagoya</i>	British	London.
<i>Nias</i>	Netherland ..	London.
<i>Ningchow</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Orama</i>	British	London.
<i>Orcoma</i>	British	Swansea.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

Name of Vessel.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
<i>Orsova</i>	British	London.
<i>Panariellos</i>	Greek	Swansea.
<i>Riouw</i>	Netherland	London.
<i>Salybia</i>	British	London.
<i>Swindon</i>	British	Bristol.
<i>Teespool</i>	British	Falmouth.
<i>Thistleban</i>	British	Bristol.
<i>Toscello</i>	—	London.
<i>Turakina</i>	British	London.
<i>Twickenham</i>	British	Dublin.
<i>Tynningham</i>	British	Cardiff.
<i>Umtata</i>	British	London.
<i>Ville de Paris</i>	French	Liverpool.
<i>Westbury</i>	British	Swansea.
<i>Wirral Coast</i>	British	Swansea.
<i>Yangsze</i>	British	Liverpool.

Foreign Office,
October 9, 1914.

VESSELS DETAINED OR CAPTURED AT SEA BY HIS MAJESTY'S
ARMED FORCES.

(In continuation of the notification which was published
in the Supplementary *London Gazette* of October 3rd, 1914.)

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name and Tonnage.	Nationality.	Where Detained.
<i>Aenne Rickmers</i> (4,083) ..	German	Alexandria.
<i>Annaberg</i> (4,463)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Barenfels</i> (5,398)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Derfflinger</i> (9,144)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Goslar</i> (4,331)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Gutenfels</i> (5,528)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Helgoland</i> (5,666)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Herzogin Elisabeth</i> (548) ..	German	*
<i>Koerber</i> (5,440)	Austrian	Alexandria.
<i>Lauterfels</i> (5,811)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Lützow</i> (8,826)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Pindos</i> (2,933)	German	Alexandria.

* Sunk in the Cameroon River.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

Name and Tonnage.	Nationality.	Where Detained.
<i>Pontoporos</i> (4,049)	Greek	†
<i>Rabenfels</i> (4,678)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Rio Pasig</i> (3,250)	United States	Hong Kong.
<i>Rostock</i> (4,957)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Tannenfels</i> (5,341)	German	Hong Kong.
<i>Werdenfels</i> (4,504)	German	Alexandria.

† Captured at sea.

Foreign Office,
October 22, 1914.

VESSELS DETAINED OR CAPTURED AT SEA BY HIS MAJESTY'S ARMED FORCES.

(In continuation of previous notice published in the *L.G.*,
London Gazette of October 23rd, 1914.) *Oct. 27.*

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name and Tonnage.	Nationality.	Where Detained.
<i>Achaia</i> (2,733)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Andros</i> (2,991)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Brindilla</i>	United States	Halifax (Nova Scotia).
<i>Haidar Pascha</i> (3,424)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Markomannia</i> (4,505)	German	*
<i>New York</i>	United States	Falmouth.
<i>Ocean</i>	Netherland	Plymouth.
<i>Paros</i> (3,576)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Platuria</i> (3,445)	United States	Stornoway.
<i>Pontoporos</i> (4,049)	Greek	Singapore.
<i>Präsident</i> (3,335)	German	†

* Sunk at sea.

† Captured in Lindi River (German East Africa).

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

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SHIPS, WHOSE CARGOES, OR PART OF THEM, HAVE BEEN
DETAINED.L.G.,
Oct. 27,
1914.(In continuation of previous notice published in the
Supplementary *London Gazette* of October 9th, 1914.)

Name of Vessel.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
<i>Aburi</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Adalia</i>	British	Zanzibar.
<i>Alcantara</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>American</i>	Netherland	Plymouth.
<i>Amsterdam</i>	British	Harwich.
<i>Antilochus</i>	British	London.
<i>Arzila</i>	British	London.
<i>Ashburton</i>	British	London.
<i>Bassam</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Berbera</i>	British	Zanzibar.
<i>Cape Antibes</i>	British	Zanzibar.
<i>Charlois</i>	Netherland	Portsmouth.
<i>Clan Macaulay</i>	British	Zanzibar.
<i>Clan Macintyre</i>	British	London.
<i>Clan Urquhart</i>	British	London.
<i>Clintonia</i>	British	London.
<i>Colchester</i>	British	Harwich.
<i>Colorado</i>	British	Hull.
<i>Copenhagen</i>	British	Harwich.
<i>Den of Glamis</i>	British	Durban.
<i>Erato</i>	British	Hull.
<i>Erich Lindol</i>	British	London.
<i>Eugene Schnider</i>	French	Cork.
<i>Eumaeus</i>	British	London.
<i>Francisco</i>	British	Hull.
<i>Galileo</i>	British	Hull.
<i>Golconda</i>	British	Zanzibar.
<i>Intaba</i>	British	London.
<i>Iyo Maru</i>	Japanese	London.
<i>Kongsfos</i>	Norwegian	Zanzibar.
<i>Mahana</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Norderdyk</i>	Netherland	Falmouth.
<i>Oranje</i>	Netherland	London.
<i>Potsdam</i>	Netherland	London.
<i>Professor</i>	British	Swansea.
<i>Ptarmigan</i>	British	London.
<i>Rhineland</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Rosetta</i>	British	London.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

Name of Vessel.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
<i>Ruperra</i>	British	Bristol.
<i>Scindia</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Strathness</i>	British	Swansea.
<i>Teano</i>	British	Hull.
<i>Tourmaline</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Trent</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Tydeus</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Warrior</i>	British	Zanzibar.

Foreign Office,
October 26, 1914.

VESSELS DETAINED OR CAPTURED AT SEA BY HIS MAJESTY'S ARMED FORCES.

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *L.G.*,
London Gazette of October 27th, 1914.)

Nov. 3,
1914.

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name and Tonnage.	Nationality.	Where Detained.
<i>Carl</i> (1,197)	German	Falmouth.
<i>Graecia</i> (2,753)	German	Gibraltar.
<i>Marquis Bacquehem</i> (4,396)	Austrian	Alexandria.
<i>Regina d'Italia</i> (6,240) ..	Italian	Gibraltar.
<i>San Giovanni</i> (6,592) ..	Italian	Gibraltar.
<i>Ulrich</i> (2,335)	German	Berehaven.

LIST OF SHIPS WHOSE CARGOES, OR PART OF THEM, HAVE BEEN DETAINED.

(In continuation of previous notice published in the *London ibid.*
Gazette of October 27th, 1914.)

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name of Vessel.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
<i>Amsteldijk</i>	Netherland ..	London.
<i>Asturias</i>	British	Southampton.
<i>Batsford</i>	British	Grimsby.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

Name of Vessel.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
<i>Clan Davidson</i>	British	London.
<i>Corfu</i>	British	London.
<i>Cufic</i>	British	London.
<i>Edgerbina</i>	Netherland	Oban.
<i>Egret</i>	British	Portsmouth.
<i>Egypt</i>	British	London.
<i>Harpalyce</i>	British	Grimsby.
<i>Hitano Maru</i>	Japanese	London.
<i>Ixion</i>	British	London.
<i>Naiad</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Polo</i>	British	Hull.
<i>Professor</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Prosper III.</i>	Norwegian	Leith.
<i>Rembrandt</i>	British	London.
<i>Saint Marie</i>	French	Glasgow.
<i>Tregarthen</i>	British	Falmouth.
<i>Virginia</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Wilis</i>	Netherland	Southampton.

*Foreign Office,
November 2, 1914.*

GERMAN VESSELS DETAINED BY THE BELGIAN AUTHORITIES
AT ANTWERP ON THE OUTBREAK OF HOSTILITIES.

Foreign Office, November 17, 1914.

L.G.,
Nov. 20,
1914.

As notified in the Supplementary *London Gazette* of September 2, 1914, and in the *London Gazette* of September 4th, 1914 (see Part I., pp. 167 and 172), a Commission was originally appointed by the Belgian Government to prepare inventories of the cargoes of these vessels, claims in respect of which were to be submitted to the Belgian Tribunal of First Instance at Antwerp.

It is understood that in some cases the cargoes were unloaded by the Belgian Authorities; in other cases the cargoes remained on board the vessels.

According to the latest reliable information the vessels were lying in dock with their cargoes intact at the time of the investment of the city by the German forces.

His Majesty's Government have no information to show

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

what treatment will be applied by the German Government to merchandise either on board ship or warehoused at Antwerp.

VESSELS DETAINED OR CAPTURED AT SEA BY HIS MAJESTY'S ARMED FORCES.

(In continuation of previous notification published in *ibid.* the *London Gazette* of November 3rd, 1914.)

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name and Tonnage.	Nationality.	Where Detained.
<i>Adjutant</i> (231)	German	Mombasa.
<i>Ascot</i> (4,334)	British	Gibraltar.
<i>Bimbashi Riza Bey</i> (1,398) ..	Turkish	Glasgow.
<i>Buyak Ada</i> (550)	Turkish	Colchester.
<i>Empress IX.</i> (90)	German	Comox Spit (B.C.).
<i>Ernst</i> (2,285)	German	Sydney.
<i>Komet</i> (977)	German	Sydney.
<i>Marina</i> (600)	German	Accra.
<i>Matupi</i>	German	New Britain.
<i>Melpomene</i> (1,784)	German	Queenstown.
<i>Ophelia</i> (1,153)	German	London.
<i>Sexta</i>	German	New Britain.
<i>Siar</i> (325)	German	New Britain.
<i>Wrestler</i> (192)	Turkish	Glasgow.

LIST OF SHIPS WHOSE CARGOES, OR PART OF THEM, HAVE BEEN DETAINED.

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *ibid.* *London Gazette* of November 3rd, 1914.)

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name of Vessel.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
<i>Alfred Nobel</i>	Norwegian	Lerwick.
<i>Astyana</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Atlantic</i>	—	Durban.
<i>Basque</i>	French	London.
<i>Bergensfjord</i>	Norwegian	Kirkwall.
<i>Bjornstjerne Bjornson</i>	Norwegian	Kirkwall.
<i>Cormorant</i>	British	Manchester.

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Name of Vessel.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
<i>Duca di Genova</i>	Italian	Gibraltar.
<i>Europa</i>	Italian	Gibraltar.
<i>Falernian</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Flamenco</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Fridland</i>	Swedish	Kirkwall.
<i>Glaucus</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Hero</i>	British	Hull.
<i>Italia</i>	British	Gibraltar.
<i>Kenuta</i>	British	London.
<i>Kronprinsessan Victoria</i> ..	Swedish	Stornoway.
<i>Kroonland</i>	United States ..	Gibraltar.
<i>Lancashire Coast</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Lord Erne</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Margareta</i>	Russian	Falmouth.
<i>Orduna</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Palermo</i>	Italian	Gibraltar.
<i>Pavia</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Poona</i>	British	London.
<i>Redstart</i>	British	London.
<i>Regina d' Italia</i>	Italian	Gibraltar.
<i>San Giovanni</i>	Italian	Gibraltar.
<i>San Guglielmo</i>	Italian	Gibraltar.
<i>Syria</i>	British	London.
<i>Tabor</i>	Norwegian	Gibraltar.
<i>Teenkai</i>	British	London.
<i>Towergate</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Verona</i>	Italian	Gibraltar.
<i>Warrior</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Zeelandia</i>	Netherland	Plymouth.
<i>Zeemeeuw</i>	Netherland	Falmouth.

Foreign Office,
November 19, 1914.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

VESSELS DETAINED OR CAPTURED AT SEA BY HIS MAJESTY'S ARMED FORCES.

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *L.G.*,
London Gazette of November 20th, 1914.)

Dec. 1,
1914.

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name and Tonnage.	Nationality.	Where Detained.
<i>Altair</i> (3,220)	German	Alexandria.
<i>Bjornstjerne Bjornson</i>	Norwegian	Leith.
<i>Concadoro</i> (1,793)	Austrian	Alexandria.
<i>Fram</i>	Norwegian	Kirkwall.
<i>Fridland</i>	Swedish	Kirkwall.
<i>Kara Deniz</i> (5,012)	Turkish	Bombay.
<i>Kim</i>	Norwegian	Falmouth.
<i>Sigrun</i>	Norwegian	Newport (Mon.).

LIST OF SHIPS WHOSE CARGOES, OR PART OF THEM, HAVE BEEN DETAINED.

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *L.G.*,
London Gazette of November 20th, 1914.)

Dec. 1,
1914.

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name of Vessel.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
<i>Anselm</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Antigone</i>	British	London.
<i>Asturian</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Brescia</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Craigisla</i>	Norwegian	Simons Bay.
<i>Danube</i>	British	London.
<i>Egba</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Elisabethville</i>	Belgian	Liverpool.
<i>Erato</i>	British	London.
<i>Jeanne Cordonnier</i>	French	Cork.
<i>Kalomo</i>	British	London.
<i>Orcoma</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Perseus</i>	British	London.

Name of Vessel.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
<i>Prins Maritz</i>	Netherland	Trinidad.
<i>Salybia</i>	British	Trinidad.
<i>Serasia</i>	British	London.
<i>Tyr</i>	Norwegian	Glasgow.

*Foreign Office,
November 30, 1914.*

ADMIRALTY MONTHLY ORDERS.

Admiralty, S.W., December 1, 1914.

225.—Joint Captures by French and British War Vessels.

THE following Convention has been agreed upon by the British and French Governments, in regard to joint captures which may be made by the naval forces of the allied countries, or captures made of merchant vessels belonging to nationals of one of the countries by cruisers of the other.

The instructions in the annex to the Convention are to be strictly observed by the Commanding Officers of H.M. Ships :

CONVENTION.

ARTICLE I.

The adjudication of neutral or enemy prizes shall belong to the jurisdiction of the country of the capturing vessel, without distinguishing whether that vessel was placed under the orders of the naval authorities of one or other of the allied countries.

ARTICLE 2.

In case of the capture of a merchant-vessel of one of the allied countries, the adjudication of such capture shall always belong to the jurisdiction of the country of the captured vessel. In such case the cargo shall be dealt with, as to the jurisdiction, in the same manner as the vessel.

When a merchant vessel of one of the allied countries, whose original destination was an enemy port, and which is

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carrying an enemy or neutral cargo liable to capture, has entered a port of one of the allied countries, the prize jurisdiction of that country is competent to pronounce the condemnation of the cargo. In such case the value of the goods, after deducting the necessary expenses, shall be placed to the credit of the Government of the allied country whose flag the merchant vessel flies.

ARTICLE 3.

When a joint capture shall be made by the naval forces of the allied countries, the adjudication thereof shall belong to the jurisdiction of the country whose flag shall have been borne by the officer having the superior command in the action.

ARTICLE 4.

When a capture shall be made by a cruiser of one of the allied nations in the presence and in the sight of a cruiser of the other, such cruiser having thus contributed to the intimidation of the enemy and encouragement of the captor, the adjudication thereof shall belong to the jurisdiction of the actual captor.

ARTICLE 5.

In case of condemnation under the circumstances described in the preceding articles :

1. If the capture shall have been made by vessels of the allied nations whilst acting in conjunction, the net proceeds of the prize, after deducting the necessary expenses, shall be divided into as many shares as there were men on board the capturing vessels, without reference to rank, and the shares of each ally as so ascertained shall be paid and delivered to such person as may be duly authorised on behalf of the allied Government to receive the same ; and the allocation of the amount belonging to each vessel shall be made by each Government according to the laws and regulations of the country.

2. If the capture shall have been made by cruisers of one of the allied nations in the presence and in sight of a cruiser of the other, the division, the payment, and the allocation of the net proceeds of the prize, after deducting the necessary

expenses, shall likewise be made in the manner above mentioned.

3. If, in accordance with article 2, paragraph 1, a capture, made by a cruiser of one of the allied countries, shall have been adjudicated by the Courts of the other, the net proceeds of the prize, after deducting the necessary expenses, shall be made over in the same manner to the Government of the captor, to be distributed according to its laws and regulations.

ARTICLE 6.

The commanders of the vessels of war of the allied countries shall, with regard to the sending in and delivering up of prizes, conform to the instructions which are annexed to the present convention, and which the two Governments reserve to themselves the right to modify by common consent, if it should become necessary.

ARTICLE 7.

When, with a view to the execution of the present convention, it shall become necessary to proceed to the valuation of a captured vessel of war, the calculation shall be according to the real value of the same; and the allied Government shall be entitled to delegate one or more competent officers to assist in the valuation. In case of disagreement, it shall be decided by lot which officer shall have the casting voice.

ARTICLE 8.

The present convention shall be ratified, and the ratifications shall be exchanged in London as soon as possible.

ARTICLE 9.

The non-signatory allied Powers shall be invited to accede to the present convention.

A Power which desires to accede shall notify its intention in writing to the Government of His Britannic Majesty, who shall immediately forward to the Government of the French Republic a duly certified copy of the notification.

In witness whereof the respective Plenipotentiaries have

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

signed the present convention, and have affixed thereto the seals of their arms.

Done at London, in duplicate, the 9th day of November, 1914.

(L.S.) E. GREY.

(L.S.) PAUL CAMBON.

ANNEX.

Instructions to the Commanders of Ships of War of His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and of the French Republic.

You will find enclosed a copy of a convention which was signed on November 9th, 1914, between His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland and the President of the French Republic, regulating the jurisdiction to which shall belong the adjudication of the captures made by the allied naval forces, or of the captures of merchant vessels belonging to the nationals of either of the two countries which shall be made by the cruisers of the other, as likewise the mode of distribution of the proceeds of such joint captures.

In order to ensure the execution of this convention, you will conform yourself to the following instructions :

ARTICLE I.

Whenever, in consequence of a joint action, you are required to draw up the report or *procès-verbal* of a capture, you will take care to specify, with exactness, the names of the ships of war present during the action, as well as the names of their commanding officers, and, as far as possible, the number of men embarked on board those ships at the commencement of the action, without distinction of rank.

You will deliver a copy of that report or *procès-verbal* to the officer of the allied Power who shall have had the superior command during the action, and you will conform yourself to the instructions of that officer, as far as relates to the measures to be taken for the conduct and the adjudication of the joint captures so made under his command.

If the action has been commanded by an officer of your

nation, you will conform yourself to the regulations of your own country, and you will confine yourself to handing over to the highest officer in rank of the allied Power who was present during the action, a certified copy of the report or the *procès-verbal* which you shall have drawn up.

ARTICLE 2.

When you shall have effected a capture in presence and in sight of an allied ship of war, you will mention exactly, in the report which you will draw up when the capture is a ship of war, and in the report or *procès-verbal* of the capture when the prize is a merchant vessel, the number of men on board your ship at the commencement of the action, without distinction of rank, as well as the name of the allied ship of war which was in sight, and, if possible, the number of men embarked on board that ship, likewise without distinction of rank. You will deliver a certified copy of your report, or *procès-verbal*, to the commander of that ship.

ARTICLE 3.

Whenever, in the case of a violation of a blockade, of the transport of contraband articles, of land or sea troops of the enemy, or of official despatches from or for the enemy, you find yourself under the necessity of stopping and seizing a merchant vessel of the allied nation, you will take care :

1. To draw up a report (or *procès-verbal*), stating the place, the date, and the motive of the arrest, the name of the vessel, that of the captain, the number of the crew ; and containing besides an exact description of the state of the vessel and her cargo ;

2. To collect and place in a sealed packet, after having made an inventory of them, all the ship's papers, such as registers, pass-ports, charter-parties, bills of lading, invoices, and other documents calculated to prove the nature and the ownership of the vessel and of her cargo ;

3. To place seals upon the hatches ;

4. To place on board an officer, with such number of men as you may deem advisable, to take charge of the vessel, and to ensure its safe conduct ;

5. To send the vessel to the nearest port belonging to the Power whose flag it carried ;

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

6. To deliver up the vessel to the authorities of the port to which you shall have taken her, together with a duplicate of the report (or *procès-verbal*), and of the inventory above-mentioned, and with the sealed packet containing the ship's papers.

ARTICLE 4.

The officer who conducts the captured vessel will procure a receipt proving his having delivered her up, as well as his having delivered the sealed packet and the duplicate of the report (or *procès-verbal*) and of the inventory above-mentioned.

ARTICLE 5.

In case of distress, if the captured vessel is not in a fit state to continue its voyage, or in case the distance should be too great, the officer charged to conduct to a port of the allied Power a prize made on the merchant service of that Power, may enter a port of his own country, and he will deliver his prize to the local authority without prejudice to the ulterior measures to be taken for the adjudication of the prize. He will take care, in that case, that the report or *procès-verbal*, and the inventory which he shall have drawn up, as well as the sealed packet containing the ship's papers, be sent exactly to the proper Court of Adjudication.

E. GREY.
PAUL CAMBON.

[The adhesion of Russia to the foregoing Convention is recorded in the following Correspondence, published in Parliamentary Paper, Cd. 7858, Treaty Series 1915, No. 4:—

Imperial Russian Embassy, London.
March 5, 1915.

SIR,

In acceding, in the name of my Government, to the Convention concluded between Great Britain and France on the 9th November, 1914, I desire to call your Excellency's attention to the fact that, according to Russian legislation, the condemnation of enemy cargoes on board merchant vessels of the allied States which enter Russian ports does not appertain to Prize Court jurisdiction, but is pronounced by the Imperial administrative authorities. It is consequently in this sense that Article 2, paragraph 2, of the aforesaid Convention should be interpreted so far as regards Russia.

In requesting your Excellency to take note of this communication in the name of His Britannic Majesty's Government, I have, &c.

BENCKENDORFF.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

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DECLARATION.

The undersigned, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of Russia, duly authorised to that effect, hereby declares, in the name of his Government, their accession to the Convention concluded between Great Britain and France on the 9th November, 1914.

In witness whereof the undersigned has signed the present Declaration.
BENCKENDORFF.

London, March 5, 1915.

SIR E. GREY TO THE RUSSIAN AMBASSADOR.

Foreign Office,
March 12, 1915.

YOUR EXCELLENCY,

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 5th instant, conveying the formal accession of Russia to the Convention relating to prizes captured during the present war, which was concluded between Great Britain and France on the 9th November, 1914.

Due note has been taken of this communication, a certified copy of which will, in accordance with Article 9 of the Convention, be forwarded by His Majesty's Government to the Government of the French Republic.

I have, &c.
E. GREY.

His Excellency the
Count Benckendorff, &c.]

228.—*Carrier Pigeons in Ships arriving at British Ports.*

The following instructions have been issued by the Board of Customs and Excise to their Officers :

CARRIER PIGEONS.

Collectors and other officers concerned are informed that by an Order in Council dated the 17th ult., no person is allowed to bring into the United Kingdom carrier or homing pigeons unless provided with a permit from the Chief Officer of Police.

Steps are to be taken to prevent unauthorised landing, and any such birds found on board ships arriving in the United Kingdom are either to be retained on board and returned with the ship in which they arrived, or liberated. If the ship has arrived from a port in Europe the birds should be liberated, care being taken that no messages are attached before they are given their liberty. If the ship has arrived from a port outside Europe, the birds may at the owner's option be

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retained on board for return, with the ship, or liberated. If retained on board, the cages in which they are contained are to be sealed so as to prevent their liberation while in port. If liberated, care is to be taken that no messages are attached before they are given their liberty.

230.—*Coast Towns—Reduction of Public and Private Lighting.*

Municipal Authorities at towns on the East and South Coasts of England, as far West as Weymouth (inclusive), and on the North and East Coasts of Scotland, have been requested by the Home Office and Scottish Office to reduce to the greatest possible extent the number and intensity of the lights on shore which are visible from seaward or which would cause a glare in the sky visible from seaward, the following specific instructions being issued :

“ Sky signs and brilliantly illuminated shop fronts to be dispensed with ; in cases where a shop front consists of a considerable area of glass illuminated from inside, the lighting intensity to be reduced to a minimum ; the majority of main street lamps to be extinguished, and those left alight to be irregularly spaced ; all bright lights visible from seaward to be extinguished at 10 p.m., as many as possible to be left unlighted at all times and the remainder darkened by shading or painting them on the top and on the side facing the sea ; blinds to be drawn in windows facing the sea.”

The intention of the instructions is to reduce the likelihood of town lights being of assistance to the enemy in the navigation of their vessels and aircraft.

Municipal Authorities on the West Coast of Scotland have been informed that any powerful elevated lights or sky signs, known to be visible from a distance should be suppressed, as in certain circumstances these might enable hostile aircraft to fix their position.

A report should be made of any case observed by Officers, where these instructions do not appear to have been effectually carried out.

Special attention should be paid to the lights at Brighton, Hove, Worthing, Eastbourne, Hull, and Grimsby.

- 235.—*Acting Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets—Rank and Command.*

In accordance with the provisions of Order-in-Council dated November 10th, 1914, Acting Admiral Sir John R. Jellicoe, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, Home Fleets, has been authorised to take rank and command as Admiral with seniority of August 4th, 1914, while holding his present appointment, notwithstanding the provisions of Article 172 of the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions, under which an Officer if only acting in the rank shall rank and command after Officers holding the corresponding confirmed rank.

- 236.—*Distinguished Service Medal—Establishment of.*

His Majesty the King has been pleased to approve of the establishment of a Medal, to be called the Distinguished Service Medal, to be awarded to Chief Petty Officers, Petty Officers, Men and Boys of all Branches of the Royal Navy, to Non-Commissioned Officers and Men of the Royal Marines, and to all other persons holding corresponding positions in His Majesty's Service afloat, for distinguished conduct in war in cases where the award of the Conspicuous Gallantry Medal would not be appropriate.

- 237.—*Rank of Lieutenant-Commander, &c., for Retired and Emergency Officers.*

It has been decided to extend the rank of Lieutenant-Commander, or its equivalent, to Officers on the Retired and Emergency Lists, viz. :

Lieutenants retired from that rank to be allowed to assume the rank of Lieutenant-Commander from date of attaining eight years' seniority on the Active or Retired Lists.

Engineer-Lieutenants retired from that rank, who are qualified under the regulations for advancement, to be allowed to assume the rank of Engineer-Lieutenant-Commander, at the discretion of the Admiralty, from the date of attaining eight years' seniority on the Active or Retired Lists.

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Engineer-Lieutenants on the senior list to be allowed to assume the rank of Engineer-Lieutenant-Commander from the date of advancement to that list.

Carpenter-Lieutenants retired from that rank to be allowed to assume the rank of Carpenter-Lieutenant-Commander from the date of attaining eight years' seniority on the Active or Retired Lists.

Lieutenants Royal Naval Reserve and Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve retired from those ranks to be allowed to assume the rank of Lieutenant-Commander from the date of attaining eight years' seniority on the Active or Retired Lists.

Lieutenants and Engineer-Lieutenants on the Emergency List who held those ranks on the Active List, and, in the case of Engineer-Lieutenants are qualified for advancement under the regulations, to be allowed to assume the rank of Lieutenant-Commander or Engineer-Lieutenant-Commander respectively from the date of attaining eight years' seniority on the Active or Emergency Lists. Promotions to the latter rank are at the discretion of the Admiralty.

The following Officers will not be eligible for the rank or equivalent rank of Lieutenant-Commander, which will be confined to Officers who held the rank or relative rank of Lieutenant on the Active List :

Commissioned Warrant Officers granted the rank of Lieutenant, Engineer-Lieutenant, or Carpenter-Lieutenant, on being pensioned.

Divisional Chief Officers and Chief Officers of Coast Guard granted the honorary rank of Lieutenant on being pensioned.

Sub-Lieutenants on the Emergency List promoted to Lieutenant while on that List.

Retired and Emergency Officers granted the step in rank who had less than eight years' seniority prior to retirement or resignation, will be eligible to receive the pay of Lieutenant-Commander, Engineer-Lieutenant-Commander, or Carpenter-Lieutenant-Commander, respectively, instead of the rate of which they were in receipt at the time of retirement or resignation.

Retired Lieutenant-Commanders, R.N.R. and R.N.V.R., are not to receive pay in excess of ten shillings a day.

243.—*Officers' Uniforms—Landing of.*

The following Dresses are to be landed at the first opportunity by all Officers employed afloat :

No. 1. " Full dress."

No. 2. " Ball dress."

No. 9. " White Mess dress."

On Home Stations :

No. 8. " White undress,"

No. 10. " White Mess undress,"

are also to be landed.

Claims for compensation under Article 1559 of the King's Regulations in respect of loss of such articles cannot in the future be entertained.

252.—*W/T. Operators R.N.R.—Enrolment, &c.*

There are only two authorised methods of entry for civilian Wireless Operators entered for the Naval Service temporarily for the period of the war :

- (a) In certain classes of Auxiliaries by the signing of the form of Agreement for Mercantile Fleet Auxiliaries (T. 124) : the men receiving their civilian rates of pay plus such additional bonus as may be authorised from time to time.
- (b) By enrolment in the R.N.R. as Wireless Telegraphy Operators, with pay, kit, etc., as follows :

	<i>Pay.</i>	<i>s. d.</i>
Wireless Telegraphy Operators, 1st Class		5 0 a day.
Wireless Telegraphy Operators, 1st Class, after two years		5 6 ..
Wireless Telegraphy Operators, 1st Class, after five years		6 0 ..
Wireless Telegraphy Operators, 2nd Class		3 0 ..
Wireless Telegraphy Operators, 2nd Class, after two years		3 6 ..
Wireless Telegraphy Operators, 2nd Class, after five years		4 0 ..

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War Retainer.

1l. a month, under Article 125, V., R.N.R. Regulations. (To be credited on the ledgers of ship in which borne, 1l. on the last day of each month, broken periods being calculated at the rate of 8d. a day.)

Free Issue of Bedding and Kit.

As for E.R.A.; R.N.R., but no blue jean combination suits.

War Clothing Gratuity.

6l. under Article 125, IV., R.N.R. Regulations.

Uniform.

That of C.P.O. Telegraphist.

Qualifications.

Operators must be British subjects of high character, and hold certificates as Wireless Operators from recognised Wireless Telegraph Companies or the General Post Office.

253.—*Advancement in Substantive Rating of Men Entered for the War.*

Men entered or re-entered for the period of the war may be rated by their Commanding Officers to fill actual vacancies in the ships in which they are serving.

254.—*Re-entered Seamen and Marines—Former Service.*

All Seamen and Marines who are allowed to re-enter during the period of the war will be allowed to count their former service towards pension irrespective of the period they have been out of the Service.

261.—*Clothing of Survivors from Action, &c.—Procedure.*

Men who provide out of their own kits articles of Clothing for survivors from Action, &c. (pending their being properly

re-kitted) may be credited on the Ledger with two-thirds of the full value of such articles of Clothing. The credits are to be supported by detailed statements of the Articles, showing how the amounts are arrived at, and charged to Vote 11 H.

The garments recovered from the survivors on their being properly kitted up are to be taken on charge, and retained for similar use in the event of emergency, or forwarded to one of H.M. General Depots for the purpose.

262.—*Losses of Uniform, Clothing, &c., in Action and by Shipwreck.*

Claims for compensation for losses of clothing, equipment and linen, etc., are to be dealt with as far as practicable in accordance with the procedure laid down in Article 1559, King's Regulations, in war as in peace.

2. The following points in particular should not be overlooked :

(i.) Compensation is awarded on the principle of making good actual losses with a view to re-equipment for service (clause 2).

(a) All claims should therefore show in detail the number and value of the articles lost.

(b) Claims for plain clothes and private effects are inadmissible.

(c) Claims for loss of money are also inadmissible (clause 3).

(d) Claims for losses of books and instruments should be supported by details showing the full titles of books, the makers of the instruments, and their original cost.

(ii.) Claims of Officers and Chief Petty Officers should be submitted to the Admiralty for consideration (clause 8).

(a) Reasonable advances in cash, which should be reported to the Admiralty, may, however, be made locally immediately after the loss.

(b) If any difficulty is experienced in obtaining local advances, application may be made to the Admiralty, in writing or in person, for an advance.

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- (iii.) Claims of men (below Chief Petty Officer) are invariably to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure laid down in clause 9.
- (iv.) Claims relating to deceased Officers and men will be settled at the Admiralty.
- (v.) The value of uniform clothing issued to men below Chief Petty Officer, although shown as a charge on Ship's Ledger in the accounts of those concerned should not actually be abated from pay pending the result of the investigation of their claims (clause 9 (a), 2nd sentence) nor are such charges to be taken into account for any purpose in connection with issues of pay and allowances or allotments and remittances, the charges being merely intended as a record of issues which cannot be finally allowed pending approval. Where a man who is in debt to the Crown from this cause is transferred from one ship to another, a note should be made on the transfer list to the effect that the balance "includes £ for clothing issued under Article 1559, King's Regulations."

3. Attention is specially drawn to paragraph 2 (v.), representations having been made to the Admiralty which suggest that ratings are under the impression that they will have to replace, at their own expense, kits, etc., lost by a casualty of the Service.

267.—*Marriage of Men of the Fleet during War.*

Home Fleets only.

The question of the facilities existing under present conditions for the marriage of men serving in H.M. Ships of the Home Fleets has been under consideration, and Their Lordships are advised as follows :

- I. *Brides resident in England, but marriage to be performed in Scotland.*

Marriages can be celebrated in Scotland *without previous residence of the bride there* under the following conditions :

"Where banns of the intended marriage have been

published in the English or Welsh parish in which the bride is then residing, and banns have similarly been published on board H.M. Ship under the Naval Marriages Act, 1908, then, upon the bride producing the Certificate of Banns in the English or Welsh parish where she has been residing to the Officiating Minister in Scotland who is to perform the ceremony, the marriage can be then celebrated *in Scotland* without any previous residence of the bride there."

2. *Brides residing in Scotland.*

Under the Scottish Marriage Law, notice of an intended marriage can be given by a bride resident in Scotland to the Registrar of the parish or district in which she has resided for not less than fifteen days. After the publication by the Registrar of such notice for seven days, and a like publication on board the Ship to which the man belongs, the marriage could be celebrated by any Minister, Clergyman or Priest in Scotland on production of the Certificates of Publication.

If banns have already been published on board ship, such procedure is equally as effective as publication of notice, but proclamation of banns necessarily takes three weeks, whereas only seven days are required for publication of notice (*see* Art. 716, clause 7, of the King's Regulations).

The above procedure does not apply to marriages intended to be solemnised in England, Wales or Ireland.

DECEMBER.

NOTICE TO MARINERS.

No. 1795 of the year 1914.

NORTH SEA AND ENGLISH CHANNEL.

Alterations in positions or withdrawal of Light-vessels and Buoys; Extinction of Lights and lights of Light-buoys, and Alteration or discontinuance of Fog-signals.

After sunrise on December 10th, 1914, in the English L.G., Channel and the Downs eastward of a line joining Selsea Dec. 4. Bill and Cape Barfleur and to the Southward of the parallel 1914. of $51^{\circ} 20'$ North latitude, all Light-vessels and buoys are liable to withdrawal or alteration in position, the lights and lights of Light-buoys are liable to be extinguished, and the fog-signals to be altered or discontinued without further notice. Trinity House Pilot Stations will be established by sunrise on December 10th, 1914, at the undermentioned places, and Merchant vessels are very strongly advised to take pilots, as navigation in the area in question will be exceedingly dangerous without their aid:

1. St. Helens, Isle of Wight, where ships proceeding up Channel can obtain pilots capable of piloting as far as Great Yarmouth.

2. Great Yarmouth, where ships from the North Sea bound for the English Channel can obtain pilots capable of piloting as far as the Isle of Wight.

3. Dover, where ships from French Channel Ports, but *no others*, can obtain pilots for the North Sea.

4. The Sunk Light-vessel, where ships crossing the North Sea between the parallels of $51^{\circ} 40'$ and $51^{\circ} 54'$ North latitude, but *no others*, can obtain pilots for the English Channel.

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5. Pilots can also be obtained at London for the English Channel or North Sea.

Authority.—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

By Command of their Lordships,

J. F. PARRY,

Hydrographer.

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,

London, December 1st, 1914.

DISPOSAL OF PRIZES OF WAR.

Times,
Dec. 2,
1914.

THE Treasury have appointed a Committee to report in what classes of case it is expedient that prize ships captured or detained at ports outside the United Kingdom should be moved for sale or disposal to other ports, or should be chartered for purposes of trade, and to make the necessary arrangements in such cases as are remitted to them by the departments concerned in the administration of the territories where the prize ships are detained.

The Committee is constituted as follows :

Vice-Admiral Sir E. J. W. Slade, Chairman.

Mr. G. L. Barstow, C.B., of the Treasury.

Mr. W. J. Evans, of the Admiralty.

Mr. Garnham Roper, of the Board of Trade.

Mr. C. B. L. Tennyson, of the Colonial Office.

Mr. H. W. Malkin, of the Foreign Office.

Mr. L. D. Wakeley, of the India Office.

Mr. T. H. Holt, Head of the Shipping Department of the Office of the Crown Agents for the Colonies.

Mr. R. A. Wiseman, of the Colonial Office, is Secretary to the Committee.

OPERATIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF AND IN MESOPOTAMIA.

FIELD OPERATIONS.

Parl. Paper No. 597.—THE Governor-General in Council has much
(Cd. 8074), pleasure in directing the publication of the following letter
1915. from the Chief of the General Staff, dated June 8th, 1915,
submitting despatches from Lieutenant-General Sir A. A.

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Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., describing certain operations of Indian Expeditionary Force "D" up to March 31st, 1915. The Governor-General in Council concurs in the opinion of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief regarding the manner in which the operations were carried out and the conduct of the troops engaged. His Excellency in Council also shares the Commander-in-Chief's appreciation of the valuable assistance rendered by the Royal Navy and the Royal Indian Marine.

From the Chief of the General Staff to the Secretary to the Government of India, Army Department, No. 11854-I, dated Simla, June 8, 1915.

I am directed by His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief in India to submit for the information of the Government of India the undermentioned reports on the operations of Indian Expeditionary Force "D," up to March 31st, 1915 :—

- (i.) Report by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., on the operations resulting in the capture of Qurnah, December 9th, 1914 ;
- (ii.) Report by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., on an engagement north of Qurnah on January 20th, 1915 ;
- (iii.) Officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers brought to notice by Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., for good services rendered during the operations from November, 1914, to March 31st, 1915.

1. His Excellency considers that the operations in question were skilfully carried out and that the conduct of the troops reflects credit on all ranks. He desires to commend to the favourable consideration of Government the officers, non-commissioned officers and men whose services are brought to notice in the reports, and wishes to invite attention to the valuable assistance rendered by the Royal Navy and Royal Indian Marine.

2. His Excellency recommends that these reports be treated as despatches and published in the *Gazette of India*.

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[D]

*From Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.,
Commanding Indian Expeditionary Force "D," to
the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters,
Delhi. Headquarters, Basrah, No. 174-G., dated
December 29, 1914.*

I have the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the accompanying reports by Major-General C. I. Fry, Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Frazer and Commander W. Nunn, R.N., on the operations which resulted in the capture of Qurnah, and the surrender of the Turkish garrison with its commander, the late Vali of Basrah.

The force originally despatched from Basrah on the evening of December 3rd for this purpose consisted of two guns of the 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, one company of Norfolks, half company 3rd Sappers and Miners, the 104th Rifles and the 110th Mahrattas under command of Colonel G. S. Frazer. Two of the transports containing these troops were armed with two field guns each, to be placed at the disposal of the Senior Naval Officer as soon as the landing of the troops had been completed.

Colonel Frazer's orders were to land at a spot, selected by Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., on the left bank of the river a few miles below Qurnah, and, acting in concert with the naval force, to clear bank of the enemy up to and beyond Qurnah, after which he had a free hand to decide whether to cross the river and attack the village of Qurnah, or to hold on and await reinforcements.

It will be seen from Colonel Frazer's report that the clearing of the left bank was carried out most successfully.

The enemy on this bank, after being driven from his entrenchments and from the village of Muzaira'ah, fell back to the north, while our leading troops got engaged with those holding the village of Qurnah on the right bank. Owing to the thick groves of palm trees at this spot, intersected as usual by numerous creeks, touch was lost with the retreating Turks, who were thus enabled to cross the river unmolested higher up stream; while Colonel Frazer, being unable to cross the river under a heavy fire, withdrew for the night. It will be seen from the report of Captain Nunn, R.N., that although the naval guns and the field guns on the transports

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were able to afford most efficient support during the first part of the action, the ships and armed launches, one of which was disabled, could not, owing to being exposed to heavy shell fire, go far enough up stream to bring an effective fire to bear upon the enemy holding this village.

I consider that Colonel Frazer accomplished all that could have been expected of him, having regard to the limited number of troops under his command. The Turks had been reinforced before the action commenced and were in greater strength than was expected.

As soon as the transports containing wounded and prisoners returned to Basrah, I ordered General Fry to take up reinforcements consisting of four more field guns, the remaining three companies of the Norfolk Regiment, the 7th Rajputs and a half battalion of the 120th Infantry.

His orders were to reconnoitre the ground thoroughly before renewing the engagement, and to let me know if he considered more troops would be required. He asked for a Mountain Battery and some transport mules, which were despatched as quickly as possible.

The further course of the action is fully described in General Fry's report, and it only remains for me to express my high appreciation of the skilful manner in which they were carried out and of the excellent behaviour of the troops engaged. I consider that the crossing of the river was a most creditable performance, and I trust that the gallant conduct of Lieutenant Campbell and the non-commissioned officers and men of the 3rd Sappers and Miners, who swam the river, will meet with due recognition.

I also wish to endorse General Fry's commendations of other officers and men who distinguished themselves during this engagement, although, as I have already mentioned in a previous report, I propose to defer bringing the names of individual officers to notice until the operations as a whole have been concluded. I much regret that the force has now lost the services of Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., and the officers and men of H.M.S. *Ocean*, who have now rejoined their ship and quitted the Gulf.

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List of accompaniments to despatch.

- I.—Report on the operations of General Fry's column on December 6th, 7th, 8th and 9th, 1914.
Appendix "A."—Report on transport arrangements.
Appendix "B."—Order of battle for operations, December 7th.
Appendix "C."—Detail of ordnance and prisoners taken at Qurnah on December 9th.
- II.—Report on the operations of Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer's column on December 4th, 1914.
Appendix "D."—Report by Lieutenant-Colonel Clery, 104th Rifles, on operations December 4th.
Appendix "E."—List of casualties December 4th.
- III.—Report by Commander W. Nunn, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, on the operations December 4th to 9th, 1914.
- Maps and Sketches :
- Sketch map of Camp Shaib.
 - Sketch map of action of December 7th.
 - Sketch map of Muzaira'ah.
 - Sketch of crossing of River Tigris.
 - Sketch showing operations of December 4th.
 - Map of country round Qurnah, scale 4 inches to 1 inch.
 - Sketches illustrating the Senior Naval Officer's Report (Part III.)

Not reproduced.

ENCLOSURE NO. I.

Report on the Operations of General Fry's Column on December 6th, 7th and 8th, 1914, culminating in the Surrender of Qurnah.

The troops despatched from Basrah on December 5th to reinforce Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer's Column (104th Rifles, 110th, Mahratta Light Infantry and section 82nd Battery) arrived at Camp Shaib at 5 a.m. on December 6th

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and disembarked, extending the existing perimeter camp to the north. Colonel Frazer had arranged for a reconnaissance of the enemy's position by three companies under Major Hill at 8 a.m., and during this, I and one of my staff went on board H.M.S. *Lawrence* to confer with Sir P. Cox and Captain Hayes-Sadler, Senior Naval Officer.

The enemy had re-occupied Muzaira'ah after Colonel Frazer's operation of December 4th and appeared to be actively engaged in entrenching the position.

At 10.30 a.m. the enemy opened fire with two guns from the southern end of Muzaira'ah on Major Hill's reconnaissance, firing about six groups of two shots of well-timed shrapnel, and at 11 a.m. opened on the *Lawrence*, firing six groups of two shots. They appeared to be ranging new guns.

The reconnaissance returned to camp, while the *Lawrence* withdrew a short distance down stream.

At 2.30 p.m. the Senior Naval officer reported that about 500 enemy with two guns were advancing from Muzaira'ah across the plain. The 110th were sent forward to reinforce the outposts with two sections, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery. After some brief long range fire the enemy retired, and beyond a small affair of outposts just before dusk, when the enemy advanced too close, necessitating the reinforcement of the outposts by one double company, there was no sniping or other disturbing element during the ensuing night.

From my intelligence it appeared that the enemy had been considerably reinforced since Colonel Frazer's action on 4th, and were now estimated at 1,200 to 1,500 about Muzaira'ah with six guns, and about 800 in Qurnah with four guns.

As any forward movement from Muzaira'ah would enable the enemy to shell the camp (though the danger was a night one only), and to prevent any further reinforcement to the enemy, I decided that an early attack on Muzaira'ah, with the clearing of the left bank of the Tigris River was essential to further operations. This, however, would have been ineffectual unless I was prepared to remain in possession of captured ground. The opening of a short line of communication to Shaib Camp would be essential, and consequently 320 mules were wired for, being the minimum estimated requirement. (For the working of this line see Appendix "A.")

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On December 7th the force (Appendix "B"), less one half-double company per battalion and details of other units left in camp, assembled on the further side of the creek just north of the camp at 9 a.m. Considerable delay occurred owing to difficulties experienced by the field artillery in crossing this shallow creek, filled by an exceptionally high tide.

My plan of attack was for the 2nd Norfolk Regiment and the 120th Infantry to attack the village of Muzaira'ah and the trenches south of that place, while the 110th Light Infantry, echeloned back on the right of the 2nd Norfolk Regiment, was to carry out a turning movement against the north of the village, the 7th Rajputs and 104th Rifles being held in reserve. The section, 82nd Battery, was directed to support the left attack, the two sections, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, the right attack. The Mountain Battery and transport mules asked for had arrived at camp, and I must here express my thanks for the prompt despatch of these, the latter being specially necessary for my plans. The 30th Mountain Battery at once joined the force for the action, and was placed between the field batteries to support either flank as required.

Close co-operation had been arranged for with the Senior Naval Officer. For the distribution of troops and subsequent movements *see* Sketch Map of action of December 7th.¹

The advance commenced at 11 a.m. over an absolutely level and bare open plain without a vestige of cover, and at 11.15 a.m. 82nd Battery opened fire on Muzaira'ah at a range of 2,750 yards.

Ten minutes later the enemy opened rifle fire from the village and trenches covering it, and at 11.45 a.m. the 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, came into action at 3,800 yards range. Two of the enemy's guns then opened fire on the 76th Battery from the north end of Muzaira'ah, the flashes being visible, but they were silenced in ten rounds and did not re-open fire, being subsequently captured intact.

The infantry were meanwhile steadily advancing and all artillery advanced to closer ranges. As the infantry came into action each line successively dropped their blankets to facilitate movement and these were collected after the action.

¹ Not reproduced.

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The 2nd Norfolk Regiment and 120th Infantry came under some enfilade fire from trenches on the enemy's right, but the prompt switching of fire on to that flank by the 82nd Battery and guns from the ships, combined with vigorous action on the part of the 120th Infantry, reinforced by a double company, 7th Rajputs, with Maxim guns effectually checked any danger from that direction.

Meanwhile the 110th Light Infantry executed their turning movement against trenches on the north of Muzaira'ah, till at 12.50 p.m. the whole of the 2nd Norfolk Regiment being now merged in the firing line, the village was stormed at the point of the bayonet, the enemy not waiting to receive the charge.

The pursuit through the palm groves was vigorously carried out by the 120th Infantry and 2nd Norfolk Regiment, while the 110th Light Infantry cleared the trenches immediately north of Muzaira'ah. The 104th Rifles followed closely after the 110th Light Infantry and, as the latter regiment swung towards the river, moved northwards clearing further trenches occupied by the enemy in their retirement. All the artillery moved round the north of Muzaira'ah and shelled the enemy.

At 2 p.m. two hostile guns opened fire from the north-north-east, the flashes only being visible. These were silenced in seven minutes by searching fire from 76th Battery at 4,100 yards range, and teams were seen galloping away, leaving the guns. A squadron of cavalry or even a troop during this pursuit would have been invaluable, for the two guns could undoubtedly have been captured and probably a large body of the enemy (estimated from 1,000 to 1,500) could have been rounded up, with their line of retreat up the river bank cut.

Major Maule, 82nd Battery, had meanwhile placed one of his guns in position on the left bank of the Tigris at the northern edge of the palm groves and effectually raked the river front of Qurnah at a range of 2,300 yards.

The 7th Rajputs, except for one double company reinforcement to the 120th, were in reserve throughout the action.

Through the palm groves the fighting continued till nearly dusk, the enemy bringing a heavy fire to bear from Qurnah and along the river bank.

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Camp was arranged for the force in some gardens between Muzaira'ah and the palm groves, where, though within shell fire from Qurnah, it was hidden from view and covered by the glare of the burning village. By 5 p.m. all units were settling into camp except the 110th Light Infantry, who were covering the operation from the north-west and who came in after dark. About this time two enemy's shells were burst outside the north-west corner of camp, and at 9.30 p.m. five shells were fired over the glowing village: no damage was done and the ensuing night was devoid of incident.

The captures this day included 3 field guns, about 130 prisoners and a large number of rifles which were destroyed.

The enemy are estimated to have had about 2,000 troops on the left bank, and subsequent information places their casualties at about 200 killed and 300 wounded, but the latter is probably under-estimated. Our casualties were British officers wounded 5; Indian officers wounded 3; rank and file killed 8; wounded 112, of whom 2 have since died.

I must acknowledge the admirable support extended by the Artillery and the Navy, which seems to have paralyzed all artillery resistance.

From my intelligence this evening it appeared that about 1,500 of the enemy escaped northwards up the left bank of the Tigris and that the majority had embarked and fled north, while in Qurnah itself were some 800 regulars with 4 guns.

I decided to attempt a crossing of the Tigris without delay.

Early on the morning of December 8th the half Company (No. 17) Sappers and Miners were despatched to the northern edge of the palm groves to get a line across the river. The 104th Rifles were to reconnoitre and cover the operations from the north; the 110th Light Infantry and 2nd Norfolk Regiment were moved to the edge of the palm groves, the former to cross and the latter to cover the crossing, while the artillery moved to positions in support, and the 120th Infantry and 7th Rajputs were to distract attention opposite Qurnah itself in combination with the naval force.

The dispositions of the crossing are shown in sketch of crossing of River Tigris.¹

¹ Not reproduced.

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At 11.30 a.m. Havildar Ghulam Nabi swam across the Tigris with a log line accompanied by Lance Naik Nur Dad and Sapper Ghulam Haidar, and in spite of a strong current and the possibility of a heavy fire being brought on them at any moment, they succeeded in swimming the 130 yards of river and landing on the right bank. Lieutenant Campbell, R.E., then went across and the 1½ inch wire cable, especially brought up for the purpose, was hauled over and made fast; a difficult feat in the strong current on an ebb tide.

A dhow was secured with the assistance of two or three friendly Arabs, and being brought across, the first party of some 70 men, 110th Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer and Captain Cochran, General Staff Officer, 3rd grade, for Intelligence, successfully landed on the right bank at 1.20 p.m. under some rifle fire from dhows down stream. Though the operation was tedious, the rest of the Battalion was gradually pushed over.

Meanwhile the Navy and a Double Company of each of the 120th Infantry and 7th Rajputs were distracting the enemy's attention in front of Qurnah successfully; for the crossing did not appear to have been realized by the enemy till too late, though some rifle and ineffectual shell fire was experienced.

The 104th Rifles had earlier reported that they could cross about 1½ miles up stream by 3 dhows, the crews of which were friendly. They were directed to cross and come up on the right of the 110th Light Infantry for the advance on Qurnah, while the 2nd Norfolk Regiment detached half a battalion to replace them.

The single gun, 82nd Battery, only returned the enemy's fire, and it was not found necessary for the other guns to disclose themselves. One Section, 30th Mountain Battery, without mules, followed the 110th Light Infantry across the river, but were not employed, as Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer, meeting with some opposition north of Qurnah, decided it was too late in the day to storm the town with the probability of street fighting.

The 104th Rifles, 110th Light Infantry and Section 30th Mountain Battery accordingly went into camp on the right bank near the flying bridge. One Double Company 110th Light Infantry, under Lieutenant-Colonel Britten, however,

moving down the right bank, did not get the order to retire, and entering the enemy's position on their right, enfiladed their northern defence and occupied three towers in this part of their position. This Double Company, being isolated, later withdrew to camp without casualty for the night.

To support this force on the right bank, the 2nd Norfolk Regiment were left to camp at the end of the palm groves on the left bank, other units resuming their camp at Muzaira'ah.

The ensuing night was devoid of incident.

Our casualties this day were 23 rank and file wounded.

At 5 a.m. on December 9th, as I was about to resume operations, I received intimation from the Senior Naval Officer that a deputation of officers from Subhi Bey, the late Vali of Basrah and Turkish Commander, had boarded H.M.S. *Espiègle* about midnight, stating that the Vali was prepared to surrender unconditionally.

I met a deputation, consisting of the Chief Staff Officer and 2 Lieutenants on board at 8.30 a.m. when arrangements for surrender were made and all movements of troops stopped.

At 1.30 p.m., accompanied by Sir Percy Cox, Captain Hayes-Sadler (Senior Naval Officer) and Staffs, I landed at the Vali's house and received his surrender, returning to him his sword in recognition of his able defence.

Meanwhile the 104th Rifles and 110th Light Infantry had moved into Qurnah, and piquets were posted round the town, the remainder of the battalions being drawn up round the Turkish force which had fallen in with piled arms on the open square at the south corner of the town.

At 2.30 p.m., the Union Jack was formally hoisted and the transference of the prisoners to the paddle steamer *Blosse Lynch* was proceeded with. The detail of ordnance and prisoners taken at Qurnah are shown in Appendix "C."

General remarks and recommendations—I cannot speak too highly of the conduct of the troops throughout these operations and their steadiness under heavy fire. Their tactical formations were admirably adapted to the ground which afforded no cover, and the units were handled with marked ability.

My thanks are due to Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., for his

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very close co-operation with his naval force throughout these operations, which was of invaluable assistance.

The fact that there were so few casualties was due to the splendid co-operation of the field and mountain artillery. Their fire was rendered very difficult owing to mirage, but in spite of this they maintained an accurate fire on the enemy's trenches right up to the moment of assault. They also immediately silenced any of the enemy's guns which opened fire. Major St. T. B. Nevison, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, acted as Commander, Royal Artillery and directed this co-operation with great skill and ability. Major St. J. Maule, 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, throughout showed great initiative, and his action in bringing a gun to bear on the river front of Qurnah on December 7th and 8th had much to do with the decisive issues of the operations.

Major H. J. Cotter, 30th Mountain Battery, and Captain E. V. Sarson, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, gave valuable services.

No. 98166 Battery Sergeant Major H. E. Haggett, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery, is noted for exceptionally able and energetic assistance.

No. 17 Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners. I cannot speak too highly of the services rendered by this half Company throughout, under the command of Lieutenant R. C. Lord, R.E. They have had very hard work and their devotion to it has been of incalculable assistance.

Major H. E. Winsloe, R.E., acted as my A.C.R.E. and ably directed the operation of bridging the river Tigris.

Havildar Ghulam Nabi, No. 2632, swam across the Tigris with a log line accompanied by Lance-Naik Nur Dad, No. 3742, and No. 3898 Sapper Ghulam Haidar. There was a strong current in the river which was about 130 yards wide, and the enemy were occupying the opposite bank only a short distance down stream. Although they were not fired on, there was every reason to expect they would be, as the ground on the opposite bank was densely wooded and favoured the approach of an enemy. It was owing to their gallant action that the steel cable was got across and the flying bridge constructed. I recommend Havildar Ghulam Nabi for the "Order of Merit" and Lance-Naik Nur Dad and Sapper Ghulam Haider for the "Distinguished Conduct Medal."

Lieutenant M. G. G. Campbell, R.E., deserves special recognition for his gallant crossing over the Tigris, holding on to the log line only, when a strong current was running, to superintend the hauling over the steel hawser and fix the running tackle for the flying bridge—he was for some time under fire while performing this difficult operation.

2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment.—This fine Regiment has throughout been an example to others, both in the field and in camp. Their cohesion and the precision in their movements showed that they have attained a very high standard of efficiency in their peace training, the credit for which is due to Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. Peebles, D.S.O., who has commanded the Regiment with marked ability and energy.

Captain W. J. O'B. Daunt (severely wounded) proved himself a gallant leader.

Captain and Adjutant G. de Grey was particularly conspicuous in taking messages to the firing line, and conveying ammunition to it when it was running short.

Lieutenant H. S. Farebrother for bold handling of his machine gun section over absolutely open ground.

No. 5008 Sergeant W. Bailey (twice wounded) for work with machine guns.

No. 5223 Lance-Sergeant L. Snell	} for exceptionally gallant and useful work during the attack on Muz-aira'ah.
No. 5973 Sergeant A. Cornwall	
No. 7226 Lance-Sergeant Leveridge	
No. 7345 Corporal W. Fristin	
No. 7545 Musician Mullinger	
No. 7784 Musician Sharpe	
No. 8049 Private A. Dawson	} did particularly well, attending to Captain Daunt when wounded.
No. 8365 Private F. Pryor	
No. 8632 Private A. George	

Captain D. Arthur, I.M.S., was particularly conspicuous in attending Captain Daunt and other wounded when exposed to heavy fire, and throughout the action.

7th Rajputs.—This Regiment was held in reserve throughout, but one Double Company under Lieutenant-Colonel Parr did well when it reinforced the 120th Infantry.

Lieutenant W. L. Harvey.—For the very efficient manner in which he brought up his machine gun section in support

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of the 120th Infantry ; he was wounded just after adjusting a jam in one of his guns.

Subadar Brijmohan Singh handled his company in a very efficient manner when brought up in support of the 120th Infantry and acted throughout with conspicuous bravery and coolness.

104th Rifles.—This Regiment has been engaged in every action which has taken place during this campaign and has met with very heavy casualties. Their work under my command during these operations has throughout been excellent and quite up to the fine traditions of the Regiment. During the action of the 7th they were in reserve, but were thrown in towards the end of the action and carried out the pursuit well. On the 8th Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Clery showed great initiative in securing the 3 dhows up stream and his action greatly facilitated the rapidity of crossing.

Captain H. M. Butler (severely wounded) for exceptional skill and gallant leading of his Double Company in the attack on Muzaira'ah.

Sub-Assistant Surgeon Pundit, I.S.M.D.—During the attack on Muzaira'ah on December 7th, 1914, Rifleman Ghos Mahammad was shot by an Arab, who was hiding in one of the huts. Sub-Assistant Surgeon Pundit called on a sepoy of another Regiment to enter the hut and clear it. The sepoy seemed reluctant to do so, and this Sub-Assistant Surgeon took his rifle and bayonet, entered the house and closed with the Arab. The sepoy followed and between them they killed him. He has also shown exceptional bravery in attending wounded under fire.

110th Mahratta, Light Infantry,—This Regiment carried out the turning movement on the enemy's left flank on the 7th with great intelligence and dash and worked well on the 8th.

Lieutenant-Colonel T. X. Britten.—His action on December 8th, 1914, in capturing 3 towers on the right of the enemy's position at Qurnah shows him to be a resourceful and dashing leader.

Captain K. E. Cooper showed great dash and bravery attacking through the north end of Muzaira'ah. He approached one small house from which fire was being kept up, climbed a wall at the back and shot 4 Turks, who were occupying it, with his revolver.

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[D]

Subadar Hari Savant and Jemadar Vishun Ghone for conspicuous coolness and ability in handling their Half Double Companies on December 7th and 8th, 1914.

No. 2089 Lance-Naik Bhan Sawant (since killed), a young soldier who showed much dash and spirit in command of the scouts of his company.

No. 1148 Lance-Naik Haider Beg, a signaller, who on two occasions signalled an important message from the firing line to the artillery, standing up fearlessly in the open under heavy fire, doing so, as he could not see properly in any other position.

120th Rajputana Infantry.—This Regiment, consisting of only Headquarters and 2 Double Companies, acted with great boldness and spirit on our left flank and ably supported the 2nd Norfolk Regiment when the latter came under enfilade fire from the enemy's right.

Lieutenant and Adjutant W. L. Miskin showed great dash and capacity. After Captain Macready was wounded he took command of that officer's Double Company and handled it well, having twice to change direction to meet enfilade fire, and on each occasion succeeded in turning out the enemy.

Subadar Dunga Rawat for conspicuous bravery and coolness in handling his Half Double Company.

No. 978 Havildar Gunesh for marked capacity as a leader.

Medical Services.—The Field Ambulances under Major E. Bennett, R.A.M.C., worked with great devotion on the 7th and were under shell fire for a short time that night.

Transport.—I must recognise the good work done by the portion of the 10th Mule Corps under Jemadar Allah Din and endorse the recommendations to notice of individuals mentioned in paragraph 12 of Appendix "A."

Headquarters.—Finally I would bring forward the names of Captain E. G. Dunn, Royal Irish Rifles, my Brigade Major, who again gave most valuable and energetic assistance in the working out of the details of the operations. His clear conveyance of my orders materially assisted in the successful issue of the operations. Also Captain W. F. C. Gilchrist, 52nd Sikhs (F. F.), my Staff Captain, who again proved himself an able, energetic and resourceful Staff Officer ; he, in the absence of either a Supply or Transport

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4] Officer, organized and maintained an unfailing supply to the troops from my original camp at Shaib.

Captain H. G. Morrell, 119th Infantry, in command of the 18th Brigade Section of the 34th Divisional Signal Company, carried out his duties under difficult circumstances very ably and with untiring energy.

Captain G. W. Cochran, 81st Pioneers, General Staff Officer, 3rd Grade for Intelligence, worked unsparingly and the information he collected turned out to be very accurate. He also gave me much assistance in other ways.

APPENDIX A.

Report on the working of the transport between Shaib Camp and Muzaira'ah.

1. On arrival at Shaib on the morning of December 5th, 1914, General Fry decided to get up three hundred mules, his intention being, when the village of Muzaira'ah was captured and the troops reached the left bank of the Tigris, to maintain himself there and attempt to cross above Qurnah.

2. A demand for 320 mules was therefore sent to Basrah at 1 p.m. on December 5th.

3. These mules (320) arrived on the morning of the 7th at 7 a.m. They were disembarked by 9 a.m.

4. I ordered them to feed and saddle up at 12 noon. Captain Lanyon, of the Norfolk Regiment, was put in charge of the mules to distribute them. I gave him a distribution list showing how mules were to be allotted.

5. At 1 p.m., orders were telephoned to camp to load up the mules as it was seen that Muzaira'ah would soon be in our possession.

6. About 4.30 p.m. the mules began to arrive in Camp Muzaira'ah. As it was getting dark and spasmodic firing was going on the confusion was considerable.

All the mules were unloaded, however, and in the dark assembled by the duffadars and taken back to camp.

This evening the Regiments got each :

- 16 loads rations,
- 8 loads ammunition,
- 8 loads tools,
- 8 loads cooking pots,
- some kits,

and so were amply provided for.

7. The orders for the 8th, 9th and 10th were to send up one day's rations each day.

8. As it was feared that the horses might not be able to get full forage rations on 8th, 190 loads of forage were sent for and arrived after dark on 8th.

With them came 48 mules for duty in Muzaira'ah as 1st line mules in case of a further advance across the river. The mules this day therefore did a double trip.

9. There being ample forage in camp, the mules on 9th and 10th only brought up men's rations from Shaib, while 48 mules assisted in carrying up kits of units as they were sent across the Tigris.

10. Eventually all the mules were taken to the right bank of Tigris on the 12th, having been used to ration the troops left on the left bank and to bring up the remains of kits left in camp.

11. On the 8th, when two units were passed over to the right bank, all available mules and the 30th Mountain Battery baggage were used to send up their kits, so that by the evening the troops across the river were rationed and had their blankets that night.

12. Captain Lanyon speaks very highly of the work done by Jemadar Allah Din who commanded the mules. His work was of the greatest help.

The Kote Duffadars :

- 2193 Busaki Ram,
- 6417 Jamal Din,
- 205 Mir Dad,

were of the greatest help to me in collecting their mules in the dark and in constantly moving backwards and forwards.

The men, of whom I saw a certain amount, were cheery and worked well, and though they were under spasmodic shell fire on 7th and 8th and had to cross the plain where bullets, though spent, were falling, behaved very well indeed

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APPENDIX B.

ORDER OF BATTLE

Major-General C. I. Fry's Column on December 7, 1914.

Commanding, Major-General C. I. Fry, Indian Army.

Staff :

Brigade Major, Captain E. G. Dunn, Royal Irish Rifles.

Staff Captain, Captain W. F. C. Gilchrist, 52nd Sikhs.

Attached :

G.S.O., 3rd grade (Intelligence), Captain G. W. Cochran,
81st Pioneers.

A.C.R.E., Major H. E. Winsloe, R.E.

O. C. Brigade Section, 34th Divisional Signal Company,
Captain H. G. Morrell, 119th Infantry.

TROOPS.

Artillery :

76th Battery, R.F.A. (less 1 Section), Major St. T. B.
Nevinson.

82nd Battery R.F.A. one section on each of *Medijieh*
and *Blosse Lynch*, Major H. St. J. Maule.

30th Indian Mountain Battery, Major H. J. Cotter.

Engineers :

17th Company, 3rd Sappers and Miners (less 2 Sections),
Lieutenant R. C. Lord.

Infantry :

18th Brigade :

2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment, Lieutenant-Colonel
E. C. Peebles, D.S.O.

7th D.C.O. Rajputs (less 1 D.C.), Lieutenant-Colonel
N. E. Robin.

120th Rajputana Infantry (less 2 D.C.), Lieutenant-
Colonel E. Codrington.

110th Mahratta Light Infantry, Lieutenant-Colonel
G. S. Frazer.

104th Rifles, Lieutenant-Colonel C. B. Clery.

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APPROXIMATE STRENGTH.						NAVAL FORCE.
Unit.	B. O.	I. O.	Br. R. & F.	Ind. R. & F.	Guns.	
76th Battery, Royal * Field Artillery ..	4	—	60	—	4 18-pr.	H.M. Ships :— <i>Espiegle, Odin, Lawrence.</i>
82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery ..	5	—	62	—	6	H.M. Gunboats :— <i>Miner, Lewis Pelly, Shaitan.</i>
30th Mountain Battery	5	3	—	277	6 10-pr.	S.S. <i>Medijieh, Blossé Lynch.</i>
17th Company, Sap- pers and Miners ..	3	1	—	75	—	2 guns on S.S. <i>Medijieh.</i>
2nd Norfolk Regiment	23	—	845	—	2 m.g.	2 guns on
7th Rajputs ..	10	13	—	479	2 m.g.	S.S. <i>Medijieh.</i>
110th Mahratta Light Infantry ..	10	17	—	675	1 m.g.	2 guns on
120th Infantry ..	9	10	—	404	2 m.g.	<i>Blossé Lynch.</i>
104th Rifles ..	12	16	—	670	2 m.g.	
Brigade Signal Section	1	—	11	18	—	N.B.—One $\frac{1}{2}$ D.C. each unit (120th details only) and details from other units were left in Camp Shaib as guard out of these numbers.
Staff and Attached ..	5	—	3	—	—	
Total ..	87	60	981	2,598	10 18-pr. 6 10-pr. 9 m. g.	

APPENDIX C.

*Detail of Ordnance and prisoners taken at Qurnah on
December 9, 1914.*

Ordnance :

2 Krupp Field guns.

2 Mountain guns.

1 .303 Maxim-gun (recovered after its loss December
4th, 1914).

22 Officers' swords.

776 Rifles (of which some 250 were handed over to Navy
at their request).

N.B.—Large quantities of ammunition were destroyed.

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Prisoners of War.

Subhi Bey, late Vali of Basrah and Turkish Commander.

	Officers.	Rank and File.
1st Battalion, 26th Regiment (Anatolia)	12	353
2nd Battalion, Murrattab Regiment (Bagdad) (Amara)	13	345
1st Company, 1st Battalion 28th Regiment Artillery	2	63
Turkish Navy	1	3
Basrah Battalion Gendarmerie ..	7	177
Medical	4	11
Supply, etc.	3	11
Vali's Staff	1	5
Wounded in hospital	2	21
Total	45	989

ENCLOSURE NO. 2.

Copy of Report by Lieutenant-Colonel G. S. Frazer, 110th Mahratta Light Infantry, Commanding, Qurnah Column, on the operations of December 4, 1914, dated Camp Um Rash, December 5, 1914.

I have the honour to report as follows on the operations yesterday :

1. My Staff Officer, Captain Branson, who was wounded, has already taken to you most of the details, and I sent you a wireless in code last night.

2. The disembarkation yesterday morning was carried out quickly and without confusion.

Two small creeks delayed the advance of the column till they could be rendered passable.

My Advanced Guard was, in the first instance, directed so as to pass well to the east of Muzaira'ah.

As all the scouting had to be done with Infantry, the advance was not very quick.

It was first reported that there was no enemy in Muzaira'ah and I then changed the direction of the Advanced Guard so that their right passed to the east of Muzaira'ah.

It was then discovered beyond a doubt that the enemy were in position along the edge of the date palms between Muzaira'ah and Qurnah.

I directed the Advanced Guard to clear the village and brought up the other half Battalion of the 110th on their left, and attacked the enemy on their left flank.

It then became known that Muzaira'ah was occupied by the enemy.

I sent the Norfolks, 1 D.C., to support the half Battalion 110th attacking the village.

Eventually the Sappers and Miners also joined the right attack.

The village was cleared and also the trenches in front of the date trees, where the 110th captured 69 prisoners and 2 abandoned field guns (9 prs).

In the meantime, the ships had been shelling Qurnah and the date groves, and the Royal Field Artillery Muzaira'ah, and the practice of all guns seemed to be excellent.

The troops after this did not come under shell fire, but the rifle fire opposed to them was considerable.

When the troops entered the date grove I reinforced the left half of the 110th by half the Battalion of 104th, and the enemy was driven back to the Tigris River, where they quickly effected a crossing by means of boats arranged as flying bridges.

At 2.10 p.m. I ordered a retirement to the place near where we disembarked and there formed camp.

After my Infantry entered the date grove my Field Artillery was unable to render any further assistance.

The Tigris east of Qurnah is from 200 to 300 yards wide and field guns cannot operate against Qurnah owing to the date trees.

My retirement to camp was well and steadily carried out.

I am of opinion that until guns can be brought up to demolish the houses of Qurnah, the only way to effect a landing would be to do so with country boats north of Qurnah.

All the troops under my command performed their duty most thoroughly.

Captain Branson, 110th Mahratta Light Infantry, my Staff officer, afforded me the greatest assistance and was

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wounded shortly after I had decided to retire, while I was issuing the orders.

I attach a report from Officer Commanding 104th.

The Officer Commanding 110th reports as follows :

“Of the officers who came under my observation I should like to particularly mention Major Hill and Lieutenant Hind in the Company firing line, and Lieutenant Ball who handled the machine guns most efficiently.”

No. 959 Lance-Naik Apa Bagive displayed great bravery during the attack on the enemy's position in the date groves, and in the subsequent advance towards Qurnah. He was carrying the flag on the left of the line in order to indicate the position of the line to the warships. The flag was a very conspicuous mark, and drew a heavy fire from the enemy. Lance-Naik Apa Bagive carried the flag absolutely in the open. Had he taken cover, the flag might not have been visible.

I am sending down all prisoners on *Blosse Lynch*, *Malomir* and *Medijieh* under command of Captain Bayley, Royal Field Artillery.

APPENDIX D.

Report by Lieutenant-Colonel C. Clery, Commanding, 104th Rifles, to the Staff Officer, Qurnah Column, dated December 5, 1914.

As requested, I have the honour to forward the names of the following officers and men of the regiment under my command, who were conspicuous for their gallant conduct during the action of the 4th instant opposite Qurnah :

Captain E. G. J. Byrne.—This officer in the face of a heavy and accurate fire brought his machine guns right up to the firing line on the river bank opposite Qurnah. From here his fire was so galling to the Turks that they brought up a field gun and endeavoured to silence the machine guns. Several of the shells hit the parapet where the machine guns were ; notwithstanding this, Captain Byrne kept his guns in action, and did not retire from his position until ordered to retire. This officer on two previous occasions on which the Regiment has been in action, has brought his

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detachment forward most intelligently and gallantly. On this occasion he received one bullet through his helmet and one cut his puttee.

2. Subadar Ghulam Rasul.—This Indian officer was conspicuous for the gallant manner in which he led his men forward in the face of a heavy accurate and short range fire from the Turks.

This officer was subsequently killed.

3. Jemadar Kishna Ram.—Conspicuous pluck under fire, and assisted a wounded man to rear under heavy fire during the retirement.

4. No. 2317 Lance-Naik Guman Singh.

5. No. 2866 Rm. Khota Ram.

6. No. 2578 Rm. Dhanna Ram.

7. No. 2090 Rm. Maula Dad.

8. When ordered to retire, the two machine guns had to be carried by hand some 250 yards back to the mules under heavy fire. Not having enough men to take away all the ammunition boxes as well as guns, the machine gun officer asked four men to return to the position and recover the ammunition boxes. They did so under a heavy gun and rifle fire and brought back all the boxes to the mules, although the troops had left the trench.

9. No. 2435 Havildar Mohru Ram, when left in command of a long mixed firing line, performed meritorious service in controlling this line and opening very heavy, accurate fire on the Qurnah position, thus keeping the enemy's fire down while other parts of the firing line retired.

10. No. 1615 Reservist Jhonta Singh, "B" Coy.—Meritorious conduct during the retirement from the river, in carrying Rm. Jai Singh, who was severely wounded through the chest, on his shoulders for 600 yards under heavy fire, over a number of water nullahs, finally handing him over to some dhoolie bearers.

Reservist Jhonta Singh was previously recommended by his Double Company Commander for good work during the action of November 15th, when he carried ammunition forward to the firing line from mules that had fallen into a canal.

11. No. 2263 Bugler Narsu Singh, "A" Coy.—For meritorious conduct in taking written orders regarding the

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retirement under a heavy fire along the firing line on two occasions—once to extreme right and again later on to the machine guns on the left.

12. No. 3241 Rm. Sobh Singh, "A" Coy., and No. 2981 Rm. Kan Singh, "A" Coy.—For meritorious conduct in carrying between them Rm. Jat Singh, "A," who was severely wounded in the head, under a heavy fire during the retirement for some 300 yards to the dhoolie.

14. No. 3195 Rm. Ratna Ram.

15. No. 2112 Rm. Dunga Ram.

16. No. 2670 Rm. Kheta Ram.

17. No. 3143 Rm. Koema Ram.

18. No. 2422 Rm. Jowana Ram.

The above men for meritorious conduct, who, in the absence of Indian Officers and Non-Commissioned Officers, were conspicuous in taking the place of Non-Commissioned Officers in leading their commands forward under a heavy and accurate fire.

19. No. 2463 Bugler Kala Khan, for meritorious conduct. On November 15th this man with another during retirement from Saihan carried Captain Maclean out of action. On November 17th and December 4th he again performed meritorious work in carrying messages backwards and forwards from the Officer Commanding to the officers in the firing line.

APPENDIX E.

Casualties on December 4.

Units.	Killed.	Wounded.	Missing.
2nd Norfolks	—	3	—
3rd Sappers and Miners	—	2	2
110th Mahratta Light Infantry ..	5	16	3
104th Rifles	{ 1 I. O.	28	2 W. M.
	{ 13		8 M.
No casualties, Royal Field Artillery			
2 mules killed			
2 mules wounded			
1 machine gun missing, 110th ..			

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1 B. O. wounded ; 1 I. O. killed.
Indians.—18 killed.
British.—3 wounded.
Indians.—46 wounded.
Indians.—15 missing.
Enemy reported in Qurnah, 600 and 4 guns ; outside,
700 and 2 guns.
Captured :
Gunner officer.
Infantry Captain, 2nd-in-command.
Another officer.
75 prisoners.
1 gun captured.
1 gun destroyed.

ENCLOSURE NO. III.

From Commander W. Nunn, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, to the General Officer Commanding, 18th Brigade, dated H.M.S. "Espiegle," Qurnah, December 15, 1914.

In the absence of Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., of H.M.S. *Ocean*, who was Senior Naval Officer at the time, I beg to forward a short report from the naval point of view on the Qurnah operations from December 3rd to December 9th, 1914.

The names of H.M. ships engaged were as follows :

H.M.S. *Espiegle* (Commander W. Nunn, R.N.)

H.M.S. *Odin* (Commander C. R. Wason, R.N.)

H.M.S. *Lawrence* (Commander R. N. Suter, R.N.)

H.M. Armed Launch *Lewis Pelly* (Lieutenant in Command, J. F. B. Carslake, R.N.)

H.M. Armed Launch *Miner* (Lieutenant in Command, C. H. Heath-Caldwell, R.N.)

H.M. Armed Launch *Shaitan* (Lieutenant Commander in Command, F. G. S. Elkes, R.N.R. killed in action.)

I have the honour to report as follows on the part taken in the operations for attack and occupation of Qurnah by H.M.S. *Espiegle* under my command

On Thursday, December 3rd, H.M.S. *Espiegle* left Basrah

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

at 3.50 p.m., and anchored to northward of Dair, about 10 miles south of Qurnah, at 7.45 p.m., and weighed, and proceeded at 5.5 a.m. on December 4th towards Qurnah, followed by H. M. Ships *Odin* and *Lawrence* and armed launches *Miner*, *Lewis Pelly*, and *Shaitan* and the four Lynch's steamers *Medijieh*, *Blosse Lynch*, *Malomir*, and *Salami*, carrying the troops.

Medijieh and *Blosse Lynch* each had two 18-pr. field artillery guns mounted in the forepart of the deck house.

On rounding the river bend near Um Rash, fire was opened on us by two Turkish guns mounted to the south-west of Muzaira'ah village, and we at once replied, opening fire at 6.45 a.m.

The transports went alongside the bank just south of Um Rash village and disembarked troops, and at 9.20 a.m., they had disembarked and were advancing towards enemy.

The *Blosse Lynch* and *Medijieh* came up and anchored off our port quarter at 9.55 a.m., and opened fire. At this point the enemy's fire was fairly accurate, and they were firing on us from the two Muzaira'ah guns and also from Qurnah.

At 10.5 a.m., *Espiègle* was hit on port bow but not damaged, and was also hit several times later, *Lawrence* also being hit several times.

Odin had been left in position to guard the camp which was formed at the place of disembarkation.

At 1.0 p.m., the armed launches were ordered up to assist in the attack as our troops were seen to have practically reached the left bank of the Tigris opposite Qurnah. The launches opened a rapid, accurate fire and a hot fire was opened on them by the Turkish guns and riflemen.

At about 1.40 p.m., *Miner* was seen to be listing and she returned towards ship and grounded just ahead of *Espiègle* and reported that she had been hit and that a shell had penetrated starboard side into engine room.

Assistance was at once sent by *Espiègle* and leak stopper placed over hole and *Miner* was, later on, able to raise steam again and proceed down river where during the night she was patched by *Odin*.

All this time *Espiègle* was in extremely shallow water and unable to move nearer Qurnah. The *Espiègle's* fire had been

directed on the enemy's guns at Qurnah, which had been several times temporarily silenced, also those at Muzaira'ah.

During the advance of our troops *Espiègle* and *Lawrence* also shelled the enemy's trenches.

At 2.37 p.m., extremely heavy firing was heard near the bank of the Tigris opposite Qurnah and at 3.0 p.m., a signal was received from Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer, Commanding Troops, that he had decided to retire to Shaib Camp south of Um-Rash.

Espiègle and *Lawrence* at once directed a heavy fire on the only Qurnah houses which could be seen plainly enough to be sure of not hitting our troops, and ordered the armed launches back at 4 p.m.

At 6.15 p.m., the retirement had been effected and *Blosse Lynch* and *Medijieh* and launches had gone down river, as *Espiègle* proceeded towards the camp and remained there for the night.

Reinforcements were asked for from Basrah and the river steamers sent down for them on December 5th, bringing up four more 18-pr. guns and two-and-a-half battalions of troops, with General Fry in command, on Sunday morning December 6th, and disembarked on arrival.

On Sunday forenoon General Fry held a conference on board *Lawrence* during which the enemy opened fire, and in the afternoon at 2.10 p.m., *Lawrence* which was anchored just to north-west of camp reported that the enemy were advancing with guns across the plain from Muzaira'ah.

Espiègle at once proceeded to a position north-west of camp and opened fire with shrapnel on the enemy at 2 p.m., *Lawrence* also firing on them.

Espiègle was hit twice by enemy's shell, one piercing the side of port bow near 3-pr. gun port. This shell had been fired by enemy's guns near Muzaira'ah village. At 3.10 p.m., one of them was silenced and, it is thought put out of action by a shell by *Espiègle*. *Lawrence* was also hit.

Our field artillery had also got into action and the enemy retired across the plain with considerable loss.

Espiègle ceased fire at 3.25 p.m., and returned to anchorage for protection of Shaib Camp. More reinforcements arrived in the river steamers about 6.30 p.m., on December 7th, and the troops left the camp at 9 a.m. to advance for attack on

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Turks' position in accordance with scheme arranged, so that Navy and Army could co-operate as much as possible.

Espiègle weighed at 9.45 a.m., and proceeded up river and anchored at 10.10 a.m., to north-west of Um-Rash with *Lawrence* astern and launches and *Odin* to south-east.

The enemy at once opened fire from the guns at Qurnah and Muzaira'ah, and we at once replied attacking the guns with lyddite and co-operating with the field guns in the river steamers *Blosse Lynch* and *Medijieh* in shelling enemy's trenches during the advance of our troops, Lieutenant A. G. Seymour, R.N., of H.M.S. *Espiègle*, directing the gun fire from the mast-head.

At 11.30 a.m., a very heavy musketry fire was opened on our troops from Muzaira'ah village, and *Espiègle* moved further up the river at 11.50 a.m., and again at 2.10 p.m., although in very shallow water, in order to support the troops.

The armed launches were sent forward at 2 p.m., and at this time Lieutenant G. E. Harden, R.N., of H.M.S. *Espiègle* went in the steam-cutter to locate and sound round the dredger which the Turks had sunk in the river between us and Qurnah.

A heavy fire was being kept up by the Turkish guns, and at 3.30 p.m. the *Shaitan* returned with her Captain, Lieutenant Commander F. O. S. Elkes, R.N.R., killed and several wounded, and steaming gear disabled. Her wounded were taken and treated on board *Espiègle*.

The launches were recalled at 2.45 p.m., and *Espiègle* remained in the same position for the night, the enemy firing a few shells when the moon rose.

The enemy's fire had been very heavy and fairly accurate during the day and *Espiègle* was hit several times, two men being wounded by a segment of shell which hit spreader of main topmast rigging and burst over afterpart of the ship. Another shell pierced foremast cowl and lodged in netting.

Great difficulty was experienced in keeping signal communication with the Army, but we ascertained during the night that they had camped near Muzaira'ah and would advance on Qurnah in the morning.

At 8.30 a.m. on December 8th, the armed launch *Lewis Pelly* was ordered to reconnoitre towards Qurnah and was heavily fired on by Turkish guns and riflemen at 9 a.m.

Espiègle therefore opened fire and ordered *Lewis Pelly*

back. Heavy firing in the woods indicated that our troops were engaged and we received information from General Fry that he intended to attempt to cross the Tigris above Qurnah and advance on the town.

Espiègle proceeded further up the river and Lieutenant G. E. Harden, of *Espiègle*, placed a buoy on the outer side of the sunken lighter, and, with *Lewis Pelly* sounding ahead, *Espiègle* passed it about 11 a.m. and anchored to northward of it, opening fire on the guns at Qurnah and firing lyddite at the houses. *Blosse Lynch* and *Medijieh* also moved up and assisted, and *Lawrence* anchored some cables astern. Firing continued intermittently until sunset, and heavy rifle fire and the burning buildings indicated that the troops were progressing. The guns did not fire till after sunset, and early in the middle watch a small steamer with all lights burning was observed to be coming down the river from the direction of the town blowing her siren to attract attention.

Espiègle's siren pipe had been cut by shell so *Blosse Lynch* was directed to sound her siren in reply, and I sent an armed boat away under Lieutenant G. H. Harden, R.N., to board her as she approached. She was found to have on board a deputation of three Turkish Officers to discuss terms of surrender of Qurnah.

They came on board at 12.35 a.m., and were interviewed by Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N., of H.M.S. *Ocean*, who is directing Naval operations from *Espiègle*, and agreed to an unconditional surrender and to meet General Fry on board *Espiègle* at 8.30 a.m.

At 8.30 a.m. on December 9th the three Turkish Officers, viz., Major Hussain, Lieutenant Kornal, and Lieutenant Ismail Haki, returned on board and met General Fry and Staff and arranged details as to surrender.

Espiègle went further up the river at high water with *Lewis Pelly* again sounding ahead, and although very shallow was able to reach the deeper water near Qurnah and entered the Tigris, anchoring off Qurnah at 10.50 a.m.

In the afternoon, General Fry landed from H.M.S. *Espiègle* and received the sword of the Turkish Vali and Officers, the Turkish troops were disarmed and sent down the river as prisoners of war, and the Union Jack was hoisted over Qurnah.

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From the General Officer Commanding, 18th Brigade, to the General Staff, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," dated Qurnah, December 15, 1914.

Forwarded. In my report on these operations I have already mentioned the great assistance and co-operation extended by the Naval Force under Captain Hayes-Sadler, R.N. I much admired the intrepidity shown by the Commanders of the armed launches in ascending the Shatt-al-Arab River under shell fire each day, and sincerely regret the death of one of these, Lieutenant Elkes, R.N.

From Lieutenant-General Sir A. A. Barrett, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commanding, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, No. 204 (G.), dated Basrah, February 3, 1915.

I have the honour to submit, for the information of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the following report on an engagement with the Turks north of Qurnah on January 20th.

Reports from naval and cavalry reconnaissances were to the effect that Turkish outposts had occupied some sand-hills about six miles north of Muzaira'ah on the left bank of the Tigris. I thought it advisable to drive them back, and to impress upon our troops, as well as upon our adversaries, that it was not our intention merely to maintain a passive defence of our prepared position at Qurnah—Muzaira'ah.

A copy of the operation order issued is attached.¹

The cavalry of the advanced guard, after drawing the enemy's fire from his trenches on the sand-hills, moved eastward to cover our right flank, sending a patrol to the west to watch the villages near the river bank. The Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry then advanced direct on the sand-hills, which were speedily cleared of the enemy. The 103rd Light Infantry prolonged the line to the left, with the 22nd Punjabis and 119th Infantry in second line, and the Norfolk Regiment and half a battalion of the 7th Rajputs in reserve. The Turkish guns, six in number, opened fire from a position near the village of Rotah and were heavily shelled by the *Espègle* and by our batteries.

¹ Page 392.

As our infantry advanced they came under fire from the Turkish main trenches.

These were at the time believed to be north of the Rotah creek, but a comparison of reports received since the action leads to the conclusion that some of them must have been on the south bank. A large extent of ground in front of the creek was marshy, so that the men of our leading battalions were over their knees in water.

The cavalry were also in wet ground. Our artillery were in action at a range of 3,500 yards, engaging the enemy's guns and shelling his trenches and camps, which were plainly visible beyond the creek. The 4-inch guns of the *Espiègle*, firing lyddite, were also within effective range, with two guns of the 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, mounted on the deck of the s.s. *Medjidieh*. The enemy's guns were temporarily silenced, and some of his troops were seen to be retiring to the north-east.

At this stage I was inclined to order a general advance on Rotah village, with a view to destroying the Turkish camp, and possibly capturing his guns. But I had warned the troops beforehand that I had no intention of crossing the creek, and an advance through marshy ground without cover would probably have entailed considerable loss. I also had to consider that our force was hardly strong enough to hold a position at Rotah as well as at Qurnah in the event of more troops being brought down from Baghdad.

I therefore issued orders to stand fast and prepare to withdraw to camp. Our second line took up a position on the sand-hills and our first line withdrew almost unmolested, except for an occasional shell from the enemy's guns, their infantry fire being well kept down by our artillery and the guns of the *Espiègle*. Shortly after noon the engagement ceased, and by 2 o'clock the last of our troops were back in camp at Muzaira'ah.

Arab reports gave the strength of the enemy at about 5,000, and variously estimated his losses at from 200 to 300 killed, besides many wounded. These numbers may be exaggerated, but it is evident that his troops were much demoralised by our fire. Askari Bey, who had recently arrived from Constantinople to take command, was wounded, and is said to have returned to Baghdad.

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I was much pleased with the behaviour of the troops on this occasion. General Dobbie handled his brigade skilfully, and the rapid and spirited advance of the Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Infantry and the 103rd Mahrattas is worthy of special mention.

I am greatly indebted to Captain Nunn, R.N., for the valuable assistance afforded by H.M.S. *Espiègle* and the armed launch *Miner*.

Enclosures :

1. Casualty return.
2. Operation Order No. 17.
3. Captain Nunn's R.N. report.
4. Rough sketch of ground.
5. Map of Qurnah and district. } Not reproduced.

INDIAN EXPEDITIONARY FORCE "D."

CASUALTIES.

Units.	BRITISH.						INDIAN.					
	Officers.			Rank and File.			Officers.			Rank and File.		
	K	W	M	K	W	M	K	W	M	K	W	M
Force Headquarters ..	—	1*	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
17TH BRIGADE.												
1st Bn., Oxford and Bucks												
L. I.	—	—	—	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
22nd Infantry	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1†	—	—	3	—
103rd Mahratta L. I. ..	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1†	—	6	20	1
119th Infantry	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	—
18TH BRIGADE.												
7th Rajputs	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
10TH BRIGADE, R.F.A.												
63rd Battery	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
76th Battery	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
33rd Cavalry	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—
Total	—	1	—	—	18	—	—	2	—	7	29	1

Grand Total 58

* Captain Cochran. † Subadar Rajpal Singh. ‡ Subadar Krishna Rao Gadgi.

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OPERATION ORDER No. 17 BY GENERAL OFFICER
COMMANDING, "D" FORCE.

Dated Qurnah, January 19, 1915

Reference 1 mile to 1-inch map issued to-day.

1. The enemy is believed to be receiving reinforcements by river at Sakhricha and north of Mazeebulah, and he occupies an advanced position on the sand-hills, one mile south of the Rotah canal.

2. The Force Commander intends to attack this advanced position to-morrow.

3. The Senior Naval Officer will co-operate from the Tigris. The *Medjidieh*, with two 18-pr. guns of 82nd Battery, Royal Field Artillery, and half a double company 120th Infantry on board, is placed at his disposal. The Navy will also guard the mouth of the Shatt-al-Shaib and the Euphrates.

4. *Advanced guards*.—Officer Commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Wogan Brown.

Troops :

33rd Cavalry, less 2 squadrons.

Half battalion, 17th Brigade.

1 section, No. 17 Company, Sappers and Miners.

5. *Rendezvous*.—Just north of the central redoubt at Muzaira'ah at 5.30 a.m.

Troops :

17th Infantry Brigade (less 1 battalion) in two lines of Company Columns.

10th Brigade Royal Field Artillery (less 82nd Battery and 1 section 76th Battery).

No. 30 Battery Mountain Artillery.

No. 17 Company, Sappers and Miners, less 1 section.

2nd Battalion, Norfolk Regiment (in reserve).

Distances 100 paces between lines, intervals, 50 paces between units.

The left hand man of the right battalion of the front line will direct.

6. One double company, 17th Brigade, on each flank.

7. The improvised Divisional Ammunition Column—Two British and three Indian Bearer Sub-Divisions, Field Ambulances and 50 riding mules escorted by two double companies

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of the 7th Rajputs—Officer Commanding, Captain Ogg—will follow the main body starting at 6 a.m.

Clearing Hospital.—1 section British and 1 section Indian Field Ambulance on the *Medjidieh*.

8. Captains Cochran and Taylor will guide the Column.

9. One hundred and fifty rounds of ammunition and a haversack ration to be carried on person.

Signalling, entrenching tools and section reserve ammunition to be carried on mules with units.

10. Reports to Force Headquarters during operations with the Royal Field Artillery.

11. The remainder of the force in garrison as follows:

Tigris Redoubt.—Officer Commanding, Major Pocock.

Troops:

120th Infantry, less half a double company.

1 section, 76th Battery, Royal Field Artillery.

Qurnah Fort.—Officer Commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Frazer.

Troops:

110th Mahratta Light Infantry.

7th Rajputs, less 2 double companies and details.

Muzaira'ah.—Officer Commanding, Lieutenant-Colonel Harward.

Troops:

48th Pioneers, less 2 double companies.

Sirmur Sappers and details.

R. N. GAMBLE, Colonel,
General Staff.

Issued at 1.30 p.m.

	Copy No.
General Officer Commanding, 17th Infantry Brigade	.. 1
Commanding Royal Artillery 4
Officer Commanding, 33rd Cavalry 5
Officer Commanding, Muzaira'ah 7
Senior Naval Officer 2
General Officer Commanding, 18th Brigade 3
Officer Commanding, Qurnah 6
Record 8

General Officers Commanding Brigades to pass copy to Sappers and Medical Units.

Copy of a report from Captain W. Nunn, Royal Navy, Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf Division, to the General Officer Commanding, Indian Expeditionary Force "D," dated Qurnah, January 21, 1915.

I have the honour to forward the following report on the Naval operations in the Shatt-el-Arab on January 20th.

At 6.50 a.m. H.M.S. *Espiègle* (Captain W. Nunn, R.N., Senior Naval Officer) followed by H.M. Armed Launch *Miner* (Lieutenant in Command, S. N. Heath-Caldwell) and *Medjidieh*, having on board two 18-p. Royal Field Artillery guns, proceeded up the river from anchorage off Tigris Camp.

At 7.30 a.m., the ships came under fire of the enemy's guns posted on south side of Rotah village, and at 7.58 a.m. *Espiègle* anchored in reach of Tigris beyond Bahran village heading E.N.E in a position in which her whole broadside bore on enemy's position, and opened fire on enemy's guns.

At 8.15 a.m. *Medjidieh* anchored as previously arranged about a quarter of a mile to southward of *Espiègle* and warped her stern round to bring her guns to bear and then opened fire.

At 8.20 a.m. *Miner* anchored off Bahran village and was attacked by twenty armed Arabs who ran out from the village. *Miner* drove them away with a well directed fire and then continued to engage parties of armed Arabs and cavalry on the right bank of Tigris.

Espiègle's fire was at first directed entirely on enemy's guns, of which five were plainly visible from the ship in pits south of Rotah village (just north of Rotah Creek) *Medjidieh* assisting.

Later on *Espiègle* and *Medjidieh* also shelled enemy's trenches and parties of Turks, who came forward close along left bank of river under cover of the raised bank and sniped at the ship.

After 10.45 a.m. the enemy's guns seldom fired. Their fire had been fairly good for direction, but badly laid for elevation, and shots and fragments of shell often fell near the ship but did no damage.

About 10.45 a.m. the signal arrived that our forces were retiring to camp, so *Espiègle* shelled the trenches vigorously and ordered *Miner* and *Medjidieh* to drop down river firing as they went.

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A large body of the enemy's infantry were observed about 10.0 a.m. to be leaving the camp near Sakhricha marching in column and numbering between one and two thousand. They marched to south-eastward round Pear Drop bend and reinforced the trenches and position near Rotah about noon. *Espiègle* was able to put a few shells amongst them and they scattered and took cover.

On their left was a large scattered body of enemy, presumably Arabs, numbering several thousand. On our departure they appeared to march into Rotah with red and green flags flying.

At noon the *Miner* was ordered to set Bahran village on fire, which she did and took two Arabs in Turkish uniforms prisoners who were fighting for the Turks; at the same time the Royal Engineers were destroying Halla village.

At 12.10 p.m. *Espiègle* weighed and followed the others down river, the enemy keeping up gun and rifle fire as we left.

From the General Officer Commanding, I.E.F. "D," to the Chief of the General Staff, Army Headquarters, India, Simla. No. 860-A., dated Basrah, March 31, 1915.

As I am about to relinquish the command of Indian Expeditionary Force "D," I have the honour to submit, for the favourable consideration of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief, the names of those officers, warrant officers and non-commissioned officers, whose good services during the operations from November, 1914, to March 31st, 1915, I desire to bring to notice, in addition to those who have already been mentioned in my reports No. 101-G., dated December 7th, 1914,¹ and 174-G., dated December 29th, 1914¹:

Commanders, Headquarters Staff, &c.

Major-General C. I. Fry.—Has done excellent service throughout. He commanded during the highly successful engagements which led to the surrender of Subhi Bey at Qurnah in December, 1914.

Brigadier-General W. H. Dobbie, C.B.—A keen and

¹ Published in the *Gazette of India*, dated February 26th, 1915.

capable Brigade Commander, and a good leader of troops in the field.

Brigadier-General W. S. Delamain, C.B., D.S.O.—Commanded the Force before my arrival and showed great skill and resource in his arrangements for overcoming the resistance of the Turks, and landing his troops in face of considerable difficulties. Has shown much dash and gallantry when leading his Brigade in action.

Brigadier-General C. T. Robinson.—A very capable Artillery Commander. When in command of a mixed force at Ahwaz he was greatly outnumbered by the enemy, and succeeded in extricating his troops from a very difficult situation with much coolness and decision.

Colonel R. N. Gamble, D.S.O.—His services as senior General Staff Officer have been carried out to my entire satisfaction, and have contributed greatly to the success of the operations. He is full of tact and resource, and possesses all the qualities that go to make a good staff officer.

Colonel L. W. Shakespear.—His duties as Assistant Quartermaster-General to the Force in connection with the landing, movement and location of troops have been of a most onerous and responsible nature, and he has spared no pains to carry them out successfully in face of many difficulties.

Colonel P. Hehir, M.D.—As senior medical officer he has done much to promote the general efficiency of the Force by his unceasing care for the physical welfare of the troops and followers, and for the treatment of the sick and wounded. He possesses great administrative ability and is an extremely valuable officer.

Colonel U. W. Evans.—A thoroughly capable and energetic Engineer Commander with high abilities and full of resource. Owing to the difficult nature of the country the work of the technical troops has been throughout of a most arduous nature, and has been carried out with thorough success.

Lieutenant-Colonel H. L. D. Fordyce.—Has performed his important duties as Assistant Director of Supplies in a highly satisfactory manner. He has good administrative ability.

Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. R. Annesley.—A very competent and energetic transport officer, with a thorough knowledge

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of the duties connected with his Branch. Under his able direction the transport has been kept in a highly efficient state, and its organisation and work in the field has left nothing to be desired.

Major J. H. M. Davie.—An officer of great administrative ability, whose most arduous and responsible duties as Deputy Assistant Adjutant-General to the Force have been carried out to my entire satisfaction.

Major G. A. F. Sanders.—An officer of great talent and resource, whose general professional ability and knowledge of staff duties in the field are much above the average. I cannot speak too highly of the quality of his work.

Major C. C. R. Murphy.—Has done valuable work as head of the Intelligence Branch. He has been successful in obtaining accurate information of the enemy's strength and movements, and his local knowledge of the country and people has been of great assistance.

Major J. F. Tyrrell.—His most responsible duties as head of the Ordnance Branch have been performed to my entire satisfaction.

Major d'A. C. Brownlow.—In addition to his work as Deputy Judge Advocate General to the Force, he has filled the important appointment of Military Governor of Basrah with marked success.

Captain H. S. Cardew.—His work as Assistant Director of Army Signals has been thoroughly satisfactory. He has good abilities and considerable powers of organisation.

Lieutenant C. K. Greenway.—As Aide-de-Camp this Officer has proved himself to be a most energetic and capable young officer.

i. The following staff and regimental officers are also worthy of special commendation:

Adamson, Lieutenant-Colonel H. M., M.B.

Ali, Risalder Mahomed.

Anthony, Major W. S.

Arthur, Captain D., M.B.

Barber, Captain C. H., M.B.

Browne, Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. Wogan.

Browne-Mason, Major H. O. B.

Booth, Captain F.

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[D

Collins, Major D. J., M.B.
 Cook, Captain W. K.
 Dallas, Major A. E.
 Dent, Captain W.
 Donegan, Lieutenant-Colonel J. F.
 Farmar, Major W. C. R.
 Gillies, Captain F. G.
 Goldsmith, Captain H. A.
 Grey, Captain A. J. H.
 Gribbon, Captain W. H.
 Harward, Lieutenant-Colonel A. J. N.
 Hewett, Captain G.
 Horton, Major J. H., D.S.O.
 Irvine, Lieutenant-Colonel G. B.
 Khan, Lieutenant Abdul Majid (Nawab of Savanur).
 Khan, Lieutenant Murtaza.
 Landale, Lieutenant C. H.
 Lyttle, Lieutenant W. J.
 Lloyd, Major J. H.
 McCreery, Captain A. T. J., M.B.
 Messenger, Captain H. T. K.
 Ogg, Captain A. C.
 O'Keefe, Major D. S. A., M.B.
 Parr, Lieutenant-Colonel H. O.
 Peel, Captain G. G.
 Pirrie, Lieutenant-Colonel F. W.
 Pocock, Major P. F.
 Pogson, Lieutenant C. A.
 Radcliffe, Major F. W.
 Riddell, Major H. J.
 Roe, Captain J. W.
 Shah, 2nd Lieutenant Abdul Samad
 Shairp, Major H. F.
 Shuttleworth, Major A. R. B.
 Singh, Lieutenant Jiwan.
 Singh, Risaldar Hukum.
 Stace, Captain R. E.
 Sykes, Lieutenant-Colonel C. A.
 Thornton, Lieutenant-Colonel C. E.
 Whiteley, Captain E. C.
 Wright, Lieutenant R.

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The following departmental warrant officers, non-commissioned officers and men have rendered valuable service, for which I recommend suitable departmental promotion in each case in the order named :

Medical Services.

No. 854 1st Class S. A. S. Mohun Lal.
 3rd Class Assistant Surgeon E. A. Cotton.
 1st Class S. A. S. Ganga Ram Hariba.
 3rd Class Assistant Surgeon S. C. Raphael.
 3rd Class Assistant Surgeon H. Vincent.
 1st Class S. A. S. Y. Sambasiva Nayakar.

Ordnance Department.

Sub-Conductor A. T. Bardens.
 Conductor W. J. J. Chambers.
 Arm. Staff Sergeant L. R. Anderson.

Supply and Transport Corps.

Conductor S. Fowles.
 Sub-Conductor F. Carey.

India Miscellaneous List.

Conductor H. Joyner.
 Sub-Conductor J. Bryce.

No. 34 Divisional Signal Company.

No. 1 Sergeant-Major J. McConville.
 No. 40 2nd Corporal W. Fletcher.
 No. 45 Private H. J. Newstead.
 Jemadar Murugesan.
 No. 78 Sapper Adimulam.
 No. 48 Lance-Naick Joshua.

Searchlight Section.

Staff Sergeant J. Houghton.
 Sergeant F. N. Booth.¹
 Sapper T. G. Pendrigh.¹
 Sapper J. Mulhern.¹
 Sapper W. J. Mooney.¹

2. The following officers are specially brought to notice for gallantry in the field :

¹ Volunteers.

Major M. H. Anderson, 33rd Cavalry.—In the operations from Mezera on the left bank of the Tigris on January 30th, 1915, he led a successful charge against the enemy with conspicuous gallantry and resolution—he had two horses shot under him.

Captain W. M. Hunt, 23rd Mountain Battery.—At Ahwaz, on March 3rd, 1915, this officer displayed conspicuous coolness and bravery in repeatedly checking the enemy with his own rifle, although severely wounded, and thus enabling his section on the 23rd Mountain Battery to withdraw at a most critical stage of the fight.

2nd Lieutenant H. J. Baillie, 2nd Battalion Dorset Regiment.—Near Ahwaz, on March 3rd, 1915, displayed conspicuous courage. With a handful of men he gallantly checked the advance of overwhelming numbers of the enemy and was thus instrumental in saving many of our wounded from falling into their hands.

Lieutenant-Colonel C. S. Stack, 33rd Cavalry.—Severely wounded near Shaiba on March 3rd, 1915, whilst displaying great personal gallantry and handling his regiment in a most skilful manner. This officer did extremely good work whilst commanding the Shaiba Post for over two months.

Captain H. E. Shortt, I.M.S.—In the operations from Mezera on the left bank of the Tigris on January 30th, 1915, this Medical Officer displayed great devotion and courage in attending wounded in the open, in face of rifle fire at comparatively close quarters.

Captain A. R. Thomson, 7th Rajputs.—Near Ahwaz, on March 3rd, 1915, was acting as Signalling Officer on the Staff of the Column Commander. At a critical moment he displayed great initiative in collecting as many men as he could and holding a position to cover the retirement. He next gallantly led a bayonet charge against a party of the enemy who were blocking the road to camp and succeeded in clearing them out.

Captain H. C. West, "S" Battery, R.H.A.—Near Shaiba, on March 3rd, 1915, at a critical moment of the operations, when the teams of a gun and a waggon were down, displayed conspicuous coolness and courage in keeping the enemy at bay with his revolver, whilst he enabled his defenceless drivers to escape on foot.

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Lieutenant R. H. Sheepshanks, 12th Cavalry (attached 33rd Cavalry).—Was conspicuous for his gallantry and skilful handling of a small body of cavalry near Ahwaz on March 3rd, 1915. Re-forming his troop he repeatedly charged the foremost lines of the enemy and inflicted heavy loss on them.

3. In a previous report, I mentioned the good service of the officers and men of the Royal Navy. Since the departure of Captain Hayes-Sadler, the duties of Senior Naval Officer have been most ably performed by Captain Nunn, R.N., of H.M.S. *Espiègle*, whose valuable advice and ready co-operation in all our undertakings has contributed so greatly to the success of the operations.

4. I am also much indebted to the officers of the Royal Indian Marine, who have shown zeal and energy in organising a most efficient river transport service, and in making all arrangements for the berthing and unloading of the large fleet of vessels that has been employed on transport duties. The whole has been under the able direction of Captain Hamilton, R.I.M., and among those serving under him I would specially mention Captains Goldsmith and Marsh.

5. I am glad to take this opportunity of expressing my thanks to the officers and crews of the steamers of the British India Steam Navigation Company which conveyed the troops from India at the outset of the operations, while the Turks were still in occupation of the country. At this time there was much risk owing to the difficult navigation of the river, and to the fact that the banks were often held by the enemy. The one desire of the captains of these vessels was to push forward as rapidly as possible, and to afford us all the help that was in their power. The same remark applies to the captains of Lynch Bros. steamers and of the other river craft which have been in constant employment on transport duties, and have many times been in situations of considerable danger.

The following are those who are worthy of special commendation :

Captain R. W. Coope, H.T. *Elephanta*.

Captain G. R. Elton, H.T. *Umaria*.

Captain J. S. Kilmer, H.T. *Ekma*.

Lieutenant S. L. Mills, R.N.R., H.T. *Varela*.

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Captain J. S. Reddock, H.T. *Erinpura*.

Captain C. J. Swanson, H.T. *Torilla*.

Captain C. H. Cowley, *Mejidieh*.

Captain E. C. P. D'Eye, *Blosse Lynch*.

Captain F. W. Lyte, *Shushan*.

Captain O. Sczulczewski, *Malamir*.

Captain Hassan bin Ghulami, *Salimi*.

Captain Tahir bin Bangool, *Mozaffari*.

6. In a previous report I expressed my great indebtedness to Sir Percy Cox for his valuable advice and assistance. His intimate knowledge of local politics, and his remarkable personal influence over the surrounding tribesmen, have smoothed over many difficulties, and greatly assisted the military operations.

I also wish to mention the good services of Mr. E. G. Gregson, of the Indian Police, Mr. D. Gumley of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, Mr. E. Clerici, of the Postal Department, and Mr. Thomas Dexter, Personal Assistant and interpreter to the Military Governor of Basrah.

Doctor Arthur Bennett, of the American Mission Hospital, has helped us greatly by undertaking the treatment of wounded Turkish and Arab officers and men.

7. Several recommendations of Indian ranks for the Indian Order of Merit and Indian Distinguished Service Medal on account of recent acts of gallantry, which are now being recorded, will be submitted in due course.

GERMAN MINES IN THE NORTH SEA.—DANGER TO MERCHANT SHIPS.

Admiralty, December 5.

THE North-German Lloyd s.s. *Berlin* has recently put into Trondjhem almost empty of coal, and with her speed considerably reduced, due, presumably, to fast steaming.

She has been specially fitted for mine-laying.

So far as is known, she now has no mines on board, the probability being that these have been sown broadcast on the high seas, under cover of darkness.

From past experience it is known that the track of merchant shipping (neutral as well as British) is a favourite locality for this operation.

German floating mines are constantly being sighted, and on many occasions these mines have proved to be still dangerous.

Merchant vessels should, therefore, be warned of the grave danger to which they are exposed, and they must bear in mind that waters which, owing to their great depth, have hitherto been regarded as comparatively safe, must now be navigated with caution.

ADMIRALTY ORDER WITH RESPECT TO PILOTAGE CERTIFICATES IN WAR TIME.

THE Admiralty, under the powers given to them by the *L.G.*,
Defence of the Realm Consolidation Act, 1914, and the *Dec. II,*
Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Regulations, 1914, *1914.*
hereby make the following Order :

(1) This Order shall relate to the ports and territorial waters adjacent to the United Kingdom from and including Plymouth eastward up to and including Great Yarmouth, with the exception of the existing pilotage district of Arundel.

(2) Any bye-law in force for the time being in the area to which this Order relates shall have effect only subject to the provisions of this Order and of Orders made by the Trinity House in accordance with instructions hereunder.

(3) The Trinity House, as defined in the Pilotage Act, 1913, is hereby instructed as follows :

(i.) To suspend, if it shall think fit, the licences of all or any present pilots and the existing pilotage certificates of all or any masters or mates within the said area.

(ii.) Subject to the provisions of this Order and to the approval of the Admiralty to make orders in respect of the said area for all or any of the purposes specified in Regulation 39 of the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Regulations, 1914.

(4) No person shall act as pilot within the said area without the special licence of the Trinity House.

(5) No licence shall be granted under this Order for a period longer than fourteen days, and all licences shall be revocable and renewable at the absolute discretion of the Trinity House.

(6) A licence shall not be granted unless the pilot signs an agreement to conform with the Trinity House Orders.

(7) The Trinity House is authorised to make new rates or to modify existing rates for pilotage.

NOTE.—Any person failing to comply with the provisions of this Order or of the Orders issued by the Trinity House will be guilty of an offence against the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Regulations, 1914, and liable to be dealt with accordingly.

Given under our hands this fifth day of December, 1914.

F. T. HAMILTON.
CECIL LAMBERT.

THE DEFENCE OF PORT SAID.

London, December 6.

K.V.,
Dec. 6,
1914. IT is reported from Cairo, by *Reuter*, that the military authorities have flooded the desert to the east of Port Said in order to isolate the town.

OPENING OF JAPANESE DIET.

Tokyo, December 7.

Times,
Dec. 7,
1914. THE Emperor's speech contained the following :
I am happy to announce that the friendship of the Empire with the Treaty Powers is growing in cordiality.
The alliance with Great Britain and the *ententes* with France and Russia have been cemented in the present critical stage by stronger bonds of amity.

Peace in the Orient is gradually being restored, but the Great War is not yet ended. We rely upon the loyalty and bravery of our subjects in our wish to obtain the final object as quickly as possible.

SPEECH ON JAPANESE POLICY BY BARON KATO.

Tokyo, December 8.

Times,
Dec. 9,
1914. IT is a matter of deep regret that the war in Europe, far from approaching its end, has greatly extended its field of operations, and holds out as yet no prospects of peace ; but in the meantime I am happy to be able to say that the relations between Japan and the Powers which are in common with us in a state of war have grown more intimate than ever, and that in all matters of importance frank exchange of views has taken place with those Powers.

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Our relations with neutral Powers are also in an excellent condition. Various questions which were raised between Japan and China in connection with the attack on Kiao-chau have been on the whole satisfactorily settled, the Chinese Government being fully alive to the general situation. Complete success has attended the efforts of our army and navy at Tsingtau, and in this respect I wish highly to appreciate the loyal assistance rendered by the British land and naval forces.

With regard to our action in the Pacific, the Imperial Government dispatched a squadron to the German South Sea Islands—namely, the Marshall, the Caroline, the Mariana, and the Palao Islands—which islands are now under military occupation and are being guarded.

Previous to the rupture of our diplomatic relations with Germany the German Government, on the pretext that they were protecting the Japanese, detained many of them in different parts of the country, and even in some cases incarcerated them. The German Government ignored the protest of our representative in Berlin against such treatment, and they flatly refused his repeated request to be allowed to visit the places where Japanese subjects were interned. The Imperial Government having requested the United States Government to protect the Imperial Embassy in Berlin and Japanese interests in Germany, the United States Government willingly consented, and as the result of the kindly and timely action taken by them the great majority of the Japanese in detention were released. It is believed that there are some still detained, for whose release we shall have to rely upon the further good offices of the United States Government. We deeply appreciate and are sincerely grateful to the United States Government for their good will.

With regard to China, the Imperial Government most earnestly hope that nothing will arise there to disturb peace and order, as their maintenance is of the greatest importance.

Lastly, strict vigilance on the part of the Imperial Government is demanded at the present juncture, and we are prepared; after mature consideration of the circumstances, to spare no effort for the safeguarding and promotion of the interests of the Empire.

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BATTLE OFF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS.

Times,
Dec. 10,
1914.

THE Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement :

At 7.30 a.m. on December 8th the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Nürnberg*, *Leipzig* and *Dresden* were sighted near the Falkland Islands by a British Squadron under Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Sturdee.

An action followed, in the course of which the *Scharnhorst*, flying the flag of Admiral Graf von Spée, the *Gneisenau*, and the *Leipzig* were sunk.

The *Dresden* and the *Nürnberg* made off during the action, and are being pursued. Two colliers were also captured.

The Vice-Admiral reports that the British casualties are very few in number. Some survivors have been rescued from the *Gneisenau* and the *Leipzig*.

Admiralty, December 11.

The following telegrams have been received and sent through the Japanese Embassy :

To the Right Honourable Winston L. Spencer-Churchill, M.P.

On behalf of Imperial Japanese Navy I express my heartfelt congratulations on the splendid victory attained by the British Squadron off Falkland Islands.

VICE-ADMIRAL R. YASHIRO,
Minister of Marine, Tokio.

To Vice-Admiral R. Yashiro, Minister of Marine, Tokio.

On behalf of the British Navy I heartily thank your Excellency for your message conveying the congratulations of the Imperial Japanese Navy on the action off the Falklands. With the sinking of the *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig*, and *Nürnberg* the whole of the German Squadron based on Tsingtau at the outbreak of the war has been destroyed, and that base itself reduced and captured. This event marks the conclusion of the active operations in which the Allied Fleets have been engaged in the Pacific for more than four months, and though it has fallen to a British Squadron in the South Atlantic to strike the final blow, it is largely owing to the powerful and untiring assistance

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rendered by the Japanese Fleet that this result has been achieved.

Had the enemy turned westward again the honours would have rested with the Japanese and Australian Squadrons moving forward in the general combination.

The peace of the Pacific is now for the time being restored, and the commerce of all nations can proceed with safety throughout the vast expanses from the coasts of Mozambique to those of South America. The expulsion of the Germans from the East is complete, and with good and vigilant arrangements all return should be rendered extremely difficult and hazardous.

I take the opportunity of your Excellency's cordial message to express on behalf of the British and Australian Navies our earnest recognition of the invaluable naval assistance of Japan.

CHURCHILL.

The Secretary of the Admiralty also announces :

A telegram has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir Doveton Sturdee reporting that in the action off the Falkland Islands no British officers were killed or wounded, and that the total British casualties amount to seven killed and four wounded.

The Secretary of the Admiralty further announces that the following telegram has been received from Petrograd :

Ayant appris l'heureuse nouvelle de la brillante victoire de l'Amiral Sir Frederick Sturdee, je m'empresse de vous en féliciter chaleureusement en mon nom, ainsi qu'en celui de la Flotte et de l'Armée Russes ; ce glorieux exploit de la Flotte Britannique ne peut que raffermir notre confiance inébranlable dans le succès définitif de la cause des Alliés.

GRAND DUC NICOLAS.

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to send *Times*, a message to Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Sturdee, and the Dec. 11, officers and men under his command, congratulating them on 1914. their victory.

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The following message also has been dispatched by Sir John French to the First Lord of the Admiralty :

General Headquarters, France.

The Army in France warmly congratulate Admiral Sturdee and the Navy on their brilliant victory, and may I also congratulate you and the Admiralty on now having practically swept the seas clear of the enemy's ships ?

COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF,

British Expeditionary Force.

ibid.

The following message has been received from Ministre Marine, Paris, addressed to Right Hon. Winston Churchill, the Admiralty, Londres :

J'adresse à votre Excellence les félicitations enthousiastes de la Marine Française pour l'éclatante victoire et la bravoure de la flotte Britannique.

VICTOR AUGAGNEUR.

ibid.

The Board of Admiralty have sent the following message to Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Sturdee :

Our thanks are due to yourself, and to the officers and men under your command, for the brilliant victory you have achieved.

ibid.

The Sudan Government, Khartum, have sent the following message to Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Sturdee :

Heartiest congratulations from all in Sudan on splendid naval success in Pacific.

WINGATE.

Admiralty, March 3, 1915.

The following dispatch has been received from Vice-Admiral Sir F. C. Doveton Sturdee, K.C.B., C.V.O., C.M.G., reporting the action off the Falkland Islands on Tuesday, December 8th, 1914 :

"Invincible" at Sea, December 19, 1914.

SIR,

I have the honour to forward a report on the action which

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took place on December 8th, 1914, against a German Squadron off the Falkland Islands.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your obedient Servant,

F. C. D. STURDEE,

Vice-Admiral, Commander-in-Chief.

The Secretary, Admiralty.

(A)—PRELIMINARY MOVEMENTS.

The squadron, consisting of H.M. Ships *Invincible*, flying my flag, Flag Captain Percy T. H. Beamish; *Inflexible*, Captain Richard F. Phillimore; *Carnarvon*, flying the flag of Rear-Admiral Archibald P. Stoddart, Flag Captain Harry L. d'E. Skipwith; *Cornwall*, Captain Walter M. Ellerton; *Kent*, Captain John D. Allen; *Glasgow*, Captain John Luce; *Bristol*, Captain Basil H. Fanshawe; and *Macedonia*, Captain Bertram S. Evans; arrived at Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, at 10.30 a.m. on Monday, December 7th, 1914. Coaling was commenced at once, in order that the ships should be ready to resume the search for the enemy's squadron the next evening, December 8th.

At 8 a.m. on Tuesday, December 8th, a signal was received from the signal station on shore:

"A four-funnel and two-funnel man-of-war in sight from Sapper Hill, steering northwards."

At this time, the positions of the various ships of the squadron were as follows:

Macedonia: At anchor as look-out ship.

Kent (guard ship): At anchor in Port William.

Invincible and *Inflexible*: In Port William.

Carnarvon: In Port William.

Cornwall: In Port William.

Glasgow: In Port Stanley.

Bristol: In Port Stanley.

The *Kent* was at once ordered to weigh, and a general signal was made to raise steam for full speed.

At 8.20 a.m. the signal station reported another column of smoke in sight to the southward, and at 8.45 a.m. the *Kent* passed down the harbour and took up a station at the entrance.

The *Canopus*, Captain Heathcoat S. Grant, reported at 8.47 a.m. that the first two ships were eight miles off, and that the smoke reported at 8.20 a.m. appeared to be the smoke of two ships about twenty miles off.

At 8.50 a.m. the signal station reported a further column of smoke in sight to the southward.

The *Macedonia* was ordered to weigh anchor on the inner side of the other ships, and await orders.

At 9.20 a.m. the two leading ships of the enemy (*Gneisenau* and *Nürnberg*), with guns trained on the wireless station, came within range of the *Canopus*, who opened fire at them across the low land at a range of 11,000 yards. The enemy at once hoisted their colours and turned away. At this time the masts and smoke of the enemy were visible from the upper bridge of the *Invincible* at a range of approximately 17,000 yards across the low land to the south of Port William.

A few minutes later the two cruisers altered course to port, as though to close the *Kent* at the entrance to the harbour, but about this time it seems that the *Invincible* and *Inflexible* were seen over the land, as the enemy at once altered course and increased speed to join their consorts.

The *Glasgow* weighed and proceeded at 9.40 a.m. with orders to join the *Kent* and observe the enemy's movements.

At 9.45 a.m. the squadron—less the *Bristol*—weighed, and proceeded out of harbour in the following order: *Carnarvon*, *Inflexible*, *Invincible*, and *Cornwall*. On passing Cape Pembroke Light, the five ships of the enemy appeared clearly in sight to the south-east, hull down. The visibility was at its maximum, the sea was calm, with a bright sun, a clear sky, and a light breeze from the north-west.

At 10.20 a.m. the signal for a general chase was made. The battle cruisers quickly passed ahead of the *Carnarvon* and overtook the *Kent*. The *Glasgow* was ordered to keep two miles from the *Invincible*, and the *Inflexible* was stationed on the starboard quarter of the flagship. Speed was eased to 20 knots at 11.15 a.m. to enable the other cruisers to get into station.

At this time the enemy's funnels and bridges showed just above the horizon.

Information was received from the *Bristol* at 11.27 a.m. that three enemy ships had appeared off Port Pleasant,

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probably colliers or transports. The *Bristol* was therefore directed to take the *Macedonia* under his orders and destroy transports.

The enemy were still maintaining their distance, and I decided, at 12.20 p.m., to attack with the two battle cruisers and the *Glasgow*.

At 12.47 p.m. the signal to "Open fire and engage the enemy" was made.

The *Inflexible* opened fire at 12.55 p.m. from her fore turret at the right-hand ship of the enemy, a light cruiser; a few minutes later the *Invincible* opened fire at the same ship.

The deliberate fire from a range of 16,500 to 15,000 yards at the right-hand light cruiser, who was dropping astern, became too threatening, and when a shell fell close alongside her at 1.20 p.m. she (the *Leipzig*) turned away, with the *Nürnberg* and *Dresden* to the south-west. These light cruisers were at once followed by the *Kent*, *Glasgow*, and *Cornwall*, in accordance with my instructions.

The action finally developed into three separate encounters, besides the subsidiary one dealing with the threatened landing.

(B)—ACTION WITH THE ARMoured CRUISERS.

The fire of the battle cruisers was directed on the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau*. The effect of this was quickly seen, when at 1.25 p.m., with the *Scharnhorst* leading, they turned about 7 points to port in succession into line ahead and opened fire at 1.30 p.m. Shortly afterwards speed was eased to 24 knots, and the battle cruisers were ordered to turn together, bringing them into line ahead, with the *Invincible* leading.

The range was about 13,500 yards at the final turn, and increased, until, at 2 p.m., it had reached 16,450 yards.

The enemy then (2.10 p.m.) turned away about 10 points to starboard and a second chase ensued, until, at 2.45 p.m., the battle cruisers again opened fire; this caused the enemy, at 2.53 p.m., to turn into line ahead to port and open fire at 2.55 p.m.

The *Scharnhorst* caught fire forward, but not seriously, and her fire slackened perceptibly; the *Gneisenau* was badly hit by the *Inflexible*.

At 3.30 p.m. the *Scharnhorst* led round about 10 points to starboard; just previously her fire had slackened perceptibly, and one shell had shot away her third funnel; some guns were not firing, and it would appear that the turn was dictated by a desire to bring her starboard guns into action. The effect of the fire on the *Scharnhorst* became more and more apparent in consequence of smoke from fires, and also escaping steam; at times a shell would cause a large hole to appear in her side, through which could be seen a dull red glow of flame. At 4.4 p.m. the *Scharnhorst*, whose flag remained flying to the last, suddenly listed heavily to port, and within a minute it became clear that she was a doomed ship; for the list increased very rapidly until she lay on her beam ends, and at 4.17 p.m. she disappeared.

The *Gneisenau* passed on the far side of her late flagship, and continued a determined but ineffectual effort to fight the two battle cruisers.

At 5.8 p.m. the forward funnel was knocked over and remained resting against the second funnel. She was evidently in serious straits, and her fire slackened very much.

At 5.15 p.m. one of the *Gneisenau's* shells struck the *Invincible*; this was her last effective effort.

At 5.30 p.m. she turned towards the flagship with a heavy list to starboard, and appeared stopped, with steam pouring from her escape pipes and smoke from shell and fires rising everywhere. About this time I ordered the signal "Cease fire," but before it was hoisted the *Gneisenau* opened fire again, and continued to fire from time to time with a single gun.

At 5.40 p.m. the three ships closed in on the *Gneisenau*, and, at this time, the flag flying at her fore truck was apparently hauled down, but the flag at the peak continued flying.

At 5.50 p.m. "Cease fire" was made.

At 6 p.m. the *Gneisenau* heeled over very suddenly, showing the men gathered on her decks and then walking on her side as she lay for a minute on her beam ends before sinking.

The prisoners of war from the *Gneisenau* report that, by the time the ammunition was expended, some 600 men had been killed and wounded. The surviving officers and men were all ordered on deck and told to provide themselves with

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hammocks and any articles that could support them in the water.

When the ship capsized and sank there were probably some 200 unwounded survivors in the water, but, owing to the shock of the cold water, many were drowned within sight of the boats and ship.

Every effort was made to save life as quickly as possible, both by boats and from the ships; life-buoys were thrown and ropes lowered, but only a proportion could be rescued. The *Invincible* alone rescued 108 men, 14 of whom were found to be dead after being brought on board; these men were buried at sea the following day with full military honours.

(C)—ACTION WITH THE LIGHT CRUISERS.

At about 1 p.m., when the *Scharnhorst* and *Gneisenau* turned to port to engage the *Invincible* and *Inflexible*, the enemy's light cruisers turned to starboard to escape; the *Dresden* was leading and the *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig* followed on each quarter.

In accordance with my instructions, the *Glasgow*, *Kent*, and *Cornwall* at once went in chase of these ships; the *Carnarvon*, whose speed was insufficient to overtake them, closed the battle cruisers.

The *Glasgow* drew well ahead of the *Cornwall* and *Kent*, and at 3 p.m. shots were exchanged with the *Leipzig* at 12,000 yards. The *Glasgow's* object was to endeavour to outrange the *Leipzig* with her 6-inch guns and thus cause her to alter course and give the *Cornwall* and *Kent* a chance of coming into action.

At 4.17 p.m. the *Cornwall* opened fire, also on the *Leipzig*.

At 7.17 p.m. the *Leipzig* was on fire fore and aft, and the *Cornwall* and *Glasgow* ceased fire.

The *Leipzig* turned over on her port side and disappeared at 9 p.m. Seven officers and eleven men were saved.

At 3.36 p.m. the *Cornwall* ordered the *Kent* to engage the *Nürnberg*, the nearest cruiser to her.

Owing to the excellent and strenuous efforts of the engine room department, the *Kent* was able to get within range of the *Nürnberg* at 5 p.m. At 6.35 p.m. the *Nürnberg* was on fire forward and ceased firing. The *Kent* also ceased firing and closed to 3,300 yards; as the colours were still observed

to be flying in the *Nürnberg*, the *Kent* opened fire again. Fire was finally stopped five minutes later on the colours being hauled down, and every preparation was made to save life. The *Nürnberg* sank at 7.27 p.m., and, as she sank, a group of men were waving a German ensign attached to a staff. Twelve men were rescued, but only seven survived.

The *Kent* had four killed and twelve wounded, mostly caused by one shell.

During the time the three cruisers were engaged with the *Nürnberg* and *Leipzig*, the *Dresden*, who was beyond her consorts, effected her escape owing to her superior speed. The *Glasgow* was the only cruiser with sufficient speed to have had any chance of success. However, she was fully employed in engaging the *Leipzig* for over an hour before either the *Cornwall* or *Kent* could come up and get within range. During this time the *Dresden* was able to increase her distance and get out of sight.

The weather changed after 4 p.m., and the visibility was much reduced; further, the sky was overcast and cloudy, thus assisting the *Dresden* to get away unobserved.

(D)—ACTION WITH THE ENEMY'S TRANSPORTS.

A report was received at 11.27 a.m. from H.M.S. *Bristol* that three ships of the enemy, probably transports or colliers, had appeared off Port Pleasant. The *Bristol* was ordered to take the *Macedonia* under his orders and destroy the transports.

H.M.S. *Macedonia* reports that only two ships, steamships *Baden* and *Santa Isabel*, were present; both ships were sunk after the removal of the crew.

I have pleasure in reporting that the officers and men under my orders carried out their duties with admirable efficiency and coolness, and great credit is due to the Engineer Officers of all the ships, several of which exceeded their normal full speed.

The names of the following are specially mentioned:

Officers.

Commander Richard Herbert Denny Townsend, H.M.S. *Invincible*.

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Commander Arthur Edward Frederick Bedford, H.M.S. *Kent*.

Lieutenant-Commander Wilfred Arthur Thompson, H.M.S. *Glasgow*.

Lieutenant-Commander Hubert Edward Dannreuther, First and Gunnery Lieutenant, H.M.S. *Invincible*.

Engineer-Commander George Edward Andrew, H.M.S. *Kent*.

Engineer - Commander Edward John Weeks, H.M.S. *Invincible*.

Paymaster Cyril Sheldon Johnson, H.M.S. *Invincible*.

Carpenter Thomas Andrew Walls, H.M.S. *Invincible*.

Carpenter William Henry Venning, H.M.S. *Kent*.

Carpenter George Henry Egford, H.M.S. *Cornwall*.

Petty Officers and Men.

Ch. P.O. D. Leighton, O.N. 124238, *Kent*.

P.O., 2nd Cl., M. J. Walton (R.F.R., A. 1756), O.N. 118358, *Kent*.

Ldg. Smn. F. S. Martin, O.N. 233301, *Invincible*, Gnr's. Mate, Gunlayer, 1st Cl.

Sigmn. F. Glover, O.N. 225731, *Cornwall*.

Ch. E. R. Art., 2nd Cl., J. G. Hill, O.N. 269646, *Cornwall*.

Actg. Ch. E. R. Art., 2nd Cl., R. Snowdon, O.N. 270654, *Inflexible*.

E. R. Art., 1st Cl., G. H. F. McCarten, O.N. 270023, *Invincible*.

Stkr. P.O. G. S. Brewer, O.N. 150950, *Kent*.

Stkr. P.O. W. A. Townsend, O.N. 301650, *Cornwall*.

Stkr., 1st Cl., J. Smith, O.N. SS 111915, *Cornwall*.

Shpwrt., 1st Cl., A. N. E. England, O.N. 341971, *Glasgow*.

Shpwrt., 2nd Cl., A. C. H. Dymott, O.N. M. 8047, *Kent*.

Portsmouth R.F.R.B. 3307, Sergeant Charles Mayes, H.M.S. *Kent*.

F. C. D. STURDEE.

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DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL
BRITISH CARGOES LANDED FROM GERMAN SHIPS
AT TSINGTAU.

L.G.,
Dec. 11,
1914.

Foreign Office, December 9, 1914.

HIS MAJESTY'S Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has received a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio to the following effect :

British subjects who possess interests in cargoes which may have been landed from German ships at Tsingtau should address their claims, through His Majesty's Embassy at Tokio, to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, sending detailed description of cargo, and documentary evidence in support of them.

The delivery of such cargo can only take place at Tsingtau. Permission to enter that place, subject to the consent of the military authorities, has been granted to foreigners having property there since November 20th last.

L.G.,
Jan. 5,
1915.

Foreign Office, December 31, 1914.

WITH reference to the notification which appeared in the *London Gazette* of December 11th, His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokyo telegraphs that the following German ships are believed to have been at Tsingtau prior to the establishment of the blockade, viz. :

Markomannia.
O. J. D. Ahlers.
Gouverneur Jaeschke.
C. Ferd Laiesz.
Albenga.
Loongmoon.
Sikiang, and
Litung.

The following vessels were sunk in the harbour :

Durendart.
Ellen Rickmers.
Michael Jebesen.

Full lists of British property at Kiao-chow are, it is understood, now at the headquarters of the Japanese Army at Tsingtau, and it is recommended that claimants in respect thereof should now forward documentary evidence in support

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

of their claims in duplicate, under flying seal, to His Majesty's Consul at Tsinanfu, for presentation to the headquarters of the Japanese Army at Tsingtau.

RUSSIAN MINES IN BLACK SEA.

(Official.)

Petrograd, December 10.

THE Russian Government notifies neutral shipping that military reasons compel it to place mines off Russian and Turkish coasts and ports in the Black Sea. While admitting that neutral shipping will consequently incur great dangers in the Black Sea, the Russian Government declines all responsibility for any accidents that may arise to neutral ships as a result of possible contact with mines placed in Russian or Turkish waters.—*Reuter.*

THE "GOEBEN" IN THE BLACK SEA.

(Official communiqué from the Headquarters of the Army in the Caucasus.)

Petrograd, December 11.

YESTERDAY about two o'clock in the afternoon, the *Goeben*, accompanied by the cruiser *Berk-i-Satvet*, approached Batum and attempted to bombard the town and fortress, but the forts having opened fire the ships drew off quickly, having fired fifteen shots which caused insignificant damage.—*Reuter.*

Times, Dec. 14, 1914.

Constantinople, December 11.

The Turkish fleet yesterday bombarded the environs of Batoum and thus refuted the Russian assertion that Turkish warships were driven from the Black Sea and that the *Sultan Javus Selim* and *Midille* were out of action. In yesterday's successful action the Russians lost 100 killed and a number of wounded.

Constantinople.

It is reported from the Turkish Headquarters that the great cruiser *Sultan Javus Selim*, which according to Russian

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reports has been seriously injured, bombarded Batoum on December 10th, and set the town on fire. The Russian shore batteries returned her fire without result.

[*Sultan Javus Selim* and *Midille* are the names given by the Turks to the *Goeben* and the *Breslau*.]

SUBMARINE RAID IN THE DARDANELLES.

December 14.

THE Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement :

Yesterday, submarine B 11, Lieutenant-Commander Norman D. Holbrook, R.N., entered the Dardanelles, and, in spite of the difficult current, dived under five rows of mines and torpedoed the Turkish battleship *Messudiyeh*, which was guarding the mine-field.

Although pursued by gunfire and torpedo-boats, B 11 returned safely after being submerged on one occasion for nine hours.

When last seen the *Messudiyeh* was sinking by the stern.

WAR WORKMEN : KING'S PRAISE OF THE MEN.

Times,
Dec. 15,
1914.

IN reply to a telegram sent by the Lord Mayor of Newcastle to the King from a meeting addressed by Dr. Macnamara last night, the following message was received later in the evening :

"The King appreciates the loyal and untiring service which is being rendered to the country by the skilled workmen in the great shipbuilding and armament firms. His Majesty greatly admires that spirit of patriotism which arouses in them the desire to enlist and fight at the front, but His Majesty wishes to remind them that by work they alone can most successfully perform they are assisting in the prosecution of the war equally with their comrades serving by land and sea."

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL RUSSIAN NAVAL SUCCESS.

Petrograd, December 17.

The following communiqué was issued on the evening of the 14th inst. by the Staff of the Russian Black Sea Fleet :

Several units of our naval forces sighted near the Turkish coast a vessel with two funnels and two masts. They discharged torpedoes, which seemed to strike home, for two explosions, followed by an outbreak of flames, were heard. The darkness and other circumstances rendered it impossible to ascertain the effects of the explosions.—*Reuter.*

NOTICE TO MARINERS.

NORTH SEA, RIVER THAMES AND ENGLISH CHANNEL.

*Alterations in positions or withdrawal of Light-vessels and L.G.,
Buoys : Extinction of Lights and lights of Light-buoys ; Dec. 18,
Alteration or discontinuance of Fog-signals ; Information 1914.
re Pilotage.*

1. Until further notice, in the English Channel and the Downs eastward of a line joining Selsea Bill and Cape Barfleur and to the southward of the parallel of $51^{\circ} 20'$ North latitude, all Light-vessels and buoys are liable to withdrawal or alteration in position, all Lights and the lights of Light-buoys are liable to be extinguished and the Fog-signals to be altered or discontinued.

2. Trinity House Pilot Stations have been established at the undermentioned places, and merchant vessels are very strongly advised to take pilots, as navigation in the area in question will be exceedingly dangerous without their aid :

(a) ST. HELENS, ISLE OF WIGHT, where ships proceeding up Channel can obtain pilots capable of piloting as far as Great Yarmouth ; and also pilots for the River Thames.

(b) GREAT YARMOUTH, where ships from the North Sea bound for the River Thames or the English Channel can obtain pilots capable of piloting as far as the Isle of Wight.

(c) DOVER, where ships from Dover and also French Channel ports, but *no others*, can obtain pilots for the English Channel and North Sea (including the River Thames and approaches).

(d) THE SUNK LIGHT-VESEL, where ships crossing the North Sea between the parallels of $51^{\circ} 40'$ and $51^{\circ} 54'$ North Latitude, but *no others*, can obtain pilots for the River Thames and the English Channel.

(e) Pilots can also be obtained at London and Harwich for the English Channel and North Sea (including the River Thames and approaches).

3. RIVER THAMES.—All traffic into and out of the River Thames must pass through the Edinburgh Channels, or through the Black Deep south of the Knock John and Knob Light-buoys, and through the Oaze Deep, until further notice.

No vessels are to remain under way in the above-mentioned Channels inside the Sunk Head Light-buoy, or within a line joining the positions of the South Long Sand and East Shingles buoys, between the hours of 7 p.m. and 6 a.m.

Vessels at anchor within these limits must not exhibit any lights between the hours of 7 p.m. and 6 a.m.

All other channels are closed to navigation.

Note.—The pilot station in the vicinity of the Tongue Light-vessel has been discontinued.

Authority.—The Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

By Command of their Lordships,

J. F. PARRY,

Hydrographer.

Hydrographic Department, Admiralty,

London, December 15th, 1914.

BOMBARDMENT OF ENGLISH COAST TOWNS.

Admiralty, December 16, 9.20 p.m.

Times,
Dec. 17,
1914.

THIS morning a German cruiser force made a demonstration upon the Yorkshire coast, in the course of which they shelled Hartlepool, Whitby, and Scarborough.

A number of their fastest ships were employed for this purpose, and they remained about an hour on the coast. They were engaged by the patrol vessels on the spot.

As soon as the presence of the enemy was reported a British patrolling squadron endeavoured to cut them off. On being sighted by British vessels the Germans retired at full speed, and, favoured by the mist, succeeded in making good their escape.

The losses on both sides are small, but full reports have not yet been received.

The Admiralty take the opportunity of pointing out that demonstrations of this character against unfortified towns or commercial ports, though not difficult to accomplish provided that a certain amount of risk is accepted, are devoid of military significance.

They may cause some loss of life among the civil population and some damage to private property, which is much to be regretted ; but they must not in any circumstances be allowed to modify the general naval policy which is being pursued.

War Office, 11.35 p.m.

At 8 a.m. to-day three enemy ships were sighted off *ibid.* Hartlepool, and at 8.15 they commenced a bombardment.

The ships appeared to be two battle cruisers and one armoured cruiser. The land batteries replied, and are reported to have hit and damaged the enemy.

At 8.50 the firing ceased, and the enemy steamed away.

None of our guns were touched. One shell fell in the R.E. line and several in the lines of the 18th (Service) Battalion of the Durham Light Infantry.

The casualties amongst the troops amounted to seven killed and fourteen wounded.

Some damage was done to the town, and the gasworks were set on fire.

During the bombardment, especially in West Hartlepool, the people crowded in the streets, and approximately twenty-two were killed and fifty wounded.

At the same time a battle cruiser and an armoured cruiser appeared off Scarborough and fired about fifty shots, which caused considerable damage, and thirteen casualties are reported.

At Whitby two battle cruisers fired some shots, doing damage to buildings, and the following casualties are reported : Two killed and two wounded.

At all three places there was an entire absence of panic, and the demeanour of the people was everything that could be desired.

ibid.

Earlier in the day (at 11.25 a.m.) the Admiralty had issued the following :

German movements of some importance are taking place this morning in the North Sea.

Scarborough and Hartlepool have been shelled, and our flotillas have at various points been engaged.

The situation is developing.

The Secretary of the War Office at 1.45 p.m. made the following announcement :

The Fortress Commander at West Hartlepool reports that German war vessels engaged that fortress between eight o'clock and nine o'clock this morning. The enemy were driven off.

A small German war vessel also opened fire on Scarborough and Whitby.

Berlin, December 16.

K.V.

A portion of our High Sea Fleet made an attack on the English East Coast, and early on December 16th bombarded the fortified coast towns of Scarborough and Hartlepool. Further information concerning the undertaking cannot yet be published.

VON POHL.

Chief of the Admiral Staff.

Berlin, December 17.

K.V.

Details are now to hand respecting the attack on the English coast. On nearing the coast, our cruisers were unsuccessfully attacked in a bad light by four English destroyers, one of which was destroyed and another disappeared from sight in a very severely damaged condition. The Hartlepool batteries were silenced and the gasometer destroyed. Several explosions and three large fires in the town were seen from on board. The coastguard station and the waterworks at Scarborough were destroyed, also the coastguard and

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signal stations at Whitby. Our ships were hit once or twice by the coast batteries, but very little damage was done. Another English destroyer was also sunk in another place.

BEHNCKE.

Acting Chief of the Admiral Staff.

The Secretary of the Admiralty announces that no British ship of war of any kind was lost in the recent operations. *Times*, Dec. 19 1914.
All German statements to the contrary are untrue.

Letter of the First Lord of the Admiralty to the Mayor of Scarborough.

Admiralty, S.W., December 20, 1914.

MY DEAR MR. MAYOR,—I send you a message of sympathy, not only on my own account, but on behalf of the Navy, in the losses Scarborough has sustained. We mourn with you the peaceful inhabitants who have been killed or maimed, and particularly the women and children. We admire the dignity and fortitude with which Scarborough, Whitby, and the Hartlepoons have confronted outrage. We share your disappointment that the miscreants escaped unpunished. We await with patience the opportunity that will surely come. *Times*, Dec. 21, 1914.

But viewed in its larger aspect, the incident is one of the most instructive and encouraging that have happened in the war. Nothing proves more plainly the effectiveness of British naval pressure than the frenzy of hatred aroused against us in the breasts of the enemy. This hatred has already passed the frontiers of reason. It clouds their vision, it darkens their counsels, it convulses their movements. We see a nation of military calculators throwing calculation to the winds; of strategists who have lost their sense of proportion; of schemers, who have ceased to balance loss and gain.

Practically the whole fast cruiser force of the German Navy, including some great ships vital to their fleet and utterly irreplaceable, has been risked for the passing pleasure of killing as many English people as possible, irrespective of sex, age, or condition, in the limited time available. To

this act of military and political folly they were impelled by the violence of feelings which could find no other vent. This is very satisfactory, and should confirm us in our courses. Their hate is the measure of their fear. Its senseless expression is the proof of their impotence and the seal of their dishonour. Whatever feats of arms the German Navy may hereafter perform, the stigma of the baby-killers of Scarborough will brand its officers and men while sailors sail the seas.

Believe me, dear Mr. Mayor,

Yours faithfully,

WINSTON S. CHURCHILL.

House of Commons, February 3, 1915.

Hansard.

SIR HENRY DALZIEL : I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for War a question of which I have given him private notice : Whether it is the case that immediately after the raid on Scarborough, the military authorities issued an order compelling all alien enemies to remove thirty miles inland ? Will he state the reasons which induced the authorities to issue such an order ? Is it the case that the order was subsequently cancelled ; and, if so, why ?

THE UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE FOR WAR (Mr. Tennant) : Shortly after the raid on Scarborough and other towns on the east coast, orders, under Regulation 14 of the Defence of the Realm Regulations, were served by the military authorities personally upon certain suspected individuals, requiring each person to remove outside the area. The reason is set forth in the Regulation referred to, and is that the persons were suspected of acting or of having acted or of being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or the Defence of the Realm. Further investigation into individual cases led to the order being cancelled in some instances. I am inquiring as to the number. In the remainder of the cases the order was enforced.

SIR H. DALZIEL : May I ask why it was cancelled ?

MR. TENNANT : It was cancelled because there was not sufficient ground for suspecting that these persons were acting or were about to act in the manner set forth as I have just read.

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ENEMY RAIDS (DAMAGE.)

House of Commons, February 4, 1915.

MR. RONALD M'NEILL asked the Prime Minister whether *Hansard.* the Government have undertaken or intend to undertake to compensate, and, if so, to what extent, persons whose property has been or may be injured by raids of the enemy by sea or air?

THE PRIME MINISTER: The Government have undertaken to give relief for damage caused by the raids which have taken place. A Committee has been appointed, over which Lord Parmoor is presiding, to advise as to the extent and scope of such relief. I am not prepared to give any general undertaking as regards future events.

SPEECH BY FRENCH MINISTER OF MARINE.

Paris, December 17.

THE Minister of Marine to-day gave the Naval Committee of the Chamber a review of the Navy's doings since the outbreak of hostilities. He reminded the Committee that thousands and thousands of men from Algeria, Tunis, West Africa, Morocco, and Madagascar had been safely transported to the Mother Country, notwithstanding the presence of Austrian and German warships in the Mediterranean. Not a ship, not a man, had been lost. The Navy had likewise, in co-operation with the Allied Fleets, ensured the transport of British troops from Asia, Australia, and Canada, and of French troops from Tongking. Their provisions have been coming in freely, whilst the sea was closed to their adversaries.

The Minister also gave information regarding the co-operation of the British and French Navies in the Mediterranean, the Channel, and the North Sea, and concerning the effective bombardment of the Belgian coast occupied by the enemy. In conclusion, he described the help given to the Army on land by the naval infantrymen and gunners, the use of naval guns on land, etc. The Committee begged him to transmit their congratulations to the Navy.—*Reuter.*

PAY OF OFFICERS OF THE ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION.

Order in Council under section 3 of the Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865 (28 & 29 Vict. c. 73), approving rates of Pay and Allowances of Officers and Men of the Royal Naval Division.

At the Court at *Buckingham Palace*,
The 17th day of December, 1914.

PRESENT,

The KING'S Most Excellent Majesty in Council.

WHEREAS there was this day read at the Board a Memorial from the Right Hon. the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty, dated the 9th day of December, 1914, in the words following; viz. :

"Whereas by Section 3 of the Naval and Marine Pay and Pensions Act, 1865, it is enacted, *inter alia*, that all pay, pensions, or other allowances in the nature thereof, payable in respect of services in Your Majesty's Naval or Marine Force to a person being or having been an Officer, Seaman, or Marine therein, shall be paid in such manner, and subject to such restrictions, conditions, and provisions, as are from time to time directed by Order in Council :

"And whereas we have deemed it expedient to organise the Active and Reserve Officers and Men not immediately required for service in Your Majesty's Fleet into a separate Corps known as the Royal Naval Division, in which certain Officers and Men of Your Majesty's Army are also employed, together with volunteers entered by direct recruitment :

"And whereas it is desirable that provision should be made for the emoluments of the Officers and Men whose cases are not already provided for by existing regulations, and we consider that the rates of pay at present authorised for certain ranks are not suitable for Officers serving in the Royal Naval Division.

"We beg leave humbly to recommend that Your Majesty may be graciously pleased, by Your Order in Council, to approve of the rates of pay and allowances set forth in the annexed schedule.

"The Lords Commissioners of Your Majesty's Treasury have signified their concurrence in these proposals."

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SCHEDULE.

PAY OF OFFICERS AND MEN OF THE ROYAL NAVAL DIVISION.

HEADQUARTERS STAFF.

Appointment, General Staff.	Rank.	Emoluments.
1st grade	Lieut.-Colonel ..	£750 per annum.
2nd "	Major	£550 "
3rd "	Captain	£400 "
Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster-General.	Lieut.-Colonel ..	£750 "
Deputy-Assistant Adju- tant and Quartermaster- General.	Major	£550 "
Deputy-Assistant Quarter- master-General.	Major	£550 "
Command Paymaster (ad- visory).	Lieut.-Colonel (now ceased duty).	Army pay and allow- ances.

BRIGADE STAFF APPOINTMENTS OF THE NAVAL BRIGADES WHEN
HELD BY OFFICERS HAVING MILITARY RANK.

Brigade Major	Major	£500 a year.
Staff Captain	Major	£400 "

REGIMENTAL APPOINTMENTS OF THE NAVAL BRIGADES WHEN
HELD BY OFFICERS HAVING MILITARY RANK.

Battalion Commandant ..	Lieut.-Colonel ..	Army pay of Lieut.- Colonel, viz., 23s. a day, with 5s. com- mand money.
Adjutant and Second in Command.	Major	Army pay of 16s. a day with Adjutant additional pay of 2s. 6d. a day.
Company Commander ..	Major	Army pay of 16s. a day.
Company Second in Com- mand.	Captain	Army pay of 11s. 7d. a day.

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BRIGADE AND BATTALION STAFF OFFICERS.

Royal Marine Brigade.

Brigade Commander ..	Colonel as Brigadier-General.	£1,000 a year.
Deputy-Assistant Quarter-master-General.	Major (or Brevet Lieut.-Colonel.)	£550 a year.
Brigade Major	Captain	£500 a year.
Lieut.-Colonels Commanding Battalions.	—	5s. a day in addition to pay of rank.
Adjutants	—	

Regimental Appointments of the Royal Marine Brigade.

All Officers to receive pay at the rates applicable to Officers of the Royal Marines serving afloat.

Second Lieutenants, Royal Marines.

Pay to be at the rate of 5s. a day.

Engineers' Branch.

Commanding Officer ..	Lieut.-Colonel ..	Army pay of Lieut.-Colonel, Royal Engineers, <i>i.e.</i> , 18s. a day with Corps' pay 14s. a day and allowances.
Other Officers	According to Rank ..	Army scale of pay and allowances.

Medical Branch (Army Officers).

Army Officers to receive Army rates of pay.

Special Rates of Pay for Officers of the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve serving with the Royal Naval Division.

Lieutenant-Commanders	14s. a day.
Lieutenants of four years' seniority ..	12s. „
Assistant Paymasters	10s. „

Officers of the Indian Army.

Officers of the Indian Army serving with the Division to receive their Indian rates of pay unless the pay of a British Staff appointment they are filling is higher, in which case the Officers to have the option of drawing the higher rate.

Deduction for Messing.

All Officers, including Army Officers, to be subject to a deduction of 2s. a day in pay when messed at the public expense.

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Seamen and Marines.

To receive pay and allowances at Naval and Marine rates respectively. Army recruits until incorporated in the Division to receive Army pay of 1s. a day together with Army Separation Allowance: pay then to be at Naval or Marine rates according to the Brigade to which they are finally attached.

Non-Commissioned Officers and Men of the Engineer Unit to receive Royal Engineers' rates of pay.

Field Allowance.

Field Allowance to Naval Officers and Men and to Marine Officers other than those borne on "shore" strength to be payable under Naval Regulations, but the minimum rate for all ranks of Officers to be 5s. a day.

Field Allowance of Army Officers to be governed by Army Regulations, but the minimum rate for all Officers to be 5s. a day subject to the understanding that they do not draw any messing allowance under paragraph 535 of the Army Allowance Regulations.

Marine Officers borne on "shore" strength to be paid Field Allowance under Army Allowance Regulations subject to a minimum rate of 5s. a day.

Non-Commissioned Officers and Men of the Royal Marines who are borne on "shore" strength in order that they may have the benefit of Separation Allowances on the Army scale not to be eligible to receive Field Allowance.

Separation Allowance.

To be paid in the usual way according as the Men are borne on ship's books or on "shore" strength.

His Majesty, having taken the said Memorial into consideration, was pleased, by and with the advice of His Privy Council, to approve of what is therein proposed. And the Right. Hon. the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty are to give the necessary directions herein accordingly.

ALLEGED OPERATIONS AT AKABA.

Constantinople.

IT is reported from Headquarters that an English cruiser, *K.V.*, which had been cruising off Akaba for some days, landed troops there. They were attacked by our troops which hurried to the spot and were compelled to re-embark. Our fire destroyed the cruiser's searchlight. Dec. 18, 1914.

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN LEVANT.

Petrograd, December 20.

A communiqué issued by the Naval Headquarters says:

The Commander of the cruiser *Askold*, which has arrived at Port Said, reports that his ship while scouting on the *Times*,
Dec. 21, 1914.

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Syrian coast captured at the port of Haifa a German vessel named *Haifa*, and took her to Port Said under the command of an officer.

At Beirut the *Askold* blew up a Turkish steamer and sank another. The cruiser sent steam pinnaces ashore to conduct reconnaissances at six points on the coast.—*Reuter*.

Constantinople.

K.V.,
Dec. 16,
1914.

It is officially stated that an English cruiser has unsuccessfully bombarded one of our observation stations between Jaffa and Gaza. The Russian cruiser *Askold* has sunk two small vessels off Beirut. Investigation has shown that the old guardship *Messoudieh* was destroyed either by a mine or by a torpedo.

Constantinople.

K.V.,
Dec. 21,
1914.

Headquarters report that a French ship yesterday bombarded the coasts to the northward of Alexandretta without doing harm of any kind.

THE CITY AND THE FLEET—SIR JOHN JELlicoe's THANKS.

Times,
Dec. 28,
1914.

THE Lord Mayor has received the following letter from Admiral Sir John Jellicoe in reply to a message at Christmas :

H.M.S. *Iron Duke*, December 22, 1914.

MY DEAR LORD MAYOR,—On behalf of the officers and men of the vessels of the Fleet under my command, may I express grateful thanks for the good wishes which you send in the name of the citizens of London, and which are most heartily reciprocated. We trust that all good things may attend upon you and upon the City at this Christmas season and at all times. I take this opportunity to thank you and those in whose name you write for the kind thoughts which have prompted the gifts which have been sent to the men of the Grand Fleet. They have given the greatest pleasure and have much alleviated the severity of the winter weather. The Fleet deeply appreciates the confidence which you express, and officers and men will do their utmost to merit

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it. I have communicated the contents of your kind letter to the officers and men of the Fleet under my command, who will receive with much satisfaction the message of good cheer which you send from the first City of the Empire.

I am, etc.,

J. R. JELlicoe,
Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet.

ENEMY OPERATIONS IN ADRIATIC.

Vienna, December 23.

THE French submarine *Curie* was bombarded and sunk on our coast by coast batteries and guardships, before it was able to make an attack. The Commander and twenty-six men were saved and taken prisoners; only the Second Officer is missing. K.V.,
Dec. 23.

Our Submarine XII., commanded by Lieut. Egon Lerch, attacked on the morning of December 21st a French fleet consisting of sixteen large vessels, in the Straits of Otranto. He hit the flagship, a vessel of the *Courbet* class, twice. The submarine was unable to ascertain the actual condition of the torpedoed ship, on account of the activity displayed by the hostile fleet, the dangerous proximity of certain vessels, and the heavy sea-way in thick weather.

COMMANDER OF THE FLEET.

An Austrian submarine fired two torpedoes at one of our ironclads cruising in squadron in the Straits of Otranto. One of the torpedoes hit the vessel in the fore part and exploded. The injuries to the ship are not serious and no man was wounded. Austrian and Italian newspapers have announced that the French submarine *Curie* struck a boom in attempting to enter the port of Pola, and being thereby forced to come to the surface, was fired at and sunk. It is true that the *Curie* was detached for the purpose of attempting an attack on the Austrian warships moored in the port of Pola, and as she has not rejoined the fleet the foreign statements about her may be taken as correct. C.O.,
Jan. 2,
1915.

C.O.
Jan. 16,
1915.

THE foreign Press, reproducing information from Vienna, says it was the battleship *Courbet* which was torpedoed by the Austrian submarine E 12, that this battleship was sunk, and that the *Jean Bart* in going to her assistance was damaged as the result of a collision. This information is absolutely incorrect. No French ship has been sunk by an Austrian submarine. The vessel which was torpedoed by submarine E 12 sustained only trifling damages. No collision occurred. The battleship *Courbet*, which was not at the scene of the attack, is at her post in excellent condition.

CONTRABAND OF WAR.

Proclamation, dated December 23, 1914, Revising the List of Contraband of War.

BY THE KING.

L.G. A Proclamation revising the List of Articles to be treated as Contraband of War.

George R.I.

⁽¹⁾ [See Part I., pp. 24-26.] WHEREAS on the fourth day of August, 1914,⁽¹⁾ We did issue Our Royal Proclamation specifying the articles which it was Our intention to treat as contraband of war during the war between Us and the German Emperor ; and

⁽²⁾ [See Part I., pp. 87-89.] Whereas on the twelfth day of August, 1914,⁽²⁾ We did by Our Royal Proclamation of that date extend Our Proclamation aforementioned to the war between Us and the Emperor of Austria, King of Hungary ; and

⁽³⁾ [See Part I., pp. 214-5.] Whereas on the twenty-first day of September, 1914,⁽³⁾ We did by Our Royal Proclamation of that date make certain additions to the list of articles to be treated as contraband of war ; and

⁽⁴⁾ [See Part I., pp. 349-52.] Whereas on the twenty-ninth day of October, 1914, We⁽⁴⁾ did by Our Royal Proclamation of that date withdraw the said lists of contraband, and substitute therefor the lists contained in the schedules to the said Proclamation ; and

Whereas it is expedient to make certain alterations in and additions to the said lists :

Now, therefore, We do hereby declare, by and with the

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advice of Our Privy Council, that the lists of contraband contained in the schedules to Our Royal Proclamation of the twenty-ninth day of October aforementioned are hereby withdrawn, and that in lieu thereof during the continuance of the war or until We do give further public notice the articles enumerated in Schedule I. hereto will be treated as absolute contraband, and the articles enumerated in Schedule II. hereto will be treated as conditional contraband.

SCHEDULE I.

1. Arms of all kinds, including arms for sporting purposes, and their distinctive component parts.

2. Projectiles, charges, and cartridges of all kinds, and their distinctive component parts.

3. Powder and explosives specially prepared for use in war.

4. Ingredients of explosives, viz., nitric acid, sulphuric acid, glycerine, acetone, calcium acetate and all other metallic acetates, sulphur, potassium nitrate, the fractions of the distillation products of coal tar between benzol and cresol inclusive, aniline, methylaniline, dimethylaniline, ammonium perchlorate, sodium perchlorate, sodium chlorate, barium chlorate, ammonium nitrate, cyanamide, potassium chlorate, calcium nitrate, mercury.

5. Resinous products, camphor, and turpentine (oil and spirit).

6. Gun mountings, limber boxes, limbers, military wagons, field forges, and their distinctive component parts.

7. Range-finders and their distinctive component parts.

8. Clothing and equipment of a distinctively military character.

9. Saddle, draught, and pack animals suitable for use in war.

10. All kinds of harness of a distinctively military character.

11. Articles of camp equipment and their distinctive component parts.

12. Armour plates.

13. Ferro alloys, including ferro-tungsten, ferro-molybdenum, ferro-manganese, ferro-vanadium, ferro-chrome.

14. The following metals: Tungsten, molybdenum, vanadium, nickel, selenium, cobalt, hæmatite pig-iron, manganese.

15. The following ores: Wolframite, scheelite, molyb-

denite, manganese ore, nickel ore, chrome ore, hæmatite iron ore, zinc ore, lead ore, bauxite.

16. Aluminium, alumina, and salts of aluminium.

17. Antimony, together with the sulphides and oxides of antimony.

18. Copper, unwrought and part wrought, and copper wire.

19. Lead, pig, sheet, or pipe.

20. Barbed wire, and implements for fixing and cutting the same.

21. Warships, including boats and their distinctive component parts of such a nature that they can only be used on a vessel of war.

22. Submarine sound signalling apparatus.

23. Aeroplanes, airships, balloons, and aircraft of all kinds, and their component parts, together with accessories and articles recognisable as intended for use in connection with balloons and aircraft.

24. Motor vehicles of all kinds and their component parts.

25. Tyres for motor vehicles and for cycles, together with articles or materials especially adapted for use in the manufacture or repair of tyres.

26. Rubber (including raw, waste, and reclaimed rubber) and goods made wholly of rubber.

27. Iron pyrites.

28. Mineral oils and motor spirit, except lubricating oils.

29. Implements and apparatus designed exclusively for the manufacture of munitions of war, for the manufacture or repair of arms, or war material for use on land and sea.

SCHEDULE II.

1. Foodstuffs.

2. Forage and feeding stuffs for animals.

3. Clothing, fabrics for clothing, and boots and shoes suitable for use in war.

4. Gold and silver in coin or bullion ; paper money.

5. Vehicles of all kinds, other than motor vehicles, available for use in war, and their component parts.

6. Vessels, craft, and boats of all kinds ; floating docks, parts of docks, and their component parts.

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7. Railway materials, both fixed and rolling stock, and materials for telegraphs, wireless telegraphs, and telephones.

8. Fuel, other than mineral oils. Lubricants.

9. Powder and explosives not specially prepared for use in war.

10. Horseshoes and shoeing materials.

11. Harness and saddlery.

12. Hides of all kinds, dry or wet ; pigskins, raw or dressed ; leather, undressed or dressed, suitable for saddlery, harness, or military boots.

13. Field glasses, telescopes, chronometers, and all kinds of nautical instruments.

Given at Our Court at Buckingham Palace, this Twenty-third day of December, in the year of our Lord one thousand nine hundred and fourteen, and in the Fifth year of Our Reign.

FURTHER OPERATIONS AT AKABA.

Constantinople.

HEADQUARTERS report that yesterday an English *K.V.*, cruiser attempted to effect a landing at Akaba, but was com- Dec. 24,
pelled to withdraw under fire of our artillery. The fire of the 1914
cruiser did no damage.

INTERVIEW GIVEN BY ADMIRAL VON TIRPITZ TO "UNITED PRESS" (U.S.A.).

"ENGLAND," he said, "England alone is responsible *Times*,
for this war. Did Germany want anything, or had Germany Dec. 24,
ever demanded anything from anybody? Had Germany a 1914
quarrel with anybody? No ; Germany wanted only to be
left alone, and to be free to continue her peaceful growth
and development. England's hostility to Germany goes
back to 1870, to the time of our victory over France. Always
overbearing, like a dictator, England was unwilling that
Germany should develop in the economic field or should
take the place in the world to which she was entitled as a
great Power. England will cut the throat of everybody
who comes across her way, or who in her opinion might cross
her path. England has not the conscientious sense of the
white race, as her alliance with Japan proves. If any

advantage is to be drawn she is ready to conclude an alliance with anybody without respect of race or colour."

Germany developed too quickly, and became too strong and too powerful; she crossed England's path, and therefore her throat had to be cut.

"That is the truth of it in a nutshell. King Edward years ago laid down the lines for this policy; he had a quite inexplicable antipathy against Germany. He looked about him and seized as the instruments of his policy pan-Slavism in the East and the *revanche* idea in the West. England concluded the alliance with the yellow race in the Far East, with the Russian barbarians in the Near East, and in the West with the French, who were not in a position to throw off the bondage of the *revanche* idea. Germany, hemmed in by pan-Slavism on one side and by the lust for *revanche* on the other, and by England on the sea, was doomed to be broken and thrust back into the place assigned to her by England. These are the weapons with which England has designed to destroy or to break up Germany, and she has the effrontery to proclaim to the whole world that by smashing up Germany with the aid of Allies like the Russian Tartars, the Japanese, the Hindus, Senegalese, negroes, Turcos, etc., she is the champion of the holiest and highest treasures of civilisation and *Kultur*. Does the world really believe this?"

In reply to a remark that there was an impression abroad that German militarism had contributed in some degree to provoke the war, Admiral von Tirpitz said:

"Yes, that is the cry that England has set up about our militarism. But what about England's militarism, which for years past lays claim to the sole mastery of the seas? In Germany there is no militarism, unless universal service is so to be described; and this service is necessary for the defence of our country, which for centuries has been the arena for the conflicts of the nations of Europe. During the past 200 years France has declared war on Germany some thirty times. In my opinion universal service makes for peace and not for war. Ask the mothers among our people. They know what war means, and knew it before it came. And they knew it because their sons are soldiers. England, who has her hireling army, goes in for football matches and for races at which large crowds are always present. Can you

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imagine anything of this kind going on in a German town? No, German mothers and wives are weeping. They give them all freely for the Fatherland, but they weep."

In reply to a question as to his views with regard to the "Japanese" problem, Admiral von Tirpitz observed:

"That is a problem for the Americans. They will have to give it their attention. Then we shall look on. When I say that we shall only look on, I am of course joking. That would depend entirely upon the circumstances—upon circumstances! . . . I can assure you of one thing; Germany will never be a traitor to the white race. Japan will make China her vassal and will make a military people out of China's millions. Then your country (the United States) will have to be on its guard. Admiral Togo once said to a European: 'The next war will be a general European war, and after that will come the great war between my race and yours.'"

Admiral von Tirpitz admitted that the fall of Tsingtau had been a heavy blow for him. He could not explain to himself the apparent indifference of America in presence of the activity of Japan in the Pacific, or the apparent inability of America to recognise the serious complications which might arise for her in the very near future. In his opinion, no one could be misled by the announcement that Japan intended to leave to Australia the islands in the Pacific.

Admiral von Tirpitz went on to say that "we are not in the least disturbed by 'Kitchener's millions.'"

"We, too, have several millions of perfectly serviceable men upon whom we can fall back. If necessary we shall take those who do not come up to the ordinary average, and we shall thus be able to put several more millions into the field. I am sure that the world will no longer doubt but that if this necessity should arise we shall fight to the bitter end."

With regard to aircraft in general, Admiral von Tirpitz expressed himself as being personally in favour of aeroplanes for naval service. But, of course, Zeppelins were far superior for carrying heavy loads for long distances. For the moment he was unable to say which of the two types would prove to be the more effective under given weather conditions, but both of them were used for different purposes.

In reply to a question as to whether the day of large ships was over, Admiral von Tirpitz said:

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"It is difficult to draw conclusions just yet. It is unquestionable that submarines are a new and powerful weapon of naval warfare. At the same time one must not forget that submarines do their best work along the coasts and in shallow waters, and that for this reason the Channel is particularly suitable for these craft. The successes which have been achieved hitherto do not warrant the conclusion that the day of large ships is past. It is still questionable whether submarines would have made such a fine show in other waters. We have learnt a great deal about submarines in this war. We thought that they would not be able to remain much longer than three days away from their base, as the crew would then necessarily be exhausted. But we soon learned that the larger type of these boats can navigate round the whole of England and can remain absent as long as a fortnight. All that is necessary is that the crew gets an opportunity of resting and recuperating, and this opportunity can be afforded the men by taking the boat into shallow and still waters, where it can rest on the bottom and remain still in order that the crew can have a good sleep. This is only possible where the water is comparatively shallow."

Admiral von Tirpitz's interviewer parenthetically remarks that it is an open secret that Germany is building forty new submarines of the 900-ton type.

In Admiral von Tirpitz's opinion a submarine war against British merchant ships would be more effective even than an invasion of England by means of Zeppelins.

"Will the German Navy come out to fight the British Fleet?"

"Certainly," Admiral von Tirpitz replied, "if the British give us an opportunity to engage them. But can it be expected that our fleet, the strength of which is only about one-third of that of the British Fleet, will seize an opportunity unfavourable in the military sense and challenge the British Fleet to fight? As far as we know the British Grand Battle Fleet is lying off the west coast of England in the Irish Sea."

THE KING'S CHRISTMAS GREETING TO THE FLEET.

THE Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement:

The following is a copy of a telegram, dated the 24th

Times,
Dec. 26,
1914.

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instant, which was sent by His Majesty the King to all His Majesty's ships and bases at home and abroad :

"The Queen and I send the officers and men of the Navy our hearty good wishes for Christmas and the New Year."

And the following reply has been received from the Commander-in-Chief, Grand Fleet :

"All ships, officers and men of the Fleet, with humble duty beg to thank their Majesties for their gracious Christmas message, which all ranks respectfully and loyally reciprocate."

JELlicoe.

RECENT OPERATIONS IN THE BLACK SEA.

IT is officially reported from Constantinople that the *K.V.*, Turkish Fleet, including the *Hamidieh*, sailed through the *Dec. 27,* Black Sea and returned undamaged. One of our men-of-war *1914.* met the Russian Fleet, consisting of seventeen units—*i.e.*, five ships of the line, two cruisers, and ten torpedo-boats, and three minelayers on December 24th. This meant one Turkish ship against seventeen of the enemy. This Turkish ship attacked this fleet nevertheless, and fired at the ship of the line *Rostislav* with good results, successfully sank the two minelayers, *Oleg* and *Atthe*, and saved and took as prisoners two officers and thirty Russian marines. At the same time other parts of our fleet successfully bombarded Batum on December 25th. Two of our ships tried to force the above-mentioned Russian Fleet into battle, but they preferred to flee towards Sebastopol.

Petrograd, January 3.

The Turco-German reports of victories won in the Black *Times,* Sea by the *Breslau* on December 24th against an entire Russian *Jan. 4,* fleet consisting of five battleships, two cruisers, and ten *1915.* destroyers are obviously fanciful. The truth is that throughout the 24th the *Breslau* used her superior speed to elude our pursuit. On the 25th the *Breslau* near Sebastopol sighted four small destroyers and began to chase them. She opened fire on them, but, failing to inflict any damage, turned about towards the open sea in spite of the fact that her greater speed rendered further pursuit possible. The *Breslau* was then sighted by the Russian Fleet, which attempted to cut her off,

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but after our first salvoes the enemy fled. The ability of the fast cruiser to approach the Russian coast and avoid an engagement with the slower Russian boats is magnified into a glorious victory, but the activity of the *Breslau* enabled the Turks to reinforce their Caucasian front.

K.V.,
Dec. 28,
1914.

Constantinople.

Headquarters report that a French torpedo-boat fired some shells at our look-out stations near Kikili opposite the island of Tenedos, but without result. The English have once more attempted a landing at Akaba ; two of their boats tried to approach the shore but retreated under the fire of our gendarmerie. They lost four killed.

GERMAN AIR RAIDS.

Times,
Dec. 26,
1914.

War Office, December 24.

AN enemy's aeroplane was seen over Dover this morning about 10.55. It dropped a bomb, which fell in a garden and exploded, but did no damage. The aeroplane was only seen for a few seconds, and left again over sea.

British aircraft went up at once, but did not see the enemy again. The weather was foggy and cloudy.

ibid.

War Office, December 25.

A hostile aeroplane was sighted to-day at 12.35 p.m. flying very high, East to West, over Sheerness. British aircraft went up in pursuit and engaged the enemy, who, after being hit three or four times, was driven off seaward.

AIR RAIDS ON CUXHAVEN AND BRUSSELS.

Times,
Dec. 28,
1914.

THE Secretary of the Admiralty makes the following announcement :

On Friday, the 25th inst., German warships lying in Schillig Roads, off Cuxhaven, were attacked by seven naval seaplanes piloted by the following officers :

Flight Commander Douglas A. Oliver, R.N.

Flight Commander Francis E. T. Hewlett, R.N.

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Flight Commander Robert P. Ross, R.N.

Flight Commander Cecil F. Kilner, R.N.

Flight Lieutenant Arnold J. Miley, R.N.

Flight Lieutenant Charles H. K. Edmonds, R.N.

Flight Sub-Lieutenant Vivian Gaskell Blackburn, R.N.

The attack was delivered at daylight, starting from a point in the vicinity of Heligoland. The seaplanes were escorted by a light cruiser and destroyer force, together with submarines. As soon as these ships were seen by the Germans from Heligoland, two Zeppelins, three or four hostile seaplanes, and several hostile submarines attacked them. It was necessary for the British ships to remain in the neighbourhood in order to pick up the returning airmen, and a novel combat ensued between the most modern cruisers on the one hand and the enemy's aircraft and submarines on the other. By swift manœuvring the enemy's submarines were avoided, and the two Zeppelins were easily put to flight by the guns of the *Undaunted* and *Arethusa*.

The enemy's seaplanes succeeded in dropping their bombs near to our ships, though without hitting any.

The British ships remained for three hours off the enemy's coast without being molested by any surface vessel, and safely re-embarked three out of the seven airmen with their machines. Three other pilots, who returned later, were picked up, according to arrangement, by British submarines which were standing by, their machines being sunk.

Six out of the seven pilots, therefore, returned safely, Flight Commander Francis E. T. Hewlett, R.N., is, however, missing. His machine was seen in a wrecked condition about eight miles from Heligoland, and the fate of this daring and skilful pilot is at present unknown. The extent of the damage by the British airmen's bombs cannot be estimated, but all were discharged on points of military significance.

December 28, 1914.

The Secretary of the Admiralty announces :

On Thursday, December 24th, Squadron Commander Richard B. Davies, R.N., of the Naval Air Service, visited Brussels in a Maurice Farman biplane for the purpose of dropping twelve bombs on an airship shed reported to contain

Times,
Dec. 29,
1914.

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a German Parseval. Eight of these bombs, of which six are believed to have hit, were discharged at the first attack, and the remaining four on the return flight. Owing to the clouds of smoke which arose from the shed the effect could not be distinguished.

Berlin.

*K.V.,
Dec. 26,
1914.*

On December 25th, in the forenoon, a small British force made an attack by hydroplanes on our estuaries, and dropped bombs on some anchored ships and one gasometer in the neighbourhood of Cuxhaven without hitting or damaging anything.

After dropping the bombs the British Airmen disappeared in a westerly direction. Our airships and aeroplanes engaged the British forces and dropped bombs on two British destroyers and one convoy vessel. On the latter fire was observed to break out. Misty weather prevented any further engagement taking place.

BEHNCKE,

Acting Chief of the Admiral Staff.

*Times,
Feb. 19,
1914.*

The following Admiralty Memorandum on the combined operations by H.M. Ships and Naval Seaplanes on Christmas day is published :

On December 25th, 1914, an air reconnaissance of the Heligoland Bight, including Cuxhaven, Heligoland, and Wilhelmshaven, was made by naval seaplanes, and the opportunity was taken at the same time of attacking with bombs points of military importance. The reconnaissance involved combined operations by light cruisers, destroyers, and seaplane-carriers, under Commodore Reginald Y. Tyrwhitt, C.B., and submarines acting under the orders of Commodore Roger Keyes, C.B., M.V.O.

The vessels detailed for the operations arrived at their rendezvous before daylight, and as soon as the light was sufficient the seaplanes were hoisted out and despatched. The following Air Service officers and observers took part in the reconnaissance :

PILOTS.

Flight Commander (now Squadron Commander) Douglas Austin Oliver.

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Flight Commander Francis Esme Theodore Hewlett.

Flight Commander Robert Peel Ross.

Flight Commander Cecil Francis Kilner.

Flight Lieutenant (now Flight Commander) Arnold John Miley.

Flight Lieutenant Charles Humphrey Kingsman Edmonds.

Flight Sub-Lieutenant (now Flight Lieutenant) Vivian Gaskell Blackburn.

OBSERVERS.

Lieutenant Erskine Childers, R.N.V.R.

C.P.O. Mechanic James W. Bell.

C.P.O. Mechanic Gilbert H. W. Budds.

The seaplane carriers were commanded by :

Squadron Commander Cecil J. L'Estrange Malone.

Flight Commander Edmund D. M. Robertson.

Flight Commander Frederick W. Bowhill.

At the beginning of the flight the weather was clear, but on nearing the land the seaplanes met with thick weather, and were compelled to fly low, thus becoming exposed to a heavy fire at short range from ships and shore batteries. Several machines were hit, but all remained in the air for over three hours, and succeeded in obtaining valuable information regarding the disposition of the enemy's ships and defences. Bombs were also dropped on military points. In the meanwhile German submarines, seaplanes and Zeppelins delivered a combined attack upon the light cruisers, destroyers and seaplane-carriers, but were driven off.

Flight Commanders Kilner and Ross and Flight Lieutenant Edmonds regained their ships. Flight Commander Oliver, Flight Lieutenant Miley, and Flight Sub-Lieutenant Blackburn became short of fuel, and were compelled to descend near Submarine E 11, which with other submarine vessels was watching inshore to assist any seaplane that might be in difficulties. Lieutenant-Commander Martin E. Nasmith, commanding E 11, although attacked by an airship, succeeded, by his coolness and resource, in rescuing the three pilots. Flight Commander Hewlett, after a flight of three-and-a-half hours, was compelled to descend on account of engine trouble, but was rescued by a Dutch trawler, landed in Holland, and returned safely to England.

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An expression of their Lordships' appreciation has been conveyed to Commodore Keyes (Commodore S.), Commodore Tyrwhitt (Commodore T.), and to Captain Sueter (Director of the Air Department), for their share in the combined operations which resulted in this successful reconnaissance.

AWARDS OF THE D.S.O.

The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointments to the Distinguished Service Order :

TO BE COMPANIONS OF THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE ORDER.

Captain Cecil Francis Kilner, R.M.L.I. (Flight Commander).

Lieutenant Charles Humphrey Kingsman Edmonds, R.N. (Flight Lieutenant).

The following awards have also been made :

TO RECEIVE THE DISTINGUISHED SERVICE MEDAL.

Chief Petty Officer Mechanic James William Bell, No. M. 489.

Chief Petty Officer Mechanic Gilbert Howard William Budds, No. 271764.

Admiralty, *February 19th, 1915.*

Amsterdam, January 1.

Flight Commander Hewlett received the following telegram from the King to-day at Ymuiden :

" I am delighted and greatly relieved to hear that you are safe, and I heartily congratulate you.

GEORGE R.I."

After a week's consideration the German naval authorities issued on January 2nd a statement about the raid on Cuxhaven, which is published in various forms in most of the German newspapers. It runs :

" The attempt of the English to sing a song of praise about their penetration of the German Bight causes no surprise, but does not alter the fact that nothing is known in Germany

Times,
Jan. 2,
1915.

Times,
Jan. 7,
1915.

about the depression supposed to have been caused by this attempted attack, and that actually the English achieved nothing at all. They cannot themselves report anything definite about the success of their bombs, nor is that indeed possible, as all the bombs missed their mark. Not a single one of the seaplanes that are so highly praised was able to hit anything.

"On the other hand, it is certain that several of the British seaplanes were lost, and that in a number of cases our bombs found their mark. An English ship was set on fire and—to mention a name—the cruiser *Arethusa* was hit three times by German bombs. It may also be presumed that two English destroyers made the same unpleasant acquaintance. What, then, was the result? On the English side a complete failure."

The German naval Press Bureau has also issued another long article about the attack on the English coast and the "defences" of Scarborough, which, it says, are proved by a study of the Army List and Navy List. The following invention of Grand Admiral von Tirpitz's department seems new:

"If the English did not fire all their guns, or if all the guns were not manned by gunners—perhaps because these guns were partly of an obsolete type, or for reasons of economy had not been kept ready for war—this state of things would not justify the charge that the enemy had bombarded unfortified places, any more than would the fact which has reached us from a trustworthy neutral source, that the defenders ran away from their guns when the German ships opened their well-aimed fire."

THE TURKISH COMMANDER TO HIS TROOPS IN SYRIA.

Constantinople.

ARAB papers publish the following Army Order issued K.V., by the Commander to the troops of the Syrian Army told off Dec. 26, for the attack on Egypt: "Warriors! Behind you lie the vast deserts, before you is the craven enemy, behind him the rich land of Egypt which is waiting impatiently for your coming. If you falter death will overtake you, before you Paradise lies."

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MINEFIELD CLEARED OFF SCARBOROUGH.

[DEC.

Admiralty, February 18.

Times,
Feb. 19,
1915.

THE following Memorandum has been furnished by the Admiral Commanding the East Coast Mine-sweepers, detailing the recent mine-sweeping operations off Scarborough :

From December 19th to the 31st sweeping operations were conducted by the East Coast Mine-sweepers with the object of clearing the minefield which had been laid by the enemy off Scarborough.

At the beginning there was no indication of the position of the mines, although owing to losses of passing merchant ships it was known that a minefield had been laid.

In order to ascertain how the mines lay it was necessary to work at all times of tide, with a consequent large increase in the element of danger.

The following officers are specially noticed for their services during the operations :

Commander Richard H. Walters, R.N., A.M.S. Staff, was in charge of the whole of the mine-sweeping operations from December 19th to 31st. During this period a large number of mines were swept up and destroyed. By December 25th, a channel had been cleared, and traffic was able to pass through by daylight.

Commander (now Captain) Lionel G. Preston, R.N., H.M.S. *Skipjack*, on December 19th, proceeded at once into the middle of the area where the mines had exploded to give assistance to the damaged trawlers. He anchored between the trawlers and the mines which had been brought to the surface, and proceeded to sink them.

Lieutenant Godfrey Craik Parsons, R.N., H.M.S. *Pekin*, displayed great skill and devotion to duty in continuing to command his group of trawlers after having been mined in Trawler No. 58 on December 19th. On this day his group exploded eight mines, and brought to the surface six more, Trawler No. 99 being blown up and Nos. 58 and 465 damaged, all in the space of about ten minutes.

Lieutenant H. Boothby, R.N.R., H.M.S. *Pekin*. When Trawler No. 99 (*Orianda*) in which he was serving was blown up by a mine on December 19th, Lieutenant Boothby successfully got all his crew (except one who was killed) into

safety. Lieutenant Boothby was again blown up on January 6th, 1915, in Trawler No. 450 (*The Banyers*).

Lieutenant C. V. Crossley, R.N.R., H.M.S. *Pekin*. Whilst sweeping on December 19th, three violent explosions occurred close under the stern of his ship, Trawler No. 465 (*Star of Britain*). He controlled the crew, and himself crawled into a confined space near the screw shaft, discovered the damage, and temporarily stopped the leak sufficiently to enable the pumps to keep the water down and save the ship.

Skipper T. Tringall, R.N.T.R., Trawler *Solon*, No. 55, on his own responsibility went to the assistance of the steamer *Gallier*, which had just been mined on the night of December 25th. It was low water at the time and dark, and the *Gallier* was showing no lights, so had to be searched for in the minefield.

Skipper Ernest V. Snowline, R.N.T.R., Drifter *Hilda and Ernest*, No. 201, carried out his duties as Commodore of the Flotilla of Lowestoft drifters under Chief Gunner Franklin, R.N., in a most satisfactory manner. He kept to his station in heavy weather, standing by the S.S. *Gallier* after she had been damaged by a mine.

Lieutenant W. G. Wood, R.N.R., Trawler *Restrivo*, No. 48, did excellent work in going to the assistance of damaged trawlers on December 19th, and performed the risky duty of crossing the minefield at low water when sent to bring in the *Valiant*, which had been disabled by a mine.

Skipper George W. Thornton, R.N.T.R., Trawler *Passing*, No. 58, displayed great coolness and rendered valuable assistance to Lieutenant Parsons in controlling the crew when No. 58 had been mined.

Skipper William Allerton, R.N.T.R., Drifter *Eager*, No. 202, kept to his station in heavy weather, standing by the S.S. *Gallier* after she had been damaged by a mine.

Sub-Lieutenant W. L. Scott, R.N.R., Drifter *Principal*, went alongside the Trawler *Garmo* in a dinghy to rescue a man at considerable risk to himself and his boat, as the vessel was floating nearly vertical at the time, with only the fore-castle above water. She turned completely over and sank a few minutes after he left her.

Skipper Thomas B. Belton, R.N.T.R., Drifter *Retriever*, No. 223, kept to his station, marking the safe channel for

shipping when all other drifters were driven in by the weather.

The following are also commended for Good Service done under dangerous conditions :

Robert A. Gray, Engineman, R.N.R. No. 694ES., M.S.Tr. No. 465.

William A. Lewis, P.O., Icl., O.N. 178498, M.S.Tr. No. 450.

Christopher Briggs, Engineman, R.N.R. No. 1542ES., M.S.Tr. No. 450.

William Gladding, Cook, R.N.R. No. 223T.C., M.S.Tr. No. 450.

Robert Frost, Second Hand, R.N.R. No. 81D.A., M.S.Tr. No. 43.

Edwin F. Frankland, Deck Hand, R.N.R. No. 2481D.A., M.S.Tr. No. 49.

George Newman, Engineman, R.N.R. No. 625ES., M.S.Tr. No. 451.

William R. Kemp, Engineman, R.N.R. No. 846ES., M.S.Tr. No. 49.

DECORATIONS AWARDED.

The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointment to the Distinguished Service Order and for the award of the Distinguished Service Cross in respect of the undermentioned Officers, in recognition of their services mentioned in the foregoing dispatch :

To be a Companion of the Distinguished Service Order.

Lieutenant H. Boothby, R.N.R.

To receive the Distinguished Service Cross.

Lieutenant C. V. Crossley, R.N.R.

Skipper T. Tringall, R.N.T.R.

Skipper Ernest V. Snowline, R.N.T.R.

The following awards have also been made :

To receive the Distinguished Service Medal.

Robert A. Gray, Engineman, R.N.R. No. 694ES.

William A. Lewis, Petty Officer, 1st Class, O.N. 178498.

Christopher Briggs, Engineman, R.N.R. No. 1542ES.

William Gladding, Cook, R.N.R. No. 223T.C.

Robert Frost, Second Hand, R.N.R. No. 81D.A.

SIR GEORGE BUCHANAN ON THE WAR, AND THE
WORK OF THE BRITISH NAVY.*Petrograd, December 31.*

SIR GEORGE BUCHANAN, the British Ambassador, speaking this evening at the annual dinner of the New English Club, referred to the last dinner of the British colony over which he presided, given in June to the officers of the British Squadron visiting Cronstadt. His Excellency said :

I then said the Navy was our glory and pride, and that, however the type of ships might change, the officers and men, like the great sea captains of the past, would ever maintain the high traditions of their noble service. I little thought when I made the speech that Sir David Beatty and his gallant officers would, ere two months had passed, be fighting a brilliant action in the Bight of Heligoland. Nobody then dreamed that Germany was already preparing to plunge Europe in war, in her mad craving for world dominion. The war is now entering on its sixth month, and we Englishmen have every reason to be proud of the part our country has played in it. A small and insignificant section, however, of public opinion in Russia seems to take a very different view of what we have done. A few well-known Germanophiles have for some time past been preaching an anti-English crusade, and their little band of proselytes is busy trying to sow dissensions between Russia and her Allies. We are accused of having pushed Russia into war for our own selfish ends, and of leaving her to bear the brunt of it, carefully reserving our resources in order to seize the lion's share of the booty when the war is over.

"Where is the British Navy?" and "What is the British Army doing?" are questions these gentlemen are asking in Petrograd, Moscow, and Odessa. I will tell them what the British Navy has done. It has, with the aid of the Allied Fleets, driven the German flag from the high seas. The first great bloodless victory was won on the day when the German Navy shut itself up in the Kiel Canal, and when nearly every vessel of the German commercial fleet had to seek refuge in some neutral port. With the exception of two or three small cruisers, all the German cruisers which during the first months of the war were able to prey on our commerce have been

sunk, and England is now mistress of the high seas. Thanks to that the Allies can draw their supplies from the whole world, while Germany is suffering from an economic pressure which in the end may prove the decisive factor of the war. Thanks to that also we were able to send an army to France and to strengthen it with continual reinforcements, and to transport a large number of troops from India and the Colonies. Besides the successful actions of Heligoland and the Falkland Isles and the sinking of the *Emden*, the daring exploit of the submarine, which, after braving the eddying currents of the Dardanelles and diving under five rows of mines, sank the Turkish guardship, ought to appeal to our critics, as it served to weaken the Turkish Fleet operating in the Black Sea. If no decisive battle has yet been fought it is because the German Fleet lies sheltered behind an impenetrable line of forts. Mines and submarines have revolutionised naval warfare, and the Grand Fleet has to be content for the present with keeping what is aptly termed "a silent vigil" until the German "Dreadnoughts" sally forth and challenge our hold of Neptune's trident.

If we deserve blame for anything, it is for not foreseeing the war and not raising a larger army in time of peace. We cannot be blamed for anything done, or left undone, since the war broke out. We have strained every nerve to support the Allies with all the resources of our Empire. At the present moment we are spending £1,500,000 daily on the war; 2,000,000 men are under training or in the field, and despite the colossal loan of £350,000,000 just raised to meet our war expenses, we are doing all we can to assist our friends in matters of finance and supplies. If our critics, who happily do not voice the true sentiments of the Russian people, refuse to accept my testimony, I would refer them to an authority whose impartiality is unquestionable, and whose word would perhaps carry more weight than mine—to Germany.

Prior to the war the Germans regarded the British as a decadent race, whose Empire would crumble to pieces before the German menace. Now that they have met our soldiers face to face, at Mons, on the Marne, the Aisne, and the Yser, and have failed, despite vastly superior numbers and urgent orders by the Emperor to break through the British lines, now that they have realised what the naval power of England

means, they have singled us out as the special object of their hatred. It is to England, the arch-enemy, that the poets address their hymns of hate; it is on England that the professors pour all the vials of their wrath. They hate us because they know that the British Empire blocks the way to that world-dominion of which they have dreamed, and to win which they have violated the laws of God and man. Could they pay us a greater compliment, or have borne more eloquent testimony to the services which Great Britain is rendering to her Allies? Ever since the war began the armies of France, Belgium, and England have been fighting shoulder to shoulder, and beating off the attacks of some two million Germans. Now our armies are on the offensive. The dangers shared in common, and the heroism with which they have faced them have forged an indissoluble link of friendship between the three countries.

In the Eastern theatre of war Russia has had to bear by herself the shock of the united armies of Austria and Germany, while in the south she has had to repel the armies of the Sultan. She has nobly confronted her gigantic task. Under the brilliant leadership of the Grand Duke Nicholas, the armies of the Emperor have won the admiration of the world by their heroic exploits. They have gained great victories and occupied the greater part of Galicia. The difficulties have been immense. They have had to defend a front from the Baltic to the Black Sea. They have had to move troops and supplies over enormous distances over bad roads, and in Poland to fight in a country flanked on the right and left by hostile territory, while their mobile enemy had at its disposition a perfect network of strategic railways.

But, despite all difficulties, the Russian Army, as those knowing it knew it would, has fought splendidly. Moreover, it has shown a spirit of self-sacrifice in its efforts to relieve the pressure on the West, and in so doing has rendered invaluable services, of which her Allies are deeply sensible. By wearing out and gradually destroying the enemy's forces it is attaining one of the main objectives of this war of attrition, and by continuing the process it will ere long break down the barrier guarding the entrance to Silesia. My only regret is that, owing to the distance separating us, our troops cannot fight side by side with their Russian comrades, as

then both would get to know and understand each other. Englishmen love brave men, and the Russian soldier is among the bravest of the brave. I have seen him in our hospital bearing sufferings with patient stoicism, never complaining, always grateful for any little kindness, and expressing thanks with a delicacy of feeling that marks him as one of nature's gentlemen. Since I first presided at the annual dinner, five winters ago, Russia and Great Britain have gradually drawn nearer and nearer to each other. I have since then often dreamed of an Anglo-Russian alliance that would serve to maintain the world's peace ; but the dream has been shattered by the war which Germany has forced upon us, and it is with their children's blood that Russia and England have consecrated their alliance. But the sacrifice will not have been made in vain, and although we of this generation have to pay a heavy price, those coming after us will enjoy the blessings of peace, for Russia, England, and France are all resolved to fight to the finish, until the spirit of German militarism is for ever exorcised. I confidently look forward to the future. Just as in these dreary winter months we console ourselves with the thought of the coming spring and summer, so I take comfort at the thought that ere summer has changed to autumn the arms of the Allies will be crowned with victory and the foundation laid for a lasting peace.—*Reuter*.

THE KAISER'S NEW YEAR'S ORDER TO THE ARMY AND NAVY.

Great Headquarters, December 31.

TO THE GERMAN ARMY AND THE GERMAN NAVY.

K.D.

AFTER five long months of severe and fierce struggling we are about to enter the new year.

Brilliant victories have been gained, great successes have been won. Almost everywhere the German armies stand on enemy soil. Repeated attempts by the enemy to overrun German soil with his massed armies have been frustrated.

My ships have covered themselves with glory on every sea ; their crews have proved that they can not only fight victoriously but that they know how to die heroically when crushed by superior force.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

Behind the army and the fleet the German nation stands in unparalleled unity prepared to give up its best for the holy homely hearth that we are defending against a wicked unexpected attack. Much has happened in the old year ; but even now the enemy is not brought down ; fresh hosts hurl themselves continuously against our armies and those of our faithful Allies.

But their number do not frighten us. Though the times are serious and the task before us difficult, we can look into the future with full confidence.

Next to God's wise guidance I rely on the incomparable bravery of the army and navy and know that I have the entire German nation with me.

Let us therefore go forth towards the new year undismayed to fresh deeds and fresh victories for the beloved Fatherland.

WILHELM, I.R.

AUSTRIAN EMPEROR'S NEW YEAR GREETING TO THE AUSTRIAN NAVY AND ARMY.

Amsterdam, December 31.

A TELEGRAM from Vienna states that the Emperor Francis Joseph has issued the following proclamation to the Austro-Hungarian army and navy :

" For the last five months of this year the Dual Monarchy has been waging war with numerous and powerful enemies—a war which was forced upon us and on our faithful Allies.

" In view of the proved steadfast and warlike spirit and the heroic bravery of my army and navy, the prospect of a fresh year of war gives me confidence that Austria-Hungary's warriors, both on land and sea, will emerge with honour from any trials, however severe, that may be imposed on their prowess for the welfare of their country.

" In sorrowing gratitude I call to memory those who have sacrificed their lives on the blood-stained field of battle fighting for our just cause. In sincerest recognition of their heroic patriotism I salute all my brave subjects, and I pray that with God's help the new year may lead them to victory."—*Reuter.*

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL PROMOTIONS, APPOINTMENTS, HONOURS AND REWARDS.

L.G.,
Dec. 8,
1914.

Admiralty, December 6, 1914.

THE KING has been graciously pleased to confer the Royal Naval Reserve Officers' Decoration upon the following Officers :

Lieutenant-Commander Cyril Edwards, Senior Engineer
James McGowan, Engineer Peter George Eckford.

Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve.

L.G.,
Dec. 15,
1914.

Admiralty, December 11, 1914.

His Grace the Duke of Leeds to be Commander, in command of the Tyneside Division. Dated December 8th, 1914.

The Victoria Cross.

L.G.,
Dec. 22,
1914.

December 22, 1914.

His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to approve of the grant of the Victoria Cross to Lieutenant Norman Douglas Holbrook, Royal Navy, for the conspicuous act of bravery specified below :

For most conspicuous bravery on December 13th, when in command of the Submarine B 11, he entered the Dardanelles, and, notwithstanding the very difficult current, dived his vessel under five rows of mines and torpedoed the Turkish battleship *Messudiyeh*, which was guarding the mine-field.

Lieutenant Holbrook succeeded in bringing the B 11 safely back, although assailed by gun-fire and torpedo boats, having been submerged on one occasion for nine hours.

ibid.

Admiralty, December 22, 1914.

The King has been graciously pleased to give orders for the following appointment to the Distinguished Service Order in respect of the undermentioned Officer, who was second in command of Submarine B 11 which torpedoed the Turkish battleship *Messudiyeh* in the Dardanelles on December 13th, 1914 :

To be Companion of the Distinguished Service Order.
Lieutenant Sydney Thornhill Winn.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

Admiralty, December 28, 1914.

Captain Edwyn Sinclair Alexander-Sinclair, M.V.O., has *L.G.*,
 been appointed a Naval Aide-de-Camp to His Majesty the *Jan. 1,*
 King, in place of Captain Norman Craig Palmer, C.V.O., *1915.*
 promoted to Flag rank. Dated December 18th, 1914.

*Royal Naval Division.**Admiralty, December 28, 1914.*

Lieutenant-Colonel Cunliffe McNeile Parsons, Royal Marine *L.G.*,
 Light Infantry, to command the Third (Royal Marine) Brigade, *Jan. 6,*
 with the temporary rank of Brigadier-General, from October *1915.*
 10th to 26th, 1914, inclusive.

*Royal Naval Division.**Admiralty, December 29, 1914.*

The undermentioned to be temporary Majors, R.M. : *L.G.,*
 Major and Quartermaster W. R. Lidington (Queen's *Jan. 1,*
 Own Oxfordshire Hussars). Dated September 30th, 1914. *1915.*

Temporary Captain G. H. Spittle. Dated November
 10th, 1914.

Temporary Captain A. J. D. Chivers. Dated
 November 12th, 1914.

Temporary Captain S. R. Adams. Dated November
 20th, 1914.

Temporary Captain W. Wilberforce. Dated Decem-
 ber 1st, 1914.

To be temporary Captains, R.M. :

F. Holmes. Dated September 8th, 1914.

Temporary Honorary Second Lieutenant the
 Honourable G. Howard, M.P. Dated September 21st,
 1914.

H. M. Leaf (Captain, Reserve of Officers). Dated
 September 28th, 1914.

Temporary Lieutenant G. H. Spittle. Dated October
 12th, 1914.

Temporary Lieutenant R. G. Aston, R.M. Dated
 October 20th, 1914.

W. Mills. Dated November 4th, 1914.

Temporary Lieutenant S. R. Adams. Dated Novem-
 ber 10th, 1914.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

[D

Temporary Lieutenant G. E. Morgans. Dated November 12th, 1914.

Temporary Lieutenant J. W. Teale, R.M. Dated November 20th, 1914.

Temporary Lieutenant H. Burges-Watson (temporary Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.). Dated December 1st, 1914.

Temporary Lieutenant C. O. F. Modin (temporary Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.). Dated December 1st, 1914.

Assistant Paymaster D. S. Hitch, R.N.V.R. Dated December 9th, 1914.

Temporary Lieutenant C. W. S. Paine, R.M. Dated December 9th, 1914.

Temporary Lieutenant F. W. Tisley (late Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.). Dated December 17th, 1914.

DETENTIONS AND CAPTURES OF ENEMY SHIPS OR CARGOES.

L.G.,
Dec. II,
1914.

VESSELS DETAINED OR CAPTURED AT SEA BY HIS MAJESTY'S ARMED FORCES.

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *London Gazette* of December 1, 1914.)

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name and Tonnage.	Nationality.	Where Detained.
<i>Alfred Nobel</i> (4,769)	Norwegian	Kirkwall.
<i>Kalymnos</i> (2,932)	German	Malta.
<i>Kamerun</i> (5,861)	German	*
<i>Liberia</i> (2,518)	British	Sierra Leone.
<i>Ran</i> (3,022)	Norwegian	Liverpool.
<i>Rechid Pacha</i> (570)	Turkish	Glasgow.
<i>Sandefjord</i> (6,026)	Norwegian	Halifax (N.S.)

* Captured outside Duala.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

SHIPS WHOSE CARGOES, OR PART OF THEM, HAVE BEEN
DETAINED.

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *ibid.*
London Gazette of December 1, 1914.)

Foreign Office,
December 9, 1914.

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name of Vessel.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
<i>Ajax</i>	British	Falmouth.
<i>Amatonga</i>	British	London.
<i>Canton</i>	Swedish	Newcastle.
<i>City of Madras</i>	British	London.
<i>Cumberland</i>	British	Falmouth.
<i>Danube</i>	French	London.
<i>Flaminian</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>George Hawley</i>	United States	Falmouth.
<i>Glenlochy</i>	British	London.
<i>Llandovery Castle</i>	British	London.
<i>Mardinian</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Moeris</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Onitsha</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Peking</i>	Swedish	Falmouth.
<i>Sarpedon</i>	Netherland	London.
<i>Sorfareren</i>	Norwegian	Glasgow.
<i>Stuart Prince</i>	British	Manchester.
<i>Taurus</i>	Norwegian	Gibraltar.
<i>Troldfos</i>	Norwegian	Zanzibar.
<i>Vondel</i>	Netherland	London.

BRITISH CARGOES LANDED FROM GERMAN SHIPS
AT TSINGTAO.

Foreign Office,
December 9, 1914.

HIS Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs has received a telegram from His Majesty's Ambassador at Tokio to the following effect :

" British subjects who possess interests in cargoes which may have been landed from German ships at Tsingtao should address their claims, through His Majesty's Embassy at Tokio, to the Japanese Ministry for Foreign Affairs, sending detailed description of cargo, and documentary evidence in support of them.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

[D]

"The delivery of such cargo can only take place at Tsingtao. Permission to enter that place, subject to the consent of the military authorities, has been granted to foreigners having property there since November 20th last."

SHIPS WHOSE CARGOES, OR PART OF THEM, HAVE BEEN DETAINED.

L.G.,
Dec. 22,
1914.

(In continuation of previous notification published in the
London Gazette of December 11, 1914.)

Foreign Office,
December 21, 1914.

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name of Vessel.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
<i>Addah</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Agamemnon</i>	British	London.
<i>Alexandra</i>	Danish	Leith.
<i>Bornu</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Bulgarian</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Carnarvonshire</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Chateaubriand</i>	French	London.
<i>Chyebassa</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Corcovado</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Deli</i>	Netherland	Liverpool.
<i>Eden Hall</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Francisco</i>	British	Hull.
<i>Galavale</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Idaho</i>	British	Hull.
<i>Kinjauns Castle</i>	British	Southampton.
<i>Koningen der Nederlanden</i>	Netherland	Liverpool.
<i>Kwango</i>	Belgian	Liverpool.
<i>Oruba</i>	British	London.
<i>Pak Ling</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Parchim</i>	Russian	London.
<i>Perugia</i>	British	Gibraltar.
<i>Poland</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Quentin</i>	British	Leith.
<i>Rindjani</i>	Netherland	Liverpool.
<i>Ronan</i>	British	Leith.
<i>San Giorgio</i>	Italian	Gibraltar.
<i>Tellus</i>	Norwegian	Gibraltar.
<i>Toronto</i>	British	Hull.
<i>Tunisie</i>	French	Swansea.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

VESSELS DETAINED, OR CAPTURED AT SEA BY HIS MAJESTY'S
ARMED FORCES.

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *ibid.*
London Gazette of December 11, 1914.)

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name and Tonnage.	Nationality.	Where Detained.
<i>Exford</i> (4,542)	British	Singapore.
<i>Jungshoved</i> (3,835)	Danish	Falmouth.

VESSELS DETAINED, OR CAPTURED AT SEA BY HIS MAJESTY'S
ARMED FORCES.

(In continuation of previous notification published in the *ibid.*
London Gazette of December 22, 1914.)

Foreign Office,
January 4, 1915.

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name.	Nationality.	Where Detained.
<i>Tanga</i> (tug)	German	Zanzibar.
23 lighters*	German	Zanzibar.
45 dhows, and		
17 small dhow-boats and canoes ..)		

(* These range from 170 tons downwards. The names of the more important are *Gema*, *Inshalla*, *Kibibi*, *Kijana*, *Kipanga*, *Kipenda*, *Naja*, *Simba*, *Ulaya*, and *Zuri*.)

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

SHIPS WHOSE CARGOES, OR PART OF THEM, HAVE BEEN DETAINED.

ibid. (In continuation of previous notification published in the
London Gazette of December 22, 1914.)

LIST OF VESSELS.

Name.	Nationality.	Cargo Detained at
<i>Arkansas</i>	Danish	Newcastle-on-Tyne.
<i>Augusta</i>	Swedish	Kirkwall.
<i>Botnia</i>	Danish	Leith.
<i>Brescia</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>City of Cambridge</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Elele</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Guido</i>	British	Hull.
<i>Kentucky</i>	Danish	Leith.
<i>Kittiwake</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Kong Helge</i>	Danish	Leith.
<i>Lycaon</i>	British	London.
<i>Mirjam</i>	Norwegian	Leith.
<i>New Sweden</i>	Swedish	Newcastle-on-Tyne.
<i>Nile</i>	British	London.
<i>Oronsa</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Romsdal</i>	Norwegian	Leith.
<i>Sorland</i>	Norwegian	Leith.
<i>Veria</i>	British	Liverpool.
<i>Virginia</i>	Danish	Newcastle-on-Tyne.
<i>Zamora</i>	Swedish	Kirkwall.

ADMIRALTY MONTHLY ORDERS.

Admiralty, S.W., January 1, 1915.

I.—*Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Regulations, 1914.*

THE following Regulations made by His Majesty's Order in Council, dated the 28th day of November, 1914, are promulgated for information and guidance :—

[N.B.—The numbers in brackets at the end of paragraphs refer to the corresponding provision in the existing Regulations (M.O. 116/1914).⁽¹⁾ The passages containing alterations and new matter are denoted by thick black lines.]

⁽¹⁾ See Part I., pp. 295–305.

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

General Regulations.

1. The ordinary avocations of life and the enjoyment of property will be interfered with as little as may be permitted by the exigencies of the measures required to be taken for securing the public safety and the defence of the Realm, and ordinary civil offences will be dealt with by the civil tribunals in the ordinary course of law. [1.]

The Admiralty and Army Council, and members of the Naval and Military Forces, and other persons executing the following Regulations shall, in carrying those Regulations into effect, observe these general principles.

Powers of competent naval and military authorities, etc.

2. It shall be lawful for the competent naval or military authority and any person duly authorised by him, where for the purpose of securing the public safety or the defence of the Realm it is necessary so to do—

- (a) to take possession of any land and to construct military works, including roads, thereon, and to remove any trees, hedges, and fences therefrom ;
- (b) to take possession of any buildings or other property, including works for the supply of gas, electricity, or water, and of any sources of water supply ;
- (c) to take such steps as may be necessary for placing any buildings or structures in a state of defence ;
- (d) to cause any buildings or structures to be destroyed, or any property to be moved from one place to another, or to be destroyed ;
- (e) to take possession of any arms, ammunition, explosive substances, equipment, or warlike stores (including lines, cables, and other apparatus intended to be laid or used for telegraphic or telephonic purposes) ;
- (f) to do any other act involving interference with private rights of property which is necessary for the purpose aforesaid. [2.]

3. The competent naval or military authority and any person duly authorised by him shall have right of access to any land or buildings or other property whatsoever. [3.]

4. The competent naval or military authority may by order authorise the use of land, within such limits as may be

DOCUMENTARY HISTORY—NAVAL

specified in the order, for the training of any part of His Majesty's naval or military forces; and may by such order confer such rights of user of the land, and provide for such temporary suspension of rights of way over roads and footpaths, as are conferred and are exerciseable with respect to authorised land, roads and footpaths under the Military Manœuvres Acts, 1897 and 1911, and the competent naval or military authority shall have all the powers exerciseable by a Military Manœuvres Commission under those Acts. [3A.]

5. The competent naval or military authority may by order if he considers it necessary so to do for the purposes of any work of defence or other defended military work, or of any work for which it is deemed necessary in the interests of public safety or the defence of the Realm to afford military protection, stop up or divert any road or pathway over or adjoining the land on which such work is situate for so long as the order remains in force: [3C.]

Provided that where any such road or pathway is so stopped up or diverted the competent naval or military authority shall publish notice thereof in such manner as he may consider best adapted for informing the public, and where any road or pathway is stopped up by means of any physical obstruction he shall cause lights sufficient for the warning of passengers to be set up every night whilst the road or pathway is so stopped up.

6. The competent naval or military authority may by order require all or any vehicles, boats, vessels, aircraft, transport animals, live stock, foodstuffs, fuel, tools, and implements of whatever description, and all or any forms of equipment and warlike stores, within any area specified in the order to be removed from that area within such time as may be so specified, or in the case of warlike stores incapable of removal to be destroyed, and if any person being the owner or having control thereof fail to comply with the requisition, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations, and the competent naval or military authority may himself cause them to be removed or in the case of warlike stores to be destroyed. [4.]

7. The Admiralty or Army Council may by order require

the occupier of any factory or workshop in which arms, ammunition, or any warlike stores or equipment, or any articles required for the production thereof, are manufactured, to place at their disposal the whole or any part of the output of the factory or workshop as may be specified in the order, and to deliver to them the output or such part thereof as aforesaid in such quantities and at such times as may be specified in the order; and the occupier of the factory or workshop shall be entitled to receive in respect thereof such price as, in default of agreement, may be decided to be reasonable having regard to the circumstances of the case by the arbitration of a judge of the High Court selected by the Lord Chief Justice of England in England, by a judge of the Court of Session selected by the Lord President of the Court of Session in Scotland, or by a judge of the High Court of Ireland selected by the Lord Chief Justice of Ireland in Ireland.

If the occupier of the factory or workshop fails to comply with the order, or without the leave of the Admiralty or Army Council delivers to any other person any part of the output of the factory or workshop to which the order relates, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

8. The Admiralty or Army Council may take possession of any such factory or workshop as aforesaid, or of any plant belonging thereto without taking possession of the factory or workshop itself, and may use the same for His Majesty's naval or military service at such times and in such manner as the Admiralty or Army Council may consider necessary or expedient, and the occupier and every officer and servant of the occupier, and, where the occupier is a company, every director of the company shall obey the directions of the Admiralty or Army Council as to the user of the factory or workshop or plant, and if he fails to do so he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

9. The competent naval or military authority may by order require the whole or any part of the inhabitants of any area specified in the order to leave that area if the removal of such inhabitants from that area is necessary for naval or military reasons, and if any person to whom the order relates fails to comply with the order he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations and the competent naval or military

authority may cause such steps to be taken as may be necessary to enforce compliance therewith. [6.]

10. The competent naval or military authority may by order require all or any premises licensed for the sale of intoxicating liquor within any area specified in the order to be closed except during such hours and for such purposes as may be specified in the order, either generally or as respects the members of any of His Majesty's forces mentioned in the order, and, if the holder of the licence in respect of any such premises fails to comply with the order, he shall be guilty of an offence under these regulations, and the competent naval or military authority may cause such steps to be taken as may be necessary to enforce compliance with the order. [7.]

11. The Secretary of State or any person authorised by him may by order direct that all or any lights, or lights of any class or description, shall be extinguished or obscured in such manner and between such hours as the order directs, within any area specified in the order and during such period as may be so specified, and if the person having control of the light fails to comply with the order, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations, and the Secretary of State may cause the light to be extinguished or obscured as the case may be, and for that purpose any person authorised by the Secretary of State in that behalf or any police constable may enter the premises in which the light is displayed, and do any other act which may be necessary. [7A.]

Any such order as aforesaid may provide that vehicles or vehicles of any class or description shall, when travelling within the area specified in the order during the period between one hour after sunset and one hour before sunrise, carry such lamps as may be specified in the order, properly trimmed, lighted and attached; and any police officer may stop and seize any vehicle which does not carry lamps in compliance with the order, and the person in charge or having control of the vehicle shall be guilty of a summary offence against these regulations.

The powers conferred by this Regulation shall be in addition to, and not in derogation of, the powers conferred on the competent naval or military authority by Regulation

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12, and the competent naval or military authority may, notwithstanding anything in an order under this Regulation, on any occasion when he may consider lights necessary for any naval or military purpose, require any lights to be lighted or kept lighted.

In the application of this regulation to Scotland, references to the Secretary for Scotland shall be substituted for references to the Secretary of State.

12. The competent naval or military authority may by order direct that all or any lights, other than lights not visible from the outside of any house, shall be kept extinguished or obscured between such hours and within such area as may be specified in the order ; and if any person resident within that area fails to comply with the order he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [23.]

13. The competent naval or military authority may by order require every person within any area specified in the order to remain within doors between such hours as may be specified in the order, and in such case, if any person within that area is or remains out between such hours without a permit in writing from the competent naval or military authority or some person duly authorised by him, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [24.]

14. Where a person is suspected of acting, or of having acted, or of being about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the Realm and it appears to the competent naval or military authority that it is desirable that such person should be prohibited from residing in or entering any locality, the competent naval or military authority may by order prohibit him from residing in or entering any area or areas which may be specified in the order and upon the making of such an order the person to whom the order relates shall, if he resides in any specified area, leave that area within such time as may be specified by the order, and shall not subsequently reside in or enter any area specified in the order, and if he does so, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [24A.]

Any such order may further require the person to whom the order relates to report for approval his proposed place of residence to the competent naval or military authority and

to proceed thereto and report his arrival to the police within such time as may be specified in the order, and not subsequently to change his place of residence without leave of the competent naval or military authority, and in such case if he fails to comply with the requirements of the order he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

15. Where a competent naval or military authority makes an order for the purpose, all persons residing or owning or occupying lands, houses or other premises in such area as may be specified in the order, or such of those persons as may be so specified, shall, within such time as may be so specified, furnish a list of all goods, animals, and other commodities of any nature or description so specified, which may be in their custody or under their control within the specified area on the date on which the order is issued, stating their nature and quantity and the place in which they are severally situate, and giving any other details which may reasonably be required. [5.]

If any person fails to comply with any such order or attempts to evade this regulation by destroying, removing, or secreting any goods, animals or commodities to which an order issued under this regulation relates, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

16. The competent naval or military authority may by order require the authority or person controlling any harbour, dock, wharf, waterworks, gasworks, electric light or power station, or other structure, to prepare a scheme for destroying or rendering useless the equipment or facilities of the harbour, dock, wharf, waterworks, gasworks, station, or structure, or such part thereof as may be specified in the order, and if the authority or person fails to prepare such a scheme within such time as may be specified in the order, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

17. The restriction on the power to make byelaws under the Military Lands Acts, 1892 to 1903, imposed by the following provisions of the Military Lands Act, 1892, that is to say, the proviso to subsection (1) of section fourteen, section sixteen, and subsection (1) of section seventeen of that Act, and by the following provisions of the Military Lands Act, 1900, that is to say, the provisoes to subsection (2) of section two and subsection (3) of section two of that Act, are hereby suspended, and the powers of the Admiralty and the Secretary

of State to make byelaws under the said Acts shall extend to the making of byelaws with respect to land of which possession has been taken under these regulations. [3B.]

Provisions respecting the collection and communication of information, etc.

18. No person shall without lawful authority collect, record, publish or communicate, or attempt to elicit, any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the forces, ships, or war materials of His Majesty or any of His Majesty's allies, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct, of any naval or military operations by any such forces or ships, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defence of any place, or any other information intended to be communicated to the enemy or of such a nature as is calculated to be or might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy, and if any person contravenes the provisions of this regulation, or without lawful authority or excuse has in his possession any document containing any such information as aforesaid, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [14.]

19. No person shall without the permission of the competent naval or military authority make any photograph, sketch, plan, model, or other representation of any naval or military work, or of any dock or harbour work or, with intent to assist the enemy, of any other place or thing, and no person in the vicinity of any such work shall without lawful authority or excuse have in his possession any photographic or other apparatus or other material or thing suitable for use in making any such representation, and if any person contravenes the provisions of this regulation or without lawful authority or excuse has in his possession any representation of any such work of such a nature as is calculated to be or might be directly or indirectly useful to the enemy, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [15.]

For the purpose of this Regulation this expression "harbour work" includes lights, buoys, beacons, marks, and other

things for the purpose of facilitating navigation in or into a harbour.

20. No person without lawful authority shall injure, or tamper or interfere with, any wire or other apparatus for transmitting telegraphic or telephonic messages, or any apparatus or contrivance intended for, or capable of being used for a signalling apparatus, either visual or otherwise or prevent or obstruct or in any manner whatsoever interfere with the sending, conveyance or delivery of any communication by means of telegraph, telephone, or otherwise, or be in possession of any apparatus intended for or capable of being used for tapping messages sent by wireless telegraphy or otherwise, and if any person contravenes the provisions of this regulation he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [16.]

21. No person shall keep or have in his possession or carry or liberate or bring into the United Kingdom any carrier or homing pigeons, unless he has obtained from the chief officer of police of the district a permit for the purpose, and if any person without lawful authority contravenes the provisions of this regulation he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations, and the chief officer of police or any officer of customs and excise may, if he considers it necessary or expedient to do so, cause any pigeons kept or brought into the United Kingdom in contravention of this regulation to be liberated detained or destroyed, or, in the case of pigeons brought into the United Kingdom, to be immediately returned in the ship in which they came. [3. O. in C. 17th Sept.]

Any person found in possession of or found carrying or liberating any carrier pigeons shall, if so required by any naval or military officer or by any sailor or soldier engaged on sentry, patrol or other similar duty, or by any officer of police, produce his permit, and if he fails to do so, may be arrested.

22. No person shall, without the written permission of the Postmaster-General, buy, sell, or have in his possession or under his control any apparatus for the sending or receiving of messages by wireless telegraphy, or any apparatus intended to be used as a component part of such apparatus; and no person shall sell any such apparatus to any person who has not obtained such permission as aforesaid; and if any person

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contravenes the provisions of this regulation he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [16A.]

If the competent naval or military authority has reason to suspect that any person having in his possession any apparatus for sending or receiving messages by telegraphy, telephony, or other electrical or mechanical means is using or about to use the same for any purpose prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the Realm, he may, by order, prohibit that person from having any such apparatus in his possession, and may take such steps as are necessary for enforcing the order, and if that person subsequently has in his possession any apparatus in contravention of the order he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

For the purposes of this regulation any apparatus ordinarily used as a distinctive component part of apparatus for the sending or receiving of messages by wireless telegraphy shall be deemed to be intended to be so used unless the contrary is proved.

23. Where the competent naval or military authority or any person duly authorised by him or an aliens officer has reason to suspect that any person who is about to embark on any ship, vessel, or aircraft is attempting to leave the United Kingdom for the purpose of communicating directly or indirectly with the enemy or with any subject of any sovereign or state at war with His Majesty, he may prevent the embarkation of that person. [16B.]

Where the embarkation of any person has been so prevented the case shall be reported to a Secretary of State, and the Secretary of State may if he thinks fit by order prohibit that person at any time subsequently from leaving the United Kingdom so long as the order is in force, and if any person leaves the United Kingdom in contravention of such an order he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

24. No person shall without lawful authority transmit, otherwise than through the post, or convey to or from the United Kingdom, or receive or have in his possession for such transmission or conveyance, any letter or written message from or originating with, or to or intended for—

- (a) any person or body of persons, of whatever nationality, resident or carrying on business in any country for

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the time being at war with His Majesty, or acting on behalf or in the interests of any person or body of persons so resident or carrying on business ; or

(b) Any person or body of persons whose sovereign or state is at war with His Majesty, and who resides or carries on business in the United Kingdom ; and if any person contravenes this provision he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations : [16c.]

Provided that a person shall not be deemed to be guilty of a contravention of this regulation if he proves that he did not know, and had no reason to suspect, that the letter or message in question was such a letter or message as aforesaid.

This regulation is in addition to and not in derogation of any provisions contained in the enactments relating to the Post Office, and shall not prejudice any right to take proceedings under those enactments in respect of any transaction which is an offence against those enactments.

25. No person shall without lawful authority be in possession of any searchlight, semaphore, or other apparatus intended for signalling, whether visual or otherwise, or display, erect, or use any signal, and if any person contravenes this provision he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations ; and the competent naval or military authority may require any flagstaff or other erection capable of being used as a means of signalling to be removed, and if the owner thereof fails to comply with the requirement, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations and the competent naval or military authority may cause the flagstaff or other erection to be removed.

26. No person shall without the permission of the competent naval or military authority, or some person authorised by him, display any light or ignite or otherwise make use of any fireworks or other similar device or any fire in such a manner as could serve as a signal, guide, or landmark, and if he does so he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [22 & 22A.]

27. No person shall by word of mouth or in writing or in any newspaper, periodical, book, circular, or other printed publication, spread false reports or make false statements or

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reports or statements likely to cause disaffection to His Majesty or to interfere with the success of His Majesty's forces by land or sea or to prejudice His Majesty's relations with foreign powers, or spread reports or make statements likely to prejudice the recruiting, training, discipline, or administration of any of His Majesty's forces, and if any person contravenes this provision he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [21.]

Provisions against injury to Railways, Military Works, etc.

28. No person shall trespass on any railway, or loiter on, under or near any tunnel, bridge, viaduct or culvert, or on or in any road, path or other place, being a road, path or place to which access has been forbidden by order of the competent naval or military authority, and if he does so shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [9 & 18.]

If any person does any injury to any railway, or is upon any railway, or on, under or near any tunnel, bridge, viaduct or culvert, or loiters on or in any road or path or other place near a railway tunnel, bridge, viaduct or culvert, with intent to do injury thereto, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

29. The competent naval or military authority may by order prohibit any person from approaching within such distance as may be specified in the order of any camp, work of defence or other defended military work, or any work to which it is deemed necessary in the interest of the public safety or the defence of the Realm, to afford military protection, and if any person contravenes any such order he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

Provisions as to Arms and Explosives.

30. The competent naval or military authority may by order prohibit the manufacture or sale of firearms, ammunition, or explosive substances or any class thereof, within the area specified in the order, either absolutely or except subject to such conditions as may be specified in the order, and if any person without a permit from the competent naval or military authority manufactures, sells, or has in his possession for sale within the area so specified any arms, ammunition, or explosive substance in contravention of the order or fails to comply with

the conditions imposed by the order he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

31. No person shall bring into the United Kingdom any firearms, military arms, or ammunition or any explosive substance without a permit from the competent naval or military authority, and if he does so shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations, and any person authorised for the purpose by the competent naval or military authority, and any police constable or officer of customs and excise, may examine, search and investigate any ship or vessel for the purpose of the enforcement of this provision, and may seize any arms or ammunition or any explosive substance which are being or have been brought into the United Kingdom without such permit as aforesaid. [12A, O. in C. 17th Sept.]

32. If any person by the discharge of firearms or otherwise endangers the safety of any member of any of His Majesty's forces he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [19.]

33. No person, without the written permission of the competent naval or military authority, shall, on or in the vicinity of any railway, or in or in the vicinity of any dock harbour or in or in the vicinity of any area which may be specified in an order made by the competent naval or military authority, be in possession of any explosive substance or any highly inflammable liquid, in quantities exceeding the immediate requirements of his business or occupation, or of any firearms or ammunition (except such shotguns, and ammunition therefor, as are ordinarily used for sporting purposes in the United Kingdom), and if any person contravenes this provision he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [20.]

34. Every place used for the storage of petroleum, turpentine, methylated spirit, wood naphtha, or any other highly inflammable liquid, exceeding in the aggregate one hundred gallons shall be surrounded by a retaining wall or embankment so designed and constructed as to form an enclosure which will prevent in any circumstances the escape of any part of the petroleum or other inflammable liquid. [20A.]

This requirement shall not apply to any storage place sunk below the level of the ground so as to form a pit, nor to any

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storage place so situated that the overflow of the petroleum or liquid from the vessel or vessels in which it is contained could not in case of fire seriously endanger life or cause material damage to property.

If any person uses or permits to be used, for the storage of petroleum or other such inflammable liquid, any premises which do not comply with the requirements of this regulation he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

For the purposes of this regulation "petroleum" means petroleum as defined in section three of the Petroleum Act, 1871, having a flashpoint below 150° F. (Abel).

Nothing in this regulation shall prejudice the effect of any requirements as to the storage of petroleum or other inflammable liquid lawfully imposed by any local authority, or the taking of any proceedings in respect of the violation of such requirements.

35. No person shall, in any prescribed area, have in his possession or in premises in his occupation or under his control any celluloid or any cinematograph film exceeding the prescribed amount, unless he has obtained the prescribed permit and observes all the prescribed requirements, and if any person contravenes this provision he shall be guilty of a summary offence against these regulations. [9A.]

Any police constable or any person authorised in writing by the Chief Officer of Police of the district, may enter, if need be by force, and search any premises in which he has reasonable cause to believe that celluloid or cinematograph film is kept or stored; and, if the prescribed permit has not been obtained or if any of the prescribed requirements are not complied with, may remove and destroy any such celluloid or film.

For the purpose of this Regulation "celluloid" includes the substances known as celluloid or xylonite and other similar substances containing nitro-cellulose or other nitrated product, but does not include celluloid which has been subjected to any manufacturing process: and "cinematograph film" means any film which is intended for use in cinematograph or similar apparatus and contains nitro-cellulose or other nitrated product: and "prescribed" means prescribed by order made by a Secretary of State, or, in Scotland, by the Secretary for Scotland.

Provisions as to navigation.

36. If the master of a ship, or any other person, disobeys or neglects to observe any regulations relating to the navigation or mooring of ships in a harbour or the approaches thereto, or any signals from, or any orders, whether verbal or written, of the competent naval or military authority of the harbour, or any examining or other officer acting under his authority, relating to such navigation or mooring, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

37. Every vessel shall comply with such regulations as to the navigation of vessels as may be issued by the Admiralty or Army Council, and shall obey any orders given, whether by way of signal or otherwise, by any officer in command of any of His Majesty's ships, or by any naval or military officer engaged in the defence of the coast.

If any vessel fails to comply with any such regulations or to obey any such orders, the master or other person in command or charge of the vessel shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations, and if the vessel is at any time subsequently found at a port of, or within the territorial waters adjacent to, the United Kingdom, the competent naval or military authority may cause the vessel to be seized and detained.

This Regulation shall not apply to a vessel not being a British vessel where the non-compliance with the regulations or disobedience to the orders takes place on the high seas outside the territorial waters adjacent to the United Kingdom.

38. The Admiralty or Army Council may by order prohibit any vessel, or any vessel of any class or description specified in the order, from entering any area which they may consider it is necessary to keep clear of vessels, or vessels of that class or description, in the interests of the public safety or the defence of the Realm, and if any vessel, or any vessel of that specified class or description, enters any such area, the master or other person in command or charge of the vessel shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

This regulation shall not apply to a vessel not being a British vessel so far as the area specified in the order extends beyond the territorial waters adjacent to the United Kingdom.

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39. The Admiralty or Army Council, or any pilotage authority acting under their instructions, may make orders as to the pilotage of vessels entering, leaving or making use of any port or navigating within any part of the territorial waters adjacent to the United Kingdom, and any such order may provide for pilotage being compulsory for all or any class of such vessels within such limits as may be specified in the order, for the granting of special pilotage licences and the suspension of existing pilotage licences and certificates, and for the supply, employment, and payment of pilots.

Any enactment, order, charter, custom, byelaw, regulation or provision in force for the time being in any area to which any such order relates shall have effect subject to the provisions of the order.

If any person fails to comply with the provisions of any such order he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

Miscellaneous offences.

40. If any person with the intent of eliciting information for the purpose of communicating it to the enemy or for any purpose calculated to assist the enemy, gives or sells to a member of any of His Majesty's forces any intoxicant, or gives or sells to a member of any of His Majesty's forces any intoxicant when not on duty, with intent to make him drunk or less capable of the efficient discharge of his duties, or when on sentry or other duty, either with or without any such intent, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [17.]

For the purposes of this Regulation the expression "intoxicant" includes any intoxicating liquor, and any sedative, narcotic, or stimulant, drug or preparation.

41. If any unauthorised person wears any naval, military, police or other official uniform, or any uniform so nearly resembling any such uniform as aforesaid as to be calculated to deceive, or if any person without lawful authority supplies a naval or military uniform to any person not being a member of His Majesty's forces, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

42. If any person attempts to cause mutiny, sedition, or disaffection among any of His Majesty's forces or among the

civilian population he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

43. No person shall obstruct or otherwise interfere with or impede, or withhold any information in his possession which he may reasonably be required to furnish, from any officer or other person who is carrying out the orders of the competent naval or military authority, or who is otherwise acting in accordance with his duty under these regulations, and if he does so shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [8.]

44. If any person, verbally or in writing, in any report, return, declaration, or application, or in any document signed by him or on his behalf of which it is his duty to ascertain the accuracy, knowingly makes or connives at the making of any false statement or any omission, with intent to mislead any officer, or other person acting under the orders of any officer, in the execution of his duties, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

45. If any person forges, alters or tampers with any naval, military, or police pass, permit or other document, or uses or has in his possession any such forged, altered or irregular naval, military, or police pass, permit or document, or personates any person to whom such a pass, permit or other document has been duly issued, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [25.]

46. If any person is found in possession of a false passport or, being a subject of a Sovereign or State at war with His Majesty, passes under an assumed name, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

47. It shall be the duty of every person affected by any order issued by the competent naval or military authority or other person in pursuance of these regulations to comply with that order, and if he fails to do so he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

48. Any person who attempts to commit, or procures, aids or abets, or does any act preparatory to, the commission of, any act prohibited by these regulations, or harbours any person whom he knows, or has reasonable grounds for supposing, to have acted in contravention of these regulations, shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [26.]

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49. It shall be the duty of any person who knows that some other person is acting in contravention of any provisions of these regulations to inform the competent naval or military authority of the fact, and if he fails to do so he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [cf. 10.]

50. If any person does any act of such a nature as to be calculated to be prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the Realm and not specifically provided for in the foregoing regulations, with the intention or for the purpose of assisting the enemy, he shall be deemed to be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

Powers of Search, Arrest, etc.

51. The competent naval or military authority, or any person duly authorised by him may, if he has reason to suspect that any house, building, land, vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or other premises or any things therein are being or have been constructed, used or kept for any purpose or in any way prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the Realm, or that an offence against these regulations is being or has been committed thereon or therein, enter, if need be by force, the house, building, land, vehicle, vessel, aircraft, or premises at any time of the day or night, and examine, search, and inspect the same or any part thereof, and may seize anything found therein which he has reason to suspect is being used or intended to be used for any such purpose as aforesaid, or is being kept or used in contravention of these regulations (including, where a report or statement in contravention of Regulation 27 has appeared in any newspaper or other printed publication, any type or other plant used or capable of being used for the printing or production of the newspaper or other publication), and the competent naval or military authority may order anything so seized to be destroyed or otherwise disposed of. [12.]

52. Any officer, or any soldier or sailor engaged on sentry patrol or other similar duty, and any police officer, may stop any vehicle travelling along any public highway, and, if he has reason to suspect that the vehicle is being used for any purpose or in any way prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the Realm, may search and seize the vehicle and

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seize anything found therein which he has reason to suspect is being used or intended to be used for any such purpose as aforesaid. [12A, O. in C. 1st Sept.]

53. It shall be the duty of any person, if so required by an officer, or by a soldier or sailor engaged on sentry patrol or other similar duty, or by a police constable, to stop and answer to the best of his ability and knowledge any questions which may be reasonably addressed to him, and if he refuses or fails to do so he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

The competent naval or military authority may by order require any person or persons of any class or description to furnish him, either verbally or in writing, with such information as may be specified in the order, and the order may require any person to attend at such time and such place as may be specified in the order for the purpose of furnishing such information, and if any person fails to comply with the order he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

54. Any person landing or embarking at any place in the United Kingdom shall, on being required to do so by the competent naval or military authority or any person authorised by him, or by an aliens officer or officer of police, make a declaration as to whether or not he is carrying or conveying any letters or other written messages intended to be transmitted by post or otherwise delivered, and, if so required, shall produce to the person making the requisition any such letters or messages; and the competent naval or military authority or person authorised by him or aliens or police officer may search any such person and any baggage with a view to ascertaining whether such person or the person to whom the baggage belongs is carrying or conveying any such letters or messages.

The competent naval or military authority or persons authorised by him or aliens or police officer may examine any letters or other messages so produced to him or found on such search, and unless satisfied that they are of an innocent nature, may transmit them to an officer appointed to censor postal correspondence. [13A.]

Any person who knowingly makes any false declaration under this regulation, or on being required to produce any

such letters or messages as aforesaid refuses or neglects to do so, shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

55. Any person authorised for the purpose by the competent naval or military authority, or any police constable or officer of customs and excise or aliens officer, may arrest without warrant any person whose behaviour is of such a nature as to give reasonable grounds for suspecting that he has acted or is acting or is about to act in a manner prejudicial to the public safety or the defence of the Realm, or upon whom may be found any article, book, letter, or other document, the possession of which gives grounds for such a suspicion, or who is suspected of having committed an offence against these regulations. [13.]

If any person assists or connives at the escape of any person who may be in custody under this regulation, or knowingly harbours or assists any person who has so escaped, he shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations.

Trial and Punishment of Offences.

56. A person alleged to be guilty of an offence against these regulations may be tried either by a court-martial or before a court of summary jurisdiction :

Provided that in the case of any offence against these regulations declared to be a summary offence the alleged offender shall not be liable to be tried otherwise than before a court of summary jurisdiction.

Where a person is alleged to be guilty of an offence against these regulations (other than offence declared by these regulations to be a summary offence) the case shall be referred to the competent naval or military authority who shall investigate the case and determine whether it shall be tried by court-martial or summarily or shall not be proceeded with, and if the alleged offender is in custody he shall if he is to be tried by court-martial be kept in or handed over to military custody, and if he is to be tried summarily be handed over to or kept in civil custody.

57. A person found guilty of an offence against these regulations by a court-martial shall be liable to be sentenced to penal servitude for life or any less punishment, or if the

court finds that the offence was committed with the intention of assisting the enemy to suffer death or any less punishment, and the court may in addition to any other sentence imposed order that any goods in respect of which the offence has been committed be forfeited : [27.]

Provided that a sentence of detention in detention barracks shall not be awarded for an offence under these regulations and that no sentence exceeding six months' imprisonment with hard labour shall be imposed in respect of any contravention of Regulations 12, 13, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28 (first paragraph), 35, 53, 60, and 61 if the offender proves that he acted without any intention of assisting the enemy, or, in the case of Regulation 27, of causing disaffection or alarm or prejudicing the recruiting, training, discipline, and administration of any force.

A court-martial having jurisdiction to try offences under these Regulations shall be a general or district court-martial convened by an officer authorised to convene such description of court-martial within the limits of whose command the offender may for the time being be ; but nothing in this regulation shall be construed as authorising a district court-martial to impose a sentence of penal servitude.

Any person tried by court-martial under these regulations shall, for the purposes of the provisions of the Army Act relating to offences, be treated as if he belonged to the unit in whose charge he may be ; but no such person shall be liable to summary punishment by a commanding officer.

58. A person convicted of an offence against these regulations by a court of summary jurisdiction shall be liable to be sentenced to imprisonment with or without hard labour for a term not exceeding six months or to a fine not exceeding one hundred pounds, or to both such imprisonment and fine, and the court may, in addition to any other sentence which may be imposed, order that any goods in respect of which the offence has been committed shall be forfeited.

For the purpose of the trial of a person for such an offence the offence shall be deemed to have been committed either at the place in which the same actually was committed, or at any place in which the offender may be, and the court in Scotland shall be the sheriff court.

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Section seventeen of the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1879, shall not apply to the charge of offences against these regulations.

Any person aggrieved by a conviction of a court of summary jurisdiction under these regulations may appeal in England to a court of quarter sessions, and in Scotland under and in terms of the Summary Jurisdiction (Scotland) Acts, and in Ireland in manner provided by the Summary Jurisdiction (Ireland) Acts.

Supplemental.

59. The powers conferred by these regulations are in addition to and not in derogation of any powers exercisable by members of His Majesty's naval and military forces and other persons to take such steps as may be necessary for securing the public safety and the defence of the Realm, and nothing in these regulations shall affect the liability of any person to trial and punishment for any offence or war crime otherwise than in accordance with these regulations. [28.]

60. The competent naval or military authority, or any other person by whom an order is made in pursuance of these Regulations, shall publish notice of the order in such manner as he may consider best adapted for informing persons affected by the order, and no person shall without lawful authority deface or otherwise tamper with any notice posted up in pursuance of these regulations, and if he does so shall be guilty of an offence against these regulations. [11.]

61. Any person claiming to act under any permit or permission granted under or for the purposes of these Regulations shall, if at any time he is required to do so by the competent naval or military authority or any person authorised by him, or by any naval or military officer, or by any sailor or soldier engaged on sentry patrol or other similar duty, or by any officer of customs and excise, officer of police or aliens' officer, produce the permit or permission for inspection, and if he refuses to do so he shall be guilty of an offence against these Regulations.

Any permit or permission granted under or for the purposes of any provision of these regulations may at any time be revoked.

62. The Admiralty or Army Council may appoint any

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commissioned officer of His Majesty's Naval or Military Forces, not below the rank of lieutenant-commander in the Navy or field officer in the Army, to be a competent naval or military authority and may authorise any competent naval or military authority thus appointed to delegate, either unconditionally or subject to such conditions as he thinks fit, all or any of his powers under these regulations to any officer qualified to be appointed a competent naval or military authority, and an officer so appointed, or to whom the powers of the competent naval or military authority are so delegated, is in these regulations referred to as a competent naval or military authority. [29.]

For the purposes of these regulations the expression "aliens officer" shall have the same meaning as in the Aliens Restriction (Consolidation) Order, 1914.

63. These regulations may be cited as the Defence of the Realm (Consolidation) Regulations, 1914. [30 and 31.]

The Interpretation Act, 1889, applies for the purpose of the interpretation of these regulations in like manner as it applies for the purpose of the interpretation of an Act of Parliament.

The said Orders in Council of the 12th of August, the 1st and 17th of September, and the 14th of October 1914 are hereby revoked.

Provided that the revocation of any such Order shall not—

- (a) affect the previous operation of any Order so revoked or anything duly done or suffered under any Order so revoked ; or
- (b) affect any right, privilege, obligation, or liability acquired, accrued, or incurred under any Order so revoked ; or
- (c) affect any penalty, forfeiture, or punishment incurred in respect of any offence committed against any Order so revoked ; or
- (d) affect any proceedings or remedy in respect of any such right, privilege, obligation, liability, penalty, forfeiture, or punishment as aforesaid ;

and any permission or direction given, or order, requirement, or appointment made, authority issued or other action taken under any Order so revoked shall be deemed to have been

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given, made, issued, or taken under the corresponding provision of this Order.

In accordance with the provisions of the final paragraph of the above Regulations, the competent naval authorities already appointed shall continue to act in that capacity.

Further detailed instructions for the guidance of the appointed competent authorities will shortly be issued.

(M.O. 116/1914 is cancelled.)

2.—*Defence of the Realm Act, 1914—Competent Naval Authorities.*

The Naval Members of the Board of Admiralty have been constituted competent naval authorities under the provisions of the Defence of the Realm Regulations, 1914.

10.—*Engineer Officers (Old System)—Status and Pay.*

1. It has been decided that from the 1st January 1915, Engineer Officers of the old system of entry shall be classified as part of the Military Branch.

2. They will wear uniform exactly similar to that of Officers of corresponding ranks of the existing Military Branch.

The distinctive colour between the lace on the sleeve will be retained.

They will retain their present titles.

There will be no change in their status as regards the command of His Majesty's Ships.

In all details relating to the duties of the Fleet and to the discipline and interior economy of His Majesty's Ships they will be subject to the authority of any Officer who may be in charge of the Executive duties of the Ship, or acting as Officer of the Watch, or specially detailed for the charge of any other special service or duty, of whatever seniority such Officer may be. Otherwise the authority of the Engineer Officer in the work of his department will continue to be regulated as at present.

Promotion will continue on the same lines as at present.

3. From the 1st January 1915, the alterations as shown

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below will be made in the pay of Engineer Lieutenant-Commanders and Engineer Commanders :—

	Present.	Future.
	s. d.	s. d.
Engineer Lieutenant-Commander — on promotion.. .. .	16 0 a day.	16 0 a day.
Engineer Lieutenant-Commander after 2 years from date of promotion to Engineer Lieutenant Commander ..	17 0 „	17 0 „
Engineer Lieutenant-Commander and Engineer-Commander after 4 years from date of promotion to Engineer Lieutenant Commander	18 0 „	20 0 „
Engineer Lieutenant-Commander and Engineer-Commander after 6 years from date of promotion to Engineer Lieutenant-Commander	20 0 „	22 0 „
Engineer Lieutenant-Commander and Engineer-Commander after 8 years from date of promotion to Engineer Lieutenant-Commander	24 0 „	24 0 „

12.—*Armed Merchant Cruisers—Appointment of Lieutenants (G) and (N).*

It has been decided to allow Lieutenants (G) and (N) in the complements of Armed Merchant Cruisers, in lieu of two R.N.R. Officers now allowed, *i.e.*, without increase of total complement.

In the event of Officers R.N. being appointed they will be entitled to the usual Naval allowances.

In other cases the Captain may select and appoint Officers for these duties from among the R.N.R. Officers borne. The names of those so selected are to be reported to the Admiralty and a notation of the fact is to be made on the Ledger.

The Gunnery Officer will be entitled to an allowance of 1s. a day, and the Navigating Officer may be paid Navigating allowance under Articles 101, 102 and 104 of the R.N.R. Regulations (Officers). The rate of Navigating Allowance payable to an Officer of the R.N.R. should be ascertained from the Accountant-General.

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13.—*Acting Sub-Lieutenants—Promotion to Sub-Lieutenant.*

During hostilities Acting Sub-Lieutenants are to be promoted to Sub-Lieutenant on their proper dates notwithstanding the fact that they have not completed their examinations for the rank of Lieutenant. On the termination of war, courses will be arranged for all those who have not completed their examinations, these courses being of a special nature to meet the requirements of the case, and examinations will be held on the result of which Sub-Lieutenants may gain accelerated promotion to the rank of Lieutenant.

If an Officer is promoted specially for war service to the rank of Lieutenant, the time so gained shall be in addition to the accelerated promotion gained by examinations, but in no case shall the total acceleration enable an Officer to be less than six months on the Sub-Lieutenants' list.

In the case of Officers who subsequently fail in their examinations for the rank of Lieutenant, promotion to Lieutenant will be delayed by the time lost and such time will not count as service for retired pay.

14.—*Acting Mate—Promotion to.*

In view of the suspension of the usual system of qualification for the rank of Acting Mate, owing to the war, the following arrangements for the promotion of junior Warrant Officers and selected Petty Officers to that rank have been approved as a temporary measure.

The names of any junior Warrant Officers and Petty Officers who are recommended by their Commanding Officers for promotion to Acting Mate are to be considered by a Committee of Officers in each Squadron as laid down in Appendix X., Part IIA. (1) of the King's Regulations, and the names of those who are considered to be in all respects suitable for commissioned rank are to be forwarded at once to the Admiralty through the usual channels. From these candidates a selection will be made for immediate promotion to Acting Mate.

In addition to those so selected, the names of any Warrant Officers and men who come prominently to the front in actual war operations should be brought to the notice of Their Lordships, provided their conduct in action has shown them to be eminently fitted for commissioned rank.

The next selection, after that to be made shortly as above, will take place in May 1915, and the names of candidates for consideration on that occasion should be forwarded so as to reach the Admiralty by the middle of that month. Any recommendations for distinguished war service should, however, be made at the time of such service being performed.

All candidates promoted to Acting Mate under the above conditions will be required to undergo courses after the termination of the war.

19.—*Acting Artificer Engineer and Acting Warrant Mechanician—Promotion to.*

Examinations for advancement to Acting Artificer Engineer and Acting Warrant Mechanician having been suspended for the present, Commanding Officers of H.M. Ships are to report through the usual channels the names of any Chief Engine-room Artificers, Engine-room Artificers and Mechanicians recommended for promotion. Each recommendation is to be endorsed by the Senior Officer of the Fleet or Squadron, and accompanied by a copy of the candidate's Service Certificate. Candidates must comply with the conditions laid down in Articles 307 and 308 of the King's Regulations and Admiralty Instructions except as regards examination. Only men of more than average ability are to be recommended, and they must have given evidence to the Commanding Officer and Engineer Officer of the ship, by the actual performance of their duties, that they may be expected to carry out satisfactorily the duties of the positions for which they are recommended.

Acting promotions will be made as necessary from the list of candidates recommended in the foregoing manner.

After the conclusion of hostilities an examination will be held at which all men who have been recommended will be required to attend, whether they have been given Acting Warrant rank or not, provided they are still considered fit in all respects for Warrant rank. Successful candidates not already promoted to Acting Warrant rank will be placed on a roster in order of merit and promoted according to requirements. Successful candidates actually holding Acting Warrant rank who have seniority of one year or more in the Acting rank will be confirmed in such rank. Successful candidates who

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have less than one year's seniority in the Acting rank will be confirmed on attaining one year's seniority, subject to being recommended in the usual way for confirmation. Candidates unsuccessful at the examination will be removed from the roster, and, if already promoted to Acting Warrant rank, will revert to the ratings held by them before such advancement.

25.—*Provisional Seamen and Stokers, R.N.R.—Confirmation.*

Provisional R.N.R. Seamen and Stokers who were undergoing training when the Royal Proclamation was issued and those entered since the commencement of the War, are to be confirmed in their respective ratings after three months' satisfactory service, and particulars of such confirmation in rating noted on pages 43 and 44 of Certificates R.V. 2.

26.—*Ordinary Seamen, R.N.V.R.—Advancement.*

Ordinary Seamen, R.N.V.R., serving in H.M. Ships who are recommended for advancement may, for the time being, be advanced to the rating of A.B., R.N.V.R., without further qualification than a recommendation for such advancement.

43.—*Life Insurance—Additional Premiums during the War.*

The position of members of the Naval and Military Forces of the Crown holding policies of assurance on their lives has been under consideration.

Some of these policies were issued free of all restrictions as to occupation or residence. The conditions of issue of other policies, however, expressly excluded exposure to particular risks, *e.g.*, participation in active Naval or Military operations, without the previous consent of the Life Office and the payment of such additional premium as might be determined. Failure to pay this additional premium rendered the insured person liable to the voidance of his policy.

In the special circumstances of the present War, the Companies have been approached on the subject of the possible modification of these conditions. It was found that

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there was a general feeling among Life Offices that the circumstances were such as to justify concessions, and the results of the deliberations which have taken place are embodied in the following memorandum :—

I.—POLICIES OF ASSURANCE EFFECTED PRIOR TO THE OUTBREAK OF WAR.

A. ATTITUDE OF LIFE OFFICE ORGANISATIONS.

(a) The Life Offices Association and the Associated Scottish Life Offices have made the following recommendations to Life Assurance Companies in regard to policies of assurance on the lives of members of the Naval and Military Forces.

- (i) *Royal Naval Reserve, Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve, Royal Naval Auxiliary Sick Berth Reserve, and new levies raised for this War only.*

As regards members of these Forces no additional premiums should be asked for.

- (ii) *Royal Navy, Royal Marines, and Royal Fleet Reserve.*

Members of these forces already insured at an all-risk rate of premium should of course be required to pay nothing in addition. Those not insured at an all-risk rate of premium should be required to pay an additional premium. This is in most cases 5*l.* 5*s.* per cent. per annum.

(b) The Association of Industrial Assurance Companies and Collecting Friendly Societies have decided that for the present no extra premium shall be charged upon policies issued up to and including the 4th August 1914 on the lives of any persons engaged in any capacity with His Majesty's Forces during the present war.

B. ACTION OF INDIVIDUAL LIFE ASSURANCE COMPANIES.

While it is recognised that the recommendations made by the Life Offices Association and the Associated Scottish Life Offices are not binding upon any particular Life Office, it is known that a very large number of the latter have decided to act in accordance with these recommendations, and it is confidently hoped that no Company will adopt a course less generous than that advocated.

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C. MODE OF PAYMENT OF ADDITIONAL PREMIUMS.

Consideration has been given by the Associations referred to at (a) above, to the question whether some scheme or schemes could be devised for the payment of the additional premiums demanded in certain cases by some less onerous method than the immediate payment of the full amount. It has not been possible to suggest any scheme of general applicability, and the Associations are of opinion that in view of the varying circumstances of the different Life Offices, the latter should be left to deal with their policies according to the circumstances of each particular case. It is anticipated that all possible consideration will be given by Life Offices generally to cases of difficulty and hardship.

II.—POLICIES OF ASSURANCE EFFECTED AFTER THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR.

The Life Office organisations referred to in I. A. above have recommended that persons effecting assurances on their lives after the outbreak of war should be required to pay additional premiums if they engage in active operations.

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
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
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
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